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Corruption has become a major issue, particular-
ly in the countries of transition. It has become an
accompanying phenomenon of the transition
from state-socialism to market capitalism and
democracy in Southeast Europe (SEE). The com-
mon problems that post-communist societies
face contribute to this fact signiﬁcantly, but there
are also a number of characteristics speciﬁc to the
countries in SEE:
Public sector operations are non-transparent,
performance is poor and distrust of the citi-
zens towards public ofﬁcials is high.
The collapse of the Communist regimes left
behind an over-extended public sector and
high expectations in the population that it will
receive assistance in all walks of life (a “pre-
mature welfare state”, as it was called)
The combination of weakness, lack of trans-
parency and overburdening in the SEE public
sectors constituted fertile ground for both
petty and large-scale corrupt practices.
These features, which originate in the recent past,
however, cannot alone explain the extraordinary
scale of corrupt transactions in the new Balkan
democracies. The process of transition of state-
owned economy into private ownership through
privatization, in addition to the restitution of prop-
erty, created huge opportunities for the misuse of
public power at the expense of the public.
Another often ignored sphere of systemic corrup-
tion is the de-facto privatization of cross-bor-
der transactions through bribing state ofﬁcials
at the customs, border police and other regulato-
ry and law-enforcement bodies. Given the open
nature of the Balkan economies, cross-border
transactions constitute up to 2/3 of the GDP for
any single country, hence they generate even
more dirty money, then privatization itself. 
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Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System. Scores close to 1 correspond to low spread of corruption, those close to 10 to high-
est degree of proliferation.(For further details see http://www.seldi.net/indexes.htm)
I. INTRODUCTION
Table 1: Main problems in the countries of SEE
Albania Bosnia and Bulgaria Macedonia Romania Croatia Serbia Montenegro
Herzegovina
2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002
Unemployment 44.4 44.8 60.9 60.9 67.8 68.9 75.3 58.2 39.5 33.9 66.0 78.5 30.3 38.0 53.1 51.1
Low incomes 39.3 40.8 39.6 39.3 49.0 47.0 62.0 26.7 41.3 49.4 39.1 44.2 39.2 33.6 35.6 37.2
Poverty 24.4 28.2 29.8 31.9 41.5 42.7 1.1 43.9 50.6 57.4 31.6 28.7 39.7 44.4 34.8 43.4
Corruption 60.8 68.4 47.6 48.3 37.5 35.1 35.1 31.2 59.9 59.9 41.7 41.1 37.2 37.3 30.8 35.9
Crime 36.0 24.6 32.9 32.8 25.7 32.9 27.6 23.9 10.2 12.5 33.5 30.4 44.1 41.4 31.5 30.1
High prices 24.0 23.3 10.9 13.9 22.4 20.9 25.4 7.8 35.6 35.6 27.3 18.4 24.7 24.0 21.2 17.7
Health Care 3.7 2.3 9.9 9.5 14.0 17.2 7.2 1.7 17.4 15.4 7.1 8.9 8.7 9.8 4.0 2.0
Political 
instability 49.6 46.0 37.0 33.9 17.0 13.1 33.2 55.9 29.9 11.6 20.1 28.7 47.8 35.3 59.3 57.7
Education 3.9 3.2 4.6 4.8 2.1 1.8 3.7 0.8 7.9 8.8 4.4 4.1 6.3 7.8 4.5 3.9
Environment 
pollution 5.2 3.6 3.8 3.1 2.7 1.5 6.0 1.0 1.6 3.2 2.8 3.5 2.5 5.6 4.8 2.7
Ethnic problems 3.0 2.4 15.6 17.1 1.7 1.4 14.9 40.7 2.4 1.6 7.0 3.6 10.2 8.2 8.6 5.2
Other 0.9 4.4 1.8 1.3 1.9 4.5 0.5 0.9 1.1 1.5 2.1 3.1 0.6 1.8 1.5 3.0
DK/NA 0.2 0.8 0.3 0.7 1.6 0.5 3.0 1.2 0.2 2.7 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.9 1.8 0.3
In most of the SEE countries, state institutions
were subordinated to private interests in the ﬁrst
stage of the transition in the early 1990s. The sym-
biosis between the state and “high-risk” busi-
nesses under unclear rules of the game and a
paralysis of the judiciary bred systemic corrup-
tion within society.
In addition, other types of misuse occured: clien-
telism, nepotism, and a secondary symbiosis of
the state and businesses. In this case, state inter-
ference in business affairs is much greater than
the opposite trend – ”buying of politicians” by
strong private-economic power-groups. In this
case, some throwbacks to the past occur, which
make possible state/party interference in the
economy despite the privatization of state-owned
property. In situations like these, the opposition
blames the ruling party for imposing neo-author-
itarian forms of government that favor private
interests close to those in power.
Understandably, it is grand - political and sys-
temic - rather than administrative or petty corrup-
tion, which is the main target of anti-corruption
efforts by civil society; and public reforms, rather
then purely preventive measures are needed
most urgently to remedy the existing situation.
Independent monitoring and assessing of the
gray zones of socially high corruption risk,
designing and recommending anti-corruption
instruments and reforms, and the lobbying for
their adoption by national assemblies and execu-
tive branches, are the main areas of civil society
mission in countering corruption. 
This report is yet another illustration of what
NGOs from SEE can do best, namely painting an
objective and as detached picture as possible of
the impact of corruption upon social, economic
and political developments in every single Balkan
country, and in the region as a whole.  
*    *    *
Despite the fact that SEE countries have achieved
different levels of economic development, politi-
cal stability and democracy, and have different
afﬁliations with international institutions, the pre-
vailing international opinion still attributes a high
corruption risk to the region as a whole.
Nevertheless, most attempts so far to look into
corruption in SEE have been based on an evalua-
tion of the political, legislative and economic con-
ditions of individual countries.
The Southeast European Legal Development
Initiative undertook to develop this report in order
to look into the truly regional factors contributing
to corruption in SEE. Several factors warrant this
approach. 
The ﬁrst one relates to the scale of the problem of
corruption in these countries. Societies in SEE are
faced with a corruption culture that permeates all
structures of the body politic and which became a
systemic feature of their political structures. The
spread of corruption throughout the whole spec-
trum of possible forms – from the usual bakshish
to the trafﬁc police to the entry of organized crime
into the mainstream economies through corrupt
privatization practices - presents a challenge that
goes beyond the effectiveness of traditional anti-
corruption tools. The systemic nature of corrup-
tion in SEE has become the major factor imped-
ing their development efforts. It has distorted the
restructuring of their economies, the moderniza-
tion of their education systems and public health
care, and has affected many social programs (e.g.
public housing). All this has had a negative
impact on the public’s trust in the emerging dem-
ocratic and market economy institutions and has
bred disillusionment with reforms in general.
The second relevant aspect relates to the factors
facilitating the corruption on such a scale. The
institutionalization of corruption in the SEE coun-
tries cannot be explained by the national circum-
stances alone. Although corruption is mostly
manifested and experienced at the national level,
a number of region-wide factors need to be taken
into account if we are to comprehend the nature
of the problem. In general, regional instability in
the past ten years has undermined effective law
enforcement throughout the region, has raised
considerably the cost of regional trade, and thus
the stakes of smuggling, which consequently has
become a breeding ground for organized crime
on a regional scale. The driving of the SEE
economies into the gray, and even criminal zone,
has been the main dynamic behind the high lev-
els of corruption. 
The speciﬁc set of circumstances and the tragic
and unfortunate sequence of events, which
unfolded in the region in the last decade, con-
tributed substantially to the spreading of corrup-
tion in the Balkan countries. The war in the former
Yugoslavia and the sanctions and embargo
regimes, imposed on the warring republics, led to
proliferation of organized crime, and especially of
smuggling, trafﬁcking and illegal trade in the
peninsula. This gave an enormous boost to
spreading of corruption. Smugglers and other
involved in the trans-border organized crime net-
works did not operate past the state institutions,
but (especially in the case of illegal trade with
arms and oil) through them. It is thus hardly sur-
6
prising that customs ofﬁcers in all Southeast
European countries top the charts, measuring
corruption among the state ofﬁcials (see Table 2). 
As the ﬁrst part of this paper intends to show, the
specificity of corruption in Southeast
Europe, as contrasted with other transition
or post-communist countries, lies in the
cross-border illegal trade, centered on the
war-ridden Western Balkans, but affecting
all the countries on the peninsula.
As the largest redistributing mechanism of
national wealth, the national borders in the
region represent the single largest source of cor-
ruption, and the impact of the illegal trans-border
trade on overall corruption in Southeast Europe
cannot and should not be underestimated.
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Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System for SEE
Table 2: Public opinion of the level of corruption in the various professions
Albania Bosnia and Bulgaria Macedonia Romania Croatia Serbia Montenegro
Herzegovina
2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002 2001 2002
Customs ofﬁcers 86.6 89.8 58.8 62.2 75.2 74.15 72.2 83.1 63.4 54.9 51.3 51.5 80.9 77.8 61.9 63.42
Lawyers 70.6 58.9 41.0 46.5 52.9 55.53 42.2 44.7 55.2 49.5 45.3 44.6 55.7 60.6 36.9 33.43
Public prosecutors 70.9 64.3 37.8 41.2 51.3 55.35 39.4 50.2 49.3 41.3 29.6 36.6 56.8 48.9 32.5 37.76
Judges 80.1 74.4 42.6 43.7 50.1 55.00 49.2 52.9 55.7 50.1 38.4 47.3 63.7 55.4 37.7 42.02
Tax ofﬁcials 79.0 80.1 54.4 59.7 53.7 51.26 52.3 75.0 49.0 32.5 40.6 48.0 63.5 54.6 44.7 47.19
Investigating 
ofﬁcers 52.7 51.4 44.5 48.2 43.8 48.04 29.8 44.9 45.3 35.1 28.0 41.9 57.0 48.7 33.0 38.27
Members of 
parliament 61.8 60.4 47.5 46.6 51.7 47.78 60.8 77.0 65.9 54.5 33.1 41.4 45.9 43.9 31.0 39.33
Ofﬁcials at 
ministries 66.2 66.2 52.5 54.3 49.7 47.08 47.5 52.5 54.5 44.2 47.0 46.7 56.1 42.8 42.5 48.52
Police ofﬁcers 56.4 65.6 46.5 59.2 54.3 47.00 46.3 53.9 64.4 55.3 47.3 47.5 73.2 66.7 50.7 50.97
Ministers 67.8 76.5 54.2 54.4 55.0 45.34 61.0 77.5 58.0 45.1 37.3 40.5 55.3 46.1 41.9 52.26
Adm. ofﬁcials in 
the judicial system 63.0 60.6 41.6 42.4 40.2 41.17 31.0 36.1 51.6 40.6 32.8 40.4 50.3 42.7 33.3 35.80
Municipal ofﬁcials 69.1 64.4 51.4 56.4 41.6 39.34 36.8 39.1 47.9 45.6 48.1 48.0 60.1 50.3 47.0 45.18
Municipal 
councilors 55.2 55.5 46.2 46.2 32.1 31.77 33.4 36.3 43.1 40.2 27.7 40.7 45.0 41.8 31.1 33.19
University ofﬁcials 
or professors 46.0 32.1 35.7 37.6 28.1 27.68 42.9 42.7 24.7 21.8 40.4 31.3 39.1 41.5 25.7 32.31
Journalists 18.8 14.8 24.3 24.8 13.9 12.27 17.1 17.0 22.1 15.4 22.8 20.3 34.0 30.7 36.3 46.80
Teachers 11.6 10.4 20.9 22.1 10.9 9.75 18.7 22.7 20.4 17.5 19.3 16.2 28.5 33.4 18.0 20.59
This report does not attempt to present a com-
prehensive program for action in SEE but rather
to sensitize politicians and civil society to the spe-
ciﬁc set of sources of corruption in the region. So
far these sources have been treated as the
domain of law-enforcement agencies. However,
both the scale of the problem and the fact that it
has signiﬁcant impact on development efforts,
and on economic development and social
reforms in particular, warrant that response is
sought under a broader partnership between
politicians, law enforcement, civil society, busi-
ness (both local and international) and the inter-
national community.
In this context, this report is a result of the efforts
of the Southeast European Legal Development
Initiative to establish a platform of cooperation
between public and private institutions in SEE
with the support of the international community.
In the course of its development, SELDI managed
to establish a regional network of organizations
trained to evaluate the institutional aspects of
corruption and serve as a watchdog of the reform
process. 
Several lessons learned in this context need to be
highlighted. The gravity of the problem calls for
bold and radical measures if corruption is to be
stemmed. These measures should upset the
already entrenched interests, which fuel the insti-
tutionalization of corruption. For this to happen,
broad public coalitions need to be formed both
within countries, and region-wide. Traditional
bureaucracies - be they national or international -
cannot muster the type of public support needed
if these reforms are to be successful. 
However, support coming from a cross-section of
society, involving major public and private actors,
could only be enlisted in this process if society
has a clear view of the severity of the problem.
This warrants the introduction of a new type of
corruption assessment, which goes beyond tradi-
tional law-enforcement methods. This new type of
assessment could only be successful if it is based
on cooperation between the public institu-
tions, involved in designing and implement-
ing anti-corruption policies, and civil socie-
ty institutions which are expected to gener-
ate civic support for these policies. For this
to happen, the assessment on which these poli-
cies are based, needs to be carried out in a pub-
lic-private partnership. 
The interaction between the role of governments
and civil society in  assessing corruption could be
illustrated in the following way by superimposing
the public sector (left circle) and NGO sector
(right circle):
– Area 1: assessment related to measures for
streamlining corruption prevention in law
enforcement (customs, police, etc), prosecu-
tion; this area is strictly (inter)governmental,
assessment is conﬁdential;
– Area 2: (the area of public-private coopera-
tion): assessment of the institutional and leg-
islative adequacy and efﬁciency (including
performance of public administration and judi-
ciary), international assistance evaluation,
general evaluation of political and institutional
reforms, etc. 
– Area 3: monitoring by and of the media, mon-
itoring of corruption inside civil society, moni-
toring of public attitudes (trust in institutions).
*    *    *
The above considerations determined a two-tier
structure of this report. The ﬁrst part analyzes the
origins of cross-border corruption in the region,
which is seen as a result of the rise of transna-
tional crime, inﬂuenced by the violent break-up of
former Yugoslavia. It intends to show that region-
al factors signiﬁcantly contribute to national-level
corruption and could undermine national anti-
corruption efforts. 
In the second part, the report evaluates the
national circumstances in which the regional fac-
tors develop. It compares the national legislation
and institutional practice in a number of areas
critical to anti-corruption efforts: regulatory and
legal framework, institutional prerequisites, cor-
ruption in the economy, the role of civil society
and media, as well as the international coopera-
tion. The coverage of the national institutional
and legal aspects making regional corruption
possible is not intended as a comprehensive
inventory of regulations and practices in all coun-
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tries, but rather emphasizes some of the issues
relevant to potential efforts for stemming region-
al sources of corruption in SEE. 
The second part is ultimately a collection of con-
tributions from watchdog organizations in the
countries in Southeast Europe. In fact, the nature
of regional concerns about corruption is evident
in the limitations of this report – namely that the
level of institutional development, policy imple-
mentation practice and international afﬁliations
of the countries in SEE are varying to such a
degree that only a “bird’s eye view” could reveal
the source of common problem. Thus, aware of
these limitations the editors have adopted the
two step approach to compiling the report – ana-
lyzing the most signiﬁcant roots of corruption in
the region and supplementing that with an
overview of the national contexts against the
background of which these processes take place.
This is very much in line with the USAID approach
that there is a strong conceptual distinction
between law- enforcement approaches to corrup-
tion, which try to strengthen crime-fighting
efforts, and a more holistic approach that
addresses poor governance systems more broad-
ly.
The countries covered by this report include
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria,
Croatia, Macedonia, Romania and Serbia. The
SELDI Corruption Monitoring System, the results
of which are presented here, also covers
Montenegro.
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The problems, related to corruption, which have
been troubling the Southeast European countries
during their transition to democracy and market
economy, are not unique and speciﬁc only to this
region. The long list of problems, described and
analyzed in detail in the second section of this
work, could be compiled for virtually any transi-
tional country, regardless of its geographic loca-
tion. The situation regarding corruption in state
administration, judiciary or in the economy in
Southeast Europe is in principle not that different
from the situation in Central Europe or in Latin
America. The main difference is in the scale of this
phenomenon and in the circumstances which fos-
tered its exceptional permeability in the Balkan
societies. This, however, might be to an enor-
mous extent a consequence of a very speciﬁc set
of circumstances the Southeast European coun-
tries (unlike the ones in Central Europe) faced,
especially during the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. 
The war in the former Yugoslavia and the
sanctions and embargo regimes, imposed on the
warring republics (especially the sanctions
imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
which, due to the fact that FRY borders on all
Southeast European transitional countries, direct-
ly effected the whole region) led to prolifera-
tion of organized crime, and especially of
smuggling, trafﬁcking and illegal trade in the
peninsula. This in turn gave an enormous boost to
spreading of corruption. The already high poten-
tial for corrupt practices, based on the drawbacks
of communist system, non-existent or low-devel-
oped democratic norms and values, inefﬁcient
and underdeveloped economy and non-transpar-
ent decision-making processes, was thus trans-
formed into one of the most important and per-
sistent problems the region faces today. 
Due to the character of the processes of appear-
ance of post-Yugoslav states and establishment
of their national-state sovereignty, the armed
conflict between the central government in
Belgrade and the authorities in the seceding
republics seemed highly likely. In the name of the
higher goals like protection of national independ-
ence and sovereignty, the leaderships of seceding
republics had to set up and arm the newly creat-
ed republican armies in the only way possible –
illegally, by using existing as well as newly estab-
lished smuggling channels. The party leaders and
high-ranking ﬁgures in the Yugoslav army and the
Yugoslav secret service largely tolerated these
activities and in their turn contributed to the
development of a stable smuggling system. This
system was built both vertically (from political
leaders to actual smugglers) and horizontally (it
included the whole chain of smuggling channels,
passing across the new state borders and con-
necting through common interests the political
elites in all post-Yugoslav republics). 
The elites in the Yugoslav republics were actively
involved in development and organization of
smuggling channels, and they protected and
assisted those who were directly involved in their
realization. This prosperous “business” was con-
trolled in close cooperation between politicians,
their security forces lobbies and organized crime
structures. The Yugoslav experience shows that
temporary symbiosis between authorities and
organized crime during the process of creation of
new states leads to permanent transformation of
state/national interests into private ones and fos-
ters the development of corrupt, non-transparent
and crime-permeated societies.
The free reign given to the organized crime in the
war-ridden Western Balkans, had an impact also
on other countries on the peninsula. The connec-
tion between the events in the former Yugoslavia
and the trans-border crime and related corruption
in the Balkans was most clearly visible during the
trade and arms embargos, imposed by the UN on
post-Yugoslav states. The sanctions and embar-
gos fostered the development of the regional net
of smuggling channels, with the organized crime
structures in countries like Bulgaria, Romania and
Albania playing a crucial role in this process.
Furthermore, smuggling of goods under embar-
go to post-Yugoslav countries became an impor-
tant source of income for people of all social
groups, ranging from political leaders to people,
living in the border areas. As a result, corruption
permeated law-enforcement agencies and politi-
cal elites in these countries. 
Understandably, the Yugoslav conﬂicts and the
interweaving of political-ethnic and criminal
interests in the Western Balkans are not the only
reasons for the creation and growth of the region-
al criminal infrastructure, based on permanent
smuggling channels and systemic corruption.
There are at least two more important factors,
which contributed to the criminalization of trans-
border trafﬁc and the ensuing corruption.
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II. THE BACKGROUND: ORIGINS OF TRANS-BORDER CRIME 
AND CORRUPTION IN SEE
The ﬁrst is the liberalization of movement of
goods and people and the lifting of visa and
other restrictions in the regional post-Communist
countries. In combination with the weakening of
the state control, this has created favorable con-
ditions for trans-border crime. In particular, the
withdrawal of the state from strict control over
the movement of people and goods across the
borders encouraged the processes of privatiza-
tion of both old and the newly-created smuggling
channels. These channels were thus taken over by
the criminal and semi-criminal groups in close
cooperation with former agents of security serv-
ices. State administrators, employed in key insti-
tutions like customs, police and other services,
involved in border control, also got included in
the scheme through the expanding corruption
networks. It can be said that to a great extent bor-
der control passed from the hands of the state
and became an unlawfully acquired private
domain of illegitimate actors. In addition,
most of the borders have not been deﬁned and
mutually recognized, and consequently properly
controlled, until well into the 1990s. Furthermore,
the succession of armed conﬂicts and ethnic
cleansing campaigns in the former Yugoslavia led
to creation of quasi-states (Kosovo is the most
obvious example of such an entity) and weak
states, practically unable to control their borders.
The second factor contributing to dynamic devel-
opment of trans-border crime and corruption dur-
ing the last 12 years was the impact of one of the
main features of Balkan economies: namely, that
the national borders in this period repre-
sented the largest redistributing mecha-
nism of national wealth. Due to a small capac-
ity of regional economies, the value of goods
transported to and from the Balkan countries
reached up to 85% of GDP in some cases. If we
calculate the losses the countries have suffered
because of the illegal import and export over the
last 12 years, they will most likely exceed the
value of revenues from privatization, including
the countries where privatization is almost com-
pleted (Bulgaria and Croatia). 
Of course, the impact of the region’s geograph-
ic position should be also considered.
Balkans have traditionally been the most impor-
tant European point of entry for the Asian heroin.
During the last decade, they also became an
important distribution center for the South
American cocaine. The region is also the most
important land route for hundreds of thousands
of illegal immigrants from Near East and Asia,
who are trying to reach the EU countries. It is also
an important source, transit and even destination
region for women and girls, trafﬁcked to be
employed in the sex industry. The Southeast
Europe is also one of the most important links in
the chain of European cigarette smuggling. All
these aspects represent a practically bottomless
source of corruption, mostly among the border
police and customs ofﬁcials, but also in the judi-
ciary and the public administration. Furthermore,
the scale of these criminal activities also bred
political corruption because of the need for polit-
ical protection of the criminal networks. 
The illegal transactions, however, are not limited
only to trans-border business (import and
export). Their destructive impact can be seen also
in the deformed structure of national economies,
since the extraction of enormous revenues from
the illicit import and export can be possible only
if the large enough gray sector exists. After the
collapse of the Soviet model of total state control
over the economy, illegal transactions performed
in the gray sector came to comprise between
30 and 50 percent of the Balkan national
economies. A common practice is that those
who are actively involved in the trans-border
crime are also directly or indirectly involved in the
conduct of trade operations in the frame of the
unofﬁcial economy. 
Becoming aware of the true dimensions of the
regional trans-border crime and of its impact on
the regional corruption patterns requires that a
comprehensive approach be adopted. For now,
the regional approach in counteracting trans-bor-
der crime and corruption is still overshadowed by
individual national efforts, which are further frag-
mented by the artiﬁcial division on challenges to
internal security on one side, and external securi-
ty of a particular country on the other. The pro-
posed analysis offers an argument in support of
complex programs and efforts for reﬂecting the
new complex challenges, which are facing not
only the societies in Southeast Europe, but also
the countries of the European Union.
2. 1. The Original Set-Up of Trans-Border
Organized Crime Schemes
Three different patterns, along which the trans-
border organized crime networks in SEE were
developed, can be distinguished:
In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, smuggling
(predominantly of weapons) was organized by
the republican governments in order to secure
the independence and sovereignty of two
republics. Similar pattern, in organization of
Kosovo Albanian political leaders, can be
observed later also in Kosovo.
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In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), governments were also
directly involved in organization of smuggling
schemes for illegal import of oil, weapons, and
numerous other goods.
In Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania,
the smuggling and trans-border crime were
not a part of the hidden agenda of the govern-
ments of the states, but were rather organized
and conducted by individuals and groups
within or closely connected to the ruling elites.
*    *    *
The development of the smuggling channels in
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo was
inﬂuenced by very speciﬁc circumstances which
could not be observed in the other former
Yugoslav republics and even less so in other tran-
sitional countries. The war in which the Croatian,
Bosnian Muslim and Kosovo Albanian armies
were ﬁghting against a militarily superior and
better armed adversary contributed to the cre-
ation of socio-political environment in which
smuggling (especially of weapons) was not per-
ceived as harmful for the interests of Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. On the con-
trary, it came to be regarded as essential for
their survival.
Setting up channels for illegal import of weapons
into Croatia in order to arm and equip the newly
created Croatian army was a necessary step if
Croatian authorities wanted to go through with
their plans for secession of Croatia and thus came
to be regarded in Croatia as a state-building and
not as a criminal act. This illegal operation,
despite being a clear violation of a number of the
UN Security Council resolutions, which imposed
arms embargo on all former Yugoslav republics,
is today still generally perceived in Croatia as a
legitimate step, necessary for securing republic’s
independence. 
It is impossible to estimate the full quantity and
value of weapons smuggled into Croatia while
the republic was subject to international arms
embargo. No data is available for 1991 and 1992,
when majority of the weapons were smuggled
into Croatia. In the period 1993 – 1995 alone,
Croatia imported for $308 million worth of
weapons. The arms trade business offered
numerous opportunities for personal enrichment
to those involved, especially to the circle of
Croats from Herzegovina, centered around the
Defense Minister Gojko Susak, and thus signiﬁ-
cantly contributed to the spread of corruption
within the Croatian ruling elites.
The smuggling channels in Bosnia-Herzegovina
were developed in a similar fashion. The crucial
role in the smuggling of arms to Bosnia-
Herzegovina was played by the Third World
Relief Agency (TWRA). TWRA was founded in
1987 in Vienna as a humanitarian agency for
Muslims. In 1992 it opened an ofﬁce in Sarajevo
and started to cooperate with the Bosnian gov-
ernment. It became the main ﬁnancier of the
smuggling of weapons for the Bosnian Muslim
army. Between 1992 and 1995, around $350 mil-
lion were deposited on its account, donated by
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Turkey, Brunei,
Malaysia and Pakistan. Most of the weapons sup-
plied through TWRA were Soviet-made and
bought in various Eastern European countries.
TWRA started to abandon its activities in Bosnia
in 1994. The Austrian anti-terrorist police unit raid-
ed the TWRA headquarters in September 1995
and confiscated enormous amount of docu-
ments, related to arms smuggling and other ille-
gal activities of the agency. After the TWRA’s
retreat, Iran took over as the most important sup-
plier of weapons to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
investigation showed that the value of weapons
smuggled into Bosnia in 1994 and 1995 reached
between $500 and 800 million. Illegal busi-
ness of such a grand scale as a rule represents a
breeding ground for corruption, and like in
Croatia, those involved in the Bosnian arms trade
(for example, Hasan Cengic, a close associate of
the President Izetbegovic) became some of the
richest people in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
In Kosovo, the arms trade was inseparably linked
with the drug trade. Kosovo Albanians have been
associated with the European drug trade for
decades. Their presence has been felt especially
on the heroin markets in Germany, Austria and
Switzerland. Apart from remittances from abroad,
the drug money was the most important pillar the
Kosovo Albanian-organized social and health care
and education were based on after 1991. By 1994
and especially after the Dayton Agreement
(November 1995), which completely ignored the
Kosovo issue, Kosovo Albanians started to turn
towards the armed resistance. Again, remittances
from Kosovo Albanians working abroad (they
supplied roughly one third of the funding, setting
aside 3 percent of their monthly income for the
purpose) and the drug money were the primary
sources for funding the arming of the newly-cre-
ated Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
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*    *    *
Unlike the other republics of the former
Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, which con-
stituted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after
1991, had no need to import arms, since they
“inherited” the lion’s share of the YPA’s arsenal.
Because of their role in the war in Croatia and in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN Security Council
imposed international sanctions on the two
republics in the summer of 1992. The Serbian
province of Vojvodina has always been known as
“the bread basket” of Yugoslavia and even under
the sanctions, Serbia and Montenegro had little
problems in producing enough food to cover the
domestic needs. Serbia was also (apart from
Slovenia) the only former Yugoslav republic
which was an energy exporter and as such had
enough reserves to “survive” few years of sanc-
tions. What Serbia and Montenegro lacked, above
all, was oil. The Serbian war machine in Bosnia
especially depended on smuggled fuel, without
which it would have been brought to a standstill.
The Serbian smuggling channels were developed
and ran in cooperation between the state admin-
istration, state security service and the criminal
underworld. The links between the three are most
clearly shown by two people, who played the cru-
cial role in establishment of the Serbian smug-
gling networks - Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan (a noto-
rious war criminal, unofﬁcial ruler of the Serbian
underworld, and an agent of the Serbian security
service) and Mihajl Kertes (ﬁrst the deputy-chief
of the security service and then the head of
Serbian Customs).
Apart from oil, cigarettes were the most sought-
after commodity and cigarette smuggling, for
which Montenegro became notorious, brought
enormous profits to people involved in it.
Cigarette smuggling schemes were developed by
people from the top echelons of the Serbian
secret service. Part of the proﬁts was used for
ﬁnancing war effort in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but
the rest went to private accounts of those
involved, including some of the highest
Montenegrin ofﬁcials. 
The smuggling channels in
Serbia and Montenegro were
established to circumvent the
international sanctions and as
such gave the appearance of
serving the interests of the
state. Smuggling did in fact
generate revenues which were
used for ﬁnancing a number of
state services (from security
forces to state-owned media)
and state-run enterprises, but
above all, smuggling ﬁnanced
the ruling regime, since the
increasing share of the proﬁts
was diverted to various private
bank accounts abroad.
*    *    *
The Southeast European coun-
tries which have not been
involved in the war nor were
they subject to international
sanctions were nevertheless
strongly affected by both. The
proximity to the war zone and
the possibilities the sanction-
busting offered to the well-
placed individuals and groups
inﬂuenced the rapid develop-
ment of smuggling and other
illegal activities, as well as pro-
Bulgaria
Italy
Hungary Romania
Macedonia
Croatia
Slovenia
Austria
Serbia
Kosovo
Albania
Adriatic sea
200 km
Beograd
SofiaPristina
Tirana
Zagreb
Split
Vliora
Lecce
Tessaloniki
Bari
Monte-
negro
Podgorica
2.
1.
7.
7.
6.
5.
5.
4.
3.
Sarajevo
Bosnia-
Hercegovina
Banja luka
Skopje
Novi sad
Figure 1: Oil smuggling routes 
to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia
liferation of organized crime and corruption in
Macedonia, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria.
During the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia was involved in the illegal arms
trade. According to press reports, three
Macedonian ministers of defense, one foreign
minister, the head of intelligence service and one
MP were involved in the illegal weapons trade.
According to estimates of the international organ-
izations, Macedonia was among the most
active violators of sanctions imposed on the
rump Yugoslavia. The Serbian-Macedonian bor-
der witnessed the countless not-too-hidden pas-
sages of whole convoys of tank trucks, organiza-
tion of which would have been impossible with-
out the involvement of government officials.
Numerous Macedonian “businessmen” partici-
pated in a popular scheme used by thousands of
Serbian entrepreneurs for side-stepping the sanc-
tions. The scheme involved an establishment of a
phantom company in Skopje. The Serbian goods
(which could not be legally exported) were smug-
gled across the porous Serbian-Macedonian bor-
der and then exported, branded with the Made in
Macedonia label. For few years, this scheme was
one of Macedonia’s main foreign currency earn-
ers. Needless to say, all these activities had an
enormous impact on the spread of corruption in
Macedonia.
The majority of the Albanian smuggling chan-
nels were developed by the former agents of the
Albanian secret service Sigurimi. Sigurimi was
abolished in July 1991 and replaced with the
National Intelligence Service (NIS). As a result of
this restructuring, many of the approximately
10,000 Sigurimi agents lost their positions and
turned to organized crime, often in partnership
with the Italian organized crime, which has
entered Albania almost immediately after the col-
lapse of the country’s Stalinist regime. The smug-
gling of oil to the rump Yugoslavia (especially to
Montenegro) soon became the most lucrative
activity in the northern Albania. The realization of
this project would not be possible without partic-
ipation or at least without the knowledge of
authorities in Podgorica and Tirana. According to
the source in the Albanian railway company,
more than 1 million liters of oil were transported
from Durres to Montenegro in September 1994
alone. The involvement of government ofﬁcials
and the former Sigurimi agents, who were
appointed as the leading ﬁgures of the customs
and tax authorities, was conﬁrmed by Genc Ruli,
the former Finance Minister in Sali Berisha’s gov-
ernment.
Channels for trafﬁcking people to Greece and
Italy were also set up almost immediately after
the collapse of the communist regime. The traf-
ﬁcking of people to Italy was developed in coop-
eration with the Italian organized crime, especial-
ly with the Sacra Corona Unita clan. The ﬁrst con-
tacts were connected with the Italian maﬁa’s pur-
chases of weapons and explosives from their
Albanian partners, who had easy access to
Albanian arms depots due to their close ties with
the former Sigurimi. The cooperation soon
extended to include drugs and illegal immigrants.
The severity of Ceausescu’s regime in Romania,
the pauperization and shortages, created by the
mismanagement of the command economy and
the drive to repay the Romanian foreign debt cre-
ated the extremely fertile ground for proliferation
of trans-border organized crime. Unable to buy
raw materials and to sell their products on open
market, numerous large and small state-owned
enterprise managers participated in development
of a huge black market. Many agents of the
Romanian Department of State Security, popular-
ly known as Securitate, also played an exception-
ally important role in its development and expan-
sion to include money laundering and cigarette,
drugs and arms smuggling schemes. Cigarette,
drugs and arms smuggling was initiated in 1970s
with the goal of obtaining hard currency for
Securitate’s covert operations abroad. Yet,
because the poor living conditions in Romania
were so widespread, even the privileged
Securitate agents were affected, and this gave
them a strong incentive to abuse their positions
and to begin diverting the funds, generated
through smuggling, to their personal bank
accounts abroad (mainly in Switzerland).
Like all other Serbian neighbors, Romania also
exploited the opportunities offered by the inter-
national sanctions imposed on the rump
Yugoslavia. In the year 2000, the then-President
Constantinescu accused his predecessor, Ion
Iliescu, and the former Foreign Minister
Melescanu of being involved in the oil smug-
gling to Serbia. Such allegations are not uncom-
mon in the Southeastern European political
inﬁghting and should be treated with caution. Yet,
it is hard to believe that the largest operation,
involving around 1,000 railway wagons loaded
with fuel and which, as subsequent investigation
has revealed, crossed from Romania into Serbia
at the Jimbolia border crossing, could have been
performed without the knowledge of some of the
most senior Romanian public ofﬁcials.
Romania was also among the largest exporters of
arms to all warring sides in the former Yugoslavia
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during the arms embargo imposed on them. The
illegal arms exports were controlled by former
Securitate and army employees. Viktor
Stanculescu, the former head of the quartering
corps for Romanian army and a member of the
tribunal which sentenced Ceausescu to death,
became the owner of several leading arms
exporting companies (all of which were selling
weapons to Croatia and to Serbia) almost imme-
diately after the revolution.
The smuggling channels in Bulgaria were set up
by the communist state and were controlled by
the former State Security – the secret service of
the communist regime. Regretfully, proof of this
criminal activity no longer exists. Only accounts
of anonymous participants in the smuggling
channels and some indirect evidence are avail-
able today. There are also the accusations by
western states of smuggling of arms, drugs, med-
ications, and excise goods.
In the period 1987-1989 certain individuals were
granted control over part of these channels and
vast authority to dispose with the undercover
companies. This allowed them to appropriate for-
mer secret funds into personal accounts.
Following the collapse of the totalitarian system
and the subsequent transformation of the State
Security structures in the period 1990-1993, thou-
sands of police ofﬁcers were made redundant or
left the Ministry of the Interior, taking with them a
large part of the archive ﬁles on agents, connec-
tions, and mechanisms for evading border con-
trol. At the same time, the ensuing vacuum in the
exercise of control functions by the state, as well
as the economic recession, especially in 1989-
1991, created favorable conditions for illegal
trafﬁcking in goods intended to meet the
domestic demand for a wide range of products.
While until November 10, 1989, when the
Communist regime fell, the State Security was
mostly engaged in trafﬁcking to other countries
and transiting of drugs and banned goods, after
that date the same smuggling channels came to
be used for the illicit import of anything that could
be sold in Bulgaria. Evading payment of customs
and excise duties and fees, certain circles of for-
mer police agents and party activists earned ille-
gal profit and accumulated huge financial
resources.
Macedonia, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria had
to face numerous difﬁculties when they started
their transition to the market economy. The swift
political and economic changes, the rising unem-
ployment, and the rising discrepancy between
wages and prices pushed many people into the
gray economy and on the black market. The abol-
ishment of tight restrictions on movement of
goods and people (especially in the case of
Albania and Romania) at the same time removed
many obstacles which hitherto prevented people
from engaging in the shadow economy. In the
ﬁrst years of transition, smuggling was a nation-
wide phenomenon tolerated by the authorities to
avoid the social upheaval among the pauperized
population, which had little choice apart from
engaging in small-scale oil smuggling to the
rump Yugoslavia and in the “suitcase trading.” Of
course, the corrupt involvement of numerous
high-ranking government ofﬁcials in the large-
scale smuggling operations is another, even
more signiﬁcant reason why in the early 1990s
virtually no attempts to counter smuggling - and
corruption that made it possible - were made.
2.2. Expansion of Trans-Border Organized
Crime and Corruption: Causes and
Course
The trans-border organized crime networks, set
up semi-ofﬁcially with the knowledge and often
even active participation of the highest state ofﬁ-
cials, were soon “privatized” by certain well-
placed individuals and groups within or closely
connected to the ruling elites. The process of “pri-
vatization” of the smuggling channels was well
underway by 1992 in all the regional countries
and largely concluded by 1995 (the only excep-
tion was Kosovo where the process could be
observed between 1997 appearance of the KLA as
an important regional player and the 1999 NATO
campaign). During the same period, the channels
initially established for smuggling predominantly
weapons and oil were expanded to include other
goods, such as drugs, stolen vehicles, cigarettes,
alcohol and other commodities. The origins of the
constantly growing Balkan trade in human beings
can also be traced to the 1992-1995 period and to
the lucrative business of “assisting” refugees to
escape from the war zones to safety. Thus, trans-
border organized crime and corruption started to
seriously undermine the normal functioning of
the states in the region. 
While the regimes, which were actively engaged
in development and organization of the smug-
gling channels, remained in power, virtually no
attempts were made to stem trans-border crime
and the corruption that facilitated it. In Croatia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia,
where due to the speciﬁc circumstances (involve-
ment in the war being the most important one)
the same regimes remained in power for almost
the whole decade, all the attempts to check the
ﬂow of smuggled goods were only cosmetic, if
made at all. In countries, where governments did
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change (Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania),
some measures to stem proliferation of smug-
gling were taken. Unfortunately, in most cases
these measures were ineffective, and led only to
the change of people involved in the smuggling. 
The Croatian authorities justiﬁed the proliferation
of smuggling and their virtually complete inabili-
ty (or unwillingness) to put an end to it with the
fact that Croatia was still engaged in the armed
conﬂict and that more than a third of Croatian ter-
ritory was not under their control. Liberation of
these territories was declared as having the
absolute priority and all other issues, including
the ﬁght against corruption, organized crime and
illegal trade, were conveniently put off to some
unspeciﬁed future. Little has changed after the
war ended. Many of the high ranking individuals
engaged in smuggling and other criminal activi-
ties enjoyed complete immunity from prosecu-
tion, due to their “defenders of the homeland”
status.
Before the Dayton Agreement, which ended the
war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, any attempt to put an
end to illegal trade was unthinkable. No legisla-
tion, no police force, no customs services, and
even no clearly deﬁned and recognized borders
existed. Above all, there was absolutely no will-
ingness on the side of the authorities to tackle the
problem. Trans-border organized crime and war
formed a closed circle in which the war generated
the need for smuggling and the proﬁts smuggling
was bringing to those involved generated the
need to prolong the war for as long as possible.
After the war, the provisions of the Dayton
Agreement, which aimed above all to preserve
peace and stability in the country, created condi-
tions in which any serious action against organ-
ized crime and corruption was made virtually
impossible. Complicated political and administra-
tive arrangement, division of the country on two
entities (of which the Croat-Muslim federation
was further divided into 10 cantons), as well as
the more pressing issues like post-war recon-
struction, return of refugees and displaced per-
sons, and preservation of peace, sidetracked the
ﬁght against organized crime, smuggling and cor-
ruption. These issues were not addressed proper-
ly until the end of the decade.
In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the interna-
tional sanctions offered the same excuse the war
offered to the elites engaged in the illicit trade in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Smuggling was
“necessary” to help Yugoslavia survive under the
“unfairly” imposed sanctions. While Milosevic’s
regime was in power, not surprisingly, no
attempts were made to ﬁght against the illegal
trade. Furthermore, even the general public, the
civil society and the majority of opposition parties
hardly ever raised the issue, despite the fact that
it was already more than clear that the only sur-
vival the trans-border organized crime made pos-
sible was the survival of Milosevic’s regime. The
explanation for this might lay in the fact that huge
segment of the population was either directly
involved in or dependent on smuggling (predom-
inantly small-scale or so called “suitcase” smug-
gling).
In Kosovo, the KLA’s armed insurrection and the
consequent clashes between the KLA and the
Yugoslav security forces destroyed even the last
vestiges of law and order in the province, giving
the drug smugglers an almost completely free
reign. The alleged goal behind the drug trade con-
tinued to be the “liberation” of Kosovo from the
Serbian “occupation” while in fact it served pri-
marily for personal enrichment of the members
of 15 clans, allegedly controlling both the drug
trade and the KLA. Prior to the UN Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) taking over the administration
of the province in 1999, effectively no authority
existed which could possibly try to curb the drug
trafﬁc.
In Albania, the weak government, inadequate and
non-enforced legislation, corrupt and ill-equipped
security forces and dire economic situation all
contributed to creation of a perfect environment
for proliferation of organized crime. The involve-
ment of the highest representatives of the gov-
erning Democratic Party in smuggling and other
criminal activities prevented any serious action
against the illicit trade before the 1997 collapse
and the subsequent change of the government.
The 1997 events exacerbated the problem to an
extent that the new, Socialist government, even if
we assume that it was actually wiling to do so,
was completely powerless to do anything on its
own and the international community had to step
in. The most important development was the
establishment of European Commission’s
Customs Assistance Mission in Albania, deployed
in June 1997 on request from the new Albanian
government.
During the rule of the Party for Social Democracy
(PSDR, the former communists) in Romania,
which lasted until the 1996 elections, numerous
ties were forged between some governing ofﬁ-
cials and the shadow economy structures. The
former provided the latter with easy access to
unsecured credits from the state banks (three of
the main state banks were driven to the edge of
bankruptcy because of this practice), with legal
“blessings” for their trading monopolies, and
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with the preferential treatment in privatization
procedures. The new Romanian “business” class
provided their political mentors with funds for
their electoral campaigns and other, ofﬁcial and
unofﬁcial, needs. In such an environment, the fact
that hardly any measures were taken to curb cor-
ruption and the gray economy, including smug-
gling and trafﬁcking, hardly comes as a surprise. 
In Bulgaria, where six regular and two interim
cabinets were in power in the period 1989-2001,
the following pattern could be observed every
time the government changed (the situation was
very similar also in other countries):
The electoral campaign, in which promises to
ﬁght corruption and organized crime play an
exceptionally important role, in fact intensiﬁes
the activities of the trans-border organized
crime networks, since those involved try both
to build up “reserves” for an uncertain future
and to take advantage of the ensuing power
vacuum between the elections and the inau-
guration of the new government. 
When the latter takes place, some swift and
highly publicized steps are taken – some con-
traband channels are broken, some of the
involved (most often including some customs
ofﬁcers) might be dismissed or arrested.
The smuggling and corruption, however, are
rarely signiﬁcantly effected. Rather, new peo-
ple, close to the new authorities, take over the
smuggling networks.
2.3. Trans-Border Organized Crime and
Corruption in Southeastern Europe 
Trans-border organized crime and corruption are
intrinsically connected. When something is to be
transported out of or into the country in order to
avoid payment of customs duties and other fees
and taxes, it very often requires the assistance of
border and other ofﬁcials from various govern-
ment agencies – passport control, immigration,
customs, etc. Corruption is particularly common
in the case of smuggling of commercial goods.
Smuggling-related corruption is found at every
level of the public administration in the region.
The claims that corruption only implicates the
rank and ﬁle of administration while top manage-
ment levels are supposedly “immune” against it
are incorrect. The series of disclosures concerning
corruption and personal gains on the part of sen-
ior public ofﬁcials, the striking rise in their stan-
dard of living, and the information about funds
and property they have acquired all suggest that
corruption exists even in the higher ranks of pub-
lic ofﬁcials.
The smuggling of goods has inﬂicted consider-
able damage to economies of the SEE countries.
It is often accompanied by trafﬁcking in banned or
controlled substances and items; criminal acts;
competition between the organized smuggling
groups, and between traffickers and lawful
importers. Moreover, in order to stay in the mar-
ket, lawful importers are forced to resort to viola-
tions of the established foreign-trade regulations.
Trans-border organized crime has a destructive
effect not only on the economy, but also on the
institutions and the rule of law in a given country.
The huge resources accumulated in this manner
allow engaging in covert ﬁnancing and reﬁnanc-
ing of various types of legal and illegal undertak-
ings. This is largely due to the fact that the rev-
enues from smuggling do not enter ofﬁcial gov-
ernment statistics; they are never declared and
thus never registered with the relevant authori-
ties. Practice shows that all too often proceeds
from illegal trafﬁcking serve to ﬁnance political
parties, labor-unions and other organizations in
SEE. Illegal import adversely affects domestic
production and harms sectors of strategic impor-
tance to the country. In its various forms it is in
fact one of the means companies employ to enter
a given market. It is also used to monopolize a
certain economic or other sector of activity – for
instance the trade in alcohol, cigarettes, grain,
sugar, video and audio equipment.
The goods most frequently subject to smuggling
are those with high import tax rates (cigarettes,
alcohol, motor vehicles), goods subject to nation-
al bans and restrictions such as arms, narcotic
substances and precursors, pornographic materi-
als, subsidized goods, protected animal species
and plants, goods and technologies of civil and
military use, works of art and objects of cultural
and historical value, strategic raw materials,
forged goods and products violating intellectual
property rights, goods subject to international
control, nuclear and radioactive materials, haz-
ardous and toxic substances and wastes, hi-tech
products, etc.
Illegal import can be carried out at any time and
anywhere along the border, with the actual places
of occurrence falling in two main zones – points
where customs control is executed (ports, air-
ports, border checkpoints, free trade zones, and
others) and points outside customs control – a
remote location along the coastline, a minor port
or airport. 
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Depending on the nature of smuggled goods, as
well as on the initial and ﬁnal buyer (destination),
citizens of different states are engaged as perpe-
trators. In a number of cases the citizenship of the
person used for the smuggling is of great signiﬁ-
cance insofar as there are visa restrictions on the
movement of persons and goods in certain
regions of the world - for instance, the Schengen
Agreement. Illegal trade with a ﬁnal destination in
a Schengen country usually involves nationals of
these countries, or persons frequently traveling
to these countries.
A key factor for increasing or reducing smuggling
is the adequacy of customs control in the detec-
tion, detainment, and seizure of illegally imported
or exported goods. Typical for Southeast Europe
is the hierarchical corruption pressure on the ofﬁ-
cials exercising the border control, the lack of
coordination among the various agencies, the
lack of established and effectively functioning
information systems and information dissemina-
tion networks, inefﬁcient internal control mecha-
nisms, and inadequate resources and facilities.
When trafﬁckers realize that control is weak, that
corruption is rampant among customs ofﬁcers,
and that they run a low risk of being intercepted
and punished, the situation in the state is consid-
ered favorable to engaging in smuggling. This is
mostly been the case in SEE throughout the
1990s. 
All forms of trans-border crime that take place
with the awareness and assistance of ofﬁcials
involve the commission of a crime – bribery or
misuse of public ofﬁce. In the cases of mass
smuggling, and especially in the trafﬁcking in
fast-moving consumer goods, there are simulta-
neous violations of the customs and criminal leg-
islation. 
The speciﬁc forms of corruption in SEE can be
summarized in several more general types of
criminal interaction between smugglers and pub-
lic ofﬁcials:
Corrupting the customs administration in
order to speed up a certain operation, includ-
ing the processing of documents, and thus
allow a businessperson or organization to con-
clude a given transaction in the fastest possi-
ble way.
Corrupting ofﬁcials in order to cover up viola-
tions of customs laws and internal regulations.
Participation of border and customs adminis-
tration in the setting up and operation of
smuggling channels across the border.
Certain enduring and recurrent schemes of com-
bining the interests of trafﬁckers and corrupt ofﬁ-
cials exist. Moreover, the linking and interaction
of interests follow a deﬁnite logic. There is a con-
nection between the level of organization of
smuggling activity and the ofﬁcials involved in
corruption.
The so-called “suitcase trade,” in which hundreds
of thousands of individuals in the whole region
are engaged, typically involves one, and occa-
sionally more than one, family member. They
establish contact with individual representatives
of customs authorities and other control agen-
cies, effecting a corruption deal. Regardless of the
actual role of the public ofﬁcial – whether passive
or active under criminal legislation deﬁnitions –
the smuggler pays a certain “fee” to the ofﬁcial
authorizing the illegal transfer of the goods. 
The use of smuggling channels in SEE involves a
more complex chain of corruption deals, includ-
ing the redistribution of the bribes received.
This chain implicates ofﬁcials from different agen-
cies, who supply railway tanks, transport corri-
dors, terminals for the loading and unloading of
fuel. All too often public ofﬁcials illicitly work for
the owners of the smuggling channels, which
have been “privatized” by semi-criminal and
criminal groups. A stable system is thus formed
of a dual loyalty of key ofﬁcials: legitimate, to the
state; and covert and illicit, to the group that
bribed them.
The third, and most dangerous, form of interac-
tion between trafﬁckers and public ofﬁcials is the
illicit transfer of goods which beneﬁts the political
elite of the country and is thus protected by a
political “umbrella.” Those instances involve the
so-called “grand corruption.”  
Below four categories of smuggling and related
corruption in SEE are examined in more detail.
Mass Smuggling (“The Suitcase Trade”)
Mass smuggling is a speciﬁc form of the illegal
trade in goods. Its signiﬁcance is often underesti-
mated, despite the fact that it constitutes a con-
siderable part of the illegal imports and exports in
Southeast Europe. Suitcase traders cross-borders
daily (sometimes even several times in the same
day). Upon each crossing, they transfer merchan-
dise for which no customs duties and other fees
are paid. Instead, a bride is often paid to the bor-
der police and customs ofﬁcials. Suitcase traders
make additional proﬁt due to the price differences
of the smuggled goods on both sides of the bor-
der. The goods most often smuggled in this man-
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ner include gasoline, household consumer
goods, foodstuffs and beverages, fruits and veg-
etables, clothes, medicine, etc. The goods subject
to import and export bans may also be involved.
Turkey plays the role of the most important
regional “shopping center,” with suitcase traders
from Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, FR
Yugoslavia and Albania contributing an important
share to the enormous turnover the suitcase
trade generates in Turkey (according to the Turkish
statistical data, the volume of suitcase trade
is between $8 and 9 billion per year). 
All countries in SEE have been affected with this
phenomenon to a greater or lesser degree. In
some, however, the suitcase trade reached such
proportions that it begun to seriously threaten the
local economy. Croatia is such an example. In the
second half on the 1990s, Croatia became
arguably the most expensive transitional country
in which a rapidly growing number of people
found it increasingly difﬁcult to get by. The solu-
tion was found in the virtually nation-wide phe-
nomenon of “suitcase” smuggling, with scores of
Croats daily visiting Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Hungary and even Slovenia to buy food and other
commodities. The exceptionally high prices in
Croatia were partly a result of war and the conse-
quent destruction of industries and infrastructure,
and partly of the rampant corruption and the
related “tycoonization” of Croatian economy,
which resulted in majority of enterprises being
plundered and brought to bankruptcy. The result-
ing corruption of the law-enforcement adminis-
tration has become extremely difﬁcult to over-
turn.
For years, Croatian authorities did nothing to curb
the “suitcase” trade, despite the losses it was
bringing to its domestic production and to the
state budget. On the contrary. Viewing the “suit-
case” trade as a safety valve for preventing the
social upheaval, Croatian authorities even made
custom frauds and smuggling much easier by
opening around 200 border crossings, of which
108 between Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina
alone (in addition to numerous ofﬁcial crossings,
there were up to 400 unofﬁcial points of entry
between Croatia and Bosnia–Herzegovina where
goods were smuggled in or out of the country).
Only 20 of them were properly equipped for con-
trol of passengers and goods. Due to the lack of
customs ofﬁcials, many border crossings were
controlled only by the police who rarely did any-
thing but check the identity of the passengers.
Mass smuggling in Kosovo represents perhaps
even a more pressing problem than anywhere
else in the region, because numerous indications
exist that it is controlled by the organized crime
structures, which have evolved from the KLA and
which are closely connected with the local politi-
cal elites. Kosovo smugglers are making huge
proﬁts through customs frauds, which UNMIK
(the United Nations Mission in Kosovo) has so far
been unable to tackle. In 1996, the governments in
Belgrade and Skopje signed an agreement
according to which a ﬂat one percent duty is
charged on all goods, traded between the two
countries. UNMIK respects this agreement and
consequently, the same low duty is levied on all
imports from Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro
to Kosovo. The duty for imports from all other
countries is 10 percent. The smugglers use this
and forge documents and stamps to present
goods (including even bananas and oil), coming
from other countries, as originating in
Macedonia. In ﬁrst four months of 2001 alone,
over 200 false certificates, issued by the
Macedonian customs authorities, have been
detected. The situation is even worse on the “bor-
der” with Serbia, where, due to the still unclear
status of Kosovo, only semi-official “control
points” exist, at which the taxes collected by the
“border ofﬁcials” end up in their pockets, instead
of in the Serbian and Kosovar budgets.
Some estimates about the range of suitcase
smuggling and customs frauds in Albania can be
made from the data on collected customs rev-
enues. The reforms in the customs and tax
authorities, initiated in 1997 by the new Socialist
government with the assistance of international
institutions, soon produced some tangible
results:
In 1996, customs revenues were only $10 mil-
lion. 
From September to December 1997 alone, $28
million were collected. 
However, the estimated losses from unpaid
customs duties for 1998 were still over
$80 million, and the extent of smuggling and
corruption in Albania continues to be higher
than anywhere else in Europe. 
One of the ways to estimate the scope of the suit-
case trade is the number of “exits” from the coun-
try. In Bulgaria, such research was conducted by
the Center for the Study of Democracy and based
on the information supplied by the National
Statistics Institute. In 1996 and 1997 more than 3
million exits were registered. Most of the visits of
Bulgarian citizens were made to the neighboring
countries: about one third of all departures were
to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 17 percent
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to Turkey and 15 percent to Romania. In nine out
of ten cases, “tourism” was the reason cited for
the trip. Yet, “tourism” can be regarded (to an
extent) as a valid reason only in the case of
Turkey, which is in fact a popular tourist destina-
tion. In cases of Yugoslavia and Romania, the
numbers offer a very good indication of the
potential scope of the suitcase trade. According to
this estimates, there is reason to claim that
between one fourth and one third of 900,000 peo-
ple engaged in the private sector are involved in
the suitcase trade. This makes it the largest sec-
tor of the Bulgarian economy in terms of the
number of people engaged. A large number of
small and medium-sized enterprises in Bulgaria
depend on suitcase trade.
Smuggling of Excise Goods
The goods which are smuggled most often are
mainly those that tend to undergo transforma-
tion, or are completely consumed, when used.
Such are fuels and lubricants, alcoholic and non-
alcoholic beverages, foodstuffs, raw materials for
the production of goods, etc. In other words,
when they appear in the market and are sold,
they are difﬁcult to identify, and since they subse-
quently disappear they cannot be tracked down
should it be established that they were imported
illegally. The second important characteristic of
most often smuggled goods are the high import
tax and duty rates (so-called excise goods).
Cigarettes and other tobacco products have both
of these two features. It is thus hardly surprising
that cigarette smuggling became one of the most
proﬁtable and widespread illegal activities in the
region.
The cigarette smuggling in the region involves
both the locally produced cigarettes and the
major international brands. The schemes for
smuggling locally produced cigarettes usually
involve “export” to a neighboring country, fol-
lowed by illegal transport of these same ciga-
rettes back into the country of origin. Cigarette
smuggling was facilitated with the existence of
several borders in the region, which were deliber-
ately kept porous for political reasons (border
between Croatia and the Croat-populated
Herzegovina, border between Serbia and the
Serb-populated Republika Srpska, and the border
between Serbia and post-1999 Kosovo). Another
popular customs fraud, used in cigarette smug-
gling, is to present cigarettes as being produced
in a (real or non-existent) domestic factory, and
not abroad as it is really the case. 
Representatives of the World Bank and the IMF
estimate that Bosnia-Herzegovina loses around
$250 million annually because of the illegal
cigarette imports.1 For example, every month
approximately 280 tons of cigarettes, produced in
the Croatian tobacco factory Tvornica duhana
Rovinj, are sold in the republic. However, only
around 100 tons are legally imported every
month.
After the fall of Milosevic’s regime, the new
Serbian authorities took numerous measures to
cut the cigarette smuggling channels and to regu-
late the trade with cigarettes and other high-duty
commodities:
According to the Serbian Prime Minister
Djindjic and the head of the Federal Customs
Administration Begovic, the share of the ille-
gal cigarettes on the market decreased from
65 to 15 percent by September 2001.
In 2000, just slightly over $400,000 were col-
lected from duties on cigarette import. 
In 2001, the sum was 32 times larger (almost
$13 million). 
In 2001, 5,313 tons of cigarettes were legally
imported, against the 3,078 tons for the whole
period between 1995 and 2000. 
Numerous arrests were made and over
500,000 boxes of cigarettes conﬁscated. 
Still, according to estimates of G17, a Serbian
think-thank involving many of the country’s top
economists, Serbia still looses $120 million
annually in revenues due to the illegal cigarette
import.2
According to the estimates, 95 percent of ciga-
rettes smoked in Kosovo were smuggled into the
province. Most of these cigarettes entered the
province from Serbia.
According to the data of the former Macedonian
Interior Minister Trajanov, between June and
September 2000 alone, more than 1,300 trucks of
cigarettes were exported duty-free to Serbia and
Kosovo and then smuggled back into Macedonia.
1 Elizabeth Sellwood Oxfam. “Policy Recommendations for Sustainable Post-Conﬂict Reconstruction in South Eastern
Europe," International Security Information Service. 19 February 2001. 
<http://www.isis-europe.org/isiseu/conference/conference_3/part_2b_recommendations.html>. 
2 Tatjana Stankovic. "Reforme iza dimne zavese." AIM Press. 30 September 2001.
<http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/pubs/archive/data/200109/10930-014-pubs-beo.htm>.
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There, they were sold on the market by small
traders and street vendors. Trajanov estimates
that the organizers of the smuggling (who are,
according to him, closely connected to the two
ruling parties) pocketed $57 million of proﬁts.
One of the biggest Romanian smuggling scan-
dals of 1990s involved the illegal import of ciga-
rettes and had dealt a signiﬁcant blow to the
administration of President Constantinescu. It
involved smuggling of cigarettes worth several
millions USD to Romania through the Otopeni
military airport near Bucharest.
According to the most conservative estimates,
the annual sales volumes of cigarettes in
Bulgaria are about $120 million. The imported
cigarettes sales amount to 15 percent of the ciga-
rettes sold ($18 million). Yet, in 1998 the value of
the legally imported cigarettes was only about
$2.5 million, which means that only 14.1 percent
of the imported cigarettes, sold in the country,
have been registered with the relevant authorities
and that the proper taxes have been paid. The sit-
uation even worsened in 1999. A comparison
shows that the duties paid by October 1999 had
dropped by about 35 percent compared to 1998.
The cigarette import often involves the most ﬂa-
grant forms of smuggling, with entire shipments
smuggled into the country, with documents being
forged with false customs seals and with involve-
ment of ghost companies.
The cigarette smuggling in Montenegro has
reached such proportions in the last decade that
the tiny republic has acquired an infamous name
of the “Cigarette Empire” in the international
press, with allegations of the direct involvement
of the republic’s highest government ofﬁcials in
this illegal activity often being made. According
to the estimates, Italy looses a few hundred mil-
lions USD annually in unpaid taxes due to ciga-
rette smuggling. The German government’s cus-
toms investigator, dealing with the cigarette
smuggling, estimates that in the years 2000 and
2001, the EU lost $3.4 billion because of the
unpaid taxes for cigarettes smuggled from
Montenegro. In December 1999, the former
Montenegrin Foreign Minister Branko Perovic
was indicted on charges of cigarette smuggling
and racketeering by the Public Prosecutor in
Naples. In May 2002, the prosecutors in Bari
opened an investigation against Montenegrin
President Milo Djukanovic in regard with his
alleged involvement in a cigarette smuggling ring
and links to organized crime.
The Smuggling of Illicit
Drugs
The Southeastern Europe
is a bridge between the
Middle Eastern and
Central Asian drug pro-
ducers and the Western
European drug con-
sumers. The heroin pro-
duced in Afghanistan trav-
els through Iran to Turkey,
where it is reﬁned, and
then to Bulgaria. 
Bulgaria is the crossroads
where three main drug
smuggling routes through
the Balkans separate:
The bulk of the Asian
heroin traveled from Bul-
garia through the former
Yugoslavia prior to 1991.
During the war in Croatia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina,
this route was temporary
cut off and two alternative
routes took over its pre-
dominance. After 1995,
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this “classical” route was again revived, and
after 1997, a sharp increase in drug trafﬁc
through former Yugoslavia was noticed, testi-
fied with the increasing number of drug
seizures, as well as with a drastic increase in
drug consumption in the major urban areas.
The northern route leads through Romania
and from there either through Hungary to
Czech Republic and Slovakia (and from there
to EU countries) or through Ukraine to Poland
(and from there to EU). 
The southern route leads from Bulgaria
through Macedonia and Kosovo to Albania.
After becoming de facto independent from
Yugoslavia in 1999, Kosovo reafﬁrmed its
“role” as the center of the Southeast European
drug smuggling networks. The International
Narcotic Enforcement Officers Association
estimates that the Kosovo mafia handles
between four and a half and ﬁve tons of
heroin monthly now, which is more than
double than before the 1999 war. The drug
smuggling is closely connected to the 2001
conﬂict in Macedonia. Numerous indications
exist that like the KLA, the so-called National
Liberation Army in Macedonia was closely
connected with the drug trade. 
One of the conse-
quences of the war
in the former Yu-
goslavia was that
now the illegal
drug trade encom-
passes all the
countries in the re-
gion. Political in-
stability, poverty,
corruption, weak
democratic institu-
tions, insufficient
and poorly
equipped security
forces and ill-
guarded, porous
borders made the
region ideal for
drug smuggling.
The drug trade
enabled the inter-
national organized
crime (especially
the Italian mafia,
and Turkish and
Middle Eastern
drug smuggling
networks) to
establish its presence in the region, adding fur-
ther incentive to the vicious circle in which cor-
ruption and organized crime reinforce each other.
Trafﬁc of heroin through the region represents
the biggest problem, but it is far from being the
only one:
- According to Interpol estimates, over 80 per-
cent of heroin, sold in the EU, has traveled
through Balkans.
- Some of the regional countries, most notably
Croatia and Albania, also became the most
important European points of entry for the
South American cocaine. 
- The Southeast Europe has also turned into an
important drug producing region, especially of
cannabis and opium poppies. 
- Laboratories for production of synthetic drugs
have also appeared. 
- The increased trafﬁc in drugs has led to in-
creased local drug consumption, and especial-
ly the pace at which heroin abuse is spreading
is alarming.
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Trafﬁcking in Human Beings
Trafﬁcking in people is growing with alarming
speed. It includes the transfer of illegal immi-
grants, women to be engaged in prostitution,
labor force to work under inhuman conditions,
trafﬁcking in children, and illegal adoptions at
exorbitant prices. The illegal ﬂows are under con-
trol of organized crime. Trafficking in people
involves ofﬁcials from passport control services
who accept forged identiﬁcation documents. The
persons involved in trafﬁcking in people often
have double citizenship and use different names.
Involved in the trafﬁc are companies providing
visa services and tourist agencies. Trafﬁckers use
networks of trusted hotel owners and people
renting private lodgings. 
The clandestine leading of people across the bor-
der is done by trafﬁckers that are often repeat
offenders who continue to engage in this type of
activity. The crossing of the border by land is typ-
ically done in groups led by a guide who is famil-
iar with the area to be traversed. He is connected
to a centre of operations in one of the large cities
where the grouping of the potential migrants is
carried out. Candidate migrants usually have a
meeting point – a railway station, restaurant, or
private house. There they are boarded on means
of transportation and ﬁnally placed in the charge
of the guides. The channels for the trafﬁcking in
people are controlled by organized crime and the
organizers inside the country as a rule get a share
of the proceeds.
The trafﬁcking in people is very often done in
secret compartments of buses and trucks.
Typically the “shipments” are accompanied by
the organizers of the channel or other trusted
individuals by car. They escort the “shipment” to
the border checkpoint and wait until the vehicle
crosses the border. The clandestine migrants are
often accompanied by their children, have little
baggage and carry no money or identiﬁcation
papers with them. Young women who have been
kidnapped and forced to engage in prostitution
also cross the border illegally. 
Trafﬁcking in Illegal Immigrants
According to the UN Ofﬁce for Drug Control and
Crime Prevention, human trafﬁcking is the fastest
growing criminal business in the world.
Southeast Europe is one of the most important
transit regions for illegal immigrants from Turkey,
China, Iran, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iraq,
Afghanistan, and other Middle Eastern and Asian
countries on their way to the EU. It is also an
important source region, with Romanians,
Albanians and Roma being among the most
numerous groups of illegal immigrants in the EU.
Among the reasons for the exceptionally fast
growth of human trafﬁcking business is that the
proﬁts are incomparably higher than risks and
costs involved. Unlike drug smuggling,
human trafficking is considered in
most countries as a minor infraction
which carries light sentences. No spe-
cial equipment is needed and no
organized network for distribution (like
in the case of drugs) is essential. In
case of danger, the immigrants (who
pay in advance for the “service”) can
be easily abandoned by their guides,
and in practice, they often are. The
ﬁnancial gains made through the traf-
ficking are enormous. Estimates,
based just on the recorded cases
(40,000 immigrants) only in Austria
only for the year 1999, gave ﬁgure of
$100 million. For the whole EU, esti-
mates are that trafﬁckers earned $3
billion in 1999.
Due to their location, Bulgaria and
Romania are the most important entry
points for illegal immigrants. Until
recently, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Serbia were also significant entry
points for numerous immigrants –
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most notably for Iranians (Bosnia) and Chinese
(Serbia). The most popular land route leads from
Bulgaria and Romania through Serbia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Croatia to Slovenia, and from
there to Italy and Austria. Many illegal immi-
grants travel also across Hungary. Equally impor-
tant is the route across the Adriatic Sea.
Numerous routes from Bosnia, Serbia and
Bulgaria (via Macedonia) therefore lead to
Montenegro and Albania, where well-established
channels for clandestine trafﬁc across the sea
exist.
The trafficking in illegal immigrants through
Southeast Europe seems to be organized by the
same groups who were previously engaged in
smuggling of weapons and drugs or in “assist-
ing” refugees to reach safety for a price during
the war. Similarly, the same routes are being used
and the same partners from the other side of the
border are involved. This seems to be especially
the case in the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
In Montenegro and Albania, the trafﬁc in illegal
immigrants across the Adriatic Sea to Italy is
organized by the same people who are engaged
in smuggling of drugs and cigarettes to Italy.
Additional proof that the same people are really
involved is offered by the ﬁndings of the Italian
authorities. According to the former Italian
Finance Minister, the gangs, operating the smug-
gling across the Adriatic Sea often combine two
businesses – the trafﬁcking in illegal immigrants
and the smuggling of drugs. Italian police has
caught immigrants with heroin in their backpacks.
The explanation for this is that they are forced to
act as couriers to pay for their passage.
Trafﬁcking in Women and Girls for the Sex
Industry
Trafﬁcking in women and girls for the sex indus-
try represents an even more alarming and dis-
turbing aspect of the trafﬁcking in human beings.
In most cases, it involves coercion, violence and
humiliation of the victims. Trafﬁcked women and
girls are often forced into prostitution, held in
slave-like conditions, and repeatedly raped, bru-
talized, denied food, water, sleep and medical
care, and sold like property by one brothel owner
or trafﬁcker to another. Many of them are girls
under 18 years of age, and numerous were either
tricked to leave their homes (with false promises
of well-paid employment or marriage) or kid-
napped. In Albania and Kosovo, cases when fam-
ilies sold their own daughters or sisters to traf-
ﬁckers were registered. By various estimates,
hundreds of thousands of women and girls are
trafﬁcked across European borders every year. In
most cases, women and girls from Eastern
Europe are trafﬁcked to the EU, but many (espe-
cially from the former Soviet Union) are trafﬁcked
also to other Eastern European countries and
“employed” in sex industry there. Often, the traf-
ﬁcked girls are forced into prostitution in Eastern
European countries for a certain period while on
their way to the EU.
In recent years (after the end of the
war in the former Yugoslavia), traf-
ficking in women from, into and
through Southeast European states
rapidly increased. The successor
states of the former Yugoslavia
(especially those with the signiﬁcant
international presence) have become
important destination countries for
women and girls from Ukraine,
Russia, Moldova, and Romania.
Belgrade became one of the most
important transit centres. Due to
their location, Bulgaria, Macedonia,
and Albania also became crucial
transit countries for trafficked
women. 
Considering the alarming pace with
which trafﬁcking in women and girls
is spreading, and the horrifying
ordeal the victims of trafﬁcking have
to go through, the realization of how
little has actually been done by the
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regional governments to ﬁght trafﬁcking comes
as a shock. In most of the countries, trafﬁcking is
still considered as having a lower priority as com-
pared to the ﬁght against more “serious” crime
like the drug smuggling.
*   *   *
The above should be ample evidence that the
most potent source of corruption pressure in the
countries of Southeast Europe occurs on a
transnational basis, mostly from cross-border
crime. This has its roots in the particularly violent
transition from communism to democracy which
allowed well-integrated regional criminal net-
works to emerge, primarily with the support of
political elites in these countries. 
This process has affected all countries in the
region, albeit through different mechanisms –
either as part of the achievement of state inde-
pendence or as abusing the opportunities provid-
ed by the international embargoes. Nevertheless,
transition developments in the countries have
taken different shape and were implemented with
varying speed. Thus, while this section reviewed
the regional sources of corruption, the rest of the
report will summarize the national institutional
and legal environments against which these
regional processes develop. 
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The shortcomings of the laws and other regulato-
ry instruments are particularly well exploited by
those involved in corrupt practices. In order to
minimize the conditions favorable to corruption
and to devise mechanisms of control over corrupt
practices in the SEE countries it is necessary to
undertake a comprehensive reexamination of the
existing legislation in terms of sanctions and pre-
vention, as well as envision the appropriate leg-
islative changes. 
This chapter presents a general overview of the
existing anti-corruption legislation and its imple-
mentation. The main objective of the analysis is to
outline the common problems and the speciﬁcs
in the individual countries and to formulate rec-
ommendations regarding the future development
of the legislation and its effective implementa-
tion. The most important issues examined are:
Anti-corruption policy, including the adop-
tion and implementation of anti-corruption
strategies and special anti-corruption laws and
instruments as well as the establishment of
special anti-corruption bodies;
Criminal law, including the sanctions and
other criminal law measures in areas often
marked by corrupt actions;
Criminal procedure with a special focus on
the guarantees for openness and transparency
of the criminal proceedings;
Civil law and procedure, including the laws
and regulations concerning business transac-
tions, company and property registration,
impartiality of the court and speed of the pro-
ceedings, as well as execution of judgments
as a part of civil procedure.
3.1 Anti-Corruption Policy and Special
Anti-Corruption Laws and Instruments
Anti-Corruption Strategies
In most of the countries in the region special
instruments regarding the ﬁght against corrup-
tion in the form of strategies and action plans
have been recently adopted or are in process of
preparation. Although these documents are not
pieces of legislation they have considerable anti-
corruption signiﬁcance since they provide analy-
sis of the current situation in the respective coun-
tries, outline the activities and measures to be
taken including legal reforms, and specify the
institutions responsible for their implementation.  
In Bulgaria the ﬁrst anti-corruption activities
were initiated by the non-governmental sector in
early 1997 and resulted in launching in the spring
of 1997 of the Coalition 20003 anti-corruption
process – an initiative of Bulgarian non-govern-
mental organizations aimed at limiting corruption
in Bulgarian society through the development of
public-private partnership between state institu-
tions, non-governmental organizations, and indi-
viduals. Within the framework of Coalition 2000
an Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Bulgaria was
developed and endorsed by a Policy Forum in
November 1998. The Anti-Corruption Action Plan
successfully became part of the social agenda as
a broadly approved system of measures and
actions for curbing the extremely dangerous
social phenomenon of corruption. Parallel to the
elaboration of the Action Plan Coalition 2000
experts developed a Corruption Monitoring
System, which represents a system of empirical
studies and analytical reports aimed to regularly
present information about the scope of corrup-
tion in the country and the public attitudes,
assessments and expectations. Each year, start-
ing with 1999, the basic ﬁndings of the Corruption
Monitoring System have been incorporated in a
Corruption Assessment Report, which presents a
general evaluation of the state and dynamic of
corruption in Bulgarian society and of the efforts
to counteract corruption in the respective year.
On October 1, 2002, Bulgarian Government
adopted a National Anti-Corruption Strategy
aimed to facilitate comprehensive measures for
achieving greater transparency and accountabili-
ty of the functioning of the state. The Strategy
incorporated many of the measures proposed by
Coalition 2000 Action Plan of 1998. Following the
NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS IN SEE:
III. REGULATORY AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION
3 For more information see www.online.bg/coalition2000.
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adoption of the Strategy, the Government adopt-
ed a Program for the Implementation of the
National Anti-Corruption Strategy and appointed
a special Committee for Coordination of the Anti-
Corruption Activities, chaired by the Minister of
Justice Mr. Anton Stankov. An Operations Plan for
Execution of the National Anti-Corruption
Strategy was recently developed by a joint task
force including experts and representatives of
state institutions and non-governmental organi-
zations. The ﬁrst measures for the implementa-
tion of the Strategy included amendments to the
criminal legislation, the Law on the Judiciary and
the Code of Civil Procedure. 
In Republic of Croatia a group of independent
experts to the Ministry of Justice, Administration
and Local Self-Government, supported by the
Government, prepared a National Anti-Corruption
Program entitled Anti-Corruption Action Plan that
is currently in Parliamentary procedure.4 The
Program explains the harmful consequences of
corruption and contains a comprehensive Action
Plan for fighting corruption with determined
tasks, responsible task carriers and timing. Tasks
are directed towards establishing the rule of law
and improving its effectiveness, establishing of a
speciﬁc body specialized in the prosecution of
cases of corruption, raising the efﬁciency of the
criminal prosecution of corruption, developing
organizational measures in the administrative
system, decentralization, ﬁnancial responsibility
measures and other economic measures, as well
as stimulating political and civil responsibility,
and international activity.
In Romania the elaboration of
an Anti-Corruption Strategy
was launched by the Govern-
ment in 2001. The Strategy
includes the goal of improving
the legal framework related to
the prevention and sanction-
ing of corruption, develop-
ment of the most appropriate
infrastructure for ﬁghting cor-
ruption and organized crime,
continuous training of persons
involved in the ﬁght against
corruption, and ensuring
transparency. 
In November 2001 the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Ser-
bia launched an Anti-Corrup-
tion Initiative including five
basic tenets for ﬁghting cor-
ruption. These are: 1. securing the institutional
frame (court reform, strengthening parliamentar-
ian control); 2. reform of the public administration
(imposing internal and external budget control,
control of the state services); 3. economic reform
(macroeconomic stabilization, liberalization, ﬁs-
cal reform, privatization); 4. motivating the partic-
ipation of civil society (afﬁrmation of media free-
dom, encouraging NGO campaigns); 5. afﬁrma-
tion of the political environment that favors the
ﬁght against corruption (political party ﬁnancing,
conﬂict of interest regulation).
The Anti-Corruption Initiative of the Serbian
Government is divided into two segments: coun-
seling initiative and operative initiative.
• Under the counseling initiative in November
2001 the Government formed the Council for
the Fight against Corruption.
The role of the Council is to give recommenda-
tions to the Government for formulating and
implementing the national anti-corruption strate-
gy and policy. The Council has also an obligation
to monitor concrete measures implemented by
the Government on stopping corruption, and to
evaluate and give suggestions for their improve-
ment. 
Following the request of the Council in January
2002, the Government has announced publicly all
information on the participation of higher state
ofﬁcials in boards of directors of publicly owned
companies, which was one of the major media
events. 
4 The Program could be found at www.transparency.hr
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Information showed that high state ofﬁcials have
several functions which created numerous con-
troversies in the public. As a result the Council
gave initiative for Avoiding Conﬂict of Interest
Law. At the initiative of the Council, the
Government formed a work group, including two
representatives of the Council, which started to
prepare the draft law. The Council also initiated
Registering State Ofﬁcials’ Property Law and
Financing Political Parties Law.
However, in order to further increase the effec-
tiveness of the Council it is necessary to improve
its ﬁnancial independence. 
• Under the operative initiative, the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Serbia has formed the
Committee for the Fight against Corruption.
The Committee has formed specilaized teams
to ﬁght corruption: anti-corruption teams and
task force team.
The anti-corruption teams are made up of the rep-
resentatives of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and
the Republic of Serbia’s State Prosecutor Ofﬁce.
Up to date, 26 teams have been formed in the
ofﬁces of the Ministry of Interior Affairs in all the
larger cities of Serbia. At the disposal of the pub-
lic are special phone numbers, which have been
publicized in all media, and through which the cit-
izens can report any case of corruption that they
encounter. In the ﬁrst 15 days of the functioning
of the teams, there have been 456 reports of cor-
ruption, which resulted in 10 prosecutions against
13 individuals. Plans have been made for greater
media promotion of the teams to increase their
effectiveness.
The task force team is made up of the govern-
ment and the non-government sector. The main
function of the group is to facilitate and ease the
communication ﬂow between various state insti-
tutions and with the civil society. The members
have been selected from the most important
Federal and Serbian state institutions, NGOs,
unions and the commercial community. This
group has also a wide action implementation ini-
tiative, its members having experience and ﬁrst
hand knowledge of corruption in the Serbian
community.
The Ministry of Finance and Economy of the
Republic of Serbia is the main Government coor-
dinator of the State’s ﬁght against corruption. The
Ministry is the home to the Anti-corruption Ofﬁce,
which is the headquarters for the Council for the
Fight against Corruption and the anti-corruption
task force. The Anti-Corruption Ofﬁce is designed
to secure the information ﬂow between all the
parties involved, coordinates relations with the
media and civil society, and manages internation-
al relations concerning the Government’s anti-
corruption initiatives. 
Special Anti-Corruption Legislation
As to the special anti-corruption legislation most
of the countries in the region have preferred the
approach of incorporating individual anti-corrup-
tion provisions in the newly adopted or already
existing laws and regulations rather than adopt-
ing special anti-corruption laws. According to the
prevailing opinions in these countries an anti-cor-
ruption law will make little sense in a legal culture
and environment marked by uncompleted overall
legal reform and ineffective law enforcement.
In Bulgaria a Draft Law on the Fight against
Corruption and Financial Crime was developed
and introduced in Parliament in 1999 providing
for the setting up of a special Government
Agency for the Fight against Financial Crime and
Corruption (ﬁnancial police). The agency was
designed as a specialized division within the
Council of Ministers, and thus subordinated to
the executive. However the draft did not gain the
support of neither the policy makers’ community
nor the civil society and was not further discussed
in the National Assembly. Thus Bulgaria followed
the approach of developing the whole spectrum
of laws and institutional preconditions necessary
to create an environment unfavorable for corrup-
tion instead of adopting a special anti-corruption
law and creating a separate anti-corruption insti-
tution.   
So far only in Macedonia and Romania parallel to
this approach special anti-corruption laws have
been adopted.
In Macedonia a Law against Corruption has been
adopted by the Parliament on April 26, 2002, pro-
viding for the establishment of a State
Commission against Corruption. The Commission
consists of seven legal and economic experts
appointed by the Parliament. Under the Law there
is an obligation for property disclosures for the
politicians and other ofﬁcials holding a high posi-
tion. The members of the Commission shall be
appointed within 6 months after the Law enters
into force, which indicates that the Law shall not
apply for the politicians and senior ofﬁcials, who
were in power until the parliamentary elections in
September 2002. The opposition, media, NGO
and experts have broadly criticized such unfavor-
able solution, which shows that the Government
had no political will to combat corruption within
its own ranks.
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The Romanian National Assembly adopted a
Law on Fighting against Corruption and
Organized Crime (78/2000), which is supposed to
bring some coherence in the legislative acts reg-
ulating this issue. It is also aimed at strengthen-
ing judicial control over a wide range of public
positions by creating a Special Department for
Fighting Corruption reporting to the Supreme
Court of Justice. For the ﬁrst time local units were
created within county courts and special judges
were appointed together with experts from vari-
ous ﬁelds (i.e. public ﬁnance, banking system,
and customs) to deal with important cases of cor-
ruption. However, the organization of local ofﬁces
encounters difﬁculties and the judges complain
that there is lack of notiﬁcations “from reliable
sources” on such cases. Therefore, no major
investigation was yet initiated.
Also in Romania the Government adopted in
early April 2002 an emergency ordinance for set-
ting up a National Anti-Corruption Prosecutor
Ofﬁce (NAP) that will go into operation from
September 1 this year. NAP will deal with such
practices as accepting and offering bribes, abuse
of power, fraud, embezzlement, money launder-
ing, tax evasion, criminal association and stealing
of classiﬁed information from banks and other
industries. The anti-corruption body only deals
with criminal cases involving material losses of
more than 100,000 Euro, or having a large impact
in society. Moreover, NAP will deal with crimes
committed by parliamentarians, government ofﬁ-
cials, judges and those who hold leading posts in
public institutions, independent accounting
departments and banks. NAP was set up as an
independent branch of the Romanian Public
Administration Ministry and is made up of 75
prosecutors, 150 police ofﬁcers and 35 other spe-
cialists. The head of NAP will be appointed by the
country’s president and perform his duty upon
authorization by the Minister of Justice.
3.2. Criminal Law and Procedure
Corruption is a serious crime, threatening the efﬁ-
cient and honest service to the population, under-
mining law enforcement and the respect of law.
In the private sector it increases the costs of
doing business which has adverse effects on
trade and industry and the gross domestic prod-
uct. When corruption has developed into system
of the public administration and the private trade
and industry, the criminal law approach has to be
supplemented by broader measures, such as edu-
cation to bring the values of decent administra-
tion, impartiality and fair-trading to life again. The
attack on the system of corruption has to be sup-
ported also by the broader public, which has to
develop a critical awareness towards shady deal-
ings. Nowadays, there is almost no ﬁeld in socie-
ty where there is no corruption. 
Criminal law has the most direct impact on the
problems of corruption and is among the most
important tools the legal system has to offer in
the ﬁght against corruption. Although the term
“corruption” is not deﬁned in the criminal legisla-
tion of most of the countries in the region their
criminal laws include a number of provisions
aimed at sanctioning various corruption related
offences. In the last few years most of the coun-
tries have focused their efforts on amending the
relevant criminal legislation in order to provide
criminal sanctions for the largest possible range
of corrupt practices and to introduce the
European and international standards.   
Sanctioning of Corruption Related Offences
The criminal laws of all SEE countries provide for
the imposition of sanctions in cases of corruption
related offences. Although the penalties provided
in the laws of the individual countries differ in
terms of type and amount most of the countries
envisage either deprivation of liberty or imposi-
tion of ﬁnes for the offenders.  
In Albania, the new Criminal Code in force since
June 1995 included numerous provisions that
attempted to prevent and punish corruption in the
state administration and the civil service.
Incriminated are the following offences: 
Offering a bribe (Articles 244) – the proposal
for remuneration, gifts, or other beneﬁts made
to an ofﬁcial holding a state function or public
responsibility, with a view to have the later act
or refrain to act against what is expected from
him by law, or to use his inﬂuence towards
other authorities in order to obtain favors,
courtesies, and any other beneﬁts;  
Asking or receiving a bribe (Article 319) – ask-
ing for or unlawfully receiving remuneration,
gifts, or other beneﬁts, as well as procuring
promises to get them, by the judge, the prose-
cutor, the defense attorneys, the experts,
and/or every arbitrator assigned to a case,
with the intent of carrying out or avoiding to
carry out an act that is connected to their func-
tion.
The offering of bribe is punishable by a ﬁne or up
to 5 years of imprisonment, while the penalty
provided for asking or receiving bribes is 5 to 10
years of imprisonment. These provisions give the
courts considerable ﬂexibility and leverage to
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impose criminal penalties in cases of actual or
attempted corruption in areas as different as pub-
lic procurement, judicial proceedings, public
works, money laundering, etc. It is also important
to mention that the Law provides effective tools
to offset corruption incentives in the judiciary sys-
tem. 
However Albanian criminal law has failed to pro-
vide a resolute response to the endemic corrup-
tion in the country. At least one reason for the rel-
ative ineffectiveness of the Albanian criminal law
in the efforts to reduce corruption is of an objec-
tive nature: corruption deals are always kept in
the dark. Secondly, pervasive corruption in the
judicial system is also determined to a consider-
able extent by the diluted professional standards
that are common among judges, prosecutors and
(to a less extent) defense attorneys.
The segment of crime control in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is a responsibility of the individual
Entity Governments while at the state level co-
operation was until recently minimal or non-
existing. On the other hand, criminal law was
designed as an Entity matter and, therefore, we
could until recently talk literally of two separate
criminal justice systems in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.5
As the country moves towards a greater degree
of political conﬁdence so is the inter-Entity crime
on the rise too. Therefore the Ministry of Civil
Affairs and Communications, being one of the six
joint ministries, in collaboration with Ofﬁce of the
High Representative (OHR) will propose a
Criminal Law of BiH regulating cross-Entity crime
and corruption. Inter alia, it will handle money
laundering as a criminal act, as well as the legal
responsibility of individuals in criminal acts.
Meanwhile, RS has adopted a new Criminal Law
in 2000, which engulfed provisions on: stock
exchange dealings, forged bankruptcy, misuse in
the liquidation procedure etc. Following the
adoption of the Criminal Law of BiH, RS through
its Ministry of Justice is likely to take over certain
provisions its current law may be lacking.
In FBiH the Law will be amended before the year’s
end, which should cater for: money laundering,
criminal acts relating to bankruptcy, stock
exchange related activities, criminal acts through
the privatization process (currently only valid
until 2003, i.e. until the privatization process was
deemed to be accomplished). These amendments
will reintroduce conﬁscation of property for those
activities, which led to illegal extra proﬁts. It will
take over certain provisions of the Council of
Europe Criminal and Civil Law Conventions on
Corruption. Generally speaking, the aim of these
revisions is to increase penalties for illegal cor-
rupt acts and it will be harmonized with the BiH
Criminal Law.
Currently both Laws in RS and BiH respectively
penalize equally those who give and take bribe
and do not differentiate between these two cate-
gories.
The Bulgarian Criminal Code envisages criminal
sanctions for several corruption related offences.
The most important of them are as follows:
5 A very important factor for understanding the complexity of crime control in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the internal political
organization of the state and the present state of affairs in the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has been, ever since the
signing of the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement (DPA) in December 1995, administratively divided into two constitutional Entities
with very high level of autonomy. While six ministries exist at the joint state level, the real authorities lay in fact with their coun-
terpart ministries in Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS). Moreover, FBiH being a federal
unit of the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats is further divided into ten Cantons, each of which has its own constitution, parlia-
ment, government, and other decentralized institutional features. FBiH was granted 51 per cent of the BiH territory by the DPA.
The RS with 49 per cent of the land is far more centralized and has no cantonal structure, yet simply municipalities as the only
local political level. In most of BiH and particularly FBiH the division of competencies is not fundamentally clear, which makes
any proper administrative regulation rather difﬁcult. The current political settings have dominated over the post-civil war peri-
od and it is unlikely to change since it is a product of the painstaking political consensus reached after the guns were silenced.
Attempts to streamline the political and legislative processes in such a complex environment have been in the forefront of the
country authorities’ efforts together with the large donor community present in BiH. The interactions between these two fac-
tors have very much determined the development of the country and tackling of the problems. However, it is very worth not-
ing that the international community has treated BiH as a semi-protectorate with its vast range of powers, vested primarily in
the High Representative and his ofﬁce (OHR) that has been imposing laws, permanently removing elected ofﬁcials and
appointing new ones to the top positions in the country. The international community has also played a pivotal role in the
design of the anti-corruption strategy, individual laws directly or indirectly tackling the issue as well as in the overall guidance,
monitoring and revision.
Most of the regulations and legal acts were inherited from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as the war
begun immediately after the disputable declaration of the BiH independence. Consequently, the conditions to build a new reg-
ulatory system had never been established properly. Reconstruction and building of a new regulatory system was one of the
most important tasks in the last couple of years for both Entities and their Governments, as well as for the State administra-
tion. No major player was prepared to do a complete legal revamping of the country and repeal most of the old, socialist leg-
islation and so the process took a long time in adjusting the individual pieces of laws, then harmonizing them among the dif-
ferent political levels and ﬁnally, bringing them in line with the EU directives. Often, legislation would change several times
which has additionally caused insecurity, as the system kept transforming.
Racketeering (Article 213a) – threatening a per-
son with violence, with making public some
disgraceful circumstances, with inﬂicting dam-
ages on property or some other unlawful
actions of grave consequences for that person
or his relatives for the purpose of forcing this
person to dispose of an article or a right or to
undertake a property obligation;
Blackmail (Article 214) – compelling somebody
by force or threat to do, to fail to do or to suf-
fer something contrary to his will and thereby
inﬂicting material damage to that person or to
another, for the purpose of procuring material
beneﬁt for oneself or for another; 
Accepting a bribe (Article 301) – accepting a
gift or any other undue material beneﬁt by an
ofﬁcial: a) in order to perform or to fail to per-
form an act connected with his service, or
because he has performed or failed to perform
such an act; b) in order to violate, or for having
violated his service, where this violation does
not constitute a crime; c) in order to perform
or because of having performed another crime
in connection with his service. Accepting a
bribe also includes the cases where the gift or
material beneﬁt has been given to another
person with the consent of the respective ofﬁ-
cial. The punishment for accepting a bribe is
also imposed to an expert, appointed by a
court, institution, enterprise or organization
where he perpetrates such acts in connection
with the tasks entrusted to him. 
Giving a bribe (Article 304) – giving a gift or
any other material beneﬁt to an ofﬁcial in
order to perform or not to perform an act with-
in the framework of his service, or because he
has performed or has not performed such an
act, including the cases where in connection
with the bribe the ofﬁcial has violated his ofﬁ-
cial duties. The provision applies also as
regards to giving a bribe to an expert, appoint-
ed by a court, institution, enterprise or organi-
zation. However no punishment is imposed on
a person who has given the bribe, if he had
been blackmailed by the ofﬁcial or by the
expert to do so or if he has informed the
authorities of his own accord.
The penalties, provided for racketeering and
blackmail, include deprivation of liberty from 1 up
to 30 years (including life imprisonment for the
cases where the offence has been accompanied
by murder or attempt to murder) and imposition
of ﬁne in the amount of BGN 500 up to 10,000. In
some of the cases the court may also rule conﬁs-
cation of the whole or a part of the property of the
perpetrator. The main penalty provided for
bribery is deprivation of liberty (up to 30 years for
particularly grave cases). Conﬁscation is also
envisaged for some of the offences. A speciﬁc
penalty as regards to bribery offences is the dep-
rivation of speciﬁc rights such as the right to
occupy certain state or public position and the
right to exercise certain profession or activity. 
The following tables provide some statistical data
on the number of criminal cases for blackmail and
bribery for the period 1999 – 2001. 
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Persons Sentenced
Courts
Regional
Courts
District
Courts
Military
Courts
Year Casesopened
Cases
closed Total
Up to 3
years
depriva-
tion of
liberty
From
them:
sen-
tences
on pro-
bation
3-10
years
depriva-
tion of
liberty
10-30
years
depriva-
tion of
liberty
Other
penalties
1999 56 18 22 20 11 2
2000 52 21 31 24 18 7
2001 73 26 29 19 13 2 8
1999 39 15 15 9 7 4 1 1
2000 46 19 28 21 17 5 1 1
2001 34 14 13 9 5 1 3
1999 8 1 2 1 1
2000 11 2 8 7 5 1
2001 13 1 2 2 2
Table 3: Criminal Cases for Racket/Blackmail under Section V “Blackmail” 
of the Criminal Code (Articles 2130-2140)
33
In the year 2000 the Bulgarian Criminal Code
was amended on two occasions. The ﬁrst set of
amendments (in effect from March 21, 2000)
enhanced the criminal measures in areas often
marked by corrupt actions. They affected drug
trafﬁcking by incriminating two new aggravated
offences – enticing or forcing someone to take
drugs. The sanctions were increased and the
forms of crime were expanded relative to the
theft of motor vehicles and smuggling. The
imprisonment previously imposed for libel and
slander was replaced with ﬁne and such crimes
will now be prosecuted on a complaint of the vic-
tim. The second set of amendments to the
Criminal Code (in effect from June 27, 2000)
increased the sanctions for bribery. Aggravated
crimes were introduced, as well as criminal liabil-
ity for the ofﬁcials. Two completely new offences
were incriminated – promising and offering
bribes. The act of the ofﬁcial who has asked for or
has accepted a bribe is criminalized. A scope, in
cases of active bribery of foreign ofﬁcials and
outside the carrying out of an international com-
mercial activity, has been broadened.
Incriminated were also the acts of promising and
offering of bribes to foreign ofﬁcials. The provi-
sion on what is known as “loyalty check” (provo-
cation to bribery) was substantially improved.
The ratiﬁcation of the Criminal Law Convention
on Corruption of the Council of Europe in 2001
was a signiﬁcant step forward as well.
As a follow-up to the adoption of the
Government’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy
the Council of Ministers upon proposal by the
Minister of Justice submitted to the National
Assembly a Draft Law on Amendments to the
Criminal Code. Most of the amendments pro-
posed are in compliance with the international
anti-corruption instruments such as the Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions. 
The most important amendments, currently in
process of discussion in the National Assembly,
envisage:
broadening the scope of the deﬁnition for “for-
eign public ofﬁcial” by including the ofﬁcials
of international parliamentary assemblies and
of international courts (Article 93);
incriminating the bribery in the private sector
(Article 225c);
including the nonmaterial beneﬁts or services
as possible subjects of bribery;
incriminating the passive bribery of foreign
public ofﬁcials (Article 301, paragraph 5);
incriminating the trade in inﬂuence and the
exercising of inﬂuence with the purpose of
receiving beneﬁts (Article 304b);
6 No data for cases for bribery in Regional Courts for 1999.
7 Regional Courts hear cases for bribery under Articles 304, 305 and 305a of the Criminal Code.
8 District Courts hear cases for bribery under Articles 301-303 of the Criminal Code.
9 Military Courts hear cases for bribery under all articles of the Criminal Code.
Persons Sentenced
Courts
Regional
Courts7
District
Courts8
Military
Courts9
Year6 Casesopened
Cases
closed Total
Up to 3
years
depriva-
tion of
liberty
From
them:
sen-
tences
on pro-
bation
3-10
years
depriva-
tion of
liberty
10-30
years
depriva-
tion of
liberty
Other
2000 16 11 9 4 3 1 4
2001 11 6 8 1 1 7
1999 47 27 25 21 19 1 2 1
2000 48 27 31 23 23 1 1 6
2001 29 12 9 5 4 2 2
1999 21 15 16 14 12 2
2000 20 10 7 6 3 1
2001 28 12 17 16 12 1
Table 4: Criminal Cases for Bribery under Articles 301 - 305a of the Criminal Code
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incriminating the bribery of arbiters and in cer-
tain cases the bribery of defense attorneys
(Article 305);
making bribery committed by a magistrate
(judge, prosecutor or investigator) as an
aggravated offense;
repealing the provision of Article 307 on the
inducement to bribery.
increasing the sanctions for bribery of magis-
trates – judges, prosecutors and investigators
(Articles 302 and 304a). 
Another part of the amendments proposed are
aimed to comply with the UN Convention against
the Transnational Organized Crime, the
International Convention on Combating Bomb
Terrorism, the Protocol against the Illegal
Trafﬁcking of Migrants by Earth, Sea and Air,
Protocol on Prevention, Counteraction and
Punishment of the People Trafﬁc, especially of
Women and Children, supplementing the UN
Convention against the Transnational Organized
Crime, all of which were ratiﬁed by the National
Assembly in 2001.
With the forthcoming amendments to the
Criminal Code the main forms of corrupt behavior
are expected to be covered to a fuller extent.
Nevertheless, in order to improve the legislative
rules on bribes (often perceived as a synonym to
corruption) some more steps should be undertak-
en concerning the sanctioning of illegal funding
of political parties and more precisely deﬁning
the term “public ofﬁcials” as major subjects of
passive bribery (at present, for instance, it could
be disputed if a MP or a municipal counselor is a
“public ofﬁcial” who could be the perpetrator of
passive bribery under the present language of
Article 93 of the Criminal Code). As much as the
titles of the chapters in the Criminal Code provide
guidance in the interpretation of their content it
would also be good if the title of the chapter,
which deals with bribery, were amended to
include the opportunities for bribery in the sphere
of the economy as well. Another necessary step is
the regulation by law of administrative liability
(imposition of monetary penalties) for legal per-
sons whose senior ofﬁcials and representatives
have committed crimes of corruption for the ben-
eﬁt of those persons.  
In the Croatian Criminal Law (adopted in 1997
and amended in 1998 and 2000) there is no legal
deﬁnition of corruption, but conventionally it is
regarded as offering and accepting bribes
(Articles 347 and 348); illegal intercession (Article
343), abuse in performing governmental duties
(Article 338), abuse of ofﬁce and ofﬁcial authority
(Article 337), concluding a prejudicial contract
(Article 294), disclosure of an official secret
(Article 351), and disclosure and unauthorized
procurement of a business secret (Article 295).
Each of the above speciﬁcations reveals an indi-
vidual element of the phenomenon of corruption,
and although disputes can occur over its deﬁni-
tion, what is indisputable is that corruption caus-
es social and political damage and that it exists in
the Republic of Croatia.
A Draft Law on Criminal Liability of Legal Persons
for Criminal Offences is currently being prepared
by a governmental working group and is expect-
ed to be adopted soon. The Draft Law provides
that all legal persons, including foreign legal per-
sons, can be held criminally liable. The criminal
liability of legal person would be an indirect lia-
bility, as it would be incurred only through the
conduct of a natural person, authorized to repre-
sent the legal person or acting in the framework
of the legal persons’ activities. The material con-
ditions as to the imputation of the liability to the
legal person are still under discussion. On this
particular point, the drafting team was inspired by
the French and Slovenian legal models.
Regarding sanctions on legal persons, the princi-
pal sanction provided by the Draft Law would be
a ﬁne of a maximal amount of 4 million KN
(approx. 550,000 Euro). Other penalties are also
envisaged, such as dissolution, placing under
judicial supervision, disqualification from the
practice of certain activities, conﬁscation of the
proceeds from the offence, interdiction to obtain
licenses, grants, etc. 
According to estimation by OECD (OECD, 2001)
Croatia now possesses a relatively sophisticated
criminal legislation and a relatively comprehen-
sive anti-money laundering legislation. Although
the laws could be estimated as appropriate, the
main problems are in their implementation.
The Criminal Code of the Republic of
Macedonia has proscribed the following crimi-
nal offences, which deal with potential corruption: 
Misuse of ofﬁcial position and authorization
(Article 353) – acquiring some kind of beneﬁt
by an ofﬁcial person for himself or for another,
or causing damage to another by using his
ofﬁcial position or authorization, by exceeding
the limits of his/her ofﬁcial authorization, or by
not performing his ofﬁcial duty; 
Receiving a bribe (Article 357) – requesting or
receiving a present or some other beneﬁt by
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an ofﬁcial person in order to perform an ofﬁ-
cial act within the framework of his own ofﬁ-
cial authorization which he should not per-
form, or not to perform an ofﬁcial act which he
otherwise must do. Paragraph 2 of this article
covers the situation when the ofﬁcial person
requests or receives a present or some other
beneﬁt, in order to perform an ofﬁcial act with-
in the framework of his own ofﬁcial authoriza-
tion which he must perform, or not to perform
an ofﬁcial act which he otherwise should not
perform.     
Giving a bribe (Article 358) – giving or promis-
ing an ofﬁcial person a present or other bene-
ﬁt to incite him/her to act in the manner,
described above (Article 357). It is very impor-
tant to mention that the offender of the crimi-
nal offence “giving a bribe” who gave a bribe
upon the request from the ofﬁcial person, and
who reported this before the crime was dis-
covered, shall be acquitted from punishment.
Unlawful mediation (trade in influence)
(Article 359) – receiving a reward or some
other beneﬁt by using one’s ofﬁcial or social
position and inﬂuence, in order to mediate for
some ofﬁcial act to be executed or not. 
All these offences are settled in Chapter 30 of the
Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia
named “Crimes against Ofﬁcial Duty.” Other cor-
ruption related crimes are money laundering
(Article 273), trafﬁcking (Article 278), etc.
All these provisions are part of Criminal Code that
entered into force in November 1996. In year 1999
the Code was amended with provisions dealing
with foreign public ofﬁcials and legal persons.
Namely, Article 122 of Criminal Code was amend-
ed with deﬁnitions of foreign ofﬁcial person and
foreign legal person. Also, responsible persons
from foreign legal persons were proscribed as
possible offenders of criminal offences receiving
a bribe, giving a bribe, and unlawful mediation.
This is in accordance with international efforts to
combat corruption, including those of the Council
of Europe. All these criminal offences are quite
modern and have been amended in past few
years with adding foreign persons (legal and
physical) as potential active or passive perpetra-
tors of this criminal offence. Also there are provi-
sions acquitting from sanctions those persons
who collaborate with authorities before they are
discovered. 
There are no adequate provisions in the Criminal
Code for provocation for bribery, but in practice it
works with legal coverage of the provisions sanc-
tioning the giving of bribes. There are no legal
provisions in Macedonian law, which regulate the
legal situation of “agent provocateur”. 
Analyzing the annual reports of Public
Prosecutors Office of Republic of Macedonia
about this kind of crime, numbers can seem
strange. Namely, in the last three years (1999,
2000 and 2001) the number of prosecuted per-
sons per year in Macedonia for the criminal
offences receiving a bribe and giving a bribe was
between 15 and 20, but for the criminal offence
misuse of ofﬁcial position and authorization, they
were about 500. These ﬁgures show very small
number of criminal procedures for classic corrup-
tion cases. It is very difﬁcult to prove that such
criminal offence has taken place without at least
one of the participants in the criminal event
reporting to authorities about offering or asking
the bribe. In this situation police rather reports to
prosecutor criminal offence misuse of ofﬁcial
position and authorization because it is easier to
prove it.
Legislative jurisdiction that is in force in Serbia is
divided between the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. The gener-
al part of the Criminal Code is in the domain of
the Federation while the special part, which
includes incriminations of most corruption
offences, is in the jurisdiction of the republics. 
Serbian legislation has not even mentioned the
term “corruption” at all until recently. Criminal
Code amendments adopted in March 2002
imposed corruption as a crime for the ﬁrst time in
the history of Serbian legal system. Although
Serbian legal system still does not recognize a
single deﬁnition of corruption, amendments of
Serbian Criminal Code that have been made in
2002 provide a number of corruption and corrup-
tion-related offences according to international
legal instruments, in particular the Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.
Furthermore, the recent amendments of the
Serbian Criminal Code introduced a completely
new chapter related to Corruption Offences
(Chapter XXI A).
The criminal law regulations contain provisions
pertaining the criminal bribe taking offences
(Article 254: Accepting a Bribe) and giving bribe
(Article 255: Offering a Bribe). Article 242 pertains
to misuse of professional capacity (Misuse of
Ofﬁcial Position). Article 243 of the Criminal Code
of Serbia also pertains to judges, sanctioning vio-
lations of the law on the part of judges with the
purpose of securing advantages for themselves
and other persons. Giving false statements
before a court of law by witnesses and experts is
also sanctioned (Articles 206 and 207 of the
Criminal Code of Serbia), as well as abuse of trust
on the part of lawyers (Article 179). Relevant
incrimination provided in the Serbian Criminal
Code is also illegal mediation and trading in inﬂu-
ence (Article 253).
Minimum sentence for bribe receiver is 1 year of
imprisonment, and for bribe giver a minimum of
6 months of imprisonment. Conﬁscation of the
received gifts and beneﬁts is prescribed, except if
the offender has voluntarily reported the offence
before its discovery; in such case, the bribe is
returned to the giver.
Chapter XXI A introduces special corruption
offences, a large number of which were already
sanctioned by the general provisions on bribery.
Corruption offences are listed in this way: corrup-
tion in the administrative bodies (Article 255b),
misuse of budget means (Article 255v), corrup-
tion in public procurements (Article 255g), cor-
ruption in the process of privatization (Article
255d), corruption in judiciary (Article 255dj),
abuse of proxy or attorney function (Article 255e),
corruption in the health system (Article 255zh),
corruption in the education system (Article 255z),
stipulating sports results (Article 255i). Very differ-
ent sanctions are prescribed for these incrimina-
tions, ranging from one to ten years of prison.
Incriminations of public sector corruption cover
both ofﬁcials of the Republic of Serbia and ofﬁ-
cials of the FRY. Corruption with a foreign element
or foreign public officials is not sanctioned.
Although bribery in private sector is criminalized
through the term of “responsible person,” the
Criminal Code does not give any deﬁnition of a
“responsible person.” According to the jurispru-
dence of the courts, the “responsible person”
would be any person in charge of particular tasks
within a legal entity (enterprises, public compa-
nies, funds, institutions, organizations, etc.), a
government body, or a body of local self-govern-
ment and administration.
A person that gives a bribe can be exempted from
the sanction if he proves that he has been solicit-
ed by the public ofﬁcial to do so, but only if he has
reported the act to the adequate law enforcement
authority before the crime was revealed (Serbian
Criminal Code, Article 255, paragraph 3). The
amendments to the Code in 2002 have introduced
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additional special mitigation measures for cor-
ruption and some corruption related offences.
Article 255a prescribes that disclosure of the
offence, perpetration, organization or prevention
of committing the offence, may be punished
more leniently. 
The Criminal Code comprises a number of
offences, which do not seem at ﬁrst sight as relat-
ed directly to corruption, but all these areas have
been severely affected by corruption, and sanc-
tioning these offences have a direct potential to
penalise quite widespread forms of corruption in
the Serbia today. The list includes: 
Offences against the electoral procedure: falsi-
ﬁcation of the results of elections (Article 84);
destruction of documents with records of elec-
tions (Article 85);
Offences against the economic system: uncon-
scientious conduct of business affairs (Article
136); causing of bankruptcy (Article 137). The
other offences against economic system are:
deliberate causing of damage to loan-givers,
abuse of authorisations in the conduct of busi-
ness (Article 86g), conclusion of contracts
harmful to one’s company (Article 140), revela-
tion and unauthorised acquisition of a com-
mercial secret, illegal usurpation of socially
owned land, illegal management and alloca-
tion of residential premises, and discrimina-
tion between customers (Article 152).
Offences against the integrity of the judiciary:
commission of acts that cause obstacles to the
process of deriving judicial proofs, illegal facil-
itation of commission of certain judicial
actions.
Offences against the integrity of ofﬁcial duty
performance: abuse of ofﬁcial position, trans-
gression of the law by a judge or magistrate
(Article 243), illegal release of a detained per-
son (Article 244), unscrupulous ofﬁcial duties
performance, illegal acceptance or making of
payments (Article 246), cheating in the per-
formance of ofﬁcial duties, ofﬁcial secret reve-
lation, fraud, illegal use of ofﬁcial resources,
illegal mediation or facilitation between par-
ties.
As most aspects of life in Serbia are affected by
corruption this list may not be entirely exhaus-
tive, so the criminal legislation that relates to
aspects that are not immediately associated with
corruption has the potential to penalise corrup-
tion in Serbia, which means that this list is an
indication of the current state of the Serbian crim-
inal law.
As far as acceptance of bribes is concerned, items
of Criminal Code of Serbia are virtually identical
to the corresponding paragraphs of Article 179 of
Criminal Code of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia: Accepting a Bribe. Other provisions
of the Criminal Code of FRY that may refer to cor-
ruption are: violation of neutrality in business
affairs (Article 163); creating and using of monop-
oly position (Article 163); abuse of ofﬁcial position
(Article 174); illegal mediation (Article 180); trans-
gression of the law by judges and magistrates
(Article 181); illegal acceptance or making pay-
ments; illegal facilitation of making business
(Article 198).
Immunity
An important issue regarding corruption related
criminal rules is the immunity from criminal pros-
ecution. The link between immunity and corrup-
tion has been publicly debated for a long time
and cited as an important issue in several inter-
national documents. Thus, for instance,
Resolution (97) 24 on the 20 Guiding Principles
for the Fight against Corruption of the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe states that
countries should “limit immunity from investiga-
tion, prosecution or adjudication of corruption
offences to the degree necessary in a democratic
society.” Despite the ongoing debate in individual
countries the present situation is as follows.
In the Constitution of Albania, immunity is clear-
ly deﬁned for the President of the Republic,
Members of the Parliament, Members of the
Constitutional and Supreme Court, Members of
the Government, judges of all levels, the General
Prosecutor, the Ombudsman and the High State
Audit. The Constitution deﬁnes how immunity is
revoked, and for which reasons. However, there
have been only a few cases over the last 10 years
when deputies have lost their immunity and were
convicted to imprisonment on corruption
charges.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina according to the
Law on Immunity,10 the following persons are
entitled to immunity: Members of the BiH
Presidency, Delegates of the House of Peoples
and Members of the House of Representatives,
Co-chairs and Vice-chair of the BiH Council of
10 Law on Immunity, (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal)
Ministers, Ministers and their Deputies, Judges of
the BiH Constitutional Court, Governor and
Members of the Central Bank Governing Board.
All ofﬁcials and other persons employed by or
authorized to represent the Presidency,
Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Ministers
with Ministries, Constitutional Court, Central
Bank and other institutions carrying out the activ-
ities from within the competencies of Bosnia and
Herzegovina have the right to immunity in the
exercise of their duties for the common institu-
tions and while traveling to and from the institu-
tions and the place of permanent or temporary
residence.
In Bulgaria according to the Constitution the
Members of Parliament, the President and the
Vice-President of the Republic, the Constitutional
Court Judges and the magistrates enjoy immuni-
ty. The immunity of a Member of Parliament could
be lifted only by a decision of the National
Assembly, while the one of the President and the
Vice President – by a decision of the
Constitutional Court upon proposal by at least
three-forths of the Members of Parliament. The
immunity of the Constitutional Court Judges
could be removed by the Constitutional Court
itself, and the immunity of the magistrates could
be removed by the Supreme Judicial Council. The
failed attempt in year 2001 to amend the
Constitution on the issue of MPs’ and magis-
trates’ immunity makes it practically impossible
to introduce some of the relevant changes in the
criminal regulations directed against corruption.
However the issue of immunity, especially the
one of magistrates, continues to be subject of dis-
cussion in view of a future amendment of the
Constitution.
According to the Article 75 of the Constitution of
Croatia the Members of the Croatian Parliament
enjoy immunity. No representative can be prose-
cuted, detained or punished for an opinion
expressed or vote cast in the Croatian Parliament.
No representative can be detained, nor can crim-
inal proceedings be instituted against him, with-
out the consent of the Croatian Parliament. A rep-
resentative may be detained without the consent
of the Croatian Parliament only if he has been
caught in the act of committing a criminal offence
which carries a penalty of imprisonment of more
than ﬁve years. In such a case, the President of
the Croatian Parliament is notiﬁed thereof. If the
Croatian Parliament is not in session, approval for
the detention of a representative, or for the con-
tinuation of criminal proceedings against him, is
given and his right to immunity decided by the
credentials-and-immunity committee, such a
decision being subject to subsequent conﬁrma-
tion by the Croatian Parliament. Further details
about immunity of MPs, are regulated with the
Standing Orders of Croatian Parliament (adopted
in 2001). According to the Article 105 of the
Constitution, the President of the Republic enjoys
immunity. The President of the Republic may not
be detained nor may criminal proceedings be
instituted against him without prior consent of
the Constitutional Court. The President of the
Republic may be detained without prior consent
of the Constitutional Court only if he has been
caught in the act of committing a criminal offence
which carries a penalty of imprisonment of more
than ﬁve years. In such a case the state body
which has detained the President of the Republic
shall instantly notify the President of the
Constitutional Court thereof. According to Article
121 of the Constitution judges enjoy immunity in
accordance with the law. Judges and lay asses-
sors who take part in the administration of justice
cannot be called to account for an opinion or a
vote given in the process of judicial decision-mak-
ing unless there exists violation of law on the part
of a judge, which is a criminal offence. A judge
may not be detained in criminal proceedings ini-
tiated for a criminal offence committed in per-
formance of his judicial duty without prior con-
sent of the National Judicial Council. According to
the Article 126 of Constitution judges of the
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia
enjoy same immunity as members of the
Croatian Parliament. According to the Law about
the National Judicial Council (adopted in 1993)
the President and the Members of the National
Judicial Council also enjoy immunity.
Several constitutional rules in Macedonia pro-
tect the President, Members of Parliament,
Members of the Government, judges, prosecu-
tors and other public ofﬁcials from harassment.
These rules have been adopted to protect the
function, and not the person. However, this pro-
cedure is sometimes perceived as privilege of
certain persons. The question becomes particular-
ly serious in the context of prosecution of
Members of Parliament and Government for
offences of corruption as such offences are usual-
ly intimately linked with the function. These rules
are normally applicable to investigation and pros-
ecution of all kinds of criminal offences, not just
for corruption. The Parliament has to authorize
arrest and detention for criminal offences with
proscribed maximum punishment of ﬁve years of
imprisonment.
According to Article 87 of the Constitution of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, people’s
deputy in the Federal Parliament (People’s Assem-
bly of FRY) cannot be detained except if caught
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executing a crime for which at least six years of
prison is prescribed. The same immunity system
is valid for the judges of Federal Court (Article
100), members of the Federal Government (Arti-
cle 100) and Federal Public Prosecutor (Article
112). Federal Parliament can lift the immunity of
people’s deputies, Federal Court is competent for
the immunity of the judges, and Federal Govern-
ment for immunity of its members. The Constitu-
tion of Serbia provides exactly the same immuni-
ty system for the Republican Parliament (People’s
Assembly of the Republic of Serbia) and Republi-
can Government. Republican Public Prosecutor
and judges do not enjoy immunity.  
Criminal Procedure
Criminal procedure mechanisms play a very
important role for the quality and speed of prose-
cution as well as for the procedures of the impo-
sition and execution of penalties for corruption
crimes.  
Criminal proceedings and trials in Albania are
open and transparent by law, and anyone wishing
so can attend them. There are, however, some
technical obstacles. For instance the courtrooms
are small, not comfortable, and they lack the nec-
essary infrastructure to accommodate everyone
who wants to attend. However, this is a technical
rather than a principle issue. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Criminal Code
of the Republika Srpska, Criminal Code of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Criminal Procedure Code for the Federation of
BiH ensure the openness and transparency of
criminal proceedings, for example: 11
The main trial is public.
The main trial may be attended by persons
who have reached the age of majority. 
From the opening of the session to the end of
the main trial the panel of judges may at any
time, automatically or on motion of the princi-
pals, but always after hearing them, exclude
the public for the entire main trial or a part of
it if this is in the interest of the national securi-
ty, or if this is required to preserve a national,
military, ofﬁcial or important business secret,
to preserve public law and order, to protect
morality in a democracy, personal or intimate
life of the accused or the injured, or to protect
the interests of a minor or a witness.
The order to exclude the public is made by the
panel in a decision which must be substantiat-
ed and made public.
The decision to exclude the public may be
contested only in the appeal of the verdict.
The complete content of the verdict is entered
in the main trial record, as well as indication as
to whether the verdict has been a decision
concerning costs of criminal proceedings, con-
cerning a claim under property law, and con-
cerning whether the ﬁnal verdict is to be made
public through the press, radio or television.
The Law on Criminal Procedure determines the
costs and duration of prosecutions. It currently
exists in both Entities, thought its structures have
thus far not secured either a quick or an inexpen-
sive procedure and the investigative bodies had
limited authority, i.e. the entire process was large-
ly inefﬁcient.
Currently efforts are underway between the BiH
authorities at both the State and Entity level
together with the OHR to prepare new laws at
both levels. The very initial draft is being prepared
at the BiH level. 
In FBiH the currently existing position of an inves-
tigative judge is to be abolished and replaced
with public prosecution. The number of mecha-
nisms to trigger an appeal is to be reduced, the
request for protection of legality as an extraordi-
nary appellation mechanism is to be repealed and
new investigative techniques are to be intro-
duced. In RS, the new Law will regulate the roles
of the process subjects and also introduce new
processes for the purpose of the pre-investigation
procedure. However the reform is still in process
of implementation and therefore its expected
anti-corruption effect is difﬁcult to be evaluated.  
In Bulgaria the amendments to the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1999, in force since
January 1, 2000, came to meet modern require-
ments to the criminal prosecution system – con-
solidation of the court’s role as the principal over-
seer of procedure and the trial phase as the cen-
tral stage in criminal proceedings; judicial control
over coercive measures which may infringe upon
basic human rights at the pre-trial phase; com-
petitiveness in court; expedited procedure; and
introduction of differentiated procedures.
Nevertheless, these amendments did not have a
signiﬁcant contribution for progress in combating
11 Criminal Code of the Republika Srpska, Criminal Code of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Criminal Procedure Code
for the Federation of BiH, (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal)
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crime in general and corruption in particular.
Admittedly, the period since these amendments
went into force has been short and it may be too
early to judge about their effectiveness but still it
should be noted that practical problems have
already emerged, primarily due to some legisla-
tive amendments which were not very appropri-
ate. Several of these amendments were made
with the Law on Amendment to the Code of
Criminal Procedure, in force since May 1, 2001,
which was passed at the very end of the mandate
of the 38th National Assembly. These changes
have had a negative inﬂuence on the efﬁciency of
the Judiciary’s work. To the greatest degree this
applies to the amendments on the issue of plea
bargaining, which very quickly won recognition
as an important procedural technique for acceler-
ating criminal prosecution and preventing corrupt
practices between defendants and magistrates.
Data from cases tried in 2000 shows that 36, 6 %
(more than 1/3) were concluded through plea bar-
gaining.
The legal community also insisted that the
amendments in question were not in line with
European standards and they were not backed by
necessary funding and would be inefﬁcient.
As a whole, the 2001 amendments to the Code of
Criminal Procedure have slowed down criminal
procedure and made it more expensive. Serious
fears also exist that the quality of administration
of justice will be reduced due to the court clog as
courts have to deal with activities for which they
should not be responsible – as a result the per-
centage of detected and punished crimes, includ-
ing those involving corruption, will decrease.
In order to improve the efﬁciency of criminal pro-
cedure, new legislative solutions are necessary.
These actions must be based on a long-term anti-
corruption strategy which will serve the public
rather than short-term particularistic interests.
The causes for the inefﬁcient operation of some
of the questionable provisions as well as the
experience so far must be thoroughly analyzed in
order to ﬁnd a solution to the low detection of the
crimes of corruption. It is recommended that after
such an analysis, a new Code of Criminal
Procedure be drafted; amendments in the sphere
of execution of penalties should also be adopted.
On issues related to good governance, experts in
Croatia put particular emphasis on the need for
the setting-up of a policy advice capacity. As
regards the rule of law, it is necessary to com-
plete the legal and institutional framework, in par-
ticular through the review of the conﬁscation and
provisional measures regime and the revision of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. With regard to
bribery of public ofﬁcials in business transac-
tions, three areas were presented as priorities: 1)
improvement of the repressive framework by
streamlining the legislation in speciﬁc areas, such
as corporate liability; 2) promotion of integrity in
business via the development of codes of con-
duct and promotion of high corporate standards;
3) enhancement of enforcement measures
through training of tax professionals for detecting
bribes (OECD, 2001).
It is very important to mention that authorities in
Macedonia, which combat criminal offences,
face huge obstacle in ﬁght against corruption.
Namely, Article 17 of the Constitution of Republic
of Macedonia has proscribed very strict rules for
eavesdropping and other forms of interrupting
private communications. That practically means
that it is forbidden for police to monitor commu-
nications, and to use this material in court as evi-
dence. Also, there are no proscribed rules in the
relevant laws for performing special investigative
measures, such as legal use of agent provocateur,
controlling deliveries, etc.
One of the basic rules of criminal procedure is
publicity. Public can be present in the courtroom,
with some exceptions, in accordance with Article
6 of European Convention for Human Rights.
Sometimes media, looking for attractive stories,
are interested in the case in the very beginning of
the procedure, violating the rule of innocence of
the person, and later, if criminal procedure really
starts, losing the interest and ceasing to inform
the public about the case.
Procedure in cases of corruption is very long, and
usually lasts one or two years. This happens espe-
cially in the situation when the accused person is
not in detention, since in such case, they often try
to postpone the conclusion of the case. That
makes the procedure very expensive. 
3.3. Civil Law and Procedure
The development of civil legislation, though not
always directly affecting corruption, could also
deter or contribute to it. Civil law could contribute
to the removal of the existing legal barriers as
regards to business, which will result in minimiz-
ing the conditions for ﬂourishing of corruption.
Therefore it is important to examine the civil law
provisions and procedures, concerning signiﬁ-
cant matters such as:
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business transaction (including acquisition of
property, privatization and concessions);
company legislation and commercial bank-
ruptcy;
company and property registration, etc.
Acquisition of Property, Privatization and
Concessions
Acquiring property in the countries in transition
has been in many cases subject to corruption.
This conclusion refers in particular to the process
of privatization and the granting of concessions
since privatization and concession deals are in
many cases target for corruption. 
Based on the civil law, the acquisition of property
in Albania can take place according to the provi-
sions of the Civil Code and other ways deﬁned by
special laws. Some of the ways to acquire prop-
erty are: acquisition by contract (Article 164);
acquisition by inheritance (Article 165); acquisi-
tion by goodwill of movable properties (Article
166); positive prescription (Article 168); acquisi-
tion by merger (Article 173); acquisition by pro-
cessing property (Article 177).
Another form of using property (rather than buy-
ing it) is a concession. The Law (No. 7973, July 26,
1995) on the Concessionaries was approved 6
years ago, but has been implemented only during
the last 3 years. Although the need and the possi-
bilities can make this investment form widely
used, the number of the concessions has been
very limited.
The following legal improvements are suggested
in order to ﬁght corrupt practices:
The Law must place terms for the main proce-
dures. In the case of the bid the period should
be no more than 60 days from the promulga-
tion to the supply assessment. It is necessary
to determine clearly this period because it
helps the private investor and eliminates abus-
ing;
According to Article 11 of the Law, the conces-
sionaire company is obligated to form a com-
mercial association and to register it in the tri-
bunal within 30 days from the signing of con-
tract. This is difﬁcult because there is a long
period from the moment of signing to its
enforcement and there is no reason to create a
company that does not act. At the same time,
not respecting this law is a violation. That is
why it is necessary to change the law so that
the registration of the company can be related
to the enforcement of the contract;
The law requirement to determine the fees,
professional payments, etc. in the contract is
not accepted by investors, because of the
impossibility of accomplishing it in the time of
contract signing.
The Law doesn’t clearly express what the
“industrial zone” notion means, and that
might give way to abuse and misunderstand-
ing. 
The phenomenon of unjustly acquiring property
during the transitional period has thrived for a
number of reasons, among which the most
important are:
Acquisition of property from politically afﬁliat-
ed people as a reward for their political loyal-
ty;
Disrespect of legal framework and exploitation
of the weak implementation power of the legal
framework;
Directly corrupting public ofﬁcials who turn a
blind eye on unjust procedures that lead to
property acquisition.  
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Law on Foreign
Investment and Concessions in Republika Srpska
(adopted in April 1998) stipulates that conces-
sions are granted by the Government of RS.
Concessions may not be given to foreign persons
for any activity on the territory of RS in areas,
which, according to the provisions regulating
general national defense, are considered as for-
bidden zones. For the use of goods of public inter-
est in accordance with the Space Plan of RS, con-
cessions are given by the Government, but prior
to that, the opinion of the National Assembly of
RS should be obtained. In other cases the
Government has to obtain the opinion of the
respective governing ministry. Concessions may
be given for duration of up to 30 years.
Concessions are granted under the condition that
the business to be conducted secures the mainte-
nance of the technical and technological unity of
the system, its efﬁcient functioning and rational
management, and that it does not jeopardize life.
Concessions are regulated by a contract in writ-
ing.
In the FBiH, concessions are regulated by the
Cantonal Concession Law and the Foreign
Investment Law. Concessions must gain the
approval of the federal agency responsible for the
foreign economic relations and the district can-
tonal government agency responsible for eco-
nomic activities. The competent cantonal and fed-
eral agencies may permit the foreign investor to
build, operate and transfer after a certain period
of time, under the conditions set out in the per-
mit, a speciﬁed facility, installation or a plant on a
state-owned or public-owned land.
Privatization is additionally supervised by the
Entity Assemblies, which directly supervise work
of the Entity Privatization Agencies, besides the
Entity Governments that regulate the mere oper-
ations, but not the essence of their work or the
administrative line of accountability.
Due to the inﬂuence of politics on public compa-
nies, and to some extent, on private companies,
corruption in this area is still signiﬁcant. This is
particularly true in the pre-privatization period
and in the course of the privatization itself, as will
be discussed in the later chapters of this paper.
In Croatia the primary legal framework for acqui-
sition of property, business transactions and pub-
licly traded companies consists of the 1993
Company Law (CL), the 1995 Law on Issuing and
Trade of Securities (amended in 1998) and the
1997 Law for the Takeover of Joint Stock
Companies. All traded securities must be in the
legal form of shares in joint stock companies,
which are governed by the Company Law. While
moving towards integration with the EU, the legal
reform necessary for that integration remains at
an early stage. Croatia’s laws have not yet been
comprehensively reviewed for compliance with
the Directives of the EU. The Securities Law gov-
erns the securities markets and establishes the
primary securities regulatory agencies: the
Croatian Securities Depository Agency (SDA) and
the Croatian Securities Commission (CSC). The
Securities Law also regulates the trading of secu-
rities and sets out the extent of civil and criminal
liabilities. Under the Securities Law, insider trad-
ing and market manipulation are prohibited and
subject to both ﬁnes and imprisonment. Current
levels of disclosure do not allow the ownership
structure of Croatian companies to be clearly
identiﬁed. Information provided is based on esti-
mates by market participants.
SDA was created in April 1997 according to Article
84 of the Law on the Issuing and Trading of
Securities (adopted in 1995) and Article 177 of the
Company Law (adopted in 1993). The mandate of
the SDA is to operate as the Croatian Central
Registry/Depository for all forms of securities and
to contribute to the competitiveness of the
Croatian capital markets through providing elec-
tronic clearing, settlement and depository servic-
es. The SDA was fully operational by November
1999 and by March 31, 2001 it had completed reg-
istration of about 150 of the most-actively traded
companies, which represent close to 100 percent
of trading. 
Founded in 1996, the CSC is the administrative
body responsible for the licensing and monitor-
ing of issuers, intermediaries, investment funds,
portfolio managers, brokers and advisors as well
as investors. Under the 1995 Securities Law, the
CSC is empowered to monitor and investigate all
securities trading and, as appropriate, refer cases
to the commercial courts or the prosecutor-gener-
al. CSC is governed by a chairman, two deputy
chairmen and three other members, all nominat-
ed by the Government of Croatia and appointed
by the Croatian Parliament for a term of six years,
with the terms of two commissioners expiring
every two years. The members of the
Commission are prohibited from acting as mem-
bers of the management, boards of directors,
oversight committees or other bodies of issuers
of securities. They may not perform any other
service or function, which might inﬂuence their
independence, or diminish their public reputa-
tion. The Commission is funded by the state
budget. The Commission can initiate investigation
of its own accord or upon the notiﬁcation of third
parties. In cases of non-compliance or violation of
the Securities Law by market participants, the
Commission may give warnings, halt trading, and
publicize cases of abuse practices. The
Commission can only investigate violations
directly related to securities trading. CSC does
not have administrative powers to impose ﬁnes,
but must refer the case to the commercial courts.
Violations of the criminal code are referred to the
prosecutor-general. Administrative decisions by
CSC can be appealed to the administrative court. 
In Croatia when establishing a joint-stock compa-
ny or a limited liability company, a domestic or
foreign investor may invest money, goods and
rights. A joint-stock company may also be estab-
lished by a single natural person or legal entity. A
company may be established by one or more per-
sons. A foreign natural person is allowed to oper-
ate as a sole trader in Croatia provided he, or she,
holds a work permit and the condition of reci-
procity is met. Before starting to engage in hand-
icrafts, the person is required to obtain a license,
which is issued by the respective County ofﬁce,
dependant on where the headquarters of the par-
ticular handicraft is located. Preferential crafts are
approved by the appropriate Ministry, dependant
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on the type of handicraft. Law and rules are clear,
so one could estimate that here are no serious
corruption related risks. 
Although these provisions create the necessary
regulatory and institutional preconditions for
transparent capital market, the successful coun-
teraction to corruption could be achieved only
through their effective practical implementation.
There are also Law on Public Procurement, Law
on Company Registration, Law on Litigation
Procedure, Law on Impartiality of Court, Law on
Privatization, which however do not have special-
ly articles regarding the combat against corrup-
tion. 
In Macedonia the acquisition of the property is
regulated by the Law on Ownership and Other
Property Rights (published in the Ofﬁcial Gazette
of the Republic of Macedonia no 18/01).
According to the Law, all domestic and foreign
persons, including the State, as well as self-gov-
ernment units, may acquire ownership rights
under conditions and method prescribed by the
Law. The methods for acquiring the property are
the following: acquisition through purchasing
contract, inheritance, gift, positive prescription,
merge ring, payment of unpaid debts, and other.
Corruption as regards to acquiring property main-
ly affects the privatization of the former state
owned companies. Depending on the size of
enterprises and method of selling, the Privatiza-
tion Agency signs different types of contracts
with the new owner after the completion of the
privatization process12 and submits the sale con-
tract to the relevant Court of Registry, which eras-
es the enterprise from the corresponding Reg-
istry.
The concession is one of the ways for using the
property for a certain period of time. According to
the Law on Concession a biding procedure is nec-
essary for getting the concession right on the
property. The Bid includes the conditions and the
manner of utilization of the property, carrying out
the concession activities, the period and the
amount of the reimbursement. A concessionaire
agreement is signed with the best bidder. The
concession is obliged to perform the concession-
aire activities in accordance with the Concession
agreement. The concession is withdrawn if the
concessionaire fails to start with the performing
of the concession activities in the period set forth
in the Agreement. However despite the existing
provisions for bidding and the requirements con-
cerning concession agreements the procedure is
still not fully transparent. Therefore there is a
need for amending the law in order to achieve
greater transparency and to prevent corrupt prac-
tices.
In Serbia the Government proposed a set of ﬁve
laws with the objective to further regulate ﬁnan-
cial markets and prevent corruption. These are:
Final Account of the 2000 Budget with Budget
Inspection Report, Organic Budget Law, Public
Procurement Law, Tobacco Law, and Games of
Chance Law. 
Company Legislation and Commercial
Bankruptcy
In Albania the insolvency procedure is based on
the Law No.8017 (date 25/10/1995) on Bankruptcy
Procedures. The law favors creditors over other
sorts of investors. At the moment the creditors of
the companies are banks. The arguable risk about
such a law is that at a time of ﬁnancial distress,
banks are keen to get their money back as soon as
they can and they do not care much about the
company business. That deﬁnitely leads to unfa-
vorable ﬁre sale valuations at the expense of the
other ﬁnancial claimants of the company. Having
said that, it is worth noting that the credit, extend-
ed to the corporate sector, accounts for approxi-
mately 5% of the country’s GDP.
Amendments to the Bulgarian Commercial
Code, in force since October 17, 2000, concern
two main areas - company law and commercial
bankruptcy law. Harmonization of the company
law section with the EC directives on publicity,
equity and single member limited liability compa-
nies and the adjustment of the legal provisions
for joint stock companies will enhance conﬁdence
in equity trading, reduce the possibilities for
abuse and ensure better transparency and the
protection of creditor and third party interests.
One of the provisions expected to improve the
quality of the administration of justice and to
have a distinct anticorruption effect is the new
Article 613b. It enables appeals before the
Supreme Court of Cassation against all rulings
delivered in the course of or putting an end to
insolvency proceedings and also prevents local
level versions of insolvency case-law and the dis-
12 Such contracts are the ones for purchasing small or medium sized enterprises, purchasing by public announcement for col-
lecting offers and by direct agreement, sale of enterprises to entities undertaking the managing of the enterprise, transforma-
tion of large sized enterprises, transformation by sale of all assets of the enterprise, issuing of shares for additional investment
and leasing of enterprise. 
pute resolution based on local interests and con-
juncture, rather than on law. Thus, the Supreme
Court of Cassation would be able to exercise its
Constitutional power, viz. to exert the ﬁnal control
for the correct enforcement of the existing legis-
lation.
The amendments to the commercial bankruptcy
legislation have not yet brought a real accelera-
tion to bankruptcy procedures and therefore have
failed to adequately deter interested parties from
seeking resolutions through corrupt means.
A signiﬁcant new amendment to the section of
the Commercial Code which deals with re-struc-
turing of companies (mergers, acquisitions, spin-
offs, splits and transformations) is now being
considered. This amendment comes as a
response to the need for harmonization of
Bulgarian legislation with EU standards and aims
to put an end to the current practice of restructur-
ing in an atmosphere of lack of transparency and
acting at the expense of some of the partners
involved which should signiﬁcantly improve the
business climate.
It is still necessary to adopt a Law on Bank
Bankruptcy, developed and discussed since 2000,
in order to ensure greater stability and speed in
bankruptcy proceedings and to enforce control
over the receiver in a bank bankruptcy, which
should reduce the possibilities for corruption.
Currently two Draft Laws on this matter have
been submitted to the Parliament and have been
passed on ﬁrst reading in a plenary session. 
In Macedonia the insolvency of the company is
regulated by the Bankruptcy Law, which was
enacted in 1997 (published in the Ofﬁcial Gazette
of the Republic of Macedonia no 55/97) and
amended in 2000. Law regulates the goals and
reasons for opening the bankruptcy proceeding,
the manner of its conduct, management and dis-
position of the property being subject of bank-
ruptcy estate and settlement of the trustees. 
The inability and insolvency of the debtor to pay
its debts within 60 days of the date on which they
have become due represents the main reason for
opening a bankruptcy procedure. The conditions
for starting the bankruptcy procedure are also
met if the debtor cannot pay its due obligations
(such as executive court or administrative deci-
sions, concerning monetary obligations) in the
executive procedure or if there is an immediate
prospect for unavoidable inability to pay. Trustee
can initiate the opening of the bankruptcy proce-
dure within 60 days from the day its claims are
due and submit to the court evidence that the
debtor is unable to settle its monetary obliga-
tions. The Court in its ofﬁcial capacity shall deter-
mine all the measures necessary for opening a
Bankruptcy Proceeding.
Upon the opening of the Bankruptcy Proceeding
the right of the debtor to manage and to dispose
of the property that comprises the Bankruptcy
Estate (the property of the debtor at the day of the
opening of the proceedings and the one to be
gained in the course of the proceedings) is trans-
ferred to the Bankruptcy Trustee. If it has been
conﬁrmed that the debtor has no property, or his
property is not sufﬁcient to settle the costs of the
proceeding, the Bankruptcy proceedings are not
conducted and the company is liquidated. The
proceeds from the sale of the real estate in the
case of liquidation are used for payment of debts
and for settlement of expenses incurred during
the Bankruptcy procedure. Any surplus is paid to
the founders.
Although the Bankruptcy Law has been designed
in order to meet the European standards, there is
still a lack of transparency, the procedure is long
and inefficient, and does not guarantee the
trustees to collect their claims. It also allows post-
poning of the bankruptcy proceeding of the com-
pany in case of its insolvency with potential
opportunities for abuse of power. The Agency for
Blocked Accounts which has been introduced
recently, aims to start the bankruptcy proceeding
against all companies, which accounts were
blocked 45 days. The amendments of the Law are
in the Parliamentary procedure. 
The adopted laws on mortgage and pledge did
not achieve the expectations for efﬁcient payment
of the claims and execution of court decisions,
although there are some improvements, especial-
ly regarding payment of unpaid banking credits.
The court procedure is still long and inefﬁcient
and may create potential for abuse.
Impartiality of the Court and Speed of the
Proceedings. Execution of Judgments
In Albania, as described in the Constitution, the
judicial system is based on the impartiality princi-
ple of courts and rigorous implementation of the
law. The courts should be impartial in giving jus-
tice and support their verdicts exclusively on facts
made public during the course of the trial. Even
though the law is quite precise, there are a lot of
complaints about the impartiality of courts and
the speed of proceedings because of corruption
of the judiciary ofﬁcials, political pressures, lack
of professionalism in some cases, etc.
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The Bailiff Ofﬁce is attached to the courts of ﬁrst
instance. As a consequence, it is erroneously per-
ceived as part of the judiciary. In fact, the Bailiff
Ofﬁce is expected to execute both judicial deci-
sions and a certain category of administrative
decisions (the so-called writs of execution). 
The Bailiff Ofﬁce conducts its business in virtue of
Articles 527-617 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Parallel to the general notions relevant to the exe-
cution of ﬁnal judicial decisions the Code regu-
lates the execution of seizure on movable and
immovable properties (including means of mar-
itime and air transport), credits of debtor and
properties that third persons owe to the debtor,
ﬁnancial obligations towards budgetary institu-
tions, sums deposited in bank accounts as well as
the execution of obligations to relinquish a deﬁ-
nite object or to perform a determined action.
Provisions on the means of defense against exe-
cution of decisions and the grounds for suspen-
sion and cessation of the execution are also
envisaged. 
As for the execution of administrative writs of
executions, the Bailiff Ofﬁce derives authority
directly from the respective special laws. In terms
of procedure the Ofﬁce uses by analogy the pro-
cedure speciﬁed in the Code of Civil Procedure for
the judicial decisions. From the point of view of
funding, the Ofﬁce is considered to be part of the
judiciary but although its budget is a part of the
overall judicial budget it is usually extremely
meager which create conditions favorable to cor-
ruption.
Judges at all levels of the judicial system in
Bosnia and Herzegovina have been subject to
political appointments. This has caused severe
partiality and bias with a high degree of political
influence over their rulings. At the Peace
Implementation Council (PIC)13 held in March in
Brussels, it had been decided that all judges at all
levels of the courts are to be temporarily sus-
pended and the new recruitment process is to fol-
low shortly. This process has commenced in April
2002 and at present all judges are applying for
jobs with the courts. Those with a proven record
of partiality of any sort will be closely looked at
and possibly not re-employed as a result of this.
The entire process is managed by the OHR and
the previous action of hot-lines for collection of
complaints against the judges will serve as the
database for the qualiﬁcation assessment. That
activity, however, was run in 1999-2001 and
resulted in a number of speciﬁc complaints of the
general public and entrepreneurs against named
judges at local and regional courts primarily.
According to opinions expressed by business
managers who were interviewed in the enterprise
survey, slowness of the courts is the most prob-
lematic obstacle to doing business in BiH. It was
selected by 87 percent of respondents and ranks
above all other 27 problems listed as negative
characteristics of the business environment.
14
In Bulgaria the Code of Civil Procedure was
amended in 1999. The new provisions guarantee
the impartiality of the court, reduce the opportu-
nities to postpone the hearings, introduce sum-
mary proceedings, and limit the insolvency pro-
ceedings to two court instances. These amend-
ments, however, have not brought about any tan-
gible improvement of court proceedings. Further
amendments will be needed along these lines in
order to eradicate any chances of protracting the
procedure on purpose or abusing procedural
rights, as all this generates corruption.
The execution of judgments is the part of civil
procedure, which concludes the process of civil
litigation but has been least reformed. The clum-
sy and inefﬁcient, frequently corrupted, execution
proceedings negate all efforts to improve the
administration of justice and prevent corruption.
Legislative amendments are required in order to
minimize the possibilities for endless delays in
the enforcement proceedings and supply credi-
tors with better guarantees.
A Draft Law on Amendments to the Code of Civil
Procedure has been recently submitted to the
National Assembly and its adoption on ﬁrst read-
ing in a plenary session is forthcoming. The
amendments proposed are aimed at introducing
simpler and speedier court procedures, especial-
ly by improving the cassation proceedings. For
instance, the possibility provided for the cassa-
tion instance to decide on the merit and the trans-
formation of the possibility for returning the case
for reexamination from a general principle into an
exception will make civil proceedings speedier
and more effective and will considerably limit the
opportunities for corrupt practices. The proposed
new foreclosure procedures, including the possi-
bility for foreclosure of company shares, materi-
alized and dematerialized securities, unpicked
13 Political steering group that observes progress of peace and particularly DPA implementation in BiH that meets regularly and
decides on the focal areas for the IC/s involvements in the year to come. It is the highest-level decision making body outside
of the country’s authorities and bears the ultimate responsibility for the IC’s policies towards BiH. 
14 World Bank, Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption, p. 40,
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/Bosnianticorruption.pdf
plants, would also have anti-corruption impact.
Parallel to this a working group to the Ministry of
Justice is developing a concept paper for intro-
ducing private bailiffs to operate parallel to the
state, which is also aimed at speeding up foreclo-
sure proceedings and limiting corruption.  
In October 2001 a Center for Out-of-Court Legal
Dispute Resolution was established with the
Union of Bulgarian Jurists and Rules on the initi-
ation and performance of out-of-court legal dis-
pute resolution was adopted. This is the ﬁrst step
towards the introduction of procedures for alter-
native out-of-court legal dispute resolution. Their
practical implementation is expected to narrow
the possibilities for corruption, ensure effective-
ness and rapidness in the resolution of disputes,
and relief the judicial system’s work.
Impartiality of the court in Macedonia is one of
the basic rules of civil procedure and court sys-
tem generally. Courts and judges are obliged by
the Constitution and laws to have impartial and
fair attitude towards parties in the procedure.
Civil Procedure Law contains a lot of provisions
that should make this general rule applicable in
practice: public procedure, equal access for the
parties to all evidences the other part has pro-
posed, obligation for the judge to warn ignorant
party about its rights in the procedure, right of
appeal, etc. Execution of judgments falls under
the competence of one of the sections of the
basic courts. It very often is the most difﬁcult part
of the civil procedure because of the problems
that can appear from the judgment itself or by the
party who use all possible legal and non-legal
measures to avoid the execution. In practice this
part of civil procedure is especially problematic. 
The procedure of execution of judgments is pro-
scribed in a separate Code (Code for Execution
Procedure), which is very long and complicated,
with lots of procedural activities and lots of court
decisions. Party, who won the case in procedure
several years long, will need another several
years to execute the judgment. This can be the
main reason for parties to try to reach the conclu-
sion of the procedure through corruption. Either
the debtor or the creditor may be tempted to offer
bribe to ofﬁcial person from court to help them. It
is important that in this procedure very active and
crucial role after judges have court clerks. The
court clerks are dealing with practical execution
on the spot, and have a power to conduct the
practical execution.
Some changes were made in the Code for
Execution Procedure in the last few years, but
that was not enough to reach an effective and fast
execution procedure as an efﬁcient ending of civil
procedure. 
The compensation for damage when a public ofﬁ-
cial has been bribed during the public procure-
ment procedure is another area connected with
this kind of procedure and considered very
important in the ﬁght against corruption. A situa-
tion of particular relevance is also when an
employee of the bribe-giving company bribes an
employee or an ofﬁcer from another company. In
such cases, compensation may be asked for by
the state or by the local government, which may
claim to be the victim of the offence, or by com-
petitors who were not given the contract. 
An important issue, which has to be solved, is the
problem of the validity of a contract concluded
through obtaining a bribe: whether the main con-
tract is null and void in itself, or it is at the discre-
tion of the Government or the company to void it.
Macedonian theory and practice have no answer
to all these questions related to corruption and
civil procedure. Until now no civil cases in
Macedonian courts have reached decisions on
these topics.
Registry Keeping and Registration Proceed-
ings
In Albania the Law No. 7632, of November 4,
1992, deﬁnes the procedures and rules to be fol-
lowed in order to register a company. The Court
keeps the commercial register. Any person may
consult the register without incurring any expens-
es. Also, anyone may get (against payment)
copies of the registration and appropriate docu-
mentation.  According to the Law companies are
registered with the court if their statute is in full
accordance with law provisions and all required
documentation is completed. 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina the procedures of
company registration is one of the most complex
of all countries in the region. Consequently, the
costs of establishing companies are high, which
does not make BiH attractive area for foreign
investment. In future, efforts will be made to
streamline procedures and in that sense, a series
of measures will be taken. One of the most efﬁ-
cient ways is introduction of a single identiﬁca-
tion number and establishment of a single reg-
istry of companies, as well as a single form for
company registration in the whole country, which
is forecasted in the next 18 month period. In par-
ticular, attention will be paid to harmonization of
regulation on registration of national and interna-
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tional companies, and resolution of the problems
related to use of land.
Company registration at present is within the
domain of regional/cantonal courts and each of
them keeps a separate company registration
database. There had until recently been no efforts
either to combine those books (although they are
public) at any level, or to introduce a computer-
ized system to make the process more efﬁcient.
Therefore the process is not so much burdened
by forged data or administrative corruption in the
process steps, as much as it is in its duration,
which is inevitably followed by the existence of
bribes that make the process “more efﬁcient” and
thus cheaper for some companies.
Survey data
15
indicates that corruption is positive
related to company registry process. Every
month businesses pay bribes in the form of gifts,
tips and money to representatives of public ofﬁ-
cials in amounts equal to 18 percent of expenses
of the average ﬁrm. The average “standard rate”
for bribes that businesses report paying for sev-
eral services including connection to utilities,
obtaining licenses and permits, dealing with
courts and customs and other bodies equals 361
KM (approximate EUR 180). 
Company registration in BiH is usually done by
the owner of the company or by an appointed
company’s employee. Only 18 percent of respon-
dents reported that they had used a third party to
handle the process of business registration. It is
worth mentioning that none of the newly-created
enterprises (those founded in 1999-2000) used a
third party. At the same time, public enterprises
used a third party very often – 40 percent of the
public ﬁrms who are were involved in WB survey
reported so. Another group of ﬁrms that used this
method of company registration are enterprises
founded before 1992. Since 72 percent of public
enterprises were founded before 1992, the preva-
lent use of third-party facilitators among older
ﬁrms is not surprising. Why do companies use
third parties for company registration? Mostly
because the managers want to make sure that no
procedural mistakes are made (59 percents of
respondents), sometimes because they want to
save time (23 percent), sometimes the reason is
that the third party has connections – “knows the
right people” (18 percent). Use of third parties is
also known to help hide corruption – the bribe in
this case might be expensed as a fee for a busi-
ness service provided by the third party.
16
It is of utmost importance as a matter of fostering
transparency in this process, to establish a single
registry of companies, for the purpose of reduc-
ing bureaucracy, increasing efﬁciency and trans-
parency in operations of both Entities.
Non-governmental organizations are subject to
the Law on Citizens Associations and Founda-
tions, which has been changed in early 2002 in
both RS and BiH. The new RS law as well as the
umbrella State law allows for a much more sim-
ple registration of non-governmental organiza-
tions, citizen associations and well as parties that
no longer requires more than thirty signatories
but minimum of three instead. The RS register
remains with the regional courts and the BiH reg-
istry is with the Ministry of Civic Affairs and Com-
munications. The new version of the law, that has
been in existence in FBiH since 2001 also allows
for other associations to group together and e.g.
form confederations of associations. The BiH Law
will register those subjects that want to operate at
the country-wide level and refuse to register sole-
ly at the Entity level. Nevertheless, both Entity
laws allow for the country-wide operations of any
citizens associations and are not restrictive in any
manner. This is why the BiH Law is often seen as
a political step, rather than changing anything in
practice, following the harmonization of the two
Entity laws and their simpliﬁcation.
The property registry is still based on the former
Austro-Hungarian system of Cadastre that was
introduced before 1914. According to this system,
the property books are kept with the municipal
authorities, while urban and construction plan-
ning happens in the relevant government agen-
cies. There are plans to start replacing the old
Cadastre system with a brand new computerized
database, but this process is likely to take ten
years or more and the launch of it is scheduled for
the late 2002. 
According to the current state of the registers in
Bulgaria private legal persons, except for the
political parties, are registered with the District
Courts in 28 separate registers located through-
out the country. Property registration is done in a
similar way. Property records are kept by about
110 Regional Courts and are still paper-based.
15 World Bank Anti-Corruption Survey, p. 52 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/Bosnianticorruption.pdf
16 World Bank ibid., pp. 52-53 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/Bosnianticorruption.pdf
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Pilot projects are being carried out for the intro-
duction of electronic information systems in
some of the courts, although these information
systems have no legal weight. Except for the
Central Pledges Register at the Ministry of
Justice, established in 1997, most of the other reg-
istries are currently decentralized and paper
based which causes serious problems of reliabili-
ty of information and its physical and legal secu-
rity. The available data shows numerous cases of
fraud, abuse and corruption.
As far as property law is concerned, in 1998 a
project Establishment of Cadastre and Property
Registry in Bulgaria was launched by the
Bulgarian Government with the support of the
World Bank and a Law on the Cadastre and the
Property Registry was adopted, in force since
January 1, 2001. This instrument is expected to be
a major step in the transition from the “owner-
based” to an “estate-based” system of real estate
registration. Changes in the system of real estate
registration, a sphere marked by abuse, fraud and
corruption, are also in progress. Introducing
these changes takes a long time but the impact,
including availability of complete and precise
information on property and pending liabilities
upon it, will have lasting anticorruption effects in
the ﬁeld of real estate transactions.
A special working group to the Ministry of Justice
chaired by the Deputy Minister of Justice has
developed a set of recommendations for improv-
ing the legal framework of property registration
including amendments to the Law on the
Cadastre and the Property Registry and adoption
of the respective secondary legislation for its
implementation. The proposal is aimed at facili-
tating the process of reforming the property reg-
istration in Bulgaria and the successful introduc-
tion of the Cadastre and the Property Registry in
the country. 
Special attention should also be paid to the idea,
developed by experts to the Law Program of the
Center for the Study of Democracy within the
framework of Coalition 2000 of replacing the
court registration of not-for-proﬁt organizations
with registration in a newly created Central
Electronic Register for Not-for-Profit
Organizations at the Ministry of Justice, the
establishment of which could serve as a ﬁrst step
towards the introduction of a Central Electronic
Register for Persons and Property. The transition
to such a register will have far-reaching anti-cor-
ruption effects, especially with regard to the pres-
ent dismal state of the country’s registers. The
business community also evaluates the existing
registration system as ineffective and sees it as
an obstacle to growth of business. It has even
proposed relieving the courts of the responsibili-
ty of keeping the commercial registers in order to
make them function better.17
According to the Coalition 2000 proposal the
Central Electronic Register for Persons and
Property should include registration data on all
private legal persons and state enterprises
(except for political parties and professional
organizations). First it should be introduced for
the not-for-proﬁt legal entities since the philoso-
phy thereof has already been laid out in a concept
paper. In a medium-term perspective this
Register should include commercial legal persons
and merge with the Central Pledges Register,
while in a long-term perspective, after the estab-
lishment of a national electronic cadastre and its
incorporation into a uniform national database,
the Register should be merged with the property
registers.
The implementation of the proposal for a Central
Electronic Register for Persons and Property will
allow both registration and obtaining of informa-
tion online by electronic means. This will make it
possible to quickly publish information about
changes in circumstances through ﬁlings and the
current situation of the Register can be checked in
real time, i.e. immediately after the conclusion of
a transaction. The Register should be public and
everyone should be able to obtain information
and receive a certiﬁcate verifying the necessary
information. A denial of a ﬁling should be subject
to appeal before the Minister of Justice following
an administrative procedure; a denial by the
Minister should be subject to appeal following
the procedure under the Law on the Supreme
Administrative Court which will minimize the
unregulated practices accompanying registration
and obtaining information.
All companies in Croatia are required to register
in the Court Register of the respective
Commercial Court, dependant on the location of
the company’s headquarters. When establishing a
joint-stock company or a limited liability compa-
ny, a domestic or foreign investor may invest
money, goods and rights.
17 Bulgarian International Business Association (BIBA) – White Paper on Foreign Investment’2001
http://www.biba.bg/docs/White%20Paper%202001%20Engl.pdf
An enterprise register is maintained by the eight
regional commercial courts and covers over
120,000 enterprises, including partnerships and
sole proprietorships. The commercial court regis-
ters include the names of the company’s mem-
bers of the management and supervisory boards,
the company’s statutes and information regard-
ing the total share capital of the company. The
register also includes the names of the company’s
founders but not the names of the current major
shareholders. Public information is not fully cen-
tralized. To obtain copies of a company’s statutes
one must visit the regional court register in per-
son. Provision for online access is being dis-
cussed by the Ministry of Justice, which is
responsible for the operation of the Commercial
Register. 
Political parties are required to be registered in
the Ministry of Justice, Administration and Local
Self-Government.
Non-governmental organizations are required to
be registered in the Ministry of Justice,
Administration and Local Self-Government. 
Property registry is required to be done at
Municipality courts. According to the World Bank
estimation Croatia is included in a group of tran-
sitional countries (with Estonia and Poland) with
quite decent state protection of the security of
property and contract rights (World Bank, 2002).
Although, there is a (quite good) Law about
Cadastre System Record Ownership, in reality sit-
uation with Ofﬁces of cadastre system record
ownership is very bad and one of the most neu-
ralgic parts in Croatian judiciary. 
In Macedonia according to the Trade Company
Law, before starting their business activities the
companies are required to be registered in the
Trade Registry. All trade companies and afﬁliates
have an obligation to be registered in the
Register. The Trade Register is a public book. There
are three courts in Macedonia authorized for
company registration in the Trade Register: the
Basic Court I, in Skopje, the Basic Court in Bitola
and the Basic Court in Stip. The authorized person
from the company submits an application for reg-
istration of the company and changes in the Trade
Register. The Law describes the necessary docu-
mentation and procedure for registration. 
The Law on Political Parties stipulates that a polit-
ical party may start with its activities after the reg-
istration in the Register of Political Parties. The
Appeal Court in Skopje is authorized for keeping
the Court register of political parties. The Minister
of Justice proscribes the blank form and method
of keeping of the Court register. The political party
is obliged within 30 days from the day of its
establishing to submit an application for enroll-
ment in the court register, accompanied with its
Program, the Article of Agreement and court deci-
sion for establishment of a political party.
According to the Law on Citizens Associations
and Foundations, the citizens associations and
foundations are required to be registered in the
Register kept in the basic court, depending on
where their headquarter is located. The blank
form and procedure for registration are pro-
scribed by the Minister of Justice. The application
for registration, along with the program for its
activities, the names of authorized persons for
representing the citizens association or founda-
tion are submitted to the court, within 30 days
from the day of their establishing.
Upon the application, the court is obliged to bring
a decision for enrollment of the association or
foundation in the register. If the court ﬁnds out
that the required elements and criteria are not
met, or that the program and its activities are not
in compliance with the law, it refuses the regis-
tration.
The Cadastre Law requires the physical and legal
persons to register their real estate in the
Cadastre register, depending on the location
where the property is located. The registration is
done under the relevant document issued by the
competent bodies. Upon the submission of the
documentation, which proves the ownership, the
Cadastre registers the real estate in the Register.
The legislation provides for transparent proce-
dure and proscribes the required documentation,
leaving narrow possibilities for discretion right of
the authorities dealing with the registration.
However some possibilities for corruption still
exist especially in relation to the Property
Register.
In Serbia company registration is regulated by
the federal Company Law (adopted in 1996 and
amended in 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999). Company
or enterprise may be established in the form of
Joint Stock Company, Limited Liability Company,
Limited Partnership and General Partnership. A
company or an enterprise is incorporated by
Decision on Incorporation (one founder) or a
Memorandum of Association (two or more
founders). These documents are to be in written
form, signed and notarized. Depending on the
intended business activities the company or the
enterprise may need some approvals by the
respective inspections such as the Market
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Inspection, the Sanitary Inspection, the Labor
Inspection, and the Environmental Inspection. The
incorporation of a company or an enterprise fol-
lows a Decree of Incorporation issued by the
competent Commercial court’s Registry
Department. After the Decree has been granted,
an ofﬁcial note of incorporation is deposited with
the Federal Bureau of Statistics. For a company
engaged in foreign trade an ofﬁcial note is also
deposited with the Federal Customs Bureau.
Finally, a company or an enterprise has to open
an account with the Public Accounting Service, as
well as an account with a commercial bank of its
choice.
All registers are kept in the Regional Commercial
Courts, which are 16, in major cities of the
provinces. System is not centralized, and you can-
not ﬁnd all the relevant data about all companies
at one place. The main disadvantage is that the
software package for such an operation has been
prepared but there are still not enough resources
for the appropriate hardware. Currently there are
no detailed databases and all registries are kept
in ﬁles. This means that for relevant details ﬁle
should be physically opened.
Company Law obliges all companies to be regis-
tered. After ﬁfty years of controlled economy, this
law is aimed at harmonizing standards with the
standards of the EU. Unlike before, the law rec-
ognizes SA organizing form and limited responsi-
bility.
Since the adoption of the Law on Foreign
Investment in March 2002 foreigners go through
almost the same procedure for registering the
company. They should only submit proofs (certi-
ﬁed copies) that they have company operating in
another country. They have the right to register
for everything apart from some segments of the
army industry, for which they need consent from
a Defense Ministry. Before adopting this law, for-
eigners needed consent from the Federal Ministry
of Economic Relations in order to establish a
company.
Inscription of companies in a register is described
by the Law on Inscription Procedures in Court
Register (adopted in 1994) and Decree on
Inscription in Court Register (adopted in 1997 and
amended in 1997) which in annex also offer sam-
ples for the registry form. 
According to the Decree on Inscription in Court
Register for establishment of a stock asset com-
pany one must enclose a set of documents such
as a contract on establishment of the company
with certified signatures of the founders, a
statute, a bank report on existent money deposits
on temporarily accounts, etc.
There are approximately 100,000 entities entered
in court register so far, and approximately 60,000
of them are companies. Others are non-proﬁt
institutions such as hospitals, schools etc. 
Common frauds that involve court registry have
to do with the forgery of signatures of authorized
persons (judges), or disposal of forged identiﬁca-
tion documents for establishing a company, pop-
ularly called phantom companies. The existence
of such kind of companies is the major problem
for the ﬁnancial police. The government is plan-
ning to strengthen the procedure for establishing
companies, but without increasing bureaucracy
at the same time. 
*    *     *
The legal preconditions ought, above all, to foster
a social and political environment unfavorable to
corruption. Along with the general preventive and
stabilizing effect, they also ought to lead to a clear
regulation of the liabilities and sanctions for the
perpetration of acts of corruption. 
Despite the different approaches followed by the
individual countries in the region they are all
directed towards further developing the legal
basis for anti-corruption and its adaptation to the
various and ﬂexible forms of corrupt behavior.
These efforts are facilitated by the common
objective to comply the national legislations with
the international and European standards and
instruments thus responding to the process of
internationalization of the phenomenon of cor-
ruption.   
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Anti-corruption legislation and regulatory instru-
ments alone are not sufﬁcient for the successful
fight against corruption since their effective
implementation requires certain institutional pre-
requisites. Creating effective institutional mecha-
nisms for preventing and curbing corruption in
the political system and civil society has been the
major issue on the anti-corruption agenda in the
Southeast European countries. This chapter offers
an overview and assessment of the measures
undertaken in the following areas:
Public Administration and Civil Service Reform
Administrative Services
Specialized Control over the Work of
Administration (National Audit Institution,
Ombudsman Institution, Other Institutions
with Controlling and Monitoring Functions)
Law Enforcement Agencies
Legislature
Political Parties
4.1. Public Administration Reform. Level of
Transparency and Accountability of
Administration. Status of Civil Ser-
vants.
The reform of public administration in general
and the creation of an effective legislative frame-
work and institutional environment for its trans-
parent operation in particular are of major impor-
tance because discretionary exercise of adminis-
trative authority creates the greatest opportuni-
ties for corruption. 
The fundamental goal of the administrative
reform is to make transparency and accountabili-
ty essential characteristics of the administration.
Thus, citizens would have a larger and better-reg-
ulated access to public services, while the risks of
abuse of power and discretion by the civil ser-
vants would be restricted. A brief description of
the level of transparency and accountability of
administration in the countries observed is dis-
cussed below.
The assessment of corruption in SEE countries is
based on a comparison between the available
data on corruption and the observed outcomes of
anti-corruption efforts of the institutional and the
general regulatory mechanisms.
Laws and Regulations on Administration and
Civil Servants. Practical Aspects
The process of developing regulatory framework
for the administration and civil service in SEE
countries started in the mid of 90s.  
In Albania the Civil Service Act was adopted in
1996. However, it soon became clear that the
Albanian political class was not ready to give up
its privilege of distributing favors, in the form of
public ofﬁces, to political supporters. Since 1997,
the situation has slightly improved. Many of the
problems that affected the civil service in the past
still exist, and in some cases, the situation has
even deteriorated. Albanian civil servants are still
very poorly paid despite several salary increases
over the last 3 years, and their salaries have con-
tinuously fallen relative to the private sector.
Reform of the civil service became a top priority
of government reform projects with the 1998
Governmental Anti-Corruption Strategy. The Law
on the Status of the Civil Servant (No.8549, dated
November 11, 1999) lays the foundation for a
transparent system of recruitment in the civil
service, with meritocracy and job security as its
primary ingredients. It provides for a sustainable,
professional, and efﬁcient civil service based on a
balanced set of rights and duties that enhance the
performance of the employees. However, it is still
difﬁcult for these legal provisions to be imple-
mented.
In BiH the limited efforts of the administration to
act as an efﬁcient service provider for the taxpay-
ers, had limited success. Accountability mecha-
nisms are virtually non-existent, yet some
improvements are being prepared. Following the
example of countries, which have already adopt-
ed the related legislation, BiH is now preparing
the introduction of the new codes of conduct and
laws on the prevention of the conﬂict of inter-
ests.
18
IV. INSTITUTIONAL PREREQUISITES FOR ANTI-CORRUPTION
18 According to Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption conducted by the World Bank in September 2000, 75% of respondents (among
public ofﬁcials) think that at least some of their colleagues run their own businesses on the side. Customs are at the top of the
list – almost 90% of respondents who work at customs think that these practices exist there. (WB, Diagnostic Surveys of
Corruption, p.3), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/Bosnianticorruption.pdf
In addition, a more efﬁcient
system of public revenue
management will be estab-
lished in order to avoid
excessive spending, and to
create a stable system of
financing of the public
administration. It will be nec-
essary to strengthen conﬁ-
dence of the general public
in the public institutions. 
The principle pieces of legis-
lation that are in process of
adoption by the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of BiH are: the
Law on State Service, the
Law on Civil Service and the
Laws on Prevention of Cor-
ruption. The aim of these
draft laws is to establish an
efficient control of public
administration. 
Another set of laws present-
ed by the Federal and RS
Ministries of Justice is a
broader Anti-Corruption Act.
It partly deals with the pre-
vention of the conflict of
interest of civil servants, but
also many other areas,
which entangle the public
administration. This Act has
been sent for the third read-
ing in the RS Parliament and
is currently being revised by
the Ministry of Justice. The
main issue that prevents its
adoption is where the anti-
corruption agency is to be
located. Some MPs prefer
seeing it as a separate insti-
tution with extended author-
ities, while the others favor
strengthening the existing
institutions and allocating a
number of their employees
to be at the anti-corruption
team’s disposal whenever
applicable. However, this
technical issue halted the
adoption of the Act for an
unrealistically long period of
time, which may suggest
that there is a hidden agenda
and that certain political par-
ties and individuals prefer
not seeing it adopted.
52
2001 2002
Customs 7.88 7.81
Tax ofﬁces 7.66 7.89
Municipal government 7.56 7.75
Privatization Agency 7.36 7.66
Municipal administration 7.32 7.57
Government 7.78 7.56
Police 6.96 7.47
Industry line ministries 7.14 7.14
Parliament 7.32 7.12
Judiciary 6.74 7.11
Presidency 7.18 7.03
Audit Ofﬁce 7.06 6.88
National Telecommunication Company 6.28 6.57
Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission 6.70 6.52
Commission for the Protection of Competition 6.84 6.46
Committee on Energy 6.30 6.36
Agency for Foreign Investment 6.46 6.33
National Bank 6.44 6.09
Army 4.78 5.21
National Statistical Institute 5.36 5.04
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System. Scores close to 1 correspond to low
spread of corruption, those close to 10 to highest degree of proliferation.
Table 6: Spread of corruption in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
2001 2002
Customs 8.8 9.0
Tax ofﬁces 8.4 8.6
Government 8.1 8.4
Judiciary 8.5 8.3
Industry line ministries 7.6 8.1
Municipal government 7.5 7.8
Municipal administration 7.5 7.7
Police 7.2 7.6
Agency for Foreign Investment 6.0 7.6
Privatization Agency 7.6 7.3
Audit Ofﬁce 7.2 7.3
Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission 6.6 7.1
Parliament 7.4 7.1
National Telecommunication Company 6.9 6.6
Commission for the Protection of Competition - 6.0
Presidency 6.1 5.6
National Bank 5.6 5.6
Army 5.9 5.3
National Statistical Institute 4.3 4.5
Committee on Energy 7.2 - 
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System. Scores close to 1 correspond to low
spread of corruption, those close to 10 to highest degree of proliferation.
Table 5: Spread of corruption in Albania
The same Act has been moving even slower in
FBiH due to its extensive internal decision-mak-
ing structures and is not forecasted for adoption
in the current pre-election season of 2002.
The legislation to regulate the public administra-
tion’s organization and its functions was adopted
in Bulgaria from the end of 1998 until 2000. The
analysis of the data on the spread of corruption at
the background of the new regulatory framework
allows drawing conclusions on the new legisla-
tion efﬁciency and its impact on corrupt practices
as well as the need for further regulatory changes
to be introduced.
The Law on the Administration, in force since
December 6, 1998, laid the foundations for the
introduction of a uniform organizational model
and common rules of internal organization of the
executive bodies. On the basis of this Law, the
transformation of all levels of administration
(central, district and municipal) was completed in
2001. The Rules of Organization and Procedure of
these administrations, most of which were adopt-
ed in 2000, as well as their subsequent amend-
ments outlined their speciﬁc functions, tasks, and
responsibilities.
Despite the promulgation of the Rules of
Organization and Procedure in the State Gazette,
the large number of administrative bodies (110
only in the central administration) and their vari-
ety (agencies, commissions, inspections, ofﬁces,
centres, etc.) makes understanding their dynam-
ics difﬁcult for both experts and ordinary citizens.
The Register of the Administrative Structures and
the Acts of the Administrative Bodies, set up and
maintained on the Government’s website in the
Internet, helps to overcome some of these difﬁ-
culties by ensuring greater openness of the work
of the administration and providing information
on the status, structure and responsibilities of the
individual units in the administration. An impor-
tant step toward making this Register work better
could be the introduction of a feedback mecha-
nism serving both its users and persons affected
by administrative action.
Rules of transparency of governance should pro-
vide opportunities to the citizens for informed
participation through access to the information
stored by public institutions. The legal prerequi-
sites for accountability, accessibility and trans-
parency in the activities of the administration,
however, have not yet been created. The current
Law on Access to Public Information has been in
force since the summer of 2000. Its implementa-
tion record shows that in spite of the numerous
requests for access to public information submit-
ted to different branches of the executive, the
numbers of denials is high.
Access to information is
restricted primarily to jour-
nalists, non-governmental
organizations and ordinary
citizens.
The process of building up a
professional civil service,
based on legality, loyalty,
responsibility, stability, polit-
ical neutrality and hierarchi-
cal subordination, started
with the adoption of the Law
on Civil Servants, in force
since August 28, 1999, and
continued with the adoption
of secondary legislation on
the status of civil servants.
As a follow-up, the status of
civil servants was accorded
to the employees of the
Council of Ministers, all the
ministries, the other central
government agencies, the
district and the municipal
administration. A necessary
next step in the process of
consolidation of a responsi-
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2001 2002
Customs 8.90 8.95
Privatization Agency 8.06 8.57
Judiciary 7.60 8.21
Agency for Foreign Investment 7.54 7.75
Tax ofﬁces 7.54 7.72
Industry line ministries 7.50 7.34
Police 7.14 7.22
Parliament 7.42 7.18
Committee on Energy 7.00 7.08
Municipal government 6.94 7.01
Commission for the Protection of Competition 6.54 7.00
Government 7.44 6.87
Municipal administration 6.54 6.73
Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission 6.46 6.73
National Telecommunication Company 6.60 6.63
Audit Ofﬁce 5.98 6.07
National Bank 5.72 5.49
Army 4.98 5.13
National Statistical Institute 5.02 4.68
Presidency 4.52 4.63
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System.  Scores close to 1 correspond to low
spread of corruption, those close to 10 to highest degree of proliferation.
Table 7: Spread of corruption in Bulgaria
ble civil service is to gradually extend the civil
servant status to people holding expert positions
in the general administration through broadening
the scope of applicability of the Law on Civil
Servants and developing the internal control
against corruption.
The offences, committed in the course of the
implementation and consolidation of the civil ser-
vant’s status, show a lack of constant control and
timely measures. Many of the legal solutions
adopted in this ﬁeld are insufﬁcient or inapplica-
ble; they do not contribute to preventing or pun-
ishing for corrupt practices. This conclusion is
valid for the disciplinary councils and the powers
and operation of the State Administrative
Commission (SAC):
- The disciplinary councils should be estab-
lished by every branch of the administration
and consist of ﬁve permanent members and
two substitutes. In practice, however, some
administrative bodies have fewer than seven
civil servants and as a result, the appointing
authorities cannot lawfully impose the penal-
ties. This problem can only be overcome
through amending the Law on Civil Servants.
- The State Administrative Commission should
exercise control over compliance with the civil
servant status. Nevertheless, the activities of
the Commission so far indicate that its control
is performed only in one direction and does
not extend to cases in which the appointing
authorities themselves are operating in viola-
tion of the civil service legislation. A new legal
framework for the activities of the State
Administrative Commission is necessary in
order to provide it with powers to exercise
effective overall control on compliance with
the civil servant status. These powers should
include the right to intervene in cases of cor-
ruption, especially when instances of corrup-
tion are discovered, not only by giving manda-
tory prescriptions to the appropriate authori-
ties but also by monitoring their implementa-
tion, issuing penal provisions, initiating
changes in administrative acts already issued,
etc. The introduction of units with similar func-
tions at the level of municipal administration
is also necessary. Specialized units in the
branches of the administration in order to
exercise internal control over their activities
and prevent corrupt practices by civil servants
as well as carry out appropriate internal pro-
cedures for investigation of administrative
abuse and corruption.
In Croatia according to the Law on Civil Servants
and Employees the duties of state administration
in state government bodies
are performed by civil ser-
vants which are appointed
according to the public
announcement, if it is not
differently regulated by the
law. Auxiliary and technical
duties in state government
bodies are performed by
government employees. The
new civil service legislation
aimed at establishing a more
open and equitable system
of government hiring of ofﬁ-
cials and at promoting the
integrity of public officials
has been adopted. However,
like in other transitional
countries, civil service legis-
lation remains insufficient
and institutions for manage-
ment and control of the civil
service will need to be
strengthened. Since issues
of corruption affect the citi-
zens mostly on the local
level of government, meas-
ures for improvement of
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2001 2002
Privatization Agency 7.70 7.30
Customs 6.90 7.07
Police 6.98 7.05
Judiciary 6.66 7.00
Municipal government 7.10 6.95
Tax ofﬁces 6.74 6.93
Municipal administration 6.80 6.80
Committee on Energy 6.86 6.51
Industry line ministries 6.94 6.48
Commission for the Protection of Competition 6.42 6.27
Parliament 5.92 6.09
Government 6.28 6.04
National Telecommunication Company 6.72 5.96
Audit Ofﬁce 6.26 5.94
Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission 6.46 5.85
Army 5.98 5.68
National Bank 6.02 5.13
Presidency 4.66 4.20
National Statistical Institute 4.58 4.11
Agency for Foreign Investment 6.84 -
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System.  Scores close to 1 correspond to low
spread of corruption, those close to 10 to highest degree of proliferation. 
Table 8: Spread of corruption in Croatia
local government functioning have to be under-
taken. 
The preparations for public administration reform
in Macedonia have started several years ago
with technical assistant of PHARE program and
are ﬁnanced by the World Bank. The Law on State
Servants and the Law on the Government of the
Republic of Macedonia were enacted by the
Parliament on July 20, 2000 (in force  since July
28), while the Law on Organization of State
Bodies was enacted on July 21, 2000 (in force
since July 29, 2000).
The Law on State Servants is setting up the uni-
form classiﬁcation of positions in public adminis-
tration and same level of salaries for the same
positions. Under the Law, an Agency for State
Servants has been established. The Agency pro-
poses a new organization of the public adminis-
tration, exercises a supervision on fulﬁllment of
uniﬁed obligations, coordinates the training and
education of state servants, develops a policy
regarding an employment, selects and evaluates
the staff, and prepares by-laws to ensure its
implementation. The new organization and uni-
form classiﬁcation has already been completed in
all ministries and other state organs. The crucial
objective of the administration reform was to
bring the legislation in line with European stan-
dards for professionalism and de-politicization of
the state servants, (except the State Secretary,
Deputy Minister and Minister). The appointment
of skilled, non-politicized, professional public ser-
vants, should create conditions for efﬁcient, mod-
ern and uncorrupted administration, competent
to respond to the citizens’ needs.  However, the
Law does not contain any provision which will
protect state servant from
being ﬁred or removed on a
lower position. In practice,
this has happened to hun-
dreds of servants, without
any reasons or criteria. In the
same time a number of inex-
perienced persons have
been appointed on high
positions without fulﬁllment
of the criteria proscribed by
the Law and other regula-
tions.
The Law on Local Self-man-
agement adopted by the
Parliament on January 29,
2002, stipulates a decentral-
ization of the power to the
local governments in the fol-
lowing fields: urban plan-
ning and issuing licenses for
constructions, environmen-
tal protection, planning of
the municipal development,
support of small and medi-
um enterprises, communal
activities, culture, sport,
social and health protection,
child protection, ﬁre protec-
tion and the like. The decen-
tralization of the power should improve the efﬁ-
ciency of the public administration and narrow
the possibilities for corruption.
Serbia has asymmetric administrative system
deﬁned by the Constitution, laws, and interna-
tional agreement. The Constitution deﬁnes Serbia
as integral territory with two autonomous
provinces – Vojvodina and Kosovo. After the
NATO intervention, greater autonomy was grant-
ed to Kosovo, including its own constitutional
frame, parliament, government, and separate
elections. Serbia has only proclaimed sovereign-
ty, but neither formal nor informal authority over
Kosovo. Vojvodina’s autonomy was also
increased by the set of laws adopted in December
2001. Vojvodina now has its own parliament and
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2001 2002
Customs 8.80 8.84
Industry line ministries 7.82 8.76
Government 8.06 8.58
Commission for the Protection of Competition - 8.25
Privatization Agency 8.08 8.24
Tax ofﬁces 7.72 8.22
Parliament 7.84 8.18
Agency for Foreign Investment 7.86 8.02
Judiciary 7.38 7.86
Audit Ofﬁce - 7.82
Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission - 7.59
Police 7.12 7.44
Municipal government 6.94 7.11
Committee on Energy - 7.03
Municipal administration 6.50 6.65
National Telecommunication Company 6.28 6.52
Presidency 4.72 5.72
National Bank 5.92 5.68
Army 4.40 5.67
National Statistical Institute 4.38 4.59 
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System. Scores close to 1 correspond to low
spread of corruption, those close to 10 to highest degree of proliferation.
Table 9: Spread of corruption 
in Macedonia
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executive body, but with much less scope of com-
petence than it is the case in Kosovo.
Basic local administration unit is municipality
(there are 189 in Serbia). Municipalities execute
power delegated from the government, perform
communal activities, and some of the social con-
cerns including culture, health care, education,
tourism, environment etc. City of Belgrade, which
is the capital of the state, is the separate territori-
al unit, wider than municipality, with somewhat
wider competence.
The Law on the State Administration was adopt-
ed in 1992 and was amended several times till
1999. Under this law, state administrative organs
transact business on the basis on the Constitution
and the law. Authorized personnel within the
authority of the state administrative organs
enforce regulations, assess evidence on the basis
of established facts, issue enactments, and per-
form other administrative tasks and measures.
Individual enactments, measures and activities of
the state administrative organs are based on laws
or other regulations adopted on the basis of laws.
Ministers cannot perform any other public, pro-
fessional or other activities incompatible with
their post. The same goes for other senior ofﬁcials
appointed by the government, except when the
Government grants them authority. Employees of
the state authorities and appointed ofﬁcials have
a duty to perform their jobs conscientiously and
fairly, and not to be guided by their political con-
victions or express such views and advocate
them. The establishment of political parties and
other political organizations, or their internal
forms, in the state of admin-
istrative organs is prohibit-
ed. This rule is violated in
practice, and politicians
often exert inﬂuence on the
work of the administration,
by either speeding up or
slowing down the adoption
of certain decisions and their
performance, or by not
allowing decisions to be
made simply because they
are not in their interest. 
The operation of the state
administration is funded
from the budget. State
administrative organs, enter-
prises and other organiza-
tions are legally bound to
enable the public unimped-
ed realization of their rights
and obligations, to provide
all necessary data and infor-
mation, to render legal assis-
tance, to cooperate with the
public, to respect personality
and protect the reputation of
the civil service.
State administrative organs
are legally bound to evaluate petitions, com-
plaints and suggestions submitted by the public,
to act according to them and to inform public
about outcomes. The grading of senior ofﬁcials
managing the state administrative organs (minis-
ters and their ofﬁcials) is deﬁned in an identical
manner as in the federal administrative organs.
The Law on Local Administration, which regulates
local administration, was adopted in February
2002. Local administration is exercised in cities
and municipalities. Local administrative organs
have no administrative power except in cases
where they have been granted such power by
law. All sessions of municipal councils are public,
except in cases deﬁned by statuses. Statutes usu-
ally regulate meetings closed to the public in a
2001 2002
Customs 8.68 8.52
Police 8.08 7.88
Privatization Agency 7.46 7.70
Judiciary 7.78 7.57
Tax ofﬁces 7.88 7.57
Agency for Foreign Investment - 7.51
Committee on Energy 6.80 7.43
Industry line ministries 7.76 7.40
Municipal government 7.38 7.22
Municipal administration 7.24 6.91
National Telecommunication Company 6.26 6.85
Commission for the Protection of Competition - 6.79
Securities and Stock Exchanges Commission - 6.39
Government 7.32 6.31
Parliament 7.04 6.27
Audit Ofﬁce 6.26 5.92
Presidency 7.68 5.79
National Bank 6.58 5.77
Army 5.42 4.85
National Statistical Institute 5.46 4.68 
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System.  Scores close to 1 correspond to low
spread of corruption, those close to 10 to highest degree of proliferation.
Table 10: Spread of corruption 
in Serbia
war condition, an immediate threat of war and a
state of emergency.
Although new laws or law amendments covering
the state administration and public services have
been adopted, regulations and enactments are
still burdened with hierarchical relations, leaving
very little room for creativity in the work of per-
sonnel employed in the state administration and
public services. Concrete questions regarding the
position of civil servants and senior ofﬁcial are
regulated by secondary legislation of the National
Assembly and the Government.  
The current situation in Serbia concerning exist-
ing legislation and enactments is conducive to
arbitrary conduct and irresponsibility, both in the
state administrative organs and public services
performing activities of the public and organiza-
tions (public transport, health, education, social
insurance etc.). These are still areas often marked
by corrupt practices.
Rules on Financial and Property Disclosure
of Senior Ofﬁcials
An important factor in preventing corruption is
the existence/establishment of rules on ﬁnancial
and property disclosure of senior ofﬁcials as well
as the introduction of sanctions for violations of
the established rules 
In Albania the Parliament passed the Law on
Assets Disclosure for Civil Servants and Senior
Ofﬁcials (No.7903, dated March 8, 1995), which
provides the regulatory basis for the investigation
of assets owned by public ofﬁcials. The following
categories of assets require disclosure under the
law: immovable properties; shares and vouchers;
cash or objects worth over 1 million Leks, as well
as other movable properties. Property belonging
to the immediate family of the functionaries men-
tioned above is also to be disclosed. The law
states that the authority to supervise the attesta-
tion of the declarations by the aforementioned
organizations vests with the High State Audit.
Failure to meet the requirements of the law to
report on assets constitutes an administrative
misdemeanor and is punishable with a ﬁne of
1,000 - 50,000 Leks for failing to submit the report
in a timely fashion, as well as a ﬁne of 500,000-
1,000,000 Leks or prohibition to practice in the
respective profession in the case of intentionally
false declarations.
Despite widespread allegations and reliable sta-
tistical evidence concerning corruption among
public ofﬁcials, veriﬁcation of declared assets has
not led to prosecution against allegedly corrupt
ofﬁcials. The prosecution service has also failed to
base its cases on the data provided by the
declared assets. No data are electronically record-
ed and no software has been devised to regulate
data entry and use. Apart from serious problems
with accessibility, the biggest problem with
regard to the declaration of assets legislation is
that nobody feels responsible for the implemen-
tation of the legislation and collection of the data.
Hence, there is a strong need for an agency
whose primary task would be the implementation
and maintenance of a database with information
on assets.
In BiH initial steps were undertaken by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) that has been organizing the gen-
eral and local elections in the country ever since
the signing of Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). In
1999 revision of the provisional elections law it
was envisaged that all individuals running for a
public ofﬁce must disclose their property and
ﬁnancial status. In the elections of 2000, the citi-
zens of BiH were allowed for the ﬁrst time to see
these documents ﬁlled out personally by the
political candidates. The same provisions will now
be built into the permanent election laws that will
be governing all elections at various levels from
the autumn of 2002 onwards. This law is waiting
the successful ending of the on-going constitu-
tional amendments discussion that is the most
signiﬁcant single constitutional affair since the
adoption of the DPA. The same provisions are also
stipulated in the not yet adopted in RS Anti-
Corruption Act.
In Bulgaria the Law on Property Disclosure by
Persons Occupying Senior Positions in the State
is in force since May 13, 2000. It has introduced
both rules on ﬁnancial and property standing and
provided for their practical implementation, thus
playing a role of prevention of corruption at the
highest levels of political power. According to its
provisions such persons are required to declare
their property on an annual basis, as of May 31
every year. They should declare not only their
own income and property acquired during the
respective previous year but also the income of
their spouses and children under 18 years of age. 
The Law has also deﬁned the group of persons
entitled to have access to the data contained in
that register and laid down the procedure for get-
ting such access. At the same time the Law in its
current formulation does not represent a sufﬁ-
cient guarantee against conﬂict of interest and
corrupt practices in the activities of senior civil
servants from the three branches of state power. 
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Though this particular Law contains primarily
what could be labeled “wishful” provisions, the
disclosure of compliance or failure to comply
with the rules is expected to entail strong moral
effects. These expectations have already been
met in the ﬁrst months after the Law had come
into effect: even the mere disclosure of the names
of persons who failed to declare their income on
time has brought about a public response that
could be regarded as a deterrent to corruption.
Nevertheless, the need to monitor the enforce-
ment of the Law, and sanction those who have
encroached on it, still exists.
In Macedonia, the laws regulating the public
administration do not require from the senior ofﬁ-
cials and civil servants, including deputies, to dis-
close their property or its origin. Such provisions
have been included in the Anti-corruption Law. A
Draft Law on recording the property of state ofﬁ-
cials had to be developed on request of the
Council for ﬁghting corruption.
In Serbia there is no formal obligation for the
government ofﬁcials to disclose their property. At
the time of the election of the current
Government of Serbia (January 2001), the prime
minister and some of the ministers informed the
public about their personal property – real estate
and funds. However, it is impossible to verify
these data, as there is no legal obligation to
record property. Although opposition at the time,
Democratic Party (DS) filed a Draft Law on
Obligatory Recording of Property Owned by the
State Ofﬁcials in 1994, no such law has been pro-
posed since the promotion of the current govern-
ment, which includes DS representatives. 
*    *    *
The rules on the ﬁnancial and property standing
of persons occupying senior positions in public
authorities has undergone a substantial legisla-
tive development. Their practical implementation
would be of key importance for curbing corrup-
tion practices at the highest level of political
power although in some SEE countries there is
still no adequate regulation. 
In most SEE countries, more effective rules on
possible conﬂict of interests linked to internal
rules need to be established, as well as sanctions
for violations of the established rules to be intro-
duced. The rules on ﬁnancial and property stand-
ing also need further elaboration to include
broader powers for the controlling authorities
and the sanctions they can impose, more precise
legal regulation of the categories of people bound
by the law, appropriate access to the register and
protection of personal data. 
Ethical Norms and Mechanisms
In combination with the adopted laws, the Codes
of ethics and behavior should play the role of a
mechanism, which prevents the conﬂict of inter-
ests and reinforces the internal control. 
In Albania the department of Public
Administration has launched a series of activities
aimed at the adoption of a Code of Ethics and the
training of public officials on the Code of
Administrative Procedures. That will make possi-
ble to qualitatively increase the extent of respon-
sibility and accountability of the administration in
the eyes of the public.
A common view is that in many countries in the
region, including BiH, the public is resigned to
corruption as a stable cultural phenomenon that
can only be reduced when a range of policy and
institutional reforms is successfully implemented
over a long period of time. The WB survey data
show that 73 percent of the general public
respondents and 71 percent of public ofﬁcials
agree with the statement that in BiH “corruption
is a part of culture and mentality”. With this
respect the ethical norms and mechanisms have
to play a very signiﬁcant role. At the Entity and/or
Cantonal level in BiH certain rules are possible,
but these were not compulsory for adoption and
thus not many institutions have adopted them as
yet. Following the adoption of the conﬂict of
interest prevention acts, ever more internal rules
are expected for adoption by the institutions and
agencies. 
In a form of manuals, instructions for interaction
with the public exist for certain agencies, such as
inspectorates, while the overall civil service is
only governed by the Law on Public Institutions
and the Law on Government (in both Entities) that
are rather thin on this side.
In Bulgaria the Code of Conduct for Civil
Servants, approved by the Minister of State
Administration on December 29, 2000, outlines
the fundamental principles and rules of ethical
behavior for civil servants in their interaction with
citizens, in the course of performing their profes-
sional duties and in their private and public lives.
Nevertheless, these principles and rules need to
have a better expressed anti-corruption content
through clear rules on civil servants’ loyalty and
conflict of interests, obligations on granting
access to public information, etc. In addition fur-
ther clariﬁcation should be brought to the regula-
tion of professional ethics monitoring mecha-
nisms and their importance for career advance-
ment, increased internal control and strict linkage
of the preservation of the civil servant status to
the performance of duties.
In its current version the Code still does not cre-
ate sufﬁcient conditions for a decrease in admin-
istrative discretion or for creating a higher degree
of transparency and accountability in its work. 
The Code of Ethics for Public Servants in
Macedonia was adopted in December 2001. The
Code deﬁnes the public servants’ behavior in
their professional and private life. According to
the Code, the state servants may not use the
advantages arising from their status or ofﬁcially
acquired information for personal interest. They
are obliged to avoid any conﬂict of interest, or sit-
uations, which may create a suspicion for conﬂict
of interest. The state servants are not allowed to
represent or express their political beliefs while
performing their duty, or any political activities,
which may undermine the public conﬁdence in
their capability for doing their duty. The state ser-
vants are not allowed to express or emphasize
their political afﬁliation in relations with citizens
or legal persons, or other civil servants. They are
not allowed to make any pressure on other state
servants to join some political party. The state ser-
vant must avoid the conﬂict of his/her personal
ﬁnancial interest with his position and status of
civil servant, and avoid activities and behavior in
the private life, which may decrease the public
conﬁdence in the public administration. Since the
Code of Ethics has been adopted only recently,
there are no evaluations yet of the results from its
implementation. However, having in mind the
widespread public belief in corruption of civil ser-
vants, the improvement of such situation cannot
be expected in the near future, unless the radical
measures are taken very soon.
Republic of Serbia still does not have a Code of
Ethics for Civic Servants, but it is expected that
such document will be adopted in the near future.
However, Article 25 of
the Labor Law in State
Services, adopted in
1991 and amended sev-
eral times till 2002,
obliges public servants
to preserve the esteem
of an institution they
work for while perform-
ing their duties.
*    *    *
Adequate ethical norms
and internal mecha-
nisms for control and
prevention of corrup-
tion within the adminis-
trative institutions need
to be introduced. The
already created ones
have to be further
developed and imple-
mented. The following
documents provide a
good basis for their fur-
ther development: Recommendation N. R (2000)
10 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe on Codes of Conduct for Public Ofﬁcials,
adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its
106th session on May 11, 2000, and the Model
Code of Conduct for Public Ofﬁcials, attached as
Appendix to the Recommendation as well as the
Code of Good Administrative Behavior, adopted
by the European Parliament on September 6,
2001, based on the practice of the Court of Justice
of the European Community and the administra-
tion-related national legislation of the member
states.
It is also recommended that specialized units in
the branches of the administration are created in
order to exercise internal control over their activ-
ities and prevent corrupt practices by civil ser-
vants as well as carry out appropriate internal
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procedures for investigation of administrative
abuse and corruption.
Status of Civil Servants Guarantees for
Political Independence
The process of application of the legal framework
for the public administration’s new organizational
model and the introduction of the civil servant
status raised several issues. In many SEE coun-
tries there is a lack of clear boundary between
political appointments and those based on pro-
motion.
The legal regulation of the status of civil servants,
their recruitment, rights, duties and liabilities is
among the measures which contribute to the
more effective counteraction of the internal fac-
tors fostering corruption and facilitate the cre-
ation of a favorable institutional environment for
preventing corruption.
In Albania the Law on the Status of the Civil
Servant (No.8549), in force since November 1999,
declares the principles of professionalism, inde-
pendence and integrity, political impartiality,
transparency, public service, career continuity,
and legality to be the guiding lights in the per-
formance of the public function. The Council of
Ministers has established the Department of the
Public Administration (DOPA), which is the real
authority on civil service issues. It formulates pro-
grams and policies, and drafts all implementing
legislation the Council of Ministers is supposed to
adopt.
The Civil Service Act has been pushed quite suc-
cessfully by DOPA. As far as central government
agencies are concerned, recruitment procedures
have increasingly been conducted according to
the pattern envisaged by the law. Also, a database
on public administration employees is being set
up. The database is expected to provide ofﬁcials
with a clear view as to the geography of human
resources and will enable them to make the best
allocations possible. Thus the legal basis for
strengthening the civil servants’ status has been
introduced but, the institutional prerequisites for
anti-corruption are still in process of establish-
ment.  
A more competitive recruitment process is antici-
pated with the adoption in BiH of legislation on
the prevention of the conflict of interests.
Currently no such mechanisms are in place. 
In Bulgaria the problem for deﬁning political
appointments and civil servant promotion was
partially solved by the Law on Amending the Law
on Administration, adopted on November 7, 2001,
in force since November 23, 2001. It mandates
strict implementation of the provisions, which
govern these two types of appointments. It is
expected to strictly apply the rules regulating
these two types of appointments, observe trans-
parency of the process and exercise control over
compliance in order to move progressively
toward a state administration model resistant to
excessive political appointments and dismissals,
and to overcome political dependence and pres-
sures over the activities of civil servants.
The Code adopted in Macedonia deﬁnes inde-
pendence of the state servants in performing
their duty and making decisions. According to the
Law, the need for a new employment has to be
publicly announced by the Agency. The
Commission has to be established for performing
a procedure of recruitment. The candidates have
to pass an exam in the Agency, which prepares
the list of the best candidates. Senior ofﬁcial from
the state body (the State Secretary or General
Secretary) performs the selection of the candi-
dates. The Agency is authorized to adopt by-laws,
which determine the key issues such as criteria,
standards, and a procedure for employment and
selection of the state servants. However, in spite
of such criteria and procedure, the practical
implementation of these rules is quite different.
There are serious indications for abuse of power
during recruitment procedure and avoidance of
prescribed criteria. The total politicization of the
public administration in the last several years
does not guarantee efficient, skilled,
competent,experienced and professional admin-
istration, according to the European standards
and criteria.
The Law on Employment in the State Authorities
of the Republic of Serbia, effective since 1991,
regulates status of civil servants. Article 4 states:
“Employed in state organs can neither be guided
by their political convictions, nor express them,
nor advocate them. Persons employed and
appointed to the state organs cannot be members
of the organs of political parties.” That is, mem-
bership in political party is implicitly allowed.
There are no other guaranties for political inde-
pendence of the civil servants.
Job Security (Hiring and Firing of Civil
Servants)
In Albania the Law on the Status of the Civil
Servant (No.8549) satisfactorily regulates the
issue of recruitment. Article 12 of the law pro-
vides a list of general requirements to be met by
candidates in order to become civil servants.
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Those who meet the conditions, go through the
selection process. After the exam (both written
and oral), the ﬁnal decision is made.
However, job security is precarious and careers
are built on grounds other than meritocracy.
These and other factors have made Albanian civil
service very prone to corruption.
19
Perhaps the
most conspicuous failure of the civil service
reforms has been the fact that local government
departments and agencies have totally ignored
the law. As a consequence, recruitment, promo-
tion and layoffs have been conducted illegally
and arbitrarily.
The Albanian Civil Service Act is proving to be an
important tool in the hands of policy makers and
administrators in their efforts to make the public
function more efﬁcient and transparent. Clearly,
this process is capable of signiﬁcantly reducing
corrupt practices in the civil service.
Government officials sustain that numerous
administrative measures have been taken against
corrupted individuals. During the last 6 years a
number of customs officers, policemen, and
other ofﬁcials of the state administration have
been dismissed on charges of corruption and
abuse of power. However, in none of these cases
legal proceedings took place. Since some of the
ofﬁcials that have been dismissed on charges of
ﬁnancial abuses have close ties with people in the
upper decision making levels of the state admin-
istration, they have been appointed in parallel
state structures, regaining immunity before any
legal proceedings. 
This has become a hot issue for the reformist
governments of BiH that took ofﬁce in 2001, as
they inherited complex administrative mecha-
nisms that were mostly hired on a political afﬁlia-
tion merit, or through connections. The existing
legislation regulating ﬁring and hiring of public
administration is extremely restrictive and in
almost two years of holding that ofﬁce, the new
governments have managed to ﬁre and competi-
tively hire only a handful of employees, nowhere
near the realistically required ﬁgures to alleviate
conﬂict of interest from the administration. The
adoption of the new legislation should be of great
beneﬁt in that respect.
In Bulgaria the transition to systematic monitor-
ing and management of the human resources in
the civil service should be carried out as a follow
up of the Ordinance on the Civil Servants
Register, issued by the Minister of State
Administration, in force since February 15, 2001.
The application of the civil servant status will be
further facilitated by improving the provisions on
ranks included in the Ordinance on the
Implementation of the Uniform Classiﬁcation of
Positions in Administration, issued in 2000.
Despite the adopted legal provisions, the selec-
tion of civil servants is still not based on distinct
criteria for evaluation of their professional knowl-
edge and skills, which should serve as a basis for
their appointment and promotion.
Under the Law, the state servants in Macedonia
can be ﬁred if they are found guilty of criminal
act, if their work was evaluated as inefﬁcient, or if
they refuse to be transferred on a different posi-
tion.
The Law on Employment in the State Authorities
of the Republic of Serbia lists the principles
deﬁning employment procedures, job allocation,
professional duties, occupations, pay scales, and
salary calculation, etc. There are clearly deﬁned
rules that regulate advancement in the ofﬁce,
acquiring titles, posts, organizational issues.
There are certain conditions concerning working
experience and qualiﬁcations that have to be met
in order to acquire higher posts. Salaries are
determined by salary groups, according to posts
and length of occupation.
Every citizen of Federation of Republic of
Yugoslavia, who is at least 18 years old, ﬁts gen-
eral health conditions, prescribed qualiﬁcation for
the certain post, and has not been convicted to
more than six months of imprisonment can be
employed in the state administration. Foreign cit-
izens cannot be employed in the state organs.
Hiring procedure begins with public announce-
ment, but ﬁnal decision on hiring is taken by the
head of the personnel within the state body.
The Law provides discipline responsibility of the
civil servants for breaking working liabilities, inef-
ﬁciency, indolence, misuses, or breaking codes.
Every employee can propose discipline trial, but
only higher ofﬁcers can initiate the process. Final
verdict is on the highest ofﬁcer in the referred
state organ.
In practice, little progress was made towards
establishing the necessary criteria for employ-
ment and promotion according to a merit system,
even after October 5. The hiring procedure is
largely disregarded in practice, because there are
no mechanisms that prevent discretionary power
of the state body officials. In most cases,
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19 According to corruption surveys, civil servants are perceived as highly corrupt. The civil administration, both local and central,
was perceived as the third most corrupt organization after customs/tax authorities and the judiciary. WB Reports on Corruption,
1998 and 2000. 
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announcements made are nothing more than for-
malities.
There is no explicit provision in the Law that reg-
ulates suspension in the state administrative bod-
ies. There are no major restrictions on employ-
ment possibilities following termination of serv-
ice in the public sector. The only provision in the
Law regarding this states that higher ofﬁcials can
change the positions of employees, and employ-
ee who does not accept new post gets ﬁred. 
Changes in the Labor Law in State Services,
adopted in July 2002, considerably liberalized this
important issue (dismissal of civil servants from
work). Article 64a sets down cases, in which pub-
lic servants can be dismissed:
If it is proven that the public servant was hired
without a proper legal procedure within a peri-
od of one year after the hiring
If he/she does not show the required results
during the probation period
If he/she refuses to work on a working position
he/she was posted on
As a consequence of loosing a title and if no
suitable working position to which he/she can
be transferred is available
If he/she is absent from work in a period of 
15 days without a proper excuse
If he/she receives a status of non-deployed
after restructuring of an organization
Nepotism/Cronyism, Gifts/Hospitality – Legal
Provisions and Practice
The prevention of the conﬂict of interest is very
important for combating corruption. However in
most SEE countries there is still no clear and
detailed regulation.
In Albania the depth of corruption, even in the
highest levels of state administration and gover-
nance, has distorted developmental policies,
resulting in high unemployment and economic
stagnation in many production sectors, as well as
in high level of pollution of the environment and
chaotic urbanization. The ﬁrst to suffer is free and
honest competition since entrepreneurs have to
adopt these practices in order to ensure survival
of their business. In recent years very few small
enterprises and business have been created. This
has happened in spite of the fact that Albanian
legislature has been improved. There is almost a
decade of experience in dealing with business,
consumption has increased and labor force has
become cheaper. The corrupt business environ-
ment has forced entrepreneurs to apply a system
of ﬁxed formal and informal practices in their
businesses, rather than sit and wait for the state
to put an end to unfair competition and informal
economic activity. Such a business environment
is also very unattractive for foreign investors, and
in fact foreign investment in Albania has fallen
signiﬁcantly.
In BiH no provisions to prevent nepotism are in
place yet, despite the fact that it is exceptionally
widespread.
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The vicious circle of nepotism con-
tinues to ﬁll space in the newspapers and talk
shows on the national media. Using one’s posi-
tion in the public ofﬁce to protect interests of
entrepreneurs with whom ofﬁcials have political
or other connections – another indication of eco-
nomic conﬂict of interest – is perceived as a wide-
spread problem by more than 50 percent of the
public ofﬁcials interviewed.
The Prevention of the Conﬂict of Interest Law reg-
ulates the position of all civil servants and politi-
cal representatives, in respect of their function in
the public institutions and introduces clear rules
on the conﬂict of interest between a public ofﬁce
and any private sector interest. At the BiH level a
draft law was passed. In the Entities, the prepara-
tions are entering the ﬁnal stage (the segment
regulating this law may be built into a broader
law on civil service, which may make some of the
mentioned legislation obsolete). That law is to be
coordinated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs and
Communications, as well as the Federal and RS
Ministries of Justice and fully adopted by the end
of 2002. 
Hospitality and gifts are more often seen as a
“sign of good will” than a bribe and are com-
monly practiced, both on the giving as well as on
20 The following outcomes of BiH anti-corruption diagnostic indicate that state capture and conﬂict of interest are major prob-
lems in BiH: Enterprises managers interviewed consider policy and regulatory aspects of state capture ("sale of votes to pri-
vate interests", "monopolies") the biggest problem for businesses. Out of 27 problems that the business environment can cre-
ate for an enterprise, most of the respondents chose "monopolies" as the most serious obstacle. "Sale of Parliamentary votes
and governmental decrees to private interests", which describes policy aspect of state capture, was also ranked among the
most serious obstacles for business. Half of the respondents in the public survey said that accepting bribes for inﬂuencing the
content of laws and other obligatory decisions – the most direct indication of state capture – is a widespread practice at the
State, Entity and Local government levels. (WB, ibid.3)
the taking side.
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Again, no legal provisions regu-
late this area or sanction either side.
In Macedonia there are no provisions which pro-
hibit nepotism/cronyism. This is one of the rea-
sons that the nepotism is highly present in the
public administration. The family members of
politicians or senior ofﬁcials have been recruited
in different ministries or public enterprises, or
even in the same organ. Such situation creates a
high possibility for corruption, because of their
internal family connection and mutual trust. 
There is no legislation regulating acceptance of
gifts and provision of presents and services to
civil servants in Serbia. There are no services
keeping registers to that effect. Restrictions can
be deﬁned by service regulations, in connection
with employment, which had the character of a
state or ofﬁcial secret. There is no single organ
resolving public complaints about the work of the
administrative organs, public services and their
staff. No regulations exist which deﬁne the exis-
tence of such an organ.
4.2. Administrative Services. Responsibili-
ty of the State for Damages Caused by
Public Ofﬁcials
In BiH, this is regulated by the not yet adopted RS
Anti-Corruption Act and partly by the Conﬂict of
Interests Prevention Law. Any disclosure of infor-
mation of privileged sort is considered a criminal
activity and the sanctions are designed according
to the mentioned laws.
The introduction in Bulgaria of an effective orga-
nizational model for the administration as a nec-
essary prerequisite for the improvement of
administrative service of the citizens and for pre-
vention of the corruption, discretionary exercise
and abuse of administrative power started with
measures for opening the administration to the
citizens and improving the quality of administra-
tive service. 
In order to open the administration to the citizens
and more effectively Implement the Law on
Administrative Services for Natural and Legal
Persons the following measures have been
undertaken: preparation of billboards with infor-
mation about the type of services, fees, necessary
documents, speciﬁc administrative unit perform-
ing the service and data on its managers and
experts; provisions ex ofﬁcio of forms and sam-
ples; publications of brochures; introduction of
badges for the employees of different administra-
tions in order to eliminate their anonymity and
initiate responsibility in cases if poor or
unscrupulous performance of duties and so on.
The organization of administrative services
through a “one stop
shop” aims at facilitat-
ing citizens’ access,
improving the quality
and efficiency of the
administration’s work
and eliminating the
direct contact between
applicants for services
and service providers,
thus decreasing the
probability of illegal
interactions between
the two parties and lim-
iting the opportunities
for corruption. These
purposes have not
been attained yet not
only because the “one
stop shop” project is
still in its early stages of
implementation. It is
the novel approach
which does not come
easy, the ﬂaws in the
internal regulation of
63
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Never
55.7
Sometimes
32.2
Frequently
12.1
Chart 4: Frequency of additional payments (sponsorships,
etc.) and/or payment of bribes in order to obtain
public services (e.g. telephone, power supply,
etc.) in Bulgaria (%)
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21 According to WB Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption (p.5), as many as 27 percent of public ofﬁcials admitted that in the past two
years they had been offered a small present by a client for services provided, and 36 percent of public ofﬁcials said that in the
past two years they had been offered either money, or an expensive present, or a counter-service.
the administration, the insufﬁcient qualiﬁcation of
the civil servants and the slow automatization of
services and introduction of new information and
management technologies all account for the
delay. 
The administrative service reform is still at the
stage of deciding upon its organizational model.
The delay in the process of creating uniform inter-
nal rules on the operation and the interaction
among the units of the respective branches of the
administration negatively affects the process of
creating an administrative service environment
free of corruption. Often internal rules are provid-
ed not in a single regulatory act but in multiple
ones, both of internal organization (orders,
instructions and rule of procedure) and legisla-
tive. Few administrations have uniform internal
rules adopted and approved by their secretary
general.
Issues still remaining to be solved are those con-
cerning the deadlines and procedures for provi-
sions of administrative services as well as the
uniﬁcation of currently existing procedures for
dealing with applications for services and com-
plains about the activities of the administration as
the current regulations are included in various
laws and contain different deadlines and appeal
procedures. The solution of these issues would
create legal guarantees of citizens’ rights in their
interaction with the administration, greater trans-
parency and more effective control over the activ-
ities of the administration, limits over obtaining
administrative services through unlawful prac-
tices.
It has become evident that the poor quality of
administrative services is often due to insufﬁcient
ﬁnancial resources: most of the units of the
administration still lack not only computers and
the necessary software, but even simple docu-
ment-processing applications. This can practically
block not only the coordination of application for
services submitted to different branches of the
administration but also the application of princi-
ples of openness of the administration, efﬁciency
of its activities and accessibility of its services in
the long run. In such environment corruption
rates at all levels remain relatively high. 
The Bulgarian Constitution in Article 2 adopts the
principle that the State bears responsibility for
damages caused by illegal acts and actions of
state bodies and ofﬁcials.
Detailed regulations on this matter are contained
in the State Liability Act for Damages Inﬂicted on
Citizens, in force since January 1, 1989, and sub-
sequently amended several times. The Law con-
cerns two groups of state bodies who can be
made accountable for damages under this act -
the administrative and the law-enforcement bod-
ies. 
The state is liable for damages inﬂicted on citi-
zens by illegal acts and acts of omission or com-
mission of state bodies and ofﬁcials while exer-
cising the functions of administration activities.
When damages have occurred due to an illegal
act of an administrative body, compensation can
be sought only after the illegal act is annulled
according to the set of rules stipulated in the law.
This includes administrative appeal before a
higher administrative body, judicial appeal, as
well as attacking the act with the help of extraor-
dinary measures for control of administrative acts
already in force. When damages have occurred as
a result of a void act of the administration, the
nullity is declared by the court before which a
claim is presented for compensation without a
preliminary reversal of the act in question. A void
act is one whose imperfections are so serious that
it cannot give rise to legal implications. When
damages have occurred from illegal acts of omis-
sion or commission of the administration, com-
pensation can be sought directly by a claim
before a court. On its part, the court has to deliv-
er a judgment on the legitimacy of the act of
omission or commission. The state is also liable
for damages inﬂicted on citizens by courts and tri-
bunals. 
The Law ﬁxes the amount of compensation owed
by the state according to the set of rules stipulat-
ed in it. The compensation includes material as
well as non-material damages that are a direct
consequence of the damage regardless of
whether the ofﬁcial has acted contradicting the
law or not.
The existing legal regulation does not facilitate
substantially the citizens in their quest for legal
defense of these violated rights. The majority of
the citizens are not acquainted with the procedure
in which they can retain the liability of the State
and to safeguard their rights. The existing legal
provision is not sufﬁciently effective because the
institution that has violated the rights of citizens
has to explain to the citizens their rights and pro-
cedures.
According to Article 13 of the adopted in Croatia
Law on Organization of Government Administra-
tion, in force since 1993, damages done to citi-
zens, legal entities or other entity caused by ille-
gal or reckless performance of government bod-
ies, bodies of local government and self-govern-
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ment, or legal entities that have public authorities
given by state bodies, will be covered by the
Republic of Croatia. 
The Law on Civil Servants in Macedonia pro-
vides a responsibility of the public ofﬁcials for
damages caused during exercising their duties.
There is also an obligation of the state organ to
reimburse the damage caused to third party by
the public ofﬁcials. Minister or other functionary
may fully or partly free public ofﬁcials of the
responsibility to reimburse the damage if it is not
done intentionally or if payment of the damage
will jeopardize the existence of public ofﬁcials.
The Central Register of state servants, as an obli-
gation deriving from the Law on State Servants
should be established. The preparation for this
register is underway.
Republic of Serbia takes no responsibility for
damages done by its ofﬁcials. Article 54 and 55 of
the Labor Law in State Services claim that public
servant himself is responsible for the damages
made intentionally or due to a careless behavior
to a state institution, legal entity or a citizen.
Special committee, headed by a chief of the insti-
tution, determines the damage and circum-
stances in which it occurred. If it is estimated that
a public servant cannot cover the damage, he/she
can be partially absolved from compensation of
the damage. This provision does not offer proper
protection to citizens and legal entities when deal-
ing with state organizations, especially because
of high discretion rights the head of the commit-
tee has on judging the amount of damage and the
related circumstances.
*    *    *
The introduction of new information and man-
agement technologies in the state administration
is a necessary condition for increasing its efﬁ-
ciency and improving the quality of administra-
tive services as well as for limiting the causes and
opportunities for corruption. Indeed, the rapid-
ness and quality of services performed by the
administration are among the most important
factors shaping the citizens’ attitude towards both
the local authorities and the central government.
It is recommended to improve legal provisions
and procedures regarding state liability for dam-
ages inﬂicted on citizens as well as to start work-
ing on a favorable environment for a gradual pri-
vatization of administrative services as a means
to decrease bureaucratic routine and corruption
and improve the speed and quality of service pro-
vision.
4.3. Specialized Control over the Work of
Administration (National Audit Institu-
tion, Ombudsman Type Institution,
Other Institutions with Controlling and
Monitoring Functions)
The introduction of effective mechanisms of con-
trol over the work of the administration is an inte-
gral part of the anti-corruption reform in the pub-
lic administration. Issues of particular importance
include greater role for the National Audit Ofﬁce
as an institution which exercises overall external
control over the budget, more effective role of the
authorities for state internal ﬁnancial control, spe-
cialized customs and tax control, the Financial
Intelligence Bureau and establishment of new
mechanisms and instruments of control, thus
contributing to the improvement of control over
the management and the use of public funds,
increase of transparency and prevention of cor-
rupt practices.
National Audit Institution
The High State Audit in Albania has a key role to
play in the ﬁght against corruption. By its very
deﬁnition, the High State Audit acts on behalf of
the taxpayers in order to make sure that the
Government properly uses the taxpayers’ money. 
The High State Audit was re-established in 1992
based on the concepts of modern constitutional
theory (it became an external audit institution
elected by the Parliament). The 1992 law was later
replaced by Law on the State Supreme Audit
Institution (No. 8270, dated December 7, 1997).
The new Constitution of 1998 baptised the High
State Audit as the High State Control. In the new
constitution, the Audit Institution is deﬁned as the
highest body of economic ﬁnancial control for
public property and funds. The term of ofﬁce for
the Institution’s president is seven years (appoint-
ed by the Parliament upon a proposal of the
President of the Republic), with the right of re-
election. The head of the High State Control has
the immunity of a member of the High Court. It
reports directly to the Parliament on the imple-
mentation of the state budget, gives its opinion
on the Council of Ministers’ report about the
expenses of the previous ﬁnancial year before it
is approved by the Parliament, and provides
information about the results of controls at any
time this is requested by the Parliament.
However, the Constitution does not guarantee the
independence of the High State Audit.
Based on constitutional and legal provisions, the
High State Audit monitors and identiﬁes every
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phenomena, problem or activity that is against
the law and regulations dealing with state budg-
et. Each year the High State Audit presents to the
Parliament its judgment on the Council of
Ministers for the realized budget together with
results and evaluation for its administration dur-
ing the ﬁscal year. It conducts an analytical audit
program that is focused on:
• Ministry of Finance, as an institution that
drafts and implements the budget;
• The ministries and governmental institutions
that are the main users of governmental
funds;
• Large governmental companies or enterpris-
es;
• Local governmental agencies.
The High State Audit presents to the Parliament
the following:
- A report on the implementation of the state
budget;
- An opinion on the Council of Ministers’ report
about the expenses of the previous ﬁnancial
year before it is approved by the Parliament;
Information about the results of controls could be
requested by the Parliament at any time.
The present legislation does not provide enough
procedural detail with regard to investigation, the
procurement of expertise, conﬂicts of interest,
etc. The biggest controversy concerning state
audit was prompted by the Government Decree
on the Financial Control (No. 217, dated May 5,
2000), which established the Financial Control
Departments at the Ofﬁces of the Prefects and
gave such departments the competencies to audit
the ﬁnancial activities of the local government
bodies as well as of the economic facilities that
are managed by the local government. It is not
difﬁcult to discern several problems of principle
in such an arrangement. Arguably, providing the
prefects (whose line of accountability ﬁnishes
with the cabinet) with auditing powers over the
local government could dilute the overall
Parliamentary control over the Audit Institution.
Secondly, the aforementioned arrangement may
by-pass the barriers that are set up to protect the
autonomy of local government from improper
interference by central government institutions.
Laws on Supreme Audit Institutions were passed
by the State and the Entity parliaments in BiH in
early 1999 and the Supreme Auditors formally
appointed in 2000. Their initial reports were pre-
sented to the respective parliaments in April/May
2001 and it is only since early 2002 that the pros-
ecution and judiciary are gradually reacting to
those alarming ﬁndings. This is the ﬁrst time
Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) are introduced
in this country and an extensive preparation pre-
ceded the appointment and the operations of the
SAIs in order to ensure their independence and
proper institutional arrangements, including a
parliament support in undertaking SAI activities.
The international community orchestrated much
of the preparatory
work, namely the
Office of the High
Representa t i ves ,
with the technical
assistance provided
by the Swedish gov-
ernment and their
respective SAI. Staff
of the Audit Ofﬁce
was appointed in
accordance with the
Rules of Service
agreed between the
Auditor General and
the Council of Minis-
ters, which must not
be less advanta-
geous then the ones
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provided for the government servants of Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
The Auditor General and his/her deputies are
appointed by the Presidency acting only in accor-
dance with the advice of both Houses of the
Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 
The Presidency may remove the Auditor General
and his/her deputies from the ofﬁce only if each
House of Parliament passes a motion asking for
removal of the Auditor General on the grounds of
misbehavior or if the quality of audit work fails to
meet the standards determined in accordance
with this Law.
22
Criteria for appointment and removal of Co-ordi-
nation Committee members was formed in accor-
dance with the Law on Audit of Financial
Operations of BiH Institutions, Law on Budget
Audit on BiH Federation and Law on RS Public
Sector Audit,23 as well as with the Lima
Declaration on Guidelines of Auditing Prospects
Principles and the Rules for the BiH SAI Legal
Powers of Enforcement.
The ﬁrst reports of the BiH Supreme Audit Ofﬁce
were sent to the Parliamentary Assembly for
analysis in July. The reports audited three
Bosnian Ministries for the ﬁnancial year 2000: the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry for Civil
Affairs and Communications and the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and Economic Relations. With the
assistance of the Parliamentary Support Project
(part of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and
Herzegovina), the relevant parliamentary commit-
tees in the legislative reported on the ﬁndings of
the audit ofﬁce in September, reaching a consen-
sus across parliamentary lines on recommenda-
tions for reform of relevant ministries.
The ﬁnance and budget committees’ scrutiny of
the ﬁrst audit reports marked some signiﬁcant
improvements in parliament’s functioning and of
the politically undermined parliamentary commit-
tee system, in particular. For example, committee
hearings were held with the relevant ministries to
follow up on the audit ofﬁce’s ﬁndings, which
pointed to mismanagement, lack of internal con-
trol, and misuse of budget in the previous ﬁnan-
cial year. Although there was reluctance on the
part of the new government ministers, appointed
in the spring of 2001, to be held accountable in
the parliament, deputy ministers attended the
hearings, responding to written and oral ques-
tions. The ﬁnance and budget committees of both
Houses issued joint recommendation for the
reform of practices in the ministries, marking a
degree of cross-party consensus rarely achieved
in the volatile Bosnian political system.
The control powers of the National Audit Ofﬁce
are of great importance for combating corruption
in Bulgaria. The new Law on the National Audit
Ofﬁce, in force since December 22, 2001, laid out
a more elaborate system of anti-corruption meas-
ures (many of these measures have been recom-
mended by Coalition 2000) including the follow-
ing elements:
- Expansion of the scope of the National Audit
Ofﬁce’s activities: the budget of the State
Social Insurance and the National Health
Insurance Company and the financial
resources from funds and programs coming
from the European Union, including their
management and end users.
- Informing in advance the Minister of Finance
or another relevant authority when in the
course of an audit either unlawful collecting or
spending of budgetary or other public funds
or damages to the audited property has been
established.
- Public announcement of the results of com-
pleted audits, which no longer represent a
legally protected secret.
- Legal regulation of the cooperation between
the National Audit Ofﬁce, the state internal
ﬁnancial control authorities, the tax and the
customs administration, the authorities for
compulsory collection of state receivables as
well as the ﬁnancial intelligence authorities
and the Judiciary; the forms of cooperation
have to be speciﬁed by joint agreements.
- More precise provisions on reporting to the
National Assembly and follow up on the
National Audit Ofﬁce’s recommendations.
The implementation of the newly adopted meas-
ures will contribute to the improvement of control
over the management and the use of public funds
in the country, including the resources provided
by the pre-accession funds, as well as increase its
22 Law on the Auditing of Financial Operations of the Institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ofﬁcial Gazette of Bosnia and
Herzegovina – No. 17/99, October 1999. (http://www.revizija.gov.ba/bs/intosai/audit-stand.asp)
23 Web site: http://www.saifbih.ba/bs/regulativa/stand-reviz.asp
transparency, prevent or uncover corrupt prac-
tices in cooperation with other specialized control
institutions.
The National Audit Ofﬁce also plays an important
role for the successful implementation of the Law
on Property Disclosure by Persons Occupying
Senior Position in the State, in force since May 13,
2000, in relation to the public register established
with the Chair of the National Audit Ofﬁce. Anti-
corruption dimensions of this role are obvious
and have to be developed.
In Croatia pursuant to State Audit Act (SAA), in
force since 1993, amended in 1995, 1999 and
2001, the State Audit Office (SAO) performs
audits of state expenditure, ﬁnancial statements
and ﬁnancial transactions of government units,
local self-government and administrative units,
legal entities that are partially or wholly ﬁnanced
from the budget, legal entities in which the state
is majority shareholder, and the National Bank of
Croatia. 
The audits consist of examinations of legality and
efﬁciency of spending of public funds in individ-
ual branches and accomplishment of certain pro-
grams in compliance with the audit standards of
the International Organization of Supreme Audit
Institutions (INTOSAI). 
The Croatian State Audit Ofﬁce (SAO) complies
with the most important condition: that the Ofﬁce
is an independent institution and that it is respon-
sible only to the Parliament and not to the
Government. SAO has obligation to make an
annual report of its audit work to the House of
Representatives of Croatian State Parliament.
According to Article 12 of SAA the State Audit
Ofﬁce is run by the Auditor General. The Auditor
General is appointed by the House of
Representatives of the Croatian State Parliament
(Sabor) for the term of 8 years and he/she can be
re-appointed. The tenure of actual Auditor
General is to be assumed as per its original
appointment. The Auditor General can be dis-
missed before expire of the tenure: upon his/her
own requests, when appointed to the other posi-
tion with his/her consent, if permanently looses
the capability to carry out the duty, and if found
guilty for a crime which makes him/her unworthy
to carry out the duty of Auditor General. 
SAO Auditing Reports should be discussed in the
Croatian State Parliament. The report must be
submitted to the House of Representatives of the
Croatian State Parliament not later than ﬁve
months following the expiry of the date for sub-
mission of annual ﬁnancial statements. Croatian
State Parliament accepts the Decision about real-
ization of SAO ﬁndings.24
SAO was set up to supervise and control the
Budget and budgetary beneﬁciaries. It regularly
publishes reports about audits it has done and
appends them to parliamentary Budget debates.
Although of very high quality, the ﬁndings of the
audits to date about shortcomings in the budget-
ary process have not been adequately applied in
practice.
The Code of Professional Ethics has been author-
ized by the Auditor General in compliance with
the Code of Ethics of INTOSAI. 
SAO organizes meetings with and was visited by
representatives of OECD and World Bank, regard-
ing the Stability Pact Anti-corruption Initiative
(SPAI) and monitoring the improvements of
auditing system in the Republic of Croatia. 
It is unfavorable that according to Article 8 of the
Decree on changes and amendments to the
Decree about Titles and Salaries of Public
Servants and State Employees, issued in 2001,
employees in SAO have the same incomes as
other state employees or public servants. The
new regulation put out of order the special rule
that regulated salaries of employees in SAO. That
could have unfavorable effect in motivating the
best and most experienced staff from Ofﬁce to
move to other services or private auditing ﬁrms. 
Simultaneously, according to Article 3 of the
Decision about Amendments of the Law on State
Audit Act of 2001 SAO also got very broad and
complex duty to audit the whole process of pri-
vatization that has to be ﬁnished by January 1,
2003.  
The auditing in Macedonia is regulated by the
Law on State Audit Ofﬁce as a national institution
and Law on Audit regulating the auditing in pri-
vate companies and legal entities.
The Law on State Audit was enacted by the
Parliament in 1997. According to the Law, the
State Audit performs audit on budget expendi-
tures, ﬁnancial reports, ﬁnancial statements and
ﬁnancial transactions by the state organs, local
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24 SAO Auditing Reports are available to the general public on SAO Internet pages (http://www.revizija.hr). SAO Auditing Reports
for year 2001, is on WEB page http://www.revizija.hr/doc-new/izvoradu.doc), and here are also the Reports from the earlier
years. 
government organs, legal entities partially or fully
ﬁnanced from the state Budget, legal entities in
which the state is major shareholder, the National
Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, payment
operation institutions, funds, agencies and other
institutions established by the Law and users of
EU funds and other international institutions. The
audit contains an examination of documents,
reports of internal control and internal auditing,
accounting and ﬁnancial procedures and other
evidences, implementation of international
accounting standards and auditing standards. The
State Audit also examines the legality and efﬁ-
ciency of ﬁnancial transactions and state expen-
ditures. The state audit has to be performed at
least once in year. The State Audit Ofﬁce is run by
the General Auditor, elected and dismissed by the
Parliament. The General Auditor and his Deputy
are not allowed to perform any other function, to
be members of governing, supervisory or any
other board, or members of political party. The
Law does not clearly state their independence.
The funds for State Audit Ofﬁce are provided
from the State Budget.
The State Auditor has a legal power to free access
to the business ofﬁces and property, insight into
the books and other documentation, and the
power to require explanation by the subjects in
which the audit is performed about all issues
essential for the auditing. The legal representative
may not declare as a state secret the documents,
which do not have such mark, in order to refuse
or disable the auditing. If the subject in any way
limits the scope of audit, the State Auditor shall
include this in the Report, in accordance with
auditing standards and immediately inform the
competent organ responsible for supervision on
the subject. If during auditing procedure the
Auditor ﬁnds out that there is basic suspicion for
misdemeanor or criminal act, he will immediate-
ly inform the competent organs to take necessary
measures. The organs are obliged to inform the
State Auditor within 30 days about undertaken
actions upon his ﬁndings. In spite of its inde-
pendence, there are serious indications that gov-
ernment often pressures the State Auditor, due to
the fact that the proposal for his appointment has
been made by the Government. The inﬂuence of
competent Government institutions on the selec-
tion of persons as auditors does not indicate
independent functioning of this institution, as
well as efﬁcient performance of his duty. The pro-
fessional and independent excising of the func-
tion by the State Auditor without inﬂuence by the
competent government institutions should
ensure regular control on the use of budget
resources and prevent corruption practices. 
The State Auditor submits the ﬁnal Report to the
legal representative of the subject, which has a
right to make notices and suggestions on it. The
competent organ, which supervises the subject,
will inform the State Audit Ofﬁce about undertak-
en actions in accordance with ﬁndings of the
Auditor. The State Audit Ofﬁce is obliged to sub-
mit report to the Ministry of Finance if it ﬁnds out
infringement of law by the ﬁnancial sector. The
State Audit Ofﬁce submits its Yearly Report to the
Parliament. The State Auditor submits also cur-
rent reports when ﬁnds out essential infringe-
ment of law and quarterly report considering
indicators for monitoring and evaluation of suc-
cessful performance of its Program, which is part
of the Annual Report. The Report of State Audit
Ofﬁce is on the website.
However, the public has not been informed so far,
whether the State Auditor has taken any actions
regarding the big scandal in the Ministry of
Defense in 2001, when several million DEM from
the budget funds were transferred to family’s
company of the former Minister of Defense, who
had to resign after the scandal was discovered by
the media. This institution is not sufficiently
opened to the public or to the media, except
through the Yearly Report. 
According to 2000 Annual Report which has
already been submitted to the Parliament, the
State Auditor has discovered abuse of several
million Euro in the Health Insurance Fund. No
transparent procurement procedure and direct
negotiations with known buyer took place. So far,
no one of the competent organs has taken any
actions. However, having in mind that the
Director of the Fund is one of the respectable
members of the ruling party, and the practice for
such cases so far, there are no optimistic expec-
tations in the public that any actions shall be
taken against the Director of the Fund and other
persons involved in this scandal. The last scandal
discovered by the State Auditor is abuse of 6 mil-
lion Euro of the budget funds by the public enter-
prise “Aerodrom.”
Within the Ministry of Finance and Economy of
the Republic of Serbia the Budget Inspection is
in function of scrutinizing all budget users in the
Republic. Assistant Minister for budget inspection
is the head of the department and currently has
only five inspectors employed full time.
Enlargement and training of this department is
among the priorities of the Ministry. Budget
Inspection conducted a control of usage of budg-
et property only for the year 2000, which was the
last year of Milosevic regime. In a sizeable report
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they made, they have identiﬁed following crimi-
nal acts:
Misused resources;
Illegal spending;
Non-paid foreign currency revenues to the
Central Bank;
Misused solidarity fund resources;
Non-paid taxes, social securities and other
public revenues.
As the consequence of the Budget Inspection of
the Ministry of Finance and Economy results, the
following measures have been taken:
29 settlements for restitution of illegally spent
resources;
24 criminal charges against 47 former govern-
ment ofﬁcials, among which 17 ministers;
29 indictments for commercial offence against
142 ofﬁcials;
16 demands for the agitation of the commer-
cial offence procedure against 23 ofﬁcials.
Republic of Serbia currently does not have a
supreme auditing institution, which is the case in
developed countries. The expert team has been
established under the auspices of UNDP, featur-
ing representatives of the People’s Assembly, the
Ministry of Finance and Economy and the
Ministry of Justice and Local Governments aimed
at developing of this institution. It is still not cho-
sen which model will be applied, German one,
featuring the institution of court, or the French
one, featuring the institution of general auditor. It
is expected that the new Law will be developed
with the help of the UNDP experts.
It is important to mention that the People’s
Assembly has adopted on March 26, 2002, Organ-
ic Budget Law that will among other facilitate the
creation of a Treasury. Treasury will be placed
within the Ministry of Finance and Economy and
its functions will be ﬁnancial planning, cash man-
agement, expenditure control, debt management,
accounting and reporting. The centralization of
cash ﬂow will decrease the risks of abuse of
funds. The Treasury development is supported by
the US treasury and the European Agency for
Reconstruction. 
The Ombudsman Institution
The ombudsman institution is a specialized insti-
tution to control and monitor the administration
operating on the basis of moral authority against
administrative abuse. The main function and
objective of the Ombudsman and the certain sim-
ilar institutions is to monitor the administrative
work within the State and act as a brake upon cor-
ruption and arbitrariness which interfere with
human rights, to assist the reinstatement of pri-
vate persons’ rights after the latter have been vio-
lated by the State and its ofﬁcials, and to create
an atmosphere of respect of human rights and of
social autonomy. The institution is established in
almost all European countries. In most SEE coun-
tries, such institutions were established after the
democratic changes.
The Ombudsman concept in Albania is based on
the Albanian Constitution, articles 60-63 and on
the Law on People’s Advocate (No. 8454, dated
04/02/1999). The People’s Advocate defends the
rights, the freedom and lawful interests of indi-
viduals from unlawful or improper actions or fail-
ures to act of public administration bodies. He
has the right to make recommendations and to
propose measures when he observes violations
of human rights and freedoms by public adminis-
tration.
In exercising his tasks, the People’s Advocate is
independent from any other public authority and
has its own budget, which he administers him-
self. He is accountable to the Parliament only. He
is elected by three-ﬁfths of all members of the
Parliament for a 5-year period with the right of re-
election. He should not be a member of the
Parliament. 
The People’s Advocate enjoys the immunity of the
judge of the High Court and his salary is equal to
the Chairman of the High Court. He/she may not
take part in any political party, carry on any other
political, state or professional activity, nor take
part in the management organs of social, eco-
nomic and commercial organizations. He can be
dismissed with a special procedure. Minimum of
1/3 of all Parliament’s members may present a
motion to dismiss the People’s Advocate. The
basic reasons for his dismissal have to do with
breaching article 10 of the Law; receiving a penal-
ty from the court; being mentally handicapped or
not present at the working place for 3 months. The
decision for dismissal is taken by a minimum of
3/5 of the members of the Parliament. It’s worth
noting that it is not clear in the law who is the
body that prepares the report and the facts that
lead to dismissal. 
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Ombudsman has 3 specialized departments:
The department of the central and local gov-
ernment and the third parties that operate
under their dependence;
The department of the police, secret service,
army and the judiciary;
The department addressing the issues which
are not mentioned above, cooperating with
non-governmental organizations, and dealing
with the studies in the ﬁeld of human rights
and freedom. 
Furthermore, in order to provide the best territori-
al coverage, the Ombudsman is entitled to
appoint a local representative. The local authori-
ties of the place where this representative is
appointed are also legally obliged to provide
him/her with appropriate ofﬁce and working con-
ditions. The people can contact Ombudsman
either by mail or in person. 
The people’s advocate can start the investigation
of any case when he/she observes or doubts that
human rights are violated, based on complaints
or requests of interested people as well as on his
own initiative for any case made public (but still
with the approval of the harmed person). All pub-
lic bodies and ofﬁcials are obliged to provide any
documents and information requested by the
Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman submits a report to the
Parliament on annual basis.
There is still more to do with respect to deﬁning
the relationship between Ombudsman and other
state institutions. Traditionally, governmental
agencies and institutions are not used to deal
with such an institution like Ombudsman.
Since BiH is constitutionally comprised of two
Entities: FBiH and RS, plus the BiH District of
Brcko, directly under the State supervision, each
of those has an ombudsman institution.25
On 3 January 2001 the new Law on the Human
Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina
came into force and gave the current legal basis
for the Human Rights Ombudsman. The new Law
replaced Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace
Agreement, which was the valid framework of the
Ombudsman ofﬁce since its birth in 1996.
The Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is according to the Law an inde-
pendent institution set up in order to promote
good governance and the rule of law and to pro-
tect the rights and liberties of natural and legal
persons, as enshrined in particular in the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
international treaties appended thereto, monitor-
ing to this and the activity of the institutions of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, its Entities, and the
District of Brcko. The Ombudsman, as a control-
ling mechanism for the protection of guaranteed
human rights, normally requires previous
exhaustion of domestic remedies if such exist and
if they are effective. If any issue appears to arise
in connection with any of the rights protected, the
Ombudsman conducts an investigation, and
invites the Government to submit its observation.
At the same time the Ombudsman seeks to
achieve an amicable solution between the parties.
Where no satisfactory solution is found, the
Ombudsman issues a ﬁnal report in which he
states his conclusions as to the violation of the
applicant’s rights and freedoms and includes rec-
ommendation to the Government how to remedy
the violation.
The Ombudsman insists that the Government
and competent authorities comply with his rec-
ommendations. If no compliance can be
achieved, the case will be forwarded to the High
Representative and referred to the Presidency/
President of the respondent Party to use their
political inﬂuence and make the relevant subject
comply with the Ombudsman’s recommenda-
tions. On the basis of his report the proceedings
can be initiated before the HR Chamber in order
that the Chamber’s ﬁnal and binding decision is
obtained.
The Ombudsman can also present a special
report to any government organ or competent
ofﬁcial to remedy occurred or perspective breach
of human rights.
The ombudsman has powers to investigate cases
involving maladministration and violations of
human rights by any state or Entity authority in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. If human rights or fun-
damental freedoms have been actively or inac-
tively violated by any of the public authorities in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Ombudsmen may
intervene and issue a recommendation to the
authority concerned. The Ombudsman can also
initiate inspections in institutions where he sus-
pects maladministration. According to the Dayton
Agreement, the Ofﬁce should be ﬁnanced by
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Bosnia and Herzegovina and any relevant author-
ity in its geographic and political area of jurisdic-
tion. However, in the view of prevailing budgetary
situation in the country, it was clearly not possible
to expect that the Government would meet these
obligations. Therefore, since the beginning, the
Ofﬁce is mainly ﬁnanced from voluntary contri-
butions of the member states of the OSCE and
the European Union. The salary of the
Ombudsperson is covered by the Swiss
Government. The office of the human rights
Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina issues
Annual Reports. So far four annual reports have
been published and presented since 1996. These
reports outline, inter alia, the functions and activ-
ities of the Ofﬁce of the ombudsman, co-opera-
tion of the Ofﬁce with authorities, relationship
with other institutions and organizations, as well
as its ﬁnancing. The annexes to the Report con-
tain, inter alia, the statistical data, list of decisions
and reports, summaries of final and special
reports, list of contributions and costs, and other
information concerning works of the Ofﬁce. The
copies of the Reports are distributed to numerous
international and national organizations and insti-
tutions.
Unfortunately, the Ombudsman’s ofﬁce has thus
far mostly dealt with the return of refugees and
displaced persons (DP), and their property claims,
and to a much lesser extent with corruption. If
any, such cases would most often refer to the cor-
rupt practices in the Ministries of Refugees and
DPs which sought bribes either to allow repos-
session of property or an extended use of tempo-
rary accommodation.
Bulgaria is among the few European countries
without an Ombudsman institution. Existing safe-
guard mechanisms cannot always ensure quick,
timely, efﬁcient and easily accessible protection
of individuals affected by the actions of the
administration. As a result, cases of maladminis-
tration, including abuse of power, corruption, dis-
respect of human rights, insufﬁcient levels of
gender equality protection, etc. are widespread.
All these create the need for a new mechanism,
which could operate in parallel with existing insti-
tutions and complement their work.  
The introduction of an Ombudsman Institution
was discussed in the very beginning of the dem-
ocratic transition, during the elaboration of the
new Bulgarian Constitution, adopted in 1991.
However the initial idea was not further devel-
oped. 
The initiative for establishing Ombudsman type
institution was launched again in early 1998 by
the Center for the Study of Democracy
(www.csd.bg) – a leading Bulgarian non-govern-
mental organization active in the ﬁeld of policy
research, drafting of legislation and advocacy
activities. The process started within the frame-
work of Coalition 2000 anti-corruption process
(www.online.bg/coalition2000). Experts of the
Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) carried
out comprehensive research work, which resulted
in the development of a Concept Paper on the
Opportunities for Establishment of Ombudsman
Institution in Bulgaria and a ﬁrst version of the
Draft Law on the People’s Defender.
Parallel to the work on the Draft Law the CSD and
its partner NGO’s implemented a number of proj-
ects for introducing civic mediation at the local
level. As a result local mediators and observers
were established in some municipalities, operat-
ing on the grounds of special agreements with
the municipal authorities. 
On June 5, 2002, on a plenary session, the
National Assembly passed the three introduced
Draft Laws on the Ombudsman on ﬁrst reading.
According to the existing legislative procedure on
the basis of these drafts a special working group
to the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights
will elaborate one consolidated Draft Law.26 The
law is expected to be adopted this fall.
The fast introduction of Ombudsman type institu-
tions on national and local level in Bulgaria can
make them an additional guarantee against
administrative arbitrariness and for free exercise
of human rights. The development of effective
institutions for guaranteeing the human rights is
also one of the basic criteria for European Union
membership. 
Legal basis for the People’s Ombudsman (PO) in
Croatia is the Constitution, Article 92 (OG – NN
41/01). According to it, the People’s Ombudsman,
as a commissioner of the Croatian Parliament,
shall protect the constitutional and legal rights of
citizens in proceedings before the state adminis-
tration and bodies vested with public authority.
According to the Article 5 of the Decree on
Announcement of People’s Ombudsman Act of
1992, Ombudsman deals with particular cases of
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26 The CSD and Coalition 2000 experts continued their work on the initial draft and developed an improved version of the Draft
Law on the Civic Defender and the Local Civic Mediators (www.csd.bg/news/law/OmbudsmanE.htm#1), which could serve as
a basis for the elaboration of the consolidated draft to be proposed for adoption on second reading by the Parliament.
endangerment of citizens rights in procedures
before state administration and bodies vested
with public authority, or persons from these bod-
ies. Ombudsman deals with other important
questions for protection of the constitutional and
legal rights that are based on other sources of
information (from mass media etc.). The organi-
zation, internal questions and functioning of
Ombudsman are determined by Standing orders
about functioning of Ombudsman, adopted in
1997. According to the Law, to be appointed as a
Ombudsman (and his Deputies), one has to be
Croatian citizen, a lawyer with at least 15 years of
working experience in the legal ﬁeld, and publicly
known for his/her personal contribution to the
protection of human rights. The Ombudsman is
appointed by the House of Representatives of the
Croatian State Parliament for the term of 8 years
and he/she can be reappointed. The Ombudsman
(and his Deputies) can be dismissed before
his/her tenure expires with his/her resignation
accepted by the Croatian State Parliament, with
the loss of Croatian citizenship, or with Decision
of the Croatian State Parliament.  
The People’s Ombudsman does not enjoy immu-
nity, but his independence is assured with his
autonomy and also with his/her high moral stan-
dards.
The People’s Ombudsman deals with the particu-
lar endangerment of constitutional and legal
rights of citizens in the proceedings before state
administration and bodies vested with public
authority, or persons from these bodies accord-
ing to his initiative or on citizens’ requirements.
Everybody has s right to complain to PO regard-
less if they are directly endangered, and PO
decides freely whether he deals with a case and
in what volume. 
The Ombudsman warns, informs, and gives sug-
gestions and recommendations. He is not author-
ized for direct intervention in acts or functioning
of state bodies. Administrative state bodies and
bodies with public authority have to inform PO
immediately, or in maximum 30 days about the
actions taken regarding his warnings, informa-
tion, suggestions and recommendations. If state
bodies do not fulﬁll their obligation, PO will
inform Parliament. PO could inform general pub-
lic in mass media about his warning, information,
proposition and recommendations. Mass media
are obliged to publish his information and mes-
sages. 
All data and information have to be available to
PO, and he has a right of access to all documen-
tation and records that are in jurisdiction of
Croatia. He also has a right of access to all acts of
bodies of public administration and bodies with
public authority, regardless of their secrecy. PO
and his deputies are required to respect the rules
about keeping secrets during their function and
after their retirement. The bodies of public admin-
istration and bodies with public authority are
obliged to provide PO with all required informa-
tion and documentation, and give him all neces-
sary aid. Government workers are obliged to co-
operate with PO and on his request provide infor-
mation and provide answers to questions. 
The Ombudsman submits his Yearly Report at the
end of March for the previous year. In his Yearly
Report, PO provides data about the level of
respect for constitutional and legal rights of citi-
zens. The Yearly Reports have to include the most
important cases that PO surveyed in previous
period, and provide reasons for complains and
actions realized by PO. PO has a possibility to pro-
vide another report to the Parliament and to
authorized Ministries when he concludes that
constitutional and legal rights of bigger number
of citizens are endangered. For the time being, PO
Ofﬁce does not have Internet page or does not
publish its Reports. Even though PO is principally
open and available to all unsatisﬁed citizens,
there is obviously lack of communication with
general public, which decreases the public sensi-
tivity for particular cases of violation of human
rights. General public is poorly informed about
performance and possibilities provided by this
Institution, which is not only result of consider-
able self-denial of PO, but also an effect of insuf-
ficient interest of mass media and citizens.
However, PO remains an important factor of cor-
rection and regulation of public administration,
and one could estimate that he would have
important role in positive changes in
Government, especially in government bodies on
lower level. 
In Macedonia the Law on People’s Ombudsman
was enacted in 1997. Under the Law on the
People’s Ombudsman (here and after Law on
Ombudsman), the Ombudsman is an independ-
ent state organ, protecting the constitutional and
legal rights of the citizens, violated by the state
organs and other organs and organizations with
public authority. According to Article 4 of the Law,
the Ombudsman is elected and dismissed by the
Parliament. His/her mandate is 8 years, and may
be elected for one more mandate. The
Ombudsman has one or more deputies, elected
also by the Parliament. The following conditions
must be fulfilled in order to be elected as
Ombudsman: candidate has to be Macedonian
citizen, graduated lawyer with working experi-
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ence of over nine years in the legal ﬁeld, and with
proved activities in the ﬁeld of protection of citi-
zen rights. The Ombudsman and his/her deputies
shall be dismissed in the following cases: upon
his/her own request; if he/she is convicted for
criminal act on imprisonment for at least six
months; if he/she has lost the capability for per-
forming the function.
According to the Law the state organs and organ-
izations are obliged to collaborate with the
Ombudsman and provide him with all required
data and information upon his request, regard-
less of the degree of their conﬁdentiality and
allow him to investigate the case. Ombudsman is
required to respect the regulations for keeping
the secret.
The Ombudsman begins the procedure upon the
complaints of the citizens, or on his/her initiative.
During the procedure the Ombudsman may:
require explanations and additional information
by the state organs and organizations regarding
the issues from the complaint; review the matters
of the competence of the organs; invite the func-
tionary and public ofﬁcers from the organ to dis-
cuss and explain the issues from the complaint,
require an opinion by experts and scientiﬁc insti-
tutions. If Ombudsman discovers violation of
constitutional and legal rights of the citizens, he
may: propose to the organs and organizations to
start a procedure according to the law; make
request to the organ for temporally termination of
some provisions; propose initiating an adminis-
trative procedure against some public ofﬁcial. The
state organs and other organizations are obliged
to inform the Ombudsman within 30 days about
measures taken upon its request. If the state
organ or organization does not inform the
Ombudsman for the results of its proposal or rec-
ommendations, the Ombudsman may inform the
competent Ministry, the Government or the
Parliament.
According to the 2000 Annual Report of the
Ombudsman, the collaboration with state organs
is improving, but is still not satisfactory. The state
organs do not respond to his requests and rec-
ommendations for taking necessary measures
upon the complaints from the citizens. 
The funds for the Ombudsman, his/her deputies
and the staff are provided by the state Budget.
The level of salaries of the Ombudsman and
his/her deputies is determined by the Law for
appointed ofﬁcials, while the salaries for the staff
in accordance with the law and collective agree-
ment. Such situation may have an impact on the
Ombudsman’s independence in performing
her/his duty.
The Ombudsman submits a Report for his activi-
ties at least once a year. The Report is published
in the media. According to 2000 Annual Report,
1,166 complaints have been submitted to the
Ombudsman (compared with 1,202 complaints in
1999 and 1,183 in 1998) by 2,500 citizens, while 11
cases were investigated on its own initiative. The
Ombudsman has brought a decision for 1,080
complaints or 77.36% (compared with 1,440 com-
plaints or 86.22% in 1999). In 310 cases or 28.70 %
a violation of citizen’s right has been conﬁrmed
(340 or 23.61% in 1999). Upon the intervention of
the Ombudsman the state organs and organiza-
tions in 189 cases or 60.97% have accepted his
proposals and recommendations (in 212 cases, or
62.35% in 1999). There were several cases report-
ing corruption. Such cases were reported to the
competent authorities for further procedure.
However, in order to strengthen the legal power
of this institution, it is highly recommended to
amend the Law and broaden the authority of the
Ombudsman, so he would be able to take con-
crete measures against state organs and other
organizations in the cases of violation of citizen’s
rights. 
The ombudsman institution in Romania is regu-
lated by the Constitution of 1991 and the Law on
the Organization and Functioning of the Advocate
of the People Institution (Ombudsman Act),
enacted by the Parliament on March 13, 1997. 
Serbia has not adopted the People’s
Ombudsman Law yet. Ministry of Law is working
on the draft law, which has still not been publicly
announced. However, the largest Serbian NGO,
“OTPOR,” plays, to an extent, an ombudsman
role. Constantly criticizing all members of the
Serbian political life, they have attracted huge
support among all citizens who often complain to
“OTPOR” on various issues. “OTPOR” members
are licensed observers in all Parliament sessions
and they oversee the work of several state insti-
tutions (i.e. control of customs ofﬁcers at border
crossings).
*    *    *
It is important to strengthen the independence
and capacity of the already established ombuds-
man type institutions as additional guarantee
against administrative abuse of power. The insti-
tutions need to be granted powers to exercise
free monitoring and speciﬁc control within a com-
paratively broad scope which includes the regula-
tion of society in general: the operation of the
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executive power and the administration in its nar-
row meaning, the judicial system’s administration
and any other exercise of public activity.
4.4. Law Enforcement
Law enforcement agencies such as police, cus-
toms etc., as well as specialized anti-corruption
agencies have to play an important role in pre-
venting and counteracting corruption.
Specialized Anti-corruption Agencies
Establishment of a body with special powers to
investigate cases of corruption and to submit
them to the competent authorities which can take
legal action is considered to be of great impor-
tance for some SEE countries. 
In Albania the Government has established Anti
Corruption Monitoring Group (ACMG) to monitor
the Anti-Corruption Plan, approved by the Inter
Ministerial Commission of the ﬁght against cor-
ruption. This plan is in the shape of the “National
Anti-Corruption Matrix,” dated 7 April 2000. The
establishment of this group is in accordance with
the initiative undertaken by the Albanian
Government in the framework of the Stability
Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative (SPAI). 
The ACMG is composed of the Monitoring Board,
which is an ad hoc body and the Permanent Anti-
Corruption Unit under the Ministry of State. The
responsibilities of ACMG as well as the duties of
the Monitoring Board and of the Permanent Unit
are deﬁned in an Order of the Prime Minister.
Various Anti-Corruption units exist in different
state bodies. One of them is the anti-corruption
sector at the General Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce. The staff
employed in this ofﬁce is too small to handle the
large volume of work they have to deal with. Most
of the activities of the Ofﬁce are made public in
the newspapers. The anti-corruption ofﬁce does
not produce any report that would present its
achievements.
Other institutions that investigate corruption and
abusive practices, such as the Department of
Internal Auditing, have not been effective. The
Department of Internal Auditing has been more of
a political tool, rather than an institution that
monitors the abuses of government’s funds and
tax payers’ money. During 1992-1996 period,
when the Democratic Party was in power, the
Department of Internal Auditing was mainly used
against local government ofﬁcials that belonged
to the opposition, or against socialist ministers
embroiled in political conﬂict with the Socialist
leadership.
The Albanian government has set up a depart-
ment specialized to ﬁght corruption, even at the
ministerial level, but so far it did not produce any
practical result. This agency has produced unreli-
able data and information that could not be sus-
tained at the court, without having a real impact
against corruption. One of the paradoxes is that
even when customs ofﬁcers or high ranking ofﬁ-
cials were dismissed on charges of corruption,
almost none of these cases were taken to the
court. 
Establishment of a specialized agency in BiH is
pending and mostly relates to adoption of the
anti-corruption act. The outstanding issue is
where this agency should be located and the cur-
rent legislature debate ranges between strength-
ening certain sectors in the existing institutions or
creating a new institution that will be specialized
in the anti-corruption issues alone, as outlined
above.
In Bulgaria, several options for the institutional-
ization of such an agency have been considered.
In early 1999 a Draft Law on Combating
Corruption and Financial Crime was prepared and
discussed. The controversial issue in it was the
status of the proposed new entity – Government
Agency for Combating Financial Crime and
Corruption as a specialized body with the Council
of Ministers. The decision taken was in favor of
extending the activities of the existing authorities
instead of setting up a new agency.
The state agency in Croatia dealing with corrup-
tion is the anti-corruption ofﬁce of the State
Security Agency (SST). The Agency itself answers
directly to the Prime Minister and a special law
regulates its activity. The anti-corruption ofﬁce
has been operating since 1999, and it follows a
certain strategy in ﬁghting corruption, which is
kept conﬁdential. The results of its work are also
kept as conﬁdential and the report is only made
to the Prime Minister. This ofﬁce co-operates with
the ofﬁce of the General Prosecutor, Customs
Department and the Tax Department. Because of
the conﬁdentiality of the work, the relations with
the public are limited and the ofﬁce does not reg-
ularly report to the media. 
The specialized agency for anti-corruption and
ﬁght against organized crime (USKOK) was set up
on 11 October, 2001, by Parliament Decision
about announcement of Law for Agency for anti-
corruption and ﬁght against organized crime. It is
envisaged to operate as an ofﬁce of the state
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attorney with broader powers. This ofﬁce has pre-
ventive but also intelligence and investigative
functions. It has a multidisciplinary composition
and includes prosecutors, investigators, account-
ants and other specialists. This Ofﬁce co-ordinates
the work of agencies on a national level and will
play an important role in the international
exchange of information of investigations relating
to corruption and organized crime. The USKOK
should coordinate the operation of existing state
bodies that can help in the struggle against
organized crime - Internal Revenue and Customs
Services, the Bureau for Preventing Money
Laundering, the police. The USKOK should also
eliminate the possibility for other bodies to avoid
complying with orders coming from the bureau
or to obstruct its investigations. Furthermore, the
forming of a special police unit under the direct
command of the USKOK has been envisaged, as
well as of a special service to safeguard USKOK
agents, protected witnesses and repented wit-
nesses. A special prosecutor is at the helm of the
USKOK, who, along with his seven deputies (all
of whom have the status of state attorneys) and
several financial, database and criminology
experts, gather information, investigate and
cooperate with similar international institutions,
in order to at least curb, if not once and for all root
out, widespread crime in Croatia. USKOK has
Department for investigation and documentation,
Department for ﬁght against corruption and pub-
lic relationship, Department for prosecution,
Secretary and Administrative services. 
It is too early to estimate how successful the
USKOK Project will be in Croatia. Its efﬁciency pri-
marily depends on the quality and knowledge of
its staff, as well as on public and media percep-
tion of its operation. To ensure the proper func-
tioning further training and material support will
be needed.  
There is no specialized anti-corruption agency in
Macedonia. According to the new Law against
Corruption, the special State Committee shall be
elected by the Parliament, with task to propose
measures for combating corruption, in coopera-
tion with other competent institutions. This body
shall propose to the Parliament measures for
combating corruption, and work on specific
cases. 
The Ministry of Finance and Economy of the
Republic of Serbia is the main Government
coordinator of the State’s ﬁght against corruption.
The Ministry is the home to the Anti-corruption
Ofﬁce, which is the headquarters for the Council
for the ﬁght against Corruption and the Anti-cor-
ruption Task Force. Anti-corruption Ofﬁce secures
the information ﬂow between all the parties
involved, coordinates relations with the media
and civil society, and manages international rela-
tions concerning the Government’s anti-corrup-
tion initiatives. At the moment, the ofﬁce is made
up of three state ofﬁcials, but a staff of ﬁve is
actually planned to run the ofﬁce.
Police Force, including Border and Metro-
politan (Special Units for Investigating and
Prosecuting Corruption Crimes and Internal
Corruption)
Police force plays an essential role in curbing cor-
ruption so the existence of special units for inves-
tigating and prosecuting corruption crimes and
internal corruption is of great signiﬁcance.
In Albania at the Ministry of Public Order, there
are two departments that address corruption
related issues:
The Fight Against Economic Crime Depart-
ment, which tracks corruption cases in both
the governmental and private sectors;
Information Service of the Public Order, which
tracks corruption among police forces. 
The Fight against Economic Crime Department
has been established in 1997, as part of the
General Criminal Department together with some
other departments such as Interpol, the depart-
ment of the ﬁght against drugs, etc. The sector
focuses its ﬁght against the following types of
crime: 
Smuggling;
Forgery of securities, money, documents; 
Theft of art works;
Misuse of public position, bribery;
Money laundering;
Financial fraud;
Penalties in the commercial companies, tax
tariffs, etc.
The internal monitoring of this department is per-
formed by the Security Service of Public Order
and the Inspection of the Minister himself. The
department operates under the Penal Code, Civil
Regulations and the Military Ethic Code. All of the
above provide for disciplinary and penal meas-
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ures for the misuse of public administration posi-
tion or for breaking the law. 
The Ministry of Finance has also several depart-
ments that include in their activities the ﬁght
against corruption. These are the Budget
Department and the Treasury, which administers
and controls the budget funds. A necessary next
step is to further increase the effectiveness in the
operation of these units. 
The only unit that has vastly covered this agenda
in BiH is the State Border Service (SBS). They cur-
rently control all the ofﬁcial border crossings in
BiH. The clearance of goods and the transit of
people is legally possible only there, although
some 400 illegal crossings continue to operate
throughout the country’s borders. The SBS’s
authority does not stretch beyond the narrow bor-
derland strip.
The preliminary police investigation was intro-
duced in Bulgaria in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, in force since January 7, 2000, aimed
at improving the state’s policy on crime by accel-
erating investigation through removing unneces-
sary formalities from criminal procedures. The
Bulgarian Police were given the power to investi-
gate about 80% of committed crimes. The advan-
tages and disadvantages of this legislative act
have been seen in practice: about ﬁve times more
police investigations were sent to the prosecution
than in the previous year with an option for trial;
the average time used to investigate crime was
also reduced by a factor of at least ﬁve. At the
same time many police ofﬁcers without the nec-
essary legal background have received the pow-
ers to investigate; in certain cases this has had an
unfavorable effect on the quality of police investi-
gation. In addition, the 2001 amendments to the
Code of Criminal Procedure instead of solving the
outlined problems increased procedural formal-
ism that brought seriously difﬁculties to police
investigation, making it slower and less efﬁcient. 
In 2001, the Ministry of Interior made serious
efforts adopting the following anti-corruption pri-
orities:
It completed the restructuring of the adminis-
trative services in the Ministry in accordance
with the Law on Administration – demilitariza-
tion of the administration and regulation of
their status in compliance with the Law on
Civil Servants. However, it is still necessary to
continue the work on the elaboration and
application of a system for selection, appoint-
ment and career progress of human
resources, based on criteria of professional-
ism and motivation (minimum term of experi-
ence, professional training, examinations,
etc.).
The new structure of the Ministry assigns the
function of coordinating the work of the vari-
ous services on ﬁghting corruption to one of
the Deputy Ministers. Within the Inspectorate
of the Ministry a unit on internal corruption
monitoring and prevention has been estab-
lished.
A Practical Manual for Police Investigators has
been written. Two additional manuals are also
being prepared to help the police ofﬁcers –
one for safeguarding public order and one for
protection of human rights. 
More ﬂexible legislation and its potential to real-
ize greater procedural efficiency is needed,
including measures such as improving police
investigators’ legal skills and training.
In the Ministry of the Interior of Croatia there is
Crime and Corruption Department. On their web
pages there are information about ﬁght against
corruption (http://www.mup.hr/korupcija/stoje.
html), free of charge telephones, fax and e-mail
address where one could give information about
corruption. In the period from September 25 to
the end of November 2001, there were all togeth-
er 240 telephone calls on toll-free phone, 20 fax
messages, and 160 e-mail messages. The police
have been investigating some leads and indica-
tions reported by the citizens on suspected cor-
ruption. Following an initial surge, the number of
reports has been decreasing every day. The police
say they are aware that, although anonymity is
guaranteed, they will have difﬁculty obtaining
information about bribery because it is always
secret. Although the results so far were not spec-
tacular, the police will not close their toll-free
phone because they want to provide a perma-
nently available address for citizens to report cor-
ruption and since it is believed to be a positive
sign of co-operation between citizens and state
bodies.
In Macedonia there was a special unit in the
Ministry of the Interior designed to combat this
kind of crime, but one year ago this unit was reor-
ganized, and now city police forces in units for
economic crime have ofﬁcers who deal with cor-
ruption cases. The real problem in combating cor-
ruption is that Macedonian legal system does not
allow special investigative measures as legal use
of agent provocateur, controlled delivery, tapping
of the telephones, etc. Macedonian constitution
does not allow eavesdropping and this has to be
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changed because this method is the most effec-
tive way to combat corruption. Unfortunately,
until now there was not enough determination of
the Government and other competent authorities
for this. There are no regulations that prohibit and
punish corruption within police forces. Police ofﬁ-
cers are ofﬁcials according to Article 122 of the
Criminal Code and they can be prosecuted under
the Criminal code provisions. Disciplinary by-
laws in the Ministry of Interior proscribe only dis-
ciplinary offences.
It is expected that the Serbian parliament will
adopt new Law on ﬁghting terrorism, organized
crime and corruption before the end of July 2002.
This Law will create the legal ground for the
development of special prosecutor’s ofﬁce in
charge of the whole Serbian territory. Special
prosecutor will have much higher authorizations
than it was the case so far. It will be able to arrest
persons who are protected with various immuni-
ties (members of parliament, government, army)
and detain them for longer period of time. The law
will also provide the ground for formation of spe-
cial police units, special detention units and spe-
cial court. All members of special teams will be
extremely well paid for local circumstances.
Witness protection program will also be included,
which is very important for ﬁghting organized
crime. This law (a mixture of Italian and Slovenian
laws), as it is announced by the Serbian
Government, is supposed to bring an end to
organized crime. It will deal with terrorism, organ-
ized crime, corruption, distribution of illicit drugs,
trafﬁcking in human beings and various other ille-
gal activities.   
Customs. Anti-Corruption Reforms. Units for
Investigating and Prosecuting Corruption
Crimes
In Albania there is Anti-Smuggling Unit (General
Customs Department). This unit has two branch-
es: the anti-smuggling branch and the depart-
ment of investigation and information.
The program to reduce smuggling, adopted by
the Anti-Smuggling Unit, includes several activi-
ties and steps that will be taken, such as comput-
er automation of the customs, establishment of
structures to fight smuggling, studying and
reviewing the references, decrease of the cus-
toms’ tariffs, etc. Considering the role of customs
and its exposure to corruption, the Unit cooper-
ates with other governmental institutions to
achieve effectiveness: the Ministry of Public
Order; the Ministry of Defense; General
Prosecutor Ofﬁce; National Information Agency;
and international agencies such as Euro-customs
and the neighbors’ customs. The unit regularly
produces reports, which present their speciﬁc
results over a period of 3, 9 and 12 months. The
department has an information sector that analy-
ses the work and publishes it in the media. The
department reports to the Ministry of Finance. 
Since 1996, the Customs and Fiscal Assistance
Ofﬁce (CAFAO) under a program funded by the
EU has been assisting the State and Entity author-
ities of BiH to implement the customs and tax
related provisions of the Dayton Peace
Agreement.
In terms of customs, the key items of customs
policy and tariff laws are now all in place, and BiH
has a single and uniform customs territory for the
ﬁrst time. The administration of customs and cus-
toms procedures is an Entity level responsibility
and the CAFAO program is therefore working
with the Federation and Republika Srpska to draft
identical Entity-level implementing legislation
and regulations to reﬂect the State Customs
Policy Law.This is being simultaneously support-
ed by the delivery of specialist training in each
customs regulation to local customs ofﬁcers.
Such training follows general training delivered
to all customs ofﬁcers by the CAFAO program.
The CAFAO program is also focusing on assisting
the Customs Services to enforce the law. A signif-
icant step forward in ﬁghting customs crime was
the creation during 1999 of Customs Enforcement
sections within each Entity Customs Service. The
CAFAO program has provided the Sections with
both classroom and on-the-job training, as well
as all of the equipment necessary to enforce the
Customs Law. The Sections will be further consol-
idated with the future introduction of Customs
Enforcement legislation, including penalties,
powers and offences for customs ofﬁcers. The
Customs Enforcement Sections’ activities are
also supported through the CAFAO-initiated
“Customs Hotline” established in each Entity in
September 1999. This ongoing advertising cam-
paign is encouraging the people of BiH to assist
in the ﬁght against customs crime by reporting
via a dedicated telephone line any information
they believe could assist the Customs Services.
Action is also being taken to ensure that customs
staff themselves uphold and enforce the law and
prevent possible internal corruption, with the
27 European Commission, Customs ﬁght against corruption and organized crime, 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/actions/customs.pdf)
CAFAO program assisting the authorities to intro-
duce internal audit and management assurance
functions. The introduction of a countrywide cus-
toms computer system (ASY- CUDA++) is the ﬁnal
and essential element in the modernization and
development of customs in BiH. Joint Entity proj-
ect groups, supported by CAFAO, are currently
developing a prototype of this computer system
for future pilot testing and then full implementa-
tion in BiH. The system will handle all data asso-
ciated with the clearance and movement of cus-
toms goods within BiH, while also assisting the
authorities to selectively investigate suspected
cases of customs crime.27
According to the information available from
CAFAO and Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Relations, there is no satisfactory coop-
eration between entity customs administration,
and there is a lot of room for improvements.
Measures will be taken that are expected to
streamline procedures and establish mechanisms
of external auditing of custom services. Two cus-
toms administrations operate as competitors and
apply the single customs policy inconsistently,
which leads to diminished total customs rev-
enues and permanent abuses. Serious analysis
needs to be undertaken in connection with future
organization of customs services, including con-
sideration of introduction of customs administra-
tion at BiH level, which is the option that might
resolve many of those problems and make the
customs system much more efﬁcient and trans-
parent.
This function of customs was elevated to the BiH
State level mostly through the function of SBS.
No civil society organization has ever been invit-
ed to monitor the performance of the customs.
The open nature of the economy in Bulgaria in
which between 65 and 75 percent of the GNP is
realized through imports and exports creates
opportunities for the existence of illegal cross-
border activities. Like before, in 2001 the
Bulgarian customs authorities were one of the
basic mechanisms involved in the redistribution
of national wealth. According to the surveys of
Coalition 2000, in the period 1998-2000, 25-35
percent of all the imports and the exports passed
through illegal channels. 
In 2001 two opposite trends marked the gray
import and smuggling in the country. On the one
hand, there was a constant increase of legal
import of goods, semi-manufactured articles and
raw materials. A basic factor for this positive
development is the increased presence of the big
hypermarket chains like Metro, Billa, Ramstore
and the supermarket chains Fantastico, Oasis and
others in the country. Similar positive inﬂuence
comes from the presence of many multinational
companies, which continue their penetration in
Bulgarian market either directly or by cooperation
with a Bulgarian partner.
On the other hand, in 2001 there was an increase
of the pressure over border control authorities to
allow illegal and semi-legal import and export of
goods (unlike the initial years of the transition in
Bulgaria when smuggling was dominant, after
1998 the prevailing violations involved mainly
import at lower prices, use of incorrect lists of
goods, etc.). The following important changes on
the domestic market account for this increase: 
The reduction of the sales of part of the mass
and luxury goods due to worsening economic
situation of consumers.
The changes in the structure of sales deter-
mined by the penetration of the big hypermar-
ket and supermarket chains which drove out of
the market part of the dominating until then
elements of the chain with large importer -
wholesaler warehouse - retailer.
Unlike previous years, in 2001 the situation in the
customs authorities was seriously inﬂuenced by
the results of the parliamentary elections in June.
When it became clear that the elections would
bring changes, illegal trafficking intensified
immensely. According to estimates, three more
channels were opened again passing through
Varna, Bourgas and Capitan Andreevo. It could be
argued that by the end of August 2001 there was
massive import of goods levied with very low
customs duties. According to Coalition 2000 esti-
mates building up reserves of goods in the sum-
mer months rose to almost 200 percent in com-
parison with the same period in previous years.
An emblematic example in this respect is the
import of alcohol. According to big international
importers at the end of 2000 the Bulgarian market
resembled any other European market with about
10 percent of gray import while in the middle of
2001 again almost 50 percent of the imported
alcohol had illegal origin. 
According to the Report of Audit Ofﬁce in year
2000, with the Decree of Minister of Finance, the
Committee for Internal Control was established in
Croatia. The members of the Committee were in
charge to provide the internal control and require
all the data and documentation in Ministry of
Finance, Tax and Customs Administration. It was
also decided that the Committee would function
till the establishment of the Department for
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Internal Control, which would inspect the whole
Ministry of Finance (Audit Ofﬁce, 2001). 
With Article 33 of the Decree about Internal
Organization of the Ministry of Finance, adopted
in 2001, it was decided to organize Independent
Department for internal control that inspects law-
ful functioning of public servants and employees
in the whole Tax Administration. This Department
is responsible for control of Central Office,
Regional Ofﬁces and Branch Ofﬁces. It makes
inspection of the particular cases according to the
rule of control. Hence, it provides measures for
detection, reporting and legal proceedings
against cases of determined disrespect of law,
including corruption. 
In Customs Administration of Croatia there are no
special departments for detecting and proceeding
the acts of corruption, neither are applied special
measures for combat against corruption. Howev-
er, with the Article 53 of the Decree about Internal
Organization of the Ministry of Finance, Depart-
ment for Internal Control was organized in Cus-
toms Administration. The Department systemati-
cally investigates the violation of laws and rules
from the side of custom employees, realizes the
procedures for determination of the facts and cir-
cumstances important for legal behavior of cus-
tom employees, proposes the expert opinions for
submissions of reports or requests for offence or
discipline procedure due to the transgression of
custom regulation from the side of custom
employees. The Department has also authority to
deal with investigations and proceedings with
cases of crime and corruption. 
In Macedonia Customs has no special unit for
investigating and prosecuting corruption crimes.
Similar to police ofﬁcers, custom ofﬁcers have
criminal law status of ofﬁcial persons and there is
no special procedure for investigating and prose-
cuting them. Many attempts to prevent corrup-
tion in customs have been made, but results were
poor. There is no civil society involvement in
monitoring the work of the customs. According to
the public opinion, custom ofﬁcers are one of the
most corrupted professions.
Federal Customs Ofﬁce in Serbia is included in
the anti-corruption activities of the Government
of Serbia, which is not surprising because its
practical competence does not extend to the
Republic of Montenegro as it is supposed to.
Customs has formed a department that deals
with anti-corruption, which has publicly
announced a phone number through which citi-
zens can report on any irregularities that are done
by customs ofﬁcials. Contact phones for possible
complaints are opened in every custom ofﬁce, i.e.
at every border crossing. Unfortunately the num-
ber of reports that have been received through
this phone line is surprisingly small. However,
several criminal charges were brought against
customs employees as a direct result from oper-
ating this phone number. Federal Customs
Service focused on education of its employees.
All employees received letters that explained the
criminal and societal consequences of accepting
bribe, which is the most often form of corruption
in customs. They have also been informed about
recent corruption study conducted by the Center
for Liberal and Democratic Studies and its con-
tent. 
In the ﬁght against corruption, the Federal Cus-
toms Administration of Yugoslavia (FCA) has
reconstructed the service for combating smug-
gling and custom inves-
tigation. This service,
thanks to intensive
international coopera-
tion with other custom
services during the past
year as well as to
Yugoslavia’s return to
World Customs Organi-
zation, now has the
possibility of following
various goods and their
ﬂows. In order that this
undoubtedly important
service should work
better, after the changes
in custom legislation,
changes in authorities
patterned by those in
European countries
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should be introduced (possibility of tracking,
superintendence, entering and checking the busi-
ness premises, deep control, arrests, carrying and
using guns). According to the latest data, illegal
import of the excise goods has been reduced,
especially of petrol, petrol derivatives and ciga-
rettes. The Yugoslav Customs Administration esti-
mates that the results in the period to come will
be even better. 
According to the Report of the Federal Customs
Administration for the period October 2000-Octo-
ber 2001, Yugoslav Customs Service has regis-
tered 4,456 customs violations worth EUR 10M,
and 1,269 foreign exchange offences of which
EUR 4.6M has been conﬁscated. Managing staff
has been replaced, whereas the employees who
violated their duties have been punished. Apart
from appointing new director and vice-director of
the FCA, 11 out of 14 managers have been
replaced. New 11 managers were chosen in the
public contest. Since January 1, 2001 disciplinary
actions against 31 workers have been undertaken
because of the grounded suspicion that they
committed serious violations of the position.
For the stimulation of workers from the current
budget item, which stipulates rewards in cases of
diligence and contributions to the service, money
rewards have been introduced for the workers
who ﬁnd out the customs and foreign exchange
offences. 
Customs and “OTPOR” have started a joint action
called “Bring respect back to customs.” “OTPOR”
activists are present on each border crossing and
they are allowed to oversee all the activities in the
customs area. It is intended that this action will
increase the sense of responsibility among cus-
toms ofﬁcials and raise the risks for corruption.
After all, this action should bring respect back to
all customs employees.
Corruption and Trafﬁcking in Human Beings
The analysis of methods and preconditions for
trafﬁcking in human beings towards South East
European countries and through their territories
has shown that one of the major and probably
most important factors for it during the transition
period is the corruption in law-enforcement and
border control institutions. 
Trafﬁcking in people has been constantly growing
in South East European countries and is in most
of the cases under the control of organized crime.
It can be divided in several different forms
depending on the persons illegally crossing the
border including the transfer of illegal immi-
grants, women to be engaged in prostitution,
labor force to work under inhuman conditions,
trafﬁcking in children, illegal adoptions at exorbi-
tant prices, etc.
In Albania the human beings trafﬁcking started
at the beginning of the ‘90s and gradually became
a serious social concern. Albania is considered as
a country with a high level of human beings traf-
ﬁcking. 
In June 2001, on the decision of Prime Minister,
the working group in charge of designing the
“National Strategy for the Fight against Human
Trafﬁcking” was established. This working group
includes representatives from the Ministry of
Public Order, Ministry of Justice, General Prose-
cution Ofﬁce, etc. 
The aim of the strategy is to deﬁne the main
guidelines with respect to prevention and imped-
iment of the human beings trafﬁcking as well as
to protect and help the victims of such trafﬁcking,
and create conditions for their re-integration in
the society. 
This document will highlight the measures that
the government will undertake to achieve this
goal within a 3 year period, as well as the action
plan for every concerned state institution.
United Nation’s Mission to BiH is involved in the
struggle against human trafﬁcking. More recently
BiH has joined Interpol and has launched some
prevention activities with its own Entity police
capacities, centrally coordinated within the
Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communications.
UNMBIH conducts regular surveys on organized
crime in various forms, but particularly on human
trafﬁcking. Most of these reports are internal and
sometimes are shared only with the official
authorities, so the general public has no access to
the data.  
In Bulgaria the cases of trafﬁcking in people fall
under the scope of application of the Criminal
Code of Republic of Bulgaria and criminal liability
is provided for the perpetrators of such offences.
Two general types of offences are regulated
under the Criminal Code – illegal crossing of the
state borders under Article 279 and trafﬁcking
under Article 280. Two different cases of illegal
border crossing are envisaged. The ﬁrst one con-
sists of entering or leaving through the state bor-
der without the permit of the competent state
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authorities, while in the second one there is a per-
mit given but the border has been crossed not
through the speciﬁed places. The trafﬁcking in
people consists of transferring persons or groups
of persons across the state border either without
the permit of the competent authorities or with
such a permit but not through the places speciﬁed
thereof. 
Separate provisions are included in the Criminal
Code dealing with certain offences usually
accompanying the trafﬁcking in women.
Criminal networks are increasingly using Mace-
donia as a transit country for human trafﬁcking,
but it also appears that a great number of women
are being forced to remain in the country to work
as prostitutes. Numerous activities have been
taken to ﬁght this kind of crime. Primarily, guard-
ing of the border has been improved, and the
main routes for illegal crossing closed. For exam-
ple, according to the report for ﬁrst ﬁve months in
year 2000, the Ministry of Interior has registered
616 illegal crossings into Macedonia. Report men-
tioned the existence of a criminal network operat-
ing in the country that lures women into traveling
to Macedonia with the false promise of work as
waitresses, and upon arrival forces them into
prostitution. Trafﬁcking is increasing in the west-
ern region of Macedonia – in Tetovo, Gostivar,
Struga, and Ohrid through the border crossings
of Strumica, Delcevo and Kriva Palanka.
From January 25, 2002, the Criminal Code
was amended with a new criminal offence called,
“trade with humans” (art.418-a). According to this
criminal offence, trafﬁcking in persons means re-
cruitment, transportation, transfer, and harboring
of a person, by means of the treat or use of force
or other means of coercion, or by abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse
of power, or by the giv-
ing or receiving of pay-
ments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a
person having control
over another person,
for the purpose of ex-
ploitation. Exploitation
includes slavery, prac-
tices similar to slavery,
forced labor, servitude,
removal of organs, or
the exploitation for the
prostitution or other
forms of sexual ex-
ploitation. The most ac-
tive NGO in Macedonia
working in this ﬁeld is
International Organiza-
tion for Migration. Its counter-trafﬁcking program
is focused in providing direct assistance to the
victims, in raising awareness and in capacity
building with the Ministry of Interior and other lo-
cal NGO’s.
There are no studies of the link between trafﬁck-
ing in human beings and corruption. In last sev-
eral years there were criminal investigations
against police ofﬁcers involved in human trafﬁck-
ing.
Republic of Macedonia has signed and ratiﬁed
the Vienna Convention and Strasbourg Conven-
tion and other international documents regarding
organized crime but there are no studies about
the link between political corruption and organ-
ized crime.
Ministry of Interior of Serbia has had some suc-
cess in discovering groups that were dealing with
trafﬁcking in human beings. However, this prob-
lem seems to be increasing due to a presence of
large number of international soldiers stationed
in Kosovo. It is expected that Special Prosecution
Ofﬁce will more seriously approach the problem
than it was the case so far. Nevertheless, further
international cooperation is necessary for dealing
with this regional issue.
For now, the regional approach in counteracting
trans-border crime and corruption is still over-
shadowed by individual national efforts which are
further fragmented by the artiﬁcial division on
challenges to internal security on one side, and
external security of a particular country on the
other. The presented overview offers an argument
in support of complex challenges, which are fac-
ing not only the societies in Southeast Europe,
but also the countries of the European Union.
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4.5. Legislature. Transparency and Account-
ability. Budget Process
Preventing corruption in the Legislature and act-
ing quickly upon discovering prerequisites
enabling the Parliaments to adopt effective anti-
corruption measures are of primary importance.
At the same time, the legislative amendments
and the adoption of new laws should only be
undertaken after serious consideration, prepara-
tion of a general conceptual framework and com-
pliance with the existing legislature, public dis-
cussion of the proposed drafts and taking into
account the opinion of all parties involved. The
following main problems are important in this
respect: specialized anti-corruption committees;
internal rules for MPs (conﬂict of interest, etc);
transparency and citizens’ participation in the leg-
islative process.
In Albania the Law No. 8379, dated 29 July, 1998,
deﬁnes the state budget as an annual ﬁnancial
program which comprises the Parliamentary
approved funds, and where all revenues, loans
and other inflows, as well as the expenses
incurred by the government, public administra-
tion, local government and the judiciary are
included (Article 2).
The Minister of Finance completes the budget
draft and presents it to the Council of Ministers by
October of every ﬁscal year. After the Council of
Ministers gives its approval, it forwards it to the
Parliament by the 20th of November of the ﬁscal
year. If the parliament does not approve the
budget till the 31 December, then the Council of
Ministers approves and implements the expendi-
ture budget for a period up to 3 months from the
initial date of the new ﬁscal year. It’s worth men-
tioning that the law does not provide room for
extra budgetary accounts.
The Constitution envisages sanctions for the con-
ﬂicts of interest for members of the Parliament.
According to Article 69, the MP cannot be at the
same time: a judge or a prosecutor; actively serv-
ing in the army; a Police or National Security ofﬁ-
cial; a Diplomatic representative; a mayor or pre-
fect; chairman or member of election commis-
sions; President of the Republic and high public
administration ofﬁcial as described in the law.
However, the Parliament has not established any
specialized anti-corruption body yet.
The legislative process has become more trans-
parent during the last years. Due to the large
number of newspapers and private television
channels, people can be informed much better on
what is going on during the legislative process.
The Parliament itself in some cases has complied
with the idea of citizen participation and an exam-
ple for that is the fact that NGO representatives
were allowed to attend the meeting of Parliament
where the NGO law was passed. Citizens partici-
pated also in the Parliament meetings regarding
the Constitution. On the other hand, the meetings
held on “Fiscal Package” and on “State Budget”
remained closed for the public. 
One of the basic principles in BiH is accuracy and
a prior approval (there is no collection or spend-
ing without the decision of Parliament for accept-
ance of the budget or a decision on temporary
ﬁnancing). According to the Constitution of FBiH
and that of RS, the President of FBiH and RS
respectively shall dissolve the Parliament if they
fail to pass the budget
before the start of the
budget year.
Once the Government
has adopted the Budget
and passed it to the Par-
liament for adoption
(both houses in case of
FBiH), and once it is
passed by the absolute
majority in the Parlia-
ment, the President
signs a decree making
the Budget effective.
Both Entity Govern-
ments have introduced
specialized anti-corrup-
tion working groups
that consist of repre-
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sentatives of the key ministries and other public
institutions. These groups are the strategic gov-
ernment think-tanks. Governments of both Enti-
ties have adopted framework strategies to ﬁght
corruption.
As discussed above, the more recent practice is to
organize public debates and hearings and that is
indeed the case of the new Anti-corruption strate-
gy of BiH. One such debate was organized by the
Council of Ministers of BiH, starting on 06 March
2002 in duration of two months. The same proce-
dure applies to all the acts, laws and strategies
that undergo the regular procedure for their
adoption (rather than special, fast-track). The
Constitutions describe in precise terms those
instances when introducing the special adoption
procedure in the Parliaments may skip the public
discussion.
Over the past few years state institutions in
Bulgaria manifested a strong reﬂex of defensive-
ness and self-preservation rather than developing
mechanisms to protect the citizens and society
against abuses of power. Although the Rules of
Organization and Procedure of the National
Assembly provide for avoiding the conﬂict of
interest, regulating receiving gifts and hospitality,
etc. the Legislature should play a more decisive
role in counteracting corruption with the National
Assembly itself providing an example of effective
anti-corruption efforts. 
In 1994, Croatia passed the Budget Law.
According to this law, the Budget is deﬁned as an
estimate of the annual revenues and receipts, and
the determined amount of expenditures and
other payments made by the state (and local gov-
ernment units) for all budgetary beneﬁciaries and
approved by parliament. Very often the Budget
has been re-balanced. There are no systematic
data about the level of neither public debt, nor are
there any restrictions on the deﬁcit or the nation-
al debt. The system of internal and budgetary con-
trol is weak and ineffective. Only part of all
actions for the establishment of a state treasury
system has been taken.
The parliamentary Finance and Budget
Committee has to have the resources and the
qualiﬁed personnel to estimate the Budget pro-
posals that the government sends to the parlia-
ment. However, lack of transparency of the budg-
et can increase the voters’ confusion and reduce
politicians’ incentives to be ﬁscally responsible.
Creating confusion by making it less clear how
policies translate into outcomes, policymakers
can retain a strategic advantage versus rational,
but not fully informed, voters. This advantage
would disappear with transparent procedures;
therefore, the policymakers would often choose
to adopt ambiguous procedures. The less elec-
torate knows and understands about budget
process, the more the politicians can act strategi-
cally and use ﬁscal deﬁcits and overspending to
achieve opportunistic goals.
Transparency on budgetary decisions is neces-
sary to improve policy decisions and to hold gov-
ernments accountable. It is, however, not sufﬁ-
cient. Participation of democratic institutions is
required just as it is required from civil society,
legislatures and the media in order to make trans-
parency effective in bringing about better budget-
ary outcomes. Institute of Public Finance – Zagreb
has published a basic guide to the Croatian budg-
et: “A Citizen’s Guide to the Budget.”28 The guide
provides a general introduction to the budget. It
analyses the various fundamental aspects of
national and local budgets; including revenues,
expenditures, extra-budgetary funds, and the
consolidated budget of the general government.
The guide also describes the budgetary process
and the main institutions engaged in the process.
It also provides a glossary of budgetary terms
and an appendix on the taxes in Croatia. The
2,500 hard copies of the guide were distributed
free of charge to individuals in parliament, gov-
ernment ministries, public enterprises, the busi-
ness sector, media, universities, and the broader
public. The guide has been widely quoted, dis-
cussed and commented upon in the Croatian
media, and will hopefully have an impact on pol-
icy through a more informed debate on budget
issues. Similar Citizens Tax Guide and Citizens
Guide for Financial Institutions have been pub-
lished at the end of 2001. 
The government during the ﬁrst quarter of 2002
should prepare internal rules for MPs incorporat-
ed in the Law Regulating the Prevention of the
Conﬂict of Interest. Such a law would regulate the
prevention of any possible conflict arising
between high ranked state ofﬁcials and their pri-
vate interest. The law should be scheduled for
parliamentary procedure and become formally
accepted by the end of the ﬁrst half of 2002. After
the expected adoption of the draft law by the
Government and subsequent adoption by the
Parliament, it shall be necessary to set up the
Commission for the Conﬂict of Interest and pro-
vide funds for its work (compensation for its
members, equipment etc.). In Draft of the Law it is
proposed that the state ofﬁcials will have to reg-
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28 The guide is available in Croatian and English at: http://ijf.hr/eng/budget_guide/proen.pdf.
ister all accepted gifts valued more than 500
kunas (appr. $60).
One of the ways to improve transparency in
Croatia would be to establish specialized parlia-
mentary bodies in charge of evaluating the trans-
parency, accuracy, and projections of legislative
process and government budget. These bodies
must be independent. So far, very little has been
done.
Generally, in Macedonia the legislation is draft-
ed by the competent ministries and other govern-
ment agencies and in very rare cases by the
Members of the Parliament. There is broad prac-
tice for participation of the professors of the
University in drafting of the legislation. The citi-
zens do not participate in the legislative process,
although strong public interest exists for adopt-
ing certain new laws or for amending the existing
laws. Such interest has been expressed during
the public discussion on the proposed
Amendments to the Constitution, organized by
the Law Faculty, including the Macedonian
Academy of Science and Arts and other experts,
when some of numerous suggestions have been
accepted, mainly under the strong public support.
The Minister of Finance is responsible for the
preparation of the Budget Proposal and its sub-
mission to the Government. Upon the report on
ﬁscal conditions of the current ﬁscal year, the
Minister of Finance proposes the directives and
objectives of the ﬁscal policy and main categories
of estimated revenues and expenditures for the
following fiscal year, and submits it to the
Government in April for the following year. The
Budget Proposal is submitted to the Parliament
by the Government not later than the middle of
November. If the expenditures require a new
source of revenues, or if the planned expendi-
tures should be reduced by more than 5% as a
result of failure to generate the planed revenues,
rebalance of the Budget is proposed. In the last
several years, the Budget was often rebalanced,
sometimes more than once. Upon the adoption of
the Budget, the Minister of Finance notiﬁes the
users that they may allocate the revenues and
expenditures to separate unit-users. 
Within the framework in the treasury system,
which has been introduced in Macedonia, the
budget users may open one or more sub-
accounts, depending on their own revenues,
donations, loans etc. The Ministry of Finance shall
open the sub-account (unit-users) upon the user’s
request. The users themselves and the Ministry of
Finance perform the control over the legality and
intentionally use of the budget funds and other
revenues. There are no provisions in the Budget
Law or internal rules of the Ministry of Finance
regarding the conﬂict of interest.
There are no specialized anti-corruption commit-
tees in Serbia - neither in the People’s Assembly
of the Republic of Serbia, nor in the People’s
Assembly of the FRY.
Sessions of the People’s Assembly and its com-
mittees are open to the public by rule (Rules of
Procedure, Art.169). Sessions of the Assembly are
broadcasted live on Radio and Television of
Serbia. Parliament sessions are not open to the
public in cases deﬁned by law or when parlia-
ment decides to do so.
Journalists cover the work of parliamentary com-
mittees. Committee reports are available to the
public, as journalists holding accreditations get
them together with all parliamentary materials,
which they get regularly. Committee meetings are
closed to the public in cases deﬁned by law or
when parliament decides to do so.
Internal rules for the members of parliament are
determined by the Rules of the Parliamentary
Procedure. Day-to-day running of the legislative
body is regulated by the Rules. There are many
violations in practice, and politicians can be said
to exert inﬂuence on the work of the administra-
tions, by either speeding up or slowing down the
adoption of certain decisions and their perform-
ance, or by preventing decisions from being
made. The Law on the Election of People’s
Deputies does not prohibit deputies from holding
other posts, so that they can be owners or man-
agers of enterprises. Many deputies take advan-
tage of information acquired ahead of other busi-
nesspersons, because deputies are often
informed about draft legislation relevant to busi-
ness long before it is enacted. Deputies can also
lobby the government for regulations to be
adopted, which would place them in advanta-
geous business situation. They also inﬂuence the
adoption of laws helping them to acquire person-
al gain.
*    *    *
Increasing transparency and accountability in the
work of the Legislature Institutions are important
prerequisites for strengthening the prestige of the
Parliament and for the consolidation of demo-
cratic values in SEE countries. The accomplish-
ment of this objective requires the establishment
of systematic control over compliance with the
laws and internal rules by the MPs. In order to
reduce corruption in the legislature the following
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measures are recommended: establishment of a
specialized body on the ethics of the MPs, led by
an independent expert with an outstanding public
reputation, whose activities and regular reports
should be independent of the Parliament  or any
other institution preventing conﬂict of interests
(similar of the existing bodies in some EU mem-
ber states, such as the UK); bringing greater
transparency to the budget process and the
Parliament’s ﬁnance; introduction of a mecha-
nism for informing public about ﬁnancial viola-
tions committed by the MPs, as well as the sanc-
tions imposed.
Stronger efforts and good will from the
Parliaments are needed for the adoption and
implementation of measures and control mecha-
nisms which contribute to the more effective
counteraction of the internal factors fostering cor-
ruption, facilitate the creation of a favorable insti-
tutional environment for preventing corruption in
the legislative process and for the development
of the anti-corruption attitudes and behavior.
4.6. Political Parties
The political corruption, including the one related
to the political parties, has two main aspects: a
trust abuse and an effort to establish control
(monopoly) over the political arena by using
power and inﬂuence in an undemocratic way. 
Financing of political parties is one of the spheres
in which the political corruption most often takes
place. The acceptance and implementation of the
legislation that shall restrict the possibilities of
widening the corruption is considered to be of
great importance in terms of carrying on an efﬁ-
cient ﬁght against corruption.
The most reliable means for ﬁghting corruption in
political parties are: creating legal rules of politi-
cal parties’ registration and functioning, and
especially their ﬁnancing; evasion of the inﬂu-
ence of the interested ﬁnancial spheres and their
private interests on the policy of the parties;
active control and the necessary transparency
and publicity of the parties’ ﬁnances.
The existence of rules of registration, functioning
and ﬁnancing of the political parties makes trans-
parent the struggle for obtaining political power
according to the democratic principles.
Registration of Political Parties – Require-
ments, Procedure, Revocation of Registra-
tion
Most of the Southeast European countries have
adopted legal and regulatory framework regard-
ing political parties registration as follows.
In Albania any group of people who want to
establish a political party should deposit with the
Ministry of Justice the statute and the program of
that party. The Ministry of Justice should give its
ofﬁcial approval or refusal within 45 days of
receiving the documentation needed to establish
a political party.
In BiH29 this is regulated by the provisional elec-
tion law of the OSCE that governed all the elec-
tions prior to the coming autumn 2002 elections.
The registration is handled in line with the law on
associations of citizens.
The High Representative has the authority to
revoke any party’s registration, ban it, prohibit its
activities and temporarily or permanently sus-
pend any of its members, or ban them from pub-
lic appearances. This may be conducted without a
prior warning or an appellation mechanism.
Every candidate standing for elected ofﬁce at the
level of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the Entity
level is obliged, no later than ﬁfteen (15) days
from the day of accepting candidacy for the elec-
tions, to submit to the Election Commission of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, on a special form, a
signed statement on his or her total property sit-
uation.
The statement should include the property situa-
tion of the candidates and close members of his
or her family: spouse, children and members of
the family household the candidate has a legal
obligation to sustain.
The Election Commission of Bosnia and
Herzegovina announces ninety (90) days before
the elections the number of voters entered on the
Central Voters Register for each electoral race. No
political party, coalition, list of independent can-
didates or independent candidate can, based on
the number of voters announced by the Election
Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina, spend
more than one (1) Convertible Mark per voter in
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29 In spite of the existing legislation, results of TI’s public survey indicate political parties as most corrupt. 37.8 percent of respon-
dents said that corruption is widespread in political parties, and 31.7 percent of respondents think that corruption is on very
high level in the political parties in BiH. Only 2.5 percent respondents among general public think that corruption is on low
level in political parties in BiH. Out of 12 public institutions (customs, juridical, etc.) in BiH, most of the respondents (10.8 per-
cent) choose political parties as most corrupt. Enterprise managers surveyed reported that up to 4 percent of their company
turnover is spent on unofﬁcial payments to political parties. 
each electoral race for the purposes of the elec-
tion campaign.
In order to participate in the elections political
parties, independent candidates, coalitions and
lists of independent candidates have to certify
their eligibility with the Election Commission of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The registration of a
political party with a competent authority is a pre-
condition for its certiﬁcation.
In Bulgaria a new Law on Political Parties is in
force since March 28, 2001. According to this Law,
only Bulgarian citizens possessing electoral rights
could establish a political party. The Law stipu-
lates that political parties are established by a
constituent assembly, which adopts the statute of
the party and appoints the managing bodies.
Political parties are registered in a separate reg-
istry kept by the Soﬁa City Court. The registration
procedure starts upon a written application by the
managing body, which represents the political
party according to its statute. A set of documents
are required to be presented together with the
application: the constituting document, the
statute of the party, and a list of at least 500
members – founders of the party (indicated by
their names, uniﬁed civil number, address and
handwritten signature). A declaration by the
party’s leaders certiﬁed by a notary and stating
that the above documents are true is also
required. 
The Soﬁa City Court should examine the applica-
tion within one month following its submission in
an open sitting with participation of a prosecutor
and subpoenaing of the applicant. If the Court
admits the registration it is obliged to enter the
party in the registry within 7 days following the
announcement of the decision. The decision of
the court, by which the registration has been
admitted or refused, could be appealed before
the Supreme Court of Cassation within 7 days fol-
lowing the learning about the decision. The
Supreme Court of Cassation issues a ﬁnal deci-
sion within 14 days following the submission of
the complaint. The decision of the Court for
admitting the registration is promulgated in State
Gazette within 7 days of its presentation and the
political party obtains the status of a legal person
from the date of the promulgation. 
The Law on Political Parties in Macedonia was
enacted on July 28, 1994. According to Article 7 of
the Law, a political party can be founded by 500
Macedonian citizens, living in Macedonia, who
make a statement for voluntary membership in
the political party. Every person may withdraw
from the political party. Political party is founded
at the Assembly of founders, which adopts a deci-
sion for founding of the party, Program for its
activities, an Article of Agreement, and elects the
bodies of the party.
The political party is registered in the Register of
political parties in the Appeal Court in Skopje. The
political party is obliged within 30 days from the
day of its founding to submit an application for
registration. Upon the application, the Appeal
Court is obliged within 15 days to bring a decision
for registration of the political party. The Appeal
Court can refuse the application if it ﬁnds out that
the Program and the Article of Agreement of the
political party are against the constitutional order
or support or call for war aggression, national
and racial intolerance and hatred.
The political party terminates its existence: upon
the court decision, which forbids its existence; if
the Constitutional Court ﬁnds out that its program
and Article of Agreement are not in accordance
with the Constitution; when its authorized body
brings a decision for its revocation; and if the
number of members of the party decreases under
the minimum required by the Law.
The Law on Election of Deputies regulates the
establishment of the electoral commissions and
their activities. According to the Law, the State
Electoral Commission, self-government commis-
sions and sub-commissions are responsible for
election process. According to the new Law on
Election of Deputies, which has been adopted
recently, the President of the State Electoral
Commission and the President of the State
among the respective lawyers elect their
deputies. The presidents and members of local
electoral commissions are proposed by the
Government and opposition parties and elected
by the Parliament. The last 1999 presidential elec-
tions and 2000 local elections have been declared
as unfair, irregular and undemocratic, accompa-
nied with numerous infringements of law, elec-
toral procedure and violence. Therefore, it is
expected that the rules deﬁned by the new law
shall narrow the possibilities for such situation
and guarantee more democracy and independ-
ence of the commissions.
In Romania the political class seems determined
to act for its own unpopularity, embracing sym-
bols of abuse and corruption. To quote only one
example from an endless list, the fortune of the
Romanian Communist Party, including buildings
of flats, dachas, Ceausescu’s hunting lodges
(over 40), was turned after the Romanian
Revolution in a public real estate agency.
Generations of politicians, regardless of their
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political party, have used its services for them-
selves and their families, both in the capital and
in mountain resorts. The winner of the 1996 elec-
tions, the Democratic Convention of Romania,
promised that it will liquidate the Regime, restore
the houses to the owners who had previously
been illegally dispossessed by the Communist
Party and privatize the rest, but it did not live up
to this promise. In 2000, the new winners of elec-
tions, the Party for Social Democracy of Romania
found most of the dachas already occupied and
since evacuating former dignitaries is a long and
painful process – even Ceausescu-time ministers
can still be found residing in Protocol houses –
they preferred to seize the buildings of another
agency, Locato, which used to rent them to
embassies and other rich clients and use them for
themselves and their clientele for free. 
Another example is the ﬁnancing of the political
parties. Though tough rules were enacted imme-
diately after 1989 to govern the political money in
Romania, it is a public knowledge that no major
party comes even close to compliance. The media
and NGOs monitored the costs of the last cam-
paign for the general elections (November 2000),
market value of paid advertising, open campaign
and other related events and compared the
results with those disclosed by the parties,
according to the law. The staggering result is that
the real costs exceeded ﬁve to ten times the legal
limits, which implies that 80-90% of the campaign
funds were black political money. Some party
leaders (from the opposition) admitted openly
that they broke the rules, and started to advocate
for more transparency and reasonable standards. 
In Serbia, the activities of political parties are
regulated by the Law on Political Parties, adopted
in 1990 and amended in 1993 and 1994. According
to the Article 5, political party can be found by at
least 100 persons holding a Yugoslavian citizen-
ship that are at least 18 years old. Act on found-
ing of a political party must contain names of the
founders, and aims and objectives of the political
organization.  Political party deﬁnes its internal
organization based on democratic principles
(Article 6). Political party must be registered in the
Register of political parties in the Ministry of
Justice of the Republic of Serbia. The Ministry of
Justice must give ofﬁcial answer (approval or
refusal) in the period of 30 days since the appli-
cation has been ﬁled. 
Political organization terminates its existence if:
it makes a decision on the termination of its
existence
a number of its members drops bellow 100
its work is forbidden by the authorized institu-
tion (Supreme court)
One of the reasons for which political party might
be forbidden is if its activities are ﬁnanced from
abroad.
Funding of Political Parties – Applicable
Legal Provisions
In BiH, according to the Law on Party Financing30
(State level law) a party may obtain funds from
membership fees; contributions from legal
Entities and natural persons; income generated
by property owned by the political party; budgets
of Bosnia and Herzegovina for ﬁnancing of the
parliamentary groups in accordance to the Art. 10,
Entities, or any subdivision thereof; and proﬁt
from the income of the enterprise owned by the
party.
The total amount of the single contribution may
not exceed eight average worker’s salaries
according to the official information by the
Bosnia and Herzegovina Agency for Statistics in a
calendar year and may not be cumulated more
than once a year. 
Public grants appropriated for political youth
organizations do not count towards the contribu-
tion limits imposed by this article and are report-
ed on political party ﬁnancial disclosure forms
separately from other incomes to the party.
If the total amount of the contributions given by
the single contributor exceeds 100 KM such pay-
ment must be recorded in the ﬁnancial report. 
A state body, public institutions, public compa-
nies, local community bodies, humanitarian
organizations, businesses which by virtue of their
activity are exclusively intended and directed for
non-proﬁt, religious communities, as well as eco-
nomic association in which public capital has
been invested to the amount of a minimum of
25% may not ﬁnance parties.
Private enterprises, which through government
contracts perform public services, cannot ﬁnan-
cially support political parties. 
According to the Law on Party Financing, political
parties have obligation to render a public state-
ment of account. A political party is obliged to ﬁle
with the Election Commission of Bosnia and
Herzegovina a ﬁnancial report for each calendar
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30 Law on Party Financing, (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/legal/oth-legist/default.asp?content_id=6015)
year (accounting year). A political party has to ﬁle
a separate ﬁnancial report for the campaign peri-
od as determined in the Election Law.
Political parties have to submit by 31 March of the
following year a ﬁnancial report in a format
approved by the Election Commission. Such
report shall contain the same information as
determined in the Election Law. The Election
Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina issues
Regulations in order to implement this article,
whereby it speciﬁes in detail the content, form,
manner and other details of reporting.
A political party, coalition, list of independent
candidates and independent candidate that par-
ticipates in the elections at any level in Bosnia
and Herzegovina are obliged to submit a ﬁnancial
report for the last three months to the Election
Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addi-
tion, no later than thirty (30) days after the
Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina
publishes the election results, a ﬁnancial report
must be submitted to the Election Commission of
Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period beginning
on the day of submission of the application for
certiﬁcation until the certiﬁcation of the results. 
The Election Commission of Bosnia and
Herzegovina has jurisdiction with respect to
enforcing this chapter, and power to make deter-
minations that a political party, coalition, list of
independent candidates or an independent candi-
date, or any other person has violated provisions
of this chapter. The Commission has the power to
assess civil penalties against any political party,
coalition, list of independent candidates or inde-
pendent candidate for non-compliance with the
mentioned provisions, or to take appropriate
administrative action within its general authority
under this law.
Before assessing a civil penalty or taking admin-
istrative action, the Election Commission seeks to
achieve voluntary compliance with the political
party, coalition, list of independent candidates or
independent candidate determined to be in viola-
tion.
The party system in Bulgaria is not yet based on
principles and models, which would make it more
transparent. The interweaving of political parties
with the state apparatus in any society tempts to
advance particularistic political interest under the
guise of public interests, including through the
use of corrupt means. The introduction of state
ﬁnancing based on objective criteria, accountabil-
ity and strict rules to ensure the transparency of
party ﬁnances as a whole and of the funds used
during pre-election campaigns in particular was
therefore urgent in order to curb corruption in
political parties and to sever the informal bonds
between political parties and private interests.
The legislation on the funding of political parties
has been enacted in 2001.
The newly adopted Law on Political Parties con-
tains a number of anti-corruption provisions,
including prohibition for political parties to
engage in business activities or hold equity in
companies; exhaustive listing of revenues of
political parties and regulation of their annual
state subsidies; assigning overall control over
political party revenues and expenditure to the
National Audit Ofﬁce. Nevertheless, the contin-
ued tolerance of anonymous donations makes it
impossible to have full transparency of the par-
ties’ income because a portion of it remains
beyond state control.
The activity of political parties in Croatia is regu-
lated by Law on Political Parties, adopted in 1993.
The Law (part III, article 18-22) contains the regu-
lation about funding of political parties. Possible
funding sources of political parties are: member-
ship fee, voluntary contribution, revenues from
publishing activities, revenues from advertise-
ment and organization of parties’ manifestations,
subsidies from state budget and budgets of local
self-government units, proﬁt of ﬁrms in parties’
ownership. A party whose candidates are elected
for Parliament receives ﬁxed amount for its func-
tion, and variable amount that depends on num-
bers of its MPs. The sources for the functioning of
political parties are distributed by Parliamentary
Committee for election, appointment and admin-
istrative duties. Party’s revenue is subject to a
public announcement. The parties have to pub-
licly announce the source and purpose of the
money collected during the year. If parties do not
record their revenues in adequate bookkeeping,
of if they receive revenues against the law, the
parties lose the possibility for subsidy from cen-
tral government budget. Bookkeeping has to be
performed in line with the rules applied for non-
proﬁt legal entities. The political parties, which
receive subsidies from central government budg-
et, have to provide Parliament each year with
ﬁnancial statement for the previous year. This
ﬁnancial statement will be controled by State
Audit Ofﬁce.
In comparison with regulation in many other
countries, regulation of funding of political par-
ties is almost completely undeveloped. The
sources of political parties’ money, the ways and
means of its spending, and regulation of the con-
trol over spending are not clearly determined.
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Everybody is ﬁnding his/her way and solution
according to the knowledge and capabilities. The
unregulated system of political parties ﬁnancing
enables political and material corruption of elect-
ed politicians. 
It is not surprising that political life in Croatia is
overloaded with different suspicions and conﬂicts
of interest, and that only few politicians are con-
sistent, respect principles and protect public
interests of their constituency. This completely
biased and deformed political praxis can be
changed only with structural changes in political
and organizational framework. Because of that,
Croatia is confronted with serious obligation of
introducing multifaceted regulation of funding of
political parties, which could enable establishing
of the situation similar to developed European
countries.
To secure a just and equal position for all political
parties in Croatia and to secure objectivity and
righteousness in the implementation of political
programs, a reform of the legal status of political
parties in Croatia is necessary. The ﬁnancing of
political campaigns has proven to be one of the
major weak spots. TI Croatia is demanding that
the regulations for political party ﬁnancing be
tightened. Public debates have been initiated by
TI Croatia to speed up and improve the process of
reforms.
The group of Croatian legal and political experts
in co-ordination of the Croatian Legal Centre
began to prepare changes and improvements of
Law about political parties. They propose three
different funds for polit-
ical parties financing:
ﬁrst for social activity,
second for staff educa-
tion and third for pre-
election activity, which
would be under full
control of general pub-
lic. It is expected that
the Amendments of
Law will be discussed
and accepted in the
Parliament during the
first half of 2002.
Unfortunately, the Draft
Amendments to the
Law (or a new Law – it
is still not clear) does
not contain any direc-
tive regarding many
problems of political
life (for example politi-
cal party accounts – availability to the public,
including obligation for publishing), as well as the
legal regulation of lobbying, so there are no reg-
ulation or/and limitations.
In Macedonia according to the Law, the political
parties may derive resources for their activities
from the membership fees, donations, revenues,
their own property, credits, gifts, legacy, and from
the state Budget. 
The political parties are not allowed to obtain
resources from governments, international insti-
tutions, organs and organizations from foreign
countries and other foreign persons, from state
organs, organs of the local self-government, out-
of-budget resources, and from the state owned
enterprises (including those, which have started
the privatization process). The Constitutional
Court has abolished the provision, which allows
the political parties to derive resources from per-
forming business activities, which creates oppor-
tunities for abuse of power and corruption.
However, instead to respect the decision of the
Constitutional Court, the ruling party VMRO-
DPMNE has transferred the property, including
shares, to its own members, who have become
major shareholders in various companies and
banks. The political parties have a legal obligation
to maintain accountability for revenue and
expenses. The political parties have to make evi-
dence of the amount and source of their rev-
enues.
Under the Law, the sources of political parties are
public. The Law defines public disclosure of
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resources of the political parties. The competent
state organ supervises the ﬁnancial activities of
the political parties.
However, the ﬁnancing of the political parties is
performed in nontransparent manner. In spite of
the provision of the law, which does not allow
ﬁnancing from abroad, there are indications that
a large amount of funds from abroad have been
transferred to the ruling political parties by lobby-
ing groups from abroad, during their election
campaign. There is no efﬁcient control on the
resources of political parties, especially those
coming from abroad, due to the lack of political
will and because of conﬁdentiality of such activi-
ties, which usually are executed through secret
channels. According to the legal provisions the
funds provided in the Budget for political parties
in amount of 30% shall be divided equally to the
parties, which received at least 3% of the total
votes during the last elections, while the rest of
70% of the funds shall be divided to the political
parties which candidates have been elected as
deputies in the Parliament, according to the num-
ber of their deputies. The individual gifts and
donations by the physical and legal persons may
not exceed 100 average salaries in the country.
During the elections, the individuals’ gifts and
donations from the physical persons and legal
persons may exceed up to 200 average salaries in
the country in the last month.
The Financing of Political Parties Law in Serbia
was adopted in 1997. Under this law, a political
party can acquire funds needed for its operation
from membership dues, donations, income from
its own property, ownership rights in enterprises
and credits, as well as from budget of the
Republic of Serbia. Political parties cannot be
financially supported by the authorities and
organizations from foreign countries and other
foreign nationals, or by state or local organs of
authority, except in ways defined by law.
Anonymous contributions are allowed if they do
not exceed 3% of a party’s net income from the
preceding year. Parties represented in parliament
also receive means from the Serbian budget.
Campaigns for parliamentary and presidential
elections are partly funded from the budget.
Maximum permissible contribution a legal entity
can contribute to political party equals to 50 net
average monthly salaries in Serbia. Public enter-
prises may not give contributions to political par-
ties. Parties are legally bound to keep records of
income and expenditure; the sources of income
are public knowledge. 
In practice, the Financing of Political Parties Law
never really became effective in Serbia. Despite
the legal obligation to make ﬁnancing transparent
and to conduct all operations through bank
accounts open to ﬁnancial supervision, neither
the ruling parties nor the opposition heeded the
law. Most of the income of the opposition parties
came from foreign donors (which the law bans)
or local businessmen, anonymously. During the
former regime, it was quite reasonable for oppo-
sition parties’ donors not to reveal their identity. 
The situation did not change signiﬁcantly after
political changes in 2000. Political parties are still
constrained by the
law only formally,
duly keeping books
showing only per-
missible income and
contributions. Major
donations still go
unreported, which
leads to political cor-
ruption. It is not
known whether any
supervision of the
ﬁnancing of political
parties has been car-
ried out lately. An
investigation against
several Socialist
Party of Serbia (SPS)
officials, suspected
of masterminding
alleged irregularities
in the ﬁnancing of
the SPS at the time
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when it was in the power is currently taking place
in Belgrade. 
Following the requests of the Council for Fighting
Corruption, the Government of the Republic of
Serbia has issued a conclusion on 22nd March
2002, obliging the Ministry of Finance and Econo-
my and the Ministry of Justice and Local Govern-
ments to develop Draft law on Preventing Conﬂict
of Interests in Public Administration, Draft law on
Recording the Property of State Ofﬁcials and Draft
Law on Financing of Political Parties.
*    *    *
In many Southeast European countries legal pro-
visions regarding registration and funding of
political parties still are not adequate and do not
guarantee equal rights and transparency of the
elections campaigns and the political process as
a whole. Even in the countries where the respec-
tive regulatory framework is already in place its
proper implementation is often hampered by
informal inﬂuence.
In order to curb corruption related to political par-
ties and cut off the informal bonds between polit-
ical parties and private interests it is recommend-
ed for the SEE countries to ensure better account-
ing and transparency of party ﬁnances. The par-
ties should obligatory keep ﬁnancial accounting
and should include auditors in the process.
Special bodies for ﬁnancing and keeping the
records should be created for exercising a more
effective control over the parties’ ﬁnances. A sep-
arate list of the donators and received donations
should be kept following the current practice of
most of the European countries and the USA.
Publication of the parties’ ﬁnancial records will
provide publicity of their activity.
The legislator should be very strict and precise
because on one hand the law should provide free
association in the political parties, and on the
other hand it should give the country an opportu-
nity to regulate the functions of the parties, which
are important for the entire political system, as
well as to restrict the possibilities of corruption to
a maximum level.
In order to further reform the political system on
a sustainable anti-corruption basis the following
measures should be undertaken: further differen-
tiation between the state and political parties as
well as between public and private interests;
introduction of mechanisms for development of
legal sources of funding as well as for control
over functioning of political parties and politi-
cians; introduction of sufﬁcient guarantees for
equal treatment of political parties during pre-
election campaigns.
Lobbying in favor of corporate interests is rou-
tinely done in modern societies, whether it is con-
sidered legal or not. In the most SEE countries
there is a lack of legal regulation of lobbying
methods which often border on corrupt practices
at all levels of politics. What usually happens is
lobbying through corrupting. Since lobbyists are
operating as representatives and mediators for
political parties, private persons or companies
whose main objective is to inﬂuence the ﬁnal out-
comes of the policies (laws, political decisions,
public procurement, awards, etc.), the negative
social impact of their unlawful activities is obvi-
ous, especially if and when they resort to corrupt
means. In addition to the direct negative impact
of the abuses in the course of lobbying for the
authority of the state and its representatives and
the common public perception of corruption, the
consequences can also have unpredictable and
possibly negative permanent effects on the state
of the national economy policy, different aspects
of legislation and so on. Despite of these risks,
however, lobbying is still not being legally
acknowledged.
Lobbying activities need to be legally regulated,
although not necessarily through a separate law.
It is possible to include speciﬁc rules and provi-
sions in relevant laws, mandatory codes of ethics
for business organizations and the non-govern-
mental sector in general. In any case such activi-
ties should be regulated on a broad legal basis
after a careful consideration. This will help create
a new model of interaction between politicians on
the one hand, and businesses and non-govern-
mental organizations, on the other hand, and
strengthen the trust between them
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Corruption in any institution impedes its opera-
tion and distorts its objectives. However, corrup-
tion in the Judiciary is particularly damaging for
several reasons. The Judiciary is one of the fun-
damental pillars of a market economy whose role
as arbiter of the law encompasses both the for-
mulation and implementation of public policy. In
addition to deciding criminal cases, the courts are
responsible for upholding property rights, enforc-
ing contracts, and settling disputes. As a result,
corruption in the Judiciary can display aspects of
both state capture and administrative corruption.
Failure in any of these roles can be costly and
reduce incentives to invest by forcing ﬁrms to
resort to more costly private means of contract
enforcement and protection. In addition to these
direct economic costs, a corrupt legal system has
a wider impact, undermining the credibility of the
state and making the implementation of public
policy more difﬁcult. In particular, since the legal
system will be the ultimate arbiter of any anti-cor-
ruption program, a corrupt Judiciary will funda-
mentally undermine anti-corruption efforts them-
selves. 
The process of reforming judicial systems in
many Southeast European countries is monitored
and measured by international organizations and
institutions as well as by national civic organiza-
tions and initiatives:
Evaluation of conducting judicial reform in EU
applicant countries by the European
Commission as reﬂected in its “Regular
Reports”
EU Accession Monitoring Program of the
Open Society Institute initiated in 2000 to
encourage independent monitoring of the
process by which the EU is considering appli-
cations for membership from the ten candi-
date States of Central and Eastern Europe and
to complement the EC Regular Reports – edi-
tion “Judicial Independence in the EU
Accession Process”, 2001
The American Bar Association – Central
and East European Law Initiative
(ABA/CEELI) developed its Judicial Reform
Index (JRI) for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Romania and
Serbia.31 The objective of the JRI is to assess a
cross-section of factors important to judicial
reform in emerging democracies.
As the various evaluation and monitoring instru-
ments show, the Judiciary was once again ranked
among the most corrupt institutions while judges,
lawyers, prosecutors, police ofﬁcers and other
law enforcement professionals are among the
most corrupt occupation groups. 
The legislative measures, already implemented
or planned for the future, target objectives in dif-
ferent areas, namely improving the substantive
and procedural laws (legislative reform in the
strict sense), reforming the organization and
operation of courts and court administration
reform and raising the criteria for the appoint-
ment of magistrates and their professional quali-
ﬁcations – training of both magistrates and court
administrators.
The fundamental objectives of the judicial
reforms in the countries in transition are to create
conditions for the quick and efﬁcient sanctioning
of corrupt practices and to preclude any possibil-
ities for corruption in the judicial system.
This chapter contains reviews on the most signif-
icant problems in the sphere of judicial reforms in
the Southeast European countries:
Structure, Organization and Governance of the
Judiciary. Independence and Relations with
the Executive; 
Status of the Magistrates – Independence,
Appointment, Promotion, and Removal Proce-
dures. Qualiﬁcation and Training;
Judicial Administration – Legal Basis, Status
and Organization;
Working Conditions. Modernization and Com-
puterization.
V. JUDICIAL REFORM
31 http://www.abanet.org/ceeli/publications/jri/home.html 
32 In September 2000 the project was successfully launched as part of the Southeast European Legal Development Initiative
(SELDI - www.seldi.net). SELDI was created by the International Development Law Institute and the Center for the Study of
Democracy in April 1999 with the overall goal to contribute to the building of the rule of law and democratic institutions in the
countries of SEE through the institutionalization of regional public-private cooperation in anti-corruption and judicial reform.
5.1. Structure, Organization and Gover-
nance (Independent Governing Bodies).
Independence and Relations with the
Executive 
The structure and organization of the Judiciary
and the governance of the judicial system are
vital for the successful anti-corruption efforts of
the Judiciary. The main principles, concerning the
structure of the Judiciary, its organization and
governance, as well as its relations with the other
powers are contained in the countries’
Constitutions, adopted after the change of the
political system in Southeast Europe. They are
developed in details in the structural and proce-
dural laws, most of which are elaborated and
adopted in accordance with the new social and
political reality in the region.
One of the principles, proclaimed in the new
Constitutions and current legislation of the coun-
tries in transition is that of the independence and
autonomy of the Judiciary. This can be achieved
by different means, but the most important is the
creation and functioning of independent institu-
tions, which determine the composition and carry
out the organization of the judicial system, and
play the role of policy–making bodies. Such insti-
tutions already exist in most of the countries in
Southeast Europe, but most of them still need
fundamental institutional strengthening. 
The system of justice in Albania consists of
District Courts with general jurisdiction, Appellate
Courts and the High Court. Each level deals with
civil, criminal, commercial and administrative
cases. The system of
military justice is also
included in the crimi-
nal justice system. 
Albania has six Appel-
late Courts and one
Military Appellate
Court, which review
the decisions of the
first instance courts.
The procedural com-
petencies of the High
Court are provided for
in the Codes of Crimi-
nal and Civil Proce-
dure. Competencies of
a substantive nature
are provided for in the
Law on the Organiza-
tion and Functioning
of the High Court and
the Administration of Judicial Services. Following
the adoption of the new Constitution in Novem-
ber 1998, the High Court now needs further regu-
lation (a new organic Law), which is almost com-
pleted. 
By virtue of Albanian Constitution of November
1998 the High Council of Justice (HCJ) was
established. HCJ is the state authority in charge
of appointing, dismissing, transferring and insti-
tuting disciplinary proceedings against judges of
primary and secondary instance in the Republic
of Albania. Its aim is to ensure judicial independ-
ence, competence and impartiality. HJC does not
belong to any of the classical branches of govern-
ment. The Constitution makes this independent
position clear by dedicating a separate chapter to
the HCJ and distinguishing its responsibilities
from the Legislative, Executive and Judicial
branches of government. Although the role of the
HCJ is focused mainly on disciplinary issues it
exerts also quasi-regulatory powers, such as giv-
ing preliminary opinions on the proposals of the
Minister of Justice to the President for the estab-
lishment of the territorial jurisdiction of the courts
and the determination of the number of judges as
well as announcing and organizing exams for
judges jointly with the school of magistrates and
School of Law at the Tirana University.
HCJ therefore has the potential to play a decisive
role in judicial affairs. The organization and func-
tioning of the HCJ’s inspectorate is perhaps the
hottest issue regarding the HCJ. The Judicial
Inspectorate monitors and controls the
Judiciary on behalf of the HCJ. Its competencies
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are extremely vague. As a consequence, there are
serious uncertainties about what procedures the
inspectorate must follow in its investigative and
decision-making capacity regarding the misbe-
havior of judges. The rules governing the
Inspectorate must be clariﬁed for it to carry out its
work better and more efﬁciently. 
Many legal experts plausibly argue that the poor
performance of the Judiciary can be ascribed, to
a great extent, to the inefﬁciency of the HCJ.
Some of this inefﬁciency can be traced to the
HCJ’s organizational volatility, exempliﬁed by the
fact that it meets only periodically. However, as
the HCJ currently stands, it cannot be trans-
formed into a permanent committee with full
time members because it includes members that
have other governmental duties such as the
President of the Republic, the Minister of Justice,
the President of the High Court, etc. Several
“moderate” proposals have been put forward.
One of these proposals is to have the mandates
of judges who become members of the HCJ sus-
pended when they are called upon to serve on the
HCJ. Another idea is for the deputy chairman of
the HCJ to serve on full time basis. An increase in
honoraria for the HCJ members has also been
considered as yet another means to make mem-
bers of the HCJ more devoted to the institution.
Another proposal is for the HCJ to split into spe-
cialized sections. In theory, specialization would
allow the HCJ to review more cases with greater
expediency at a higher level of professionalism.
Of course, there would be no impediment for the
HCJ to review cases in plenary sessions when
such an action is deemed appropriate. 
The relationship between the Judiciary and the
Executive is strained because each maintains a
certain degree of control through a separate
inspectorate. Distinctions between these inspec-
torates are blurred. The ﬁrst inspectorate was cre-
ated by the Law on the Organization of the
Judiciary and is attached to the HCJ. The other
consists of a number of inspectors attached to the
Minister of Justice (some argue that this is not a
real inspectorate).
The issue whether the parallel existence of two
inspectorates is beneﬁcial or detrimental is a sub-
ject of debate in the legal community. One view is
that the existence of the ministerial inspectors is
an unnecessary vestige of the communist era –
when the interference of the executive power into
the affairs of the Judiciary was legitimate (the
Albanian constitutional doctrine at the time was
that of unity of government powers). Another
argument, which is practical in nature, is that the
parallel existence of two inspectorates causes
serious communication difﬁculties and in the
long run can lead to the failure of the HCJ’s super-
visory role. The supporters of this view would
advocate for the abolishment of the ofﬁce of min-
isterial inspectors and therefore for the concen-
tration of supervisory powers in the HCJ’s inspec-
torate. However, this view remains a minority
view. Most legal experts argue that concentrating
all of the supervisory powers in the HCJ’s inspec-
torate alone is a bad idea because most of the
HCJ’s members are judges. If the only check on
judges were other judges, there might be a ten-
dency towards supporting judicial independence
to the point of virtual unaccountability. Such a sit-
uation would undermine the rule of law and the
constitutional doctrine of checks and balances.
Ministerial inspectors, on the other hand, are
seen to be in a constant state of “institutional ten-
sion” with the Judiciary, and should, in theory, be
more likely to criticize the Judiciary. Ministerial
inspectors are also more accessible and, as a con-
sequence, constitute a better advocate for indi-
viduals whose rights have been allegedly violated
by the Judiciary. Finally, the performance of the
HCJ inspectorate is arguably diluted by the fact
the HCJ is not a standing organism but rather
meets only periodically.
The new Constitution, by strengthening the polit-
ical control over the Judiciary through a political-
ly selected HCJ, has only nourished the tendency
of politics to misuse the Judiciary and to effec-
tively abolish its independence. Even the law
amendments have only served to strengthen the
position of the prosecution in respect to the posi-
tion of the court, to diminish the rights of the
accused, to prolong the terms of preliminary
detention, rather then to provide for independ-
ence, impartiality, protection from political pres-
sure etc.
After the political changes of 1997 in Albania,
there was a strong movement towards changes
within the Judiciary which resulted in an intolera-
ble politicization of the Judiciary. This had consid-
erable negative effect on its independence. The
Head of the Constitutional Court and the
President of the High Court, as well as other
courts throughout Albania were dismissed and
replaced with people pertaining to the Socialist
Party.  
The failure of the courts in punishing notorious
criminals, murderers and terrorists, known also
for their links to politicians in power, as well as
the misuse of the Judiciary for the punishment of
opposition party leaders, have severely compro-
mised the independence and impartiality of the
courts. Furthermore, they have damaged the con-
stitutional and legal guarantees for the rule of
law, and eroded the faith of the public in justice.
In the last three years the state prosecution, espe-
cially the Attorney General’s Ofﬁce, has compro-
mised itself with absurd accusations against the
leaders of the opposition. The Judiciary in Albania
is therefore clearly an instrument of political
oppression.
The examples of such political oppression were
the arrests and detention of thousands of opposi-
tion supporters, because of their participation in
protest rallies organized by the opposition in the
aftermath of the disputed October election.
Numerous people were arrested and detained for
periods varying from 48 hours to two months in a
clear violation of the law. Many victims of unlaw-
ful detention and mistreatment were minors.
Using the courts as an instrument of political
oppression has obscured their constitutional sta-
tus and functions. Political pressure has made
judges vulnerable towards any other kind of pres-
sure. Bribery, threatening, corruption, incompe-
tence have become main features of the
Judiciary.
Albanian courts are ﬁlled with Socialist Party sup-
porters. They feel that their positions are secure,
because of their political afﬁliation. In such a situ-
ation reports about the release of notorious crim-
inals and the failure of the courts to punish real
crime have become normal.
The system has failed to pursue organized crime,
and especially corruption and trafﬁcking, related
to the highest political level in the country.
Recently severe accusations have been raised
against the Attorney General of the country for
his involvement in the international drug-trafﬁc,
as well as for his efforts to protect famous crimi-
nal organizations. These accusations resulted in
the Parliament discussion whether to lift his
immunity. The socialist majority protected him
and thus hindered his prosecution.
The corrupt and inefﬁcient justice system is one
of the most serious obstacles to democratic gov-
ernance. The Judiciary has failed in two aspects:
1) it has failed to be independent, and 2) it has
failed to fulﬁll its constitutional mission and legal
obligations.
There is an open tendency on the politicians’ side
to blame the Judiciary for the failure of the anti-
crime policy of the Government. By accusing the
Judiciary of unprofessional behavior and corrup-
tion, the Government wants to hide its political
failure to reform the police and the prosecution,
which are really to blame for this precarious situ-
ation.  
Corruption in itself cannot be fought without a
functioning and clean Judiciary. Corruption has
become a malaise of the Albanian system, wide-
spread at all levels of the administration and a
serious obstacle to efﬁciency. As such, it under-
mines legitimacy of the system. Public trust in the
Government and state institutions is very low.
Combined with the above mentioned corrupt and
dysfunctional state institutions, this undermines
the efﬁciency of the state in collecting revenues,
and in implementing and making policies.
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is currently
reviewing all judges and prosecutors. The current
judges and prosecutors are required to reapply
for their positions and undergo a comprehensive
evaluation – by the newly created High Judicial
Councils (HJC). This review started in June
2000, when the Entities’ new laws on judicial and
prosecutorial service established independent
commissions (in the Federation of BiH) and coun-
cils (in the Republika Srpska). These bodies were
charged with determining incumbents’ profes-
sional and moral suitability for continued service,
albeit under the close supervision of the
Independent Judicial Commission (IJC), which
was initially created under the auspices of the
High Representative and his ofﬁce (OHR) in early
2001 to assist in the process of guiding and coor-
dinating a comprehensive judicial reform strate-
gy in BiH. As part of this task, it provides assis-
tance to domestic judicial and prosecutorial com-
missions and councils that deal with matters
related to the appointment, discipline, and review
of judges and prosecutors. The International
Crisis Group (ICG) carries out its pivotal role in
close co-operation with both local and interna-
tional partners.
Both Entities have local courts that operate at the
municipal level and only in those municipalities
that are sizeable enough to require one. Each of
the ten FBiH Cantons operates a cantonal court
and in RS there are ﬁve regional courts to cover
only the largest centers. These are the ﬁrst appel-
lation instances, above which there is only the
Supreme Court. Notwithstanding the level of the
magistrates, the new appointment procedures, as
well as the veriﬁcation of promotion, are now
subject to the HJC’s decisions. Removal proce-
dures as described below again require the ulti-
mate decision of the HJC.
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In addition to the parallel judicial system in the
two Entities that is being harmonized, the BiH
District of Brcko, having become a non-Entity ter-
ritory and directly subordinated to the State insti-
tutions, organized its own administration includ-
ing Judiciary. This has very much been an exer-
cise of the International Community (IC), primari-
ly a US-led effort. While there has been much crit-
icism over state-building in a town of 30,000,
most of the work related to making the courts
professional and independent has been success-
ful. 
The major outstanding issue is the organization
of the Judiciary. In the complex BiH judicial envi-
ronment, now certain motions exist on formation
of the BiH Supreme Court and the BiH State
Prosecutor. They currently exist solely at the
Entity level. If they were to be established at the
joint level, they would focus on the international
and inter-Entity commercial crime and organized
crime. Regardless of the judicial system, any
interference of political and government struc-
tures must be eliminated. For the purpose of
ensuring a more efﬁcient resolution of disputes, it
will be necessary to establish alternative institu-
tions, for instance, in the area of business arbi-
trage and mediation. The possibility of re-estab-
lishment of commercial courts in the resolution of
commercial disputes or an establishment of spe-
cialized commercial departments within the exist-
ing courts should be considered. This decision
will be based on general strategy of judicial sys-
tem reform.33
The Executive cannot directly inﬂuence the
work of the judges. Ministries of Justice in both
Entities and in the Cantons of FBiH cater for the
supporting staff to the courts and other expendi-
tures for Judiciary. They also pay for investigation
processes and all external staff associated with
the courts on a case by case basis.
However, this has presented the courts with
another problem. Any investigation is pending a
prior authorization of the Government, by the
means of funding the experts, evaluators, etc.,
and this way may indirectly disable courts in their
decision-making. Much of the current magistrates
were appointed by the previous administration
and now refuse to review their mismanagement,
fraud and criminal activities and the current
Government has no means to inﬂuence a greater
efﬁciency and impartiality. This vicious circle is
likely to extend for as long as there can be some
influence, exercised on the judges by the
Executive.
Bulgarian Constitution provides that judicial
branch of Government is independent and has
three parts (a) the courts (b) the prosecutor’s
ofﬁce and (c) investigating bodies which are
responsible for performing the preliminary inves-
tigation in criminal cases. 
Three-instance proceedings were introduced,
namely: ﬁrst instance, appeal-on-the-merits and
cassation proceedings. The current system
includes 112 regional courts (courts of first
instance), 28 district courts (of both ﬁrst and sec-
ond instance), ﬁve courts of appeal (which oper-
ate as courts of second instance with respect to
the regional courts’ judgments only), ﬁve region-
al military courts, one military court of appeal, a
Supreme Court of Cassation and a Supreme
Administrative Court. 
When evaluating the Judicial system’s efﬁciency
in curbing corruption, one usually underscores
the court’s administration of justice. Under the
existing Constitution, the other units of the judi-
cial system (the investigation and the prosecu-
tion) should also be taken into account, as the
efﬁciency of their work is a prerequisite for better
and more efﬁcient administration of justice. The
proper place and role of the prosecution in the
judicial system including the status of the
Attorney General has been the subject of serious
discussions. Different and often controversial
approaches have been suggested: to preserve the
status quo; to amend the Constitution and trans-
fer the prosecution to the Executive, in particular
to the Ministry of Justice; to give it greater inde-
pendence from the Supreme Judicial Council; to
impose parliamentary control over the Attorney
General, etc. According to the European
Commission Regular Report 2001 the fact that
criminal investigators with the functions they
33 The WB survey data show that businessmen use courts much more often than informal channels – courts were used by 41 per-
cent of those interviewed and informal channels only by 10 percent. Most of those who did not use the court system to resolve
these problems cite as the main reason complicated court procedures. Another reason mentioned by several respondents is
when the issue concerned "was not substantial". Those who used courts for resolving relevant business matters were asked
about their experience. As many as 66 percent of respondents in the enterprise survey who dealt with courts considered them
fair, unbiased, and objective. At the same time, 46 percent of the same group of people (those who dealt with courts) said that
the courts are corrupt. Courts are regarded as not fast, with unnecessary delays by 77 percent of the respondents who dealt
with them. Moreover, ﬁrms that felt the process was unfair were also very likely to declare it corrupt. (WB, ibid. pp. 49-50)
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/Bosnianticorruption.pdf
exercise in Bulgaria (some of which are exercised
by police elsewhere), are members of the judici-
ary, is unusual, and the inter-agency co-operation
is weak and complicated. The issues related to the
judicial system’s composition are subject to dis-
cussion in the context of the recently launched
debate on constitutional amendments.
The governance of the Judiciary is a key factor for
the efﬁcient ﬁght against corruption both inside
the Judicial system and throughout the rest of the
society. A pressing issue is the delineation and re-
deﬁnition of the authority and functions of the
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) as a govern-
ing body which makes decisions on personnel
and organization, and the Ministry of Justice as a
unit of the Executive.
The SJC has the main representative function in
the Judiciary as well as broad powers in its
administration. Unfortunately, there are serious
weaknesses in its activities. Some of these are
created by constitutional provision on its compo-
sition, responsibilities and powers while others
can be corrected within the current constitutional
framework. These weaknesses are generally due
to the lack of transparency in the work of
Judiciary, lack of clear procedures for a number of
aspects of its activities, outdated internal rules,
insufﬁcient administrative capacity and a lack of
feedback mechanism with the branches of the
Judiciary. The unclear division of roles between
the SJC and Ministry of Justice is an issue, which
contributes to the poor functioning of judicial sys-
tem and was also pointed out in the last Regular
Report of the European Commission.
Under the pressure of criticism regarding the
shortcomings of judicial reform both from the
Bulgarian civil society and European Commission
as well as from other evaluations missions of
international or foreign organizations, the
Government in its recent reform efforts tried to
address the problems of the Judicial system by
starting the implementation of the following
measures:
Using the experience of nongovernmental
organizations and their initiatives to reform
the Judiciary and developing partnerships
with these organizations – among them the
Judicial Reform Initiative34 and Coalition 2000;
Adopting a Strategy for Reform of the Judicial
System in Bulgaria (SRJ) on October 1st, 2001.
Its aim is to develop European Standards in
justice by determining the political and leg-
islative priorities in the reform of the judiciary,
thus contributing to the preparation for
European Union membership. The Strategy
and the Action plan cover a ﬁve-year period.
Although the Strategy does not deal with
issues where in fact constitutional change will
be required, the implementation and the mon-
itoring of the effectiveness of the institutional
and legislative measures proposed remain a
high priority.
In the course of the implementation of the
Strategy for Reform of the Judicial System in
Bulgaria, the Law on the Judiciary was amended
by the National Assembly in July 2002. The prin-
cipal changes regarding the structure and gover-
nance of the Judiciary are as follows:
The Law extends the competencies of the
Supreme Judicial Council with regard to creat-
ing capacity to perform governing functions
for Judicial system - strategy, ﬁnancing, gov-
ernance and to removing magistrates. One
ﬁfth of the members of the Supreme Judicial
Council may also demand that the Chief
Prosecutor be divested of immunity. 
Regional prosecutor’s ofﬁces will be required
to regularly submit reports on their activities.
The Chief Prosecutor will also submit the
report to the Minister of Justice who will
include it in the yearly report on the work of
the judicial system.
The National Investigation Service shall be re-
established to manage administrative and
ﬁnancial matters relating to the investigators.
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34 The Judicial Reform Initiative (JRI) was launched in March 1999 as a joint endeavor of eight Bulgarian non-governmental
organizations, including the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) acting as a Secretariat to the Initiative, and representa-
tives of the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary. Within the framework of JRI (www.csd.bg/jri) a Program for Judicial
Reform in Bulgaria (PJR) was drafted, beneﬁting from the combined efforts of inﬂuential non-governmental organizations, rep-
resentatives of State authorities and experts. Since July 1999 the Draft program has been open for discussion and suggestions
from the major stakeholders in the reform process such as the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Judicial Council, associations
and guilds of the legal profession, concerned non-governmental organizations, representatives of the media, independent
legal experts and the Bulgarian citizenry. The amended and revised Program, incorporating the comments, suggestions and
notes provided, was endorsed at a Policy Forum in May 2000. The Program represented the state of the Bulgarian Judiciary
and the legislation as to May 2000 and pointed out the priorities to be followed during the next steps of the reform process.
Its independence from the prosecution shall
be enhanced.35
The Law provides for the establishment of an
Uniform Information System. This System
should link the data on crime from the
Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Defense,
the Agency Financial Intelligence Bureau, the
customs authorities, the investigation, courts
and public prosecution ofﬁces and make much
easier the interaction between the above men-
tioned institutions in curbing corruption.
In order to achieve better co-ordination of the
governance of the Judicial system and protect the
independence of the Judiciary, it is of particular
importance to establish a model of interaction
and at the same time delineation of the
responsibilities of the Executive and the
Judiciary. Strengthening the independence of
the Judiciary also requires that the Executive, i.e.
the Ministry of Justice does not restrict the cre-
ation of the necessary material conditions for its
efﬁcient functioning. These conditions include the
management and maintenance of court build-
ings, providing the required materials and equip-
ment etc.
The Croatian Constitution stipulates that the rule
of law is one of the Constitution’s fundamental
values.  The government is divided into legisla-
tive, executive and judicial branches along the
principle of separation of powers in order to fos-
ter “mutual cooperation and reciprocal checks
and balances provided by the Constitution and
law.” 
According to the constitutional principle of sepa-
ration of powers, the Judiciary is independent
and autonomous.
Croatia’s legal system follows the principles of
civil law. Thus, the primary sources of law are the
Constitution, laws enacted by Parliament, and
other written legal provisions enacted pursuant to
statutory provisions. Court decisions are general-
ly not viewed as precedents, and – although
lower courts tend to follow the opinion of the
higher courts – there is no legal obligation for
judges to follow the legal interpretations of high-
er courts. A practical problem is the current lack of
access to many court decisions. Only decisions of
the highest courts are published, and even then
only in short excerpts, and only those selected by
anonymous administrative services of the courts.
Court hearings are open to the public and judg-
ments pronounced publicly (Article 119). Croatia
is also committed to equality and the equal treat-
ment of citizens before the law.
Although basic procedural norms govern the sys-
tem, they do not reﬂect how it actually functions.
Legal disputes often drag on for years without
resolution, raising costs for businesses and
increasing uncertainty for investors. Instead of
solving problems, the legal system often pro-
longs them, and creates a fruitful environment for
corruption. The criminal justice system is also
inefﬁcient, and criminals – both white-collar and
violent offenders – have little fear of effective
punishment. 
There is currently a satisfactory legal framework
for effective co-operation between the prosecu-
tion and the police; however, this co-operation
must be reinforced in practice. The prosecutors
must become involved in police investigations at
an earlier stage in order to improve the quality
and effectiveness of the investigations, especially
in the more important and more serious cases.
This shortcoming is especially obvious in regard
to the lack of coordination between the different
bodies engaged in combating corruption and
organized crime: the police carries out investiga-
tions on their own without contacting the district
attorney’s ofﬁce for necessary legal backup, the
district attorneys cannot thoroughly examine the
evidence in the mere 48 hours of custody pre-
scribed by the law, and as a result the public pros-
ecutor refrains from instituting charges against
the detainee, since there is no way for him to
establish in such a short period of time whether
the evidence submitted by the police is strong
enough to uphold the indictment in a court of law. 
Both experts and practicing lawyers agree that
the intentions of the law are not being achieved.
Judges have not yet been appointed for many
judicial positions (an estimated 1/5). Croatia’s
judges are also relatively young – almost 40% are
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35 Previous experiments in reforming the investigation reﬂected in confrontation between the short-term particularistic interests
and resulted in ineffective cases of preliminary investigation, including cases on corruption. Over the course of the last 10
years several attempts to re-organize the investigation have been made. They have varied from transferring investigation serv-
ices back to the Ministry of Interior (1997) to closing down the National Investigation Service and creating 28 independent dis-
trict investigation services and one Specialized Investigation Service (1998). As a result, the Specialized Investigation Service
was deprived of organizational, ﬁnancial and administrative means of inﬂuencing district investigations. In 2001, an attempt
was made to subordinate administrative of investigation to the prosecutor’s ofﬁce
younger than 35 years old. That can be a positive
trait, but it also means that they do not have ade-
quate life and professional experience. In munici-
pal courts, 61.5% of all judges have fewer than 6
years of working experience in the courts. Despite
the lack of judges, efﬁciency concerns do not
favor the alternatives of raising or lowering the
number of judges. In the late 1990s, it became
evident that the Judiciary was not able to cope
with either its new functions or a fast growing
caseload consisting of many complex cases.
Understaffed courts with highly centralized and
inﬂexible management do not allow for a quick
and adequate response to the pressures created
by market. As a result, since 1998, the courts have
been continuously swamped by a backlog of over
one million cases – in a country of only four mil-
lion people (the ﬁgure more than doubled from
1996 – 2000). An example of the reasons for this
backlog is a new system of land cadastre registry
where the situation is almost chaotic. Croatia
chronic economic instability also accounts for the
increase in the volume of court cases. Each of the
successive economic reforms enacted by the gov-
ernment completely changed the rules. The con-
fusing rules enacted have resulted in an enor-
mous number of disputes between parties with
different understandings on how to adjust to a
certain obligation. The volume of court cases coin-
cides with a very weak and inefﬁciently managed
court system. The courts have not yet designed
and implemented a uniform policy or internal
management system that would guarantee more
efﬁcient results.
The management crisis also affects criminal jus-
tice and the law enforcement system, which have
been extremely inefﬁcient in effectively prosecut-
ing and punishing those who commit a crime. The
volume of criminal cases also exceeds capacity,
and controls over judges and court clerks, if any,
are also very weak. Consequently, judicial pro-
ceedings are slow and sometimes useless. 
As a result, corruption seems to be widely spread
in the sphere of Judiciary as some examples
show. For instance, there were publications in the
media revealing documentation that owner and
director of the First Artisan Savings Bank (FASB)
bribed the highest judicial ofﬁcials by paying for
their summer holidays, air tickets and by granting
them favorable loans. The former President of the
Administrative Court and current member of the
Constitutional Court, the head of the Criminal
Section of the Supreme Court, a judge from the
Commercial Court, a judge from the
Administrative Court and a judge from the High
Commercial Court were all connected with the
controversial banker.
Crime statistics are not reliable. Many people
report activities that are not criminal, and many
criminal activities go unreported. Nevertheless, it
is interesting to note that only 17.2% of reported
offences in Croatia result in a conviction, and only
0.0392%, end with a non-suspended prison sen-
tence. This does not necessarily reﬂect the actual
extent of the frequency of certain criminal acts,
but tells more about the efﬁciency of the detect-
ing bodies, which occasionally fail completely
and leave the perpetrator of the criminal act
undiscovered. 
Indeed, the Croatian judicial statistics are alarm-
ing. The penalties associated with the violation of
rules that regulate economic activities are
extremely low. The total number of persons legal-
ly prosecuted is negligibly small and the number
of those actually convicted is even smaller. The
perpetrators are exposed to very low risk, since
the courts of law are overloaded; employees are
too busy and court decisions take years to
become effective. The main problem is still the
slowness of the judicial process, particularly in
the criminal ﬁeld. There is also a lack of judges
and support staff. The direct result of this situation
is the low number of charges pursued. It is dis-
turbing that only a small number of people were
charged and convicted for the criminal acts of
accepting or giving bribes. This does not reﬂect
the frequency of individual criminal offences, but
rather the lack of effectiveness of the bodies that
investigate these crimes. 
The impact of law and the courts on society is
much greater today than ever before. During the
socialist era, most of the social and political prob-
lems were resolved outside the legal system, in
the bodies of the party bureaucracy. With the tran-
sition to a market economy and multi-party
democracy, many heated issues are being sub-
mitted to courts, which are often unprepared for
such hard tasks. Virtually all the major issues of
social and political life are resolved by the courts
– from privatization and economic restructuring
to organized crime, corruption, and the conse-
quences of ethnic conﬂicts and war. In response,
the Croatian judicial system has improved its
capabilities. Despite its slowness and inefﬁciency,
it is ﬁnally assuming the responsibility of guaran-
teeing that new laws do not violate the
Constitution or other conflicting legislation.
Reﬂecting the growing pains of a new democracy,
the executive and legislative branches have
passed huge amounts of new legislation. The
accomplishments of the transition period should
not be entirely overshadowed by the presence of
corruption.
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The judicial system has also been subjected to
improper executive and political influence.
Unfortunately, although progress is hoped for,
cooperation between the Croatian Judiciary and
foreign experts in carrying out anti-corruption
activities remains weak. 
Macedonian Constitution adopted in 1991 creat-
ed an independent Judiciary – subject only to the
Constitution and the various laws and regula-
tions. Judicial independence was further devel-
oped in 1995 by the Law on the Judiciary and the
Law on the Republic Judicial Council as well as
laws to regulate judicial procedures. Although
Macedonian Judiciary is nominally independent
several improvements are necessary for it to
become more effective and truly independent.
The organization of the courts is uniform, irregu-
lar courts are forbidden. Judgments should be
made on the basis of the Constitution, laws and
international agreements are ratiﬁed in accor-
dance with the Constitution. The Supreme Court
is the highest court in the country and is respon-
sible for providing a uniform implementation of
the laws. Publicity of both trails and of the court’s
rulings is guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, the public may be prevented from
attending trials in some circumstances. The court
council executes trials. In some cases, the sole
arbiter is a judge. In other cases, there may be
three judges. In yet other cases, there is a right to
a jury. Juries cannot be held responsible for the
opinions or decisions made in the procedure of
rendering a verdict.  
The Republic Judicial Council (RJC) consists of
seven members. Members of the RJC are elected
by Parliament and consist of respectable lawyers.
Each member of the RJC is granted tenure of 6
years, with the right to pursue one additional
term on the RJC. The members of the RJC enjoy
immunity. The functions of the RJC are incompat-
ible with any other public duties or professions or
with membership in a political party. 
There are several practical problems regarding
the relationship between the Judiciary and the
executive power. The most serious issue concerns
the ﬁnancing of the Judiciary. In Macedonia, the
Judiciary receives its entire budget from the
Ministry of Finance, a state institution. This total
reliance on state resources has serious implica-
tions because it can jeopardize the Judiciary’s
independence. For this reason, the Macedonian
Judges Association has advocated for the cre-
ation of an independent judicial budget. A special
study was conducted by the Government. It con-
cluded that such a law is necessary since ﬁnancial
independence is a precondition for judicial inde-
pendence. 
Another practical issue is the abuse of political
inﬂuence. There are often indications of serious
problems regarding the inﬂuence of political par-
ties on the election of judges. Some judicial can-
didates proposed by the RJC were not elected
judges after several votes in the Parliament, with-
out any explanation being given. This creates an
unfavorable picture of the Judiciary and of the
RJC as a competent body. The executive power is
also known to interfere with the Judiciary’s
power, disputing the legality of judicial decisions
and court sentences. The Judiciary opposes all
such interventions and indeed any inﬂuence that
might jeopardize its independence.
However, real judicial independence has not yet
been achieved. Due to the lack of effective inter-
nal mechanisms and procedures the Judiciary is
still not in a position to prevent internal corrup-
tion and combat corruption in the society.
Although some improvements were made over
the last decade, the independence of the
Judiciary in Romania is still severely hampered
by legal, institutional and practical obstacles.
Judges’ career depends to a large extent on the
executive branch. The Minister of Justice is grant-
ed recommendation powers in the process of
appointment, promotion, transfer and removal of
judges. The Minister may easily avoid appoint-
ment or promotion by keeping uncomfortable
names off the agenda. Equally, the Minister may
decide not to initiate disciplinary proceedings
leading to sanctions or even removal of judges.
The Superior Council of Magistracy (SCM),
which controls the selection, promotion, transfer,
removal and sanctioning of judges is formed of
both judges and prosecutors although the latter
are subordinated to the Minister of Justice. The
executive branch is also inﬂuencing the Judiciary
through the budgeting process. 
In addition, judges’ professional activity and con-
duct is subject to veriﬁcation by inspectors in the
Ministry of Justice, in the courts of appeal and by
court presidents. Although the law provides that
such veriﬁcations may not interfere with judges’
decisional independence, the controlling process
includes assessments of the application of laws in
particular cases. Reportedly, judges suffer inter-
ference and pressure in the course of the veriﬁca-
tion process, the results of which are essential for
their career. High political ofﬁcials in the current
Government have repeatedly attempted – during
the ﬁrst months of the year 2001 – to inﬂuence the
judicial decisions in particular matters and to
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hamper the independence of the Judiciary. Many,
including judges, see this issue as raising very
serious concerns with the Government’s inten-
tions in the area of judicial independence. In
many respects, judges’ status is equal to that of
prosecutors. Law calls them both “magistrates”
and provides similar ways of appointment, trans-
fer and promotion, similar salaries and even a
unique code of ethics. In addition, prosecutors
continue to perform judicial like functions, and
the Attorney General enjoys the power of ﬁling
extraordinary appeals against ﬁnal judgments.
The powerful role of the prosecutors has been
guarded through political obstruction of institu-
tional reforms that propose diminishing prosecu-
torial power in favor of increasing the powers and
independence of judges. The military justice sys-
tem continues to exist, deciding, inter alia, on
allegations of police mistreatment. 
The public perception is that the Judiciary is cor-
rupt. As suggested by the 2001 World Bank’s sur-
vey,36 corruption should be treated in a systemat-
ic way, including the legal profession and educa-
tion as well as the public at large in addition to
courts system. The lack of legal culture con-
tributes to the corruption or to the image of a cor-
rupt Judiciary. Judges’ associations are few and
weak, lacking a voice strong enough to defend
and promote judges’ rights and independence.
Professional capabilities and integrity is not seri-
ously evaluated during the appointment and pro-
motion process. In addition, the training of judges
is still at the beginning and it does not have the
force to include a large number and to provide
extensive knowledge on constitutional law and
reasoning, international and in particular EU law,
court management and ethics. The public as well
as the large majority of judges is unaware of the
EU assessments and recommendations in all
areas, including the judicial system, and therefore
their support to reforms is merely declarative.
The current court system in Romania follows a
four-tiered pyramid structure. The lowest level
consists of District Courts, the next level is com-
prised of Regional Courts, and the Courts of
Appeal occupy the third level. At present, there
are 186 District Courts, 41 Regional Courts and 15
Court of Appeal. The Military Courts are divided
into military tribunals, military territorial tribunals
and military appellate courts. The Supreme Court
of Justice is at the top of the system and it is dis-
tinctly regulated. Constitutional matters are han-
dled by the Constitutional Court, which acts as an
independent institution. 
Although the independence of judges is constitu-
tionally guaranteed, some judicial decisions
prove that a number of judges continue to oper-
ate as they had under the communist regime, par-
ticularly by defending state property to an
extreme, and dutifully following the bureaucratic
chain of command. For example, in cases where
state civil liability is at stake, some judges provide
little redress since they feel a duty to protect the
state budget. 
In addition, many of the judges that had served
under the previous political regime remained on
the bench, particularly in the higher courts.
However, it should be also emphasized that many
judges do indeed understand and defend their
independence. During the 1990s, judges had
strengthened their attempts to lobby for legisla-
tion that would ensure their economic independ-
ence and grant them substantial incentives. The
implementation of such legislation was seen nec-
essary in order to deter corruption and further
stop the exodus of magistrates into the private
sector. Judges’ salaries (as well as prosecutors’)
and other ﬁnancial beneﬁts were substantially
increased during the last ﬁve years, in particular
in 1997. Nevertheless, the Romanian Magistrates
Association claims that judges’ income is dispro-
portionately low in comparison with the income
of some private lawyers. Yet, this comparison
seems dubious, since the competition among
judges is not nearly as high as it is among private
lawyers and many judges value job stability more
than a high income. 
Public trust in courts and other law enforcing
institution is low. The public perception is that the
Judiciary is corrupt. A 2000 survey of the World
Bank shows that between 53% and 65% of those
interviewed believe that the judges and prosecu-
tors engage in corruption. Journalists do bring
into the public discussion matters within the
administration of justice and allegations of cor-
ruption. In response, many judges say that the
way media reports on the Judiciary contribute to
the low public trust. Some journalists and politi-
cians joined in expressing an overall criticism of
the Judiciary. At present, the development of lib-
eral institutions, such as an independent
Judiciary, has strong support among intellectuals
and professional elites rather than among the
majority of the population and the government
ofﬁcials. According to a survey performed by the
non-governmental organization “Pro
Democratia,” the public believes that the courts,
the prosecutors and the police are the most cor-
rupt institutions in the country.
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International organizations do not perceive the
Romanian Judiciary as fully independent and
very effective. The European Commission 2000
Regular Report37 provides the image of a Judiciary
facing a real risk of political inﬂuence and having
a low administrative capacity. The World Bank
survey shows a signiﬁcant lack of public trust in
the Judiciary and a domestic overall perception
of corruption within the judicial system. In addi-
tion, the 2000 US State Department’s report on
Romania states that the Judiciary remained sub-
ject to the executive branch inﬂuence.38
Corruption is a major obstacle to judicial inde-
pendence and continues to be a widespread and
systemic problem in Romania. Corruption in the
Judiciary goes largely uninvestigated and unpun-
ished. However, there have been some cases
where corruption was identiﬁed and sanctioned.
In 1999 the SCM handled 14 disciplinary actions
against judges and of the eight actions accepted,
six judges received disciplinary sanctions and
two were removed from ofﬁce.39 However, any
form of corruption is a crime requiring criminal
investigation and court hearings. By applying dis-
ciplinary sanctions, the SCM avoided the courts’
jurisdiction and the public debate over such
cases. 
The information provided by the Ministry of
Justice showed, for example, that during the ﬁrst
6 months of year 2000, the prosecution requested
approval to investigate six judges and the
Minister had only approved three. This process is
not transparent, and it seems that ofﬁcials are
more concerned with the public image of the
Judiciary than with bringing the allegedly corrupt
judges before the courts and face media report-
ing. 
A series of procedural shortcomings in the judi-
cial system encourage corruption and prevent
judges from being punished. For instance, court
proceedings are not recorded. In practice, the
leading judge uses his/her own words to summa-
rize the parties’ and witnesses’ statements and
dictates these summaries to the clerk. The oral
debates between the parties or between the court
and the parties, as well as the questions asked
during the interviews are never recorded. In addi-
tion, there is no record of the questions rejected
by the court. The lack of recording applies to all
cases at all levels of jurisdiction. Under these cir-
cumstances, a corrupt judge may easily distort
what the parties and witnesses have stated in the
court. Moreover, the appeal proceedings lack the
instruments of identifying eventual wrongs in the
previous proceedings. The right to a fair trail is
seriously limited.
The Judiciary in Serbia is regulated by two
Constitutions – that of Serbia and that of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Although
the two Constitutions are not identical, there are
no major differences regarding judicial issues.
The Constitutions of both Serbia and the FRY
deﬁne the states as democratic states and pro-
vide for the separation of power into legislative,
executive and Judiciary branches of government.
The Judiciary is regulated by the Republic, and it
will remain the same regardless of any future
agreements on the principles of the relationship
between Serbia and Montenegro. The Serbian
Constitution provides that Serbia is established
on the basis of the rule of law. 
The Constitutions cited above were drafted in
1990 (Serbian) and 1992 (FRY). However, both
were largely disregarded during the turmoil that
engulfed the region in the 1990s. Indeed, under
the previous regime, the Judiciary was highly
dependent on executive power, or more precisely
on the personal networks close to Milosevic and
his cronies. The period since the fall of Slobodan
Milosevic’s regime has not been characterized by
comprehensive and radical judicial reform. A new
set of judicial laws has been proposed, but in the
meantime, judicial reform has been conﬁned to
some personnel changes. New laws have come
into force, but time is needed to assess how the
new institutional solutions will function. Since
application of the law depends on the proﬁciency
and moral integrity of the judges and magis-
trates, good personnel are of great importance
for the quality of the Judiciary. For this reason,
the Ministry of Justice launched an initiative to
discharge 69 magistrates. Of this number, 21
judges were dismissed, and it is suggested that
the rest should not be reelected. This was all done
before December 2001, under the old laws, which
permitted the Ministry of Justice to exert inﬂu-
ence on judges.
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37 European Commission 2000 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession, Chapter on Political Criteria and Rule
of Law. http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/ro_en.pdf 
38 US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2000, Romania; February 2001.
http://www.usis.usemb.se/human/2001/europe/romania.html
39 European Commission 2000 Regular Report on Romania’s Progress towards Accession
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_00/pdf/en/ro_en.pdf
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The Serbian Parliament adopted ﬁve new laws to
regulate the Judiciary in November 2001, and
they came into force on January 1, 2002. The ﬁve
laws are: Law on Court Organization, Law on
Judges, High Judiciary Council Law, Public
Prosecutor Law, Law on Placement of the Courts
and Public Prosecutors. The new laws are aimed
at bringing Serbia in accord with some of the
norms and standards of modern European judi-
cial systems. The Law on Judges provides for an
independent Judiciary, lifetime appointments, the
immovability of judges, livable salaries, the right
to form a union, freedom of thought, and a cer-
tain degree of immunity. 
The basic division separates the Judiciary into
general courts and special courts. The general
courts are: Municipal Courts,40 District Courts,41
the Appeals Court42 and the Supreme Court of
Serbia. The special courts include the Trade 
Court,43 the Higher Trade Court,44 and the
Administrative Court.45
The Supreme Court decides the competence of
the courts, controls the courts, deﬁnes uniform
rules for court practice, gives advice on legisla-
tion concerning judicial power, elects judges and
members of the High Judicial Council (HJC),
deﬁnes criteria for assessing the judges’ activities
and performs other duties concerning the
Judiciary. 
The general impression is that the Judiciary in
Serbia would not be independent enough even if
legislation provided for fairness and court inde-
pendence. One of the key questions is how citi-
zens and businesses evaluate the Judiciary.
Surveys carried out by the Center for Liberal-
Democratic Studies (2001)46 demonstrate that citi-
zens have an extremely bad perception of the
Judiciary. Less than thirty percent of the popula-
tion (28.4%) rates the case courts as being just
and unbiased whereas three ﬁfths (60.3%) believe
that this is only rarely or never true. Thus, the cit-
izens of Serbia believe that the courts deny justice
and impartiality, as they, also, deny fairness
(65.8%), speed and efﬁciency (74.3%), accessibili-
ty (57.8%), reliability (67.1%) and the ability to
carry out their own decisions (58.1%). The courts
did even worse in a survey of entrepreneurs, who
were evidently concerned about the court’s prob-
lems settling business disputes fairly. 
The creation of truly independent Judiciary in
Serbia is impeded by a number of factors: courts
have no real inﬂuence on the election of judges
(particularly of the presidents of courts), many
courts do not have presidents but interim presi-
dents, the commercial courts are almost all resist-
ant to change, salaries in the Judiciary are lower
than in legislative and executive branches. These
problems still remain unsolved thus creating
favorable conditions for the continuing attempts
of exercising political pressure over the Judiciary. 
*    *    *
Country review reveals the necessity of further
institutional and organizational strengthening of
the Judiciary in Southeast European countries
and improvement of the judicial systems’ struc-
ture and governance. Achieving judicial inde-
pendence also remains a priority of the reforms
and the anti-corruption efforts. 
5.2. Status of the Magistrates (Indepen-
dence, Appointment, Promotion, and
Removal Procedures). Qualification
and Training 
The progress made towards the creation of an
independent and stable Judiciary in Southeast
European countries depends to a great extent on
the status of magistrates. Some of the most
important provisions in the new laws concerning
judicial systems are related to the problem about
the status of the magistrates, including their
appointment, promotion, immunity, removal pro-
cedures and criteria, as well as protection against
removal and disciplinary proceedings. The profes-
40 Municipal Courts are the courts of ﬁrst instance and try cases involving less serious crimes, including legal and citizens’ dis-
putes and labor and residential issues.
41 The jurisdiction of the District Courts has increased under the new laws. In addition to hearing the appeals of municipal court
verdicts, they now serve as the courts of ﬁrst instance for more serious crimes, such as those involving violence, bribery, com-
mercial law offences, trafﬁcking, deeds against individual rights, criminal offences committed by judges, deeds against nation-
al integrity and sovereignty and so on. 
42 The Appeals Court is an intermediate court based in Belgrade that also hears cases in Kragujevac, Nis and Novi Sad. This court
decides appeals from the municipal and district courts. 
43 The Trade Court assumes the competence of the old Commercial Court and judges disputes between business enterprises or
other economic subjects. 
44 The High Trade Court decides appeals from the Trade Court.
45 The Administrative Court is a new institution created by the Law on Court Organization. Its competence is to settle disputes
that arise within Government institutions. This court is conceived to encompass a wide range of activities, including banking,
ﬁnance, foreign trade, intellectual property, etc. 
46 Center for Liberal-Democratic Studies, Corruption in Serbia. http://www.clds.org.yu/html/e0.html
sional training of magistrates is one of the indis-
putable priorities in the judicial reform so many
efforts should be made to raise the professional
qualiﬁcation of those, working within the system
in the countries of Southeastern Europe.
Details on issues of selection, recruitment,
appointment, career progress or termination of
ofﬁce of a judge, as well as of disciplinary pro-
ceedings against judges in Albania are set out in
the Law on the Organization of the Judiciary, and
in the upcoming Law on the Organization and
Functioning of the High System of Justice. At
present, one can only anticipate the outcome
after these new forms of controls of the Judiciary
are adopted and speculate on how effective the
controls will be in ﬁghting corruption in the
Judiciary. 
However, it must also be noted that inconsisten-
cies between the Constitution and laws that have
already come into force make it difﬁcult to deter-
mine which body actually has which power.
Namely, the Law on the Organization of the Judi-
ciary (Law no. 8436) stipulates that the HCJ nom-
inates judges for the courts of ﬁrst instance and
the courts of appeals (Articles 20 and 24). On the
other hand, the new Constitution stipulates that
the nominations of judges are made by the Pres-
ident of Republic based upon the proposal of the
HCJ. In this case, the hierarchy of norms is clear -
the constitutional text is to prevail. However, the
Parliament passed the
aforementioned Law on
the Organization of the
Judiciary after the new
Constitution came into
force, clearly contra-
dicting it. However,
although the problem is
a very serious legal
issue it still remains
unsolved neither by the
Parliament nor by the
Constitutional Court.  
Improving the level of
legal education is
imperative. It is also
urgent that regulations
ensure that judges have
the requisite specific
judicial knowledge and
qualiﬁcations. With the
establishment of the
magistrates’ school in
1997, the government undertook an important
step in this regard. Although much remains to be
done to upgrade its faculty and curriculum, this
school presently functions as the sole institution
for the education of new judges. The main prob-
lems concern the level of legal education and the
lack of training opportunities.47
An examination of all sitting judges was adminis-
tered by the Organization of Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of
Europe in May 1999. The purpose of the examina-
tion was to weed out judges weak in legal knowl-
edge, so the examination questions were very
basic. Only four judges failed the exam. Several
judges refused to take the exam and as a conse-
quence were dismissed by the Supreme Council
of Justice. 
The School of Magistrates was established to
train judges and thereby combat the Judiciary’s
lack of proﬁciency. The School of Magistrates’
mandate comprises: 
Teaching regular students;
Providing ongoing training for sitting judges
with fewer than ﬁve years of experience; 
Providing ongoing training for court adminis-
trators. 
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47 Currently there are only three law schools in Albania (Tirana, Elbasan and Shkoder). The Law School in Elbasan no longer
enrols students, and will close in two years, so this need is urgent. The Faculty of Law in Tirana is the largest law school in
Albania with 3,300 students. Its environment has improved recently, but it remains fraught with problems.  
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The school is designed to be a two-year program
and is currently attended primarily by recent law
school graduates.
However, the main shortcomings in the imple-
mentation of judicial reform in Albania remain:
The lack of democratic procedures for appoint-
ing, assigning, remunerating and removing
judges and prosecutors, in order to insulate
them from political inﬂuence and pressure;
The insufﬁcient publication and dissemination
of legal information, including judicial deci-
sions, necessary to increase transparency in
the ﬁght against corruption;
The lack of recruitment standards based on
professionalism;
The corruption within the Judiciary.
In BiH the period designated for the judicial
review expired in FBiH at the end 2001 and in the
beginning of 2002 in the RS. The RS agreed to
prolong the review until June 2002, but the FBiH
rejected any extension. Consultations with inter-
national and local agencies also provided infor-
mation on the work of the Judiciary. Both OSCE
and the Ombudsmen’s ofﬁces supplied valuable
material on judges’ and prosecutors’ adherence
to and implementation of the laws.
Only ﬁve incumbents were removed (two more
are pending) and 32 disciplinary procedures were
initiated. Another 30 individuals resigned rather
than face appraisal. (Five of these resignations
were directly attributable to the review process.)
Thirty-three new judges and prosecutors were
appointed, while twenty judges and prosecutors
(in the Federation only) were reappointed when
their mandates expired. The review process,
therefore, resulted in less than a 2.5 per cent rate
of replacement.
This judicial review process does not apply to
appointments to the Constitutional Court of BiH,
the Constitutional Courts of the FBiH and the RS,
the Human Rights Chamber, to judicial and pros-
ecutorial appointments in the Brcko District alto-
gether, nor to the nomination process for
appointments to the Court of BiH.
Following the adoption of the federation Criminal
Code and Criminal Procedure Code in 1998, spe-
cial training on the new legislation was provided
to members of the legal professions, including
the Judiciary, prosecutors and defense lawyers,
as well as police ofﬁcers. In the meantime a series
of specialized study visits, seminars and training
on anti-corruption measures have also been
organized mainly for prosecutors and police ofﬁ-
cers. However, in general, more sustainable train-
ing structures should be established; this could
be one of the tasks of the new Training Institute
for Judges and Prosecutors.48
With regard to the selection and appointment of
magistrates in Bulgaria during 2001 the need for
competition based on detailed criteria deﬁned in
the Law on the Judiciary and overseen by the SJC
gained further support and provisions on such a
procedure are included in the Law on the
Amendments to the Law on the Judiciary. The
Law introduces mandatory competitions for the
selection of junior judges, junior prosecutors and
regional judges, regional prosecutors and investi-
gators.
Regular assessments for each magistrate’s work
were also introduced. Magistrates may be demot-
ed as a result of these assessments. Magistrates
will also be required to undergo an assessment
before acquiring irremovable status. The proce-
dure for such assessments lies within the power
of the Supreme Judicial Council. The objective cri-
teria are clearly deﬁned by the Law, thus reducing
the possibilities for subjective judgments and cor-
ruption to minimum.
With regard to the magistrates’ further training in
the year 2001 the Magistrate Training Center
(MTC)49 continued to function successfully, earn-
ing a deserved reputation as a unique institution
to provide training for already appointed magis-
trates. In the beginning, training programs target-
ed mainly judges, but in 2001 prosecutors, inves-
tigators, civil servants at the Ministry of Justice,
and university lecturers were also included.
Training curricula already includes general cours-
es in European law and the Institutions of the EU
and specialized courses in international co-opera-
tion on criminal cases.
The new amendments to the Law on the Judiciary
envisage the establishment of a National
Academy of Justice as a public institution for pro-
fessional training of magistrates and clerks, and
create a legal framework for magistrate’s qualiﬁ-
48 Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative, Anti-corruption measures in South-eastern Europe - Country reviews and priorities for
reform, Council of Europe, September 2001, p. 76 ,http://book.coe.int/GB/CAT/LIV/HTM/l1780.htm
49 The existing Magistrate Training Center was set up in 1999 as a non-governmental entity and has been a unique institution pro-
viding training for already appointed magistrates. 
cation and its consequences for the magistrate’s
movement in the professional hierarchy.
In Croatia the Judiciary’s independence is safe-
guarded by a number of protections. Judges can
be suspended only for the reasons enumerated in
the Constitution, judicial positions carry lifetime
tenure and judges cannot be transferred against
their will. Judges can be discharged only if per-
manently incapacitated or if sentenced for a crim-
inal offence that makes it impossible for them to
hold a judicial position. The latter case requires a
speciﬁc disciplinary procedure before the State
Judicial Council. A judge must not be a member
of any political party and has to avoid any kind of
political engagement. Law prescribes the salaries
of the judges. All these measures are intended to
secure the autonomy and independence of the
courts.  
The provision granting judges lifetime tenures
has been extended only to judges appointed
since the new Constitution came into effect.
Making lifetime tenure available only to judges
appointed by (and loyal to) the new Government
was a clear message to others to withdraw from
the function. Thus, it is not surprising that in the
years immediately following the passage of the
new Constitution (until 1997) there was an
unprecedented ﬂow of judges to other legal pro-
fessions (mostly to become lawyers and notary
publics). This long period of insecurity had a far-
reaching impact on the quality of the Judiciary
and contributed to the present crisis in the state
justice system. The court system has suffered
from such a severe backlog of cases and shortage
of judges that the right of citizens to address their
concerns in court has been seriously impaired.
Better training and specialization would be bene-
ﬁcial to both the efﬁciency and the quality of the
justice system. Detecting unlawful activities in
certain ﬁelds of business and ﬁnding additional
evidence in support of previously available facts
often requires specialized economic or criminalis-
tic knowledge and expertise. At present, judges
working in the criminal and investigative depart-
ments of the Croatian courts do not specialize in
either economic crimes or any other individual
branch of criminality. The solution is to appoint
specialized law enforcement personnel and spe-
cialized judges – people who know about what
they are ﬁghting against. This would signiﬁcantly
increase the efﬁciency of courts. More important-
ly, judges would be able to properly evaluate the
often complex ﬁnancial and book-keeping reports
of the court experts and other evidence that
requires detailed knowledge of the economic and
business administration issues. Training police
officers and inspection services personnel is
equally important, since they are the ones who
must discover delinquency and uncover it in the
initial phases. To sum up, in order to better com-
bat economic crimes and corruption, specialized
training of all the personnel involved in detection
and enforcement is required. 
Students who want to become judges and state
attorneys begin to prepare for their professional
responsibilities immediately after graduating
from law school. Up until 2000, every Croatian cit-
izen who completed studies at a faculty of law
and passed the state Judiciary exam was eligible
to be appointed as a judge at the municipal or
petty crimes courts. Since 2000, appointment has
required two years of practice after the examina-
tion. For promotion to higher courts, a longer
period spent practicing law (mostly at the ﬁrst-
instance courts) is required.
The judicial and law enforcement authorities are
constrained by the lack of resources. Attracting
qualiﬁed judges is difﬁcult because of low wages.
The judicial system also suffers from a massive
case backlog. Cases involving average citizens
drag on for years, while criminal libel suits or
other cases affecting high-level government ofﬁ-
cials are heard within weeks under “urgent pro-
ceedings.” Salaries have also been increased. The
Law on Judicial Salaries, passed in 1999, raised
the salaries of judges on the lower courts by an
average of about 50% and judges on the Supreme
Court by 200%. Still, courts remain poorly
equipped and the basic equipment they have is
often not properly maintained. For example, it is
not uncommon that judges are forced to use their
own computers or to work at home. The same
applies to other types of ofﬁce supplies and basic
working tools.
Inadequate training, together with low salaries
and poor working conditions, results in an inefﬁ-
cient law enforcement system that is vulnerable
to corruption. Corruption also results from the
lack of effective control over the activities of law
enforcement agents, such as public attorneys,
police ofﬁcers, advocates, states advocates, etc. 
Croatia suffers from a problem common to many
transition countries – a weak Judiciary suffering
from inadequately trained judges and the lack of
procedural reforms aimed at overcoming exces-
sive delays in court cases.
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Judges elected in Macedonia are granted life-
time tenure. They may not be removed against
their will. A judge is dismissed only:
at his/her own request;
if he/she permanently loses the capability to
perform judicial functions, which is deﬁned by
the Republic Judicial Council;
if he/she retires;
if the judge is found guilty of a criminal
offense that entails a minimum incarceration
of 6 months; 
if he/she commits a disciplinary infraction that
makes him/her unsuitable to perform judicial
functions, as deﬁned by the Republic Judicial
Council 
The Republic Judicial Council (RJC) proposes the
election and dismissal of judges to the
Parliament. It also decides the disciplinary
responsibilities of judges, evaluates their compe-
tence and conscience and proposes two judges to
the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional provi-
sions related to the Judiciary are further reﬁned
by the Law on the Republic Judicial Council,
which also provides for the de-politicization of
judges. The RJC bases its proposals on the rec-
ommendations of the applicant’s current col-
leagues as well as from the superior court and the
Supreme Court. RJC bases its proposal for the
election of judges to higher courts on the basis of
an objective evaluation of the experience, profes-
sional competence, skills and ethics of the candi-
date. The RJC proposes an equivalent number of
persons to the number of judges that need to be
elected. When a candidate for judge does not get
the required majority of votes in the Parliament,
the RJC nominates a new candidate. If the RJC
does not support the nomination of any of the
proposed candidates, it must inform the
Parliament, which then shall announce again the
need for election of a judge to the respective
court. The RJC proposes dismissal of judges
when certain conditions are fulﬁlled. Aside from
the RJC, judicial evaluations of incompetence
may also be addressed by the president of the
court, the president of the superior court and by a
plenary session of the Supreme Court. For this
reason, the RJC has adopted rules of operations.
The RJC has also adopted general criteria for the
election and dismissal of judges. 
According to the Law on the Judiciary, judges are
obliged to have professional training. However,
no state system for the education and training of
judges currently exists in Macedonia. For this rea-
son, the Center for Continuing Education (CCE)
was formed by the Macedonian Judges
Association with the aim of establishing a perma-
nent educational institution for judges. The Center
educates the judges by creating annual programs
in order to educate judges from the Basic courts,
the Appeals courts and from the Supreme Court.
The educational program is administered by
respectable lawyers, primarily judges from the
Appeals courts and the Supreme Court. It is also
necessary to establish regular and effective anti-
corruption training programs for prosecutors, the
police, the Judiciary and ﬁnancial intelligence
ofﬁcers.50
Romanian legislation provides for a number of
legal guarantees aimed at maintaining the impar-
tiality and independence of individual judges. The
1991 Constitution states that the position of a
judge shall be incompatible with any other public
or private ofﬁce, except for academic teaching
activities. In addition, the Law on the Judiciary
prohibits magistrates from acquiring member-
ship in political parties and engaging in public
political activities. Consequently, judges may not
attend political meetings and they are not
allowed to write political articles or be involved in
any political debates. Judges are allowed to write
articles in legal, literary, academic, or social jour-
nals and take part in broadcasting programs
except where the context is political. 
Judges are not allowed to perform, by them-
selves or through agents, commercial activities,
or be active in the leadership and management of
trading companies, civil partnerships or
autonomous economic administrations.
Consequently, judges may not engage in entre-
preneurial activities. However, some believe that
judges have the right to acquire shares and other
securities, and to become stockholders, but only
at levels below that of a controlling share.
In accordance with the law, judges must submit
statements on their assets at the beginning and
the end of the term they serve. In practice, how-
ever, their statements are never veriﬁed, neither
at the beginning of the term, nor at the end. While
at present such statements are conﬁdential, some
believe that judges’ ownership statements as
well as those of the parliamentarians and other
ofﬁcials should be made public. The law regulates
judges’ conduct in cases of conﬂict of interests in
order to ensure their impartiality in individual
cases. Judges either disclose the conﬂict refrain-
ing from the case or risk that the parties disclose
50 Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative, Anti-corruption measures in South-eastern Europe - Country reviews and priorities for
reform, Council of Europe, September 2001, p. 122, http://book.coe.int/GB/CAT/LIV/HTM/l1780.htm
it and require them to step down. In addition,
judges are not allowed to give legal advice, oral-
ly or in writing, even in cases pending before
other courts. They must also refrain from publicly
expressing their views on lawsuits that are pend-
ing.
Judges may set up professional associations or
other organizations for representing their inter-
ests, improve their professional skills and protect
their status. They may also join international pro-
fessional organizations. However, judges are not
entitled to form or join trade unions. At present,
there are two associations, neither strong enough
to represent judges’ interest before the other
branches of power. The Association of the
Romanian Magistrates includes judges, prosecu-
tors and civil servants of the Ministry of Justice.
Although judges’ interests are not similar to
those of prosecutors and other ofﬁcials, some
continue to place them on equal foot. The
Association of the Romanian Magistrates has
been quite active, but not necessarily successful,
in defending the ﬁnancial interests of its mem-
bers. Another organization is the Union of
Judges’ Association, formed exclusively of
judges. It claims that half of the existing judges
are its members. However, the Union mainly
focuses on professional training, and it has not
been a voice defending judges’ rights and inde-
pendence. Apparently, the two associations com-
pete for representativness. None of them had
reacted publicly against the recent political inter-
ference with the Judiciary independence.
Although there are some legal guarantees for
judges’ individual independence and impartiality,
the institutional guarantees are not satisfactory.
In addition, some high ofﬁcials have failed to sup-
port judicial independence and the Governing
Program for the next four years is ambiguous in
this respect, mixing up the needs of independ-
ence and controlling. While at present judges are
irremovable, some high ofﬁcials have recently
placed this status into questions. Both the
Minister of Justice and the President publicly
expressed doubts with regard to judges’ irremov-
ability. At the same time, judges’ associations are
week and have failed to represent judges’ inter-
ests, rights and independence against the other
branches of power. 
Judges’ disciplinary liability51 falls under the juris-
diction of the Minister of Justice, the Superior
Council of Magistracy and the Supreme Court,
each playing different roles. The Minister of
Justice fulﬁls the role of the disciplinary prosecu-
tor, except in cases concerning the justices of the
Supreme Court, where the disciplinary action
may only be initiated by the Deputy Chief Justice.
Prior to Minister’s decision, an inquiry takes
place. The inquiry commission is formed by
judges or by general inspectors of the Ministry of
Justice following the Minister’s order.52
In Serbia a new institution called the Great
Personnel Council (GPC) was created to handle
disciplinary procedures. The GPC is composed of
9 judges from the Supreme Court. The President
of the Supreme Court, who cannot be a member
of the GPC because of potential conﬂicts of inter-
est, initiates dismissal procedures and the GPC
decides the cases on their merits. The Presidents
of the lower courts may also propose dismissal
proceedings against members of their courts. 
The GPC must follow clear criteria and proce-
dures for dismissals. Judges may be dismissed
only for one of the following reasons: they are
sentenced to six months or more in prison, con-
victed of a crime that makes it inappropriate for
them to be a judge, guilty of the nonperformance
or unreliable performance of judicial duties, per-
manently lose the ability to carry out judicial
duties, delay the process or act against the rules
of the judicial system, or perform other jobs that
conﬂict with judicial duties. Dismissed judges
may appeal their discharge to the Constitutional
Court. 
*    *    *
Achieving the stability of the institutions that
guarantee the supremacy of law is impossible
without an independent Judiciary consisting of
independent, objective, highly qualiﬁed magis-
trates possessing impeccable moral standards.
The independence of the Judiciary is a major
democratic achievement. It should not be regard-
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51 The grounds for disciplinary proceedings are: frequent delay in the paper work; unjustiﬁed absence from work; interference
with the activity of another judge or persuasion for unlawfully solving personal or family demands; offensive attitude in the
ofﬁce; violation of the deciding process or of other conﬁdential activity or document; public political activities; activities affect-
ing the professional integrity and honour; unjustiﬁed denial of fulﬁlling the duties; violation of the taxation rules; repeated vio-
lations of the celerity requirements; repeated work negligence; violation of rules of judges’ incompatibilities; major misbe-
haviour breaking the rules set forth in the Code of Ethics. 
52 When a judge is found guilty, the Council can apply one of the following disciplinary sanctions: warning; admonition; reduc-
tion of the basic salary up to 15 percent, for a period of one to three months; transfer for a period of one to three months to
another court; suspension from ofﬁce for a maximum of 6 months without pay; dismissal from a leading position; or expul-
sion from the magistracy
ed as a privilege of the magistrates but as a guar-
antee for establishing order and the rule of law in
the states and for a fully-ﬂedged protection of cit-
izens’ rights. Judicial independence is also an
important precondition for preventing internal
corruption as well as combating corruption in the
society.
5.3. Judicial Administration – Legal Basis,
Status and Organization
The professional competence of magistrates is an
essential, though insufﬁcient, prerequisite for the
efficient operation of the Judiciary. Equally
important is the good organization of their work,
generally denoted as “court administration.”
Administrative staff working in the courts as well
as in other units of the Judiciary is responsible for
the performance of all non-judicial tasks neces-
sary to process cases through the system. The
level of efﬁciency with which administrative staff
performs has a profound impact on the adminis-
tration of justice. The want of qualiﬁed adminis-
trative staff deteriorates the quality of the admin-
istration of justice and the public assessment of
the work of the Judiciary. Any improvement of
the work of that staff would certainly beneﬁt the
operation of the whole system. Addressing the
needs of administrative staff for continuing pro-
fessional education and acknowledging their role
in improving the operations of the courts is there-
fore essential to improving the judicial system.
However, according to the public opinion, corrup-
tion in the sphere of court administration seems
to be widely spread. 
The Western concept of judicial administration is
not really known in Albania. The Chief Judge is
responsible for assigning cases randomly.
Judges have secretaries who record hearings and
type the decisions. Many judges, particularly at
the Tirana District Court, complain that their sec-
retaries and clerks are unprofessional.
The few people who serve as court administra-
tors do not have a clear understanding of their
role in a judicial system. This means that most
Albanian judges serve as both judges and court
administrators, leaving them with little time to
focus on their caseloads. 
Moreover there is no clear deﬁnition of the term
“court administrator” which often results in its
very broad interpretation. Thus for instance court
administrators are the court messengers, the
security personnel/police, the court secretaries,
the chief secretaries/chancellors, the archive per-
sonnel, the budget staff, the execution ofﬁce staff,
and the company register staff.
There is a great need to train court administrators
to perform tasks that they do not presently per-
form. Training programs teach employees how to
assist with monitoring the workﬂow and budget,
manage cases and assist in managing the dock-
ets, develop an annual court budget, manage
other court employees, such as secretaries and
ﬁlling clerks, ensure that decisions and other
orders are disseminated to the right parties, col-
lect ﬁling fees, compile and compute statistics,
assign cases, and develop courtroom procedures.
However, Albania still lacks the necessary institu-
tional and regulatory prerequisites for the estab-
lishment of an anti-
corruption environ-
ment in the area of
court administration.
Some basic training
has been organized for
the supportive staff in
BiH primarily in the
use of information
technology, which is
n o n - s p e c i a l i z e d .
Several tests are being
taken by the staff upon
hiring, to ensure their
general judicial knowl-
edge and the basic
understanding of the
system, but there is lit-
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tle training preparatory work, let alone any fol-
low-ups.
There was notable progress on several priorities
of the reform in the ﬁeld of court administration
during 2001 in Bulgaria.
The newly created automated system for case
management throughout the entire Judicial sys-
tem was presented at the ﬁrst annual assembly of
the Bulgarian Court Clerks’ Association in
November 2001 and is expected to begin func-
tioning soon. However there is still no adequate
regulation of the court administration, including
the rights and obligations of the different cate-
gories of the court administration staff as well as
the position of a court administrator. Court
administrators’ positions have already been cre-
ated within the Supreme Court of Cassation, the
Supreme Administrative Court and the Attorney
General’s Ofﬁce. In addition to the amendments
to the Law on the Judiciary the respective sec-
ondary legislation is necessary to be adopted in
order to overcome the inefficiency of court
administration (poor procedures for case man-
agement, lack of central coordination of manage-
ment practices, etc.).
In Macedonia the president of the court is
responsible for managing the judicial administra-
tion, organizing the work of the judicial adminis-
tration and undertaking measures to perform the
Judiciary’s activities in a timely and orderly fash-
ion. The president also implements the judicial
rules of procedure, which regulate the internal
functioning of the courts. The courts, in which the
number of judges exceeds seven, have a secre-
tary. The secretary’s job is to help the president
perform the duties of judicial administration. The
laws to ensure that the Judiciary gets adequate
funding and that the judges and their staffs are
properly compensated are necessary. 
In Romania the judicial administration consists
of independent judicial counselors, judicial coun-
selors, beginning judicial employees and other
clerks who perform administrative, technical and
other activities, depending on the scope of the
activities and the needs of Judiciary. It also
includes persons responsible for the security of
the courts, premises, property and persons. The
judicial police have the task of keeping order in
the court.
Cases are assigned to judges by court presidents.
The assignment process is not transparent. The
assignment of a case to a particular judge may be
a deciding factor in the outcome of a trial. For
example, in cases involving the nationalized
property, the practice proved that most judges
have strong personal opinions on the matter – as
to return it or not to the former owners – and
therefore the assignment becomes decisive for
the judicial outcome. The law does not provide for
criteria in cases assignment, leaving the court
presidents with a wide discretion. Corruption had
also been connected with the assignment
process. A World Bank survey found that one of
the most cited reasons for bribery was “to assure
that a certain person would be assigned to the
case.” There have been some attempts to develop
formal rules for case assignment to judges, but
software for distribution of cases has not been
introduced. 
The rules on tracking the case ﬁles have not been
modiﬁed in the recent years and reveal a number
of shortcomings: limited identiﬁcation of the indi-
vidual judge, clerk or other administrative staff
working on a particular case ﬁle; uncontrolled
access to the case ﬁles by members of the reg-
istry or other administrative staff as well as by the
court’s presidents or vice-presidents; insufﬁcient
control over the handing of case ﬁles leaving
open the possibility of documents’ disappearance
without any chance of identifying the moment or
the responsible person. Although there is a judge
in charge with the supervision of the court’s reg-
istry in each court, permanent and effective con-
trol is still inadequate. 
Following a veriﬁcation of the registry and notiﬁ-
cation ofﬁces of some of the lower courts, the
Ministry of Justice issued a press release in June
2000, noting the large number of malfunctions in
the process of tracking the case ﬁles. Some staff
members were dismissed while others received
disciplinary sanctions. 
In addition, it is common knowledge that many of
the staff in the registry and judicial clerks are
involved in petty corruption on a daily basis.
When asking for information or case ﬁles, the par-
ties or their lawyers bribe the staff. As this has
become a notorious practice, the bribe is often
offered automatically.
*    *    *
To reduce everyday (“petty”) corruption in the
interaction between the court administrative staff
and the citizens a new approach to adminis-
tration in the courts must be adopted,
including a system of management of the court’s
records, human resources, distribution of cases
among judges and their progress through the
courts, automation, and a database for judges.
Also, additional institutional capacity of the inde-
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pendent governing bodies, including setting up a
National Coordination Offices for the Court
Administration, has to be built, and a Code of
Ethics for the Administration of the Judicial sys-
tem needs to be prepared. All of these measures
should lead to the creation of clear, transparent
and logical rules, which will facilitate fair admin-
istration of justice and prevent opportunities for
corrupt practices to arise.
5.4. Working Conditions, including 
Modernization and Computerization
A very important issue as regards to judicial
reform in all Southeast European countries is the
problem with the poor working conditions and
the inadequate or completely missing technical
equipment in the courts. Although of great signif-
icance, this issue was until recently unreasonably
ignored by most of the countries.
However, efﬁcient distribution and maintenance
of electronic data within courts, between courts,
and between courts and other actors inside the
government and legal community is a necessary
component of improving judicial administration,
as well as improving the condition and utilization
of the physical space in courts for the conven-
ience of employees and the public. Facilitating
the communication between the staff and the cit-
izens and allowing more rapidity and transparen-
cy in the work of the court administration, would
play an important role in curbing corruption. This
cannot be done without the introduction of mod-
ern information technology.
The poor working environment is a major con-
cern of the judges in Albania. Buildings are not
adequate, and there are not enough telephone
lines, computers, etc. When improvements are
made, judges are often not consulted. For exam-
ple, the Tirana District Court judges did not know
about plans to build a new court and they were
not given a voice in planning the new building to
accommodate their practical needs. 
Security is also a major concern of the courts. The
judges have requested that non-police security
guards be placed in the courts. They complain
that the police have no respect for the Judiciary
and will only take instructions from the Ministry
of Public Order. 
Meanwhile, many judges think that the govern-
ment has been trying to shift the blame for law-
lessness to the Judiciary. The poor conditions of
the courts, insufﬁcient support at all levels and an
overall lack of respect for the Judiciary are ongo-
ing problems. For instance, the Attorney General
of Albania has assented some publicly accused
high government ofﬁcials, including three minis-
ters, for corruption, ﬁnancial abuses and other
major economic crimes. He declared that no
investigation will be conducted since his ofﬁce
did not have the means, the necessary staff and
the ability to conduct such an investigation. 
Finally, two years ago, the government accepted
the appeal of the Tirana District Court Chief
Judges and put a special police force at their dis-
posal that was under direct authority of the Chief
Judges themselves. This was a good precedent
and it has improved the situation. 
The courts have very few computers and little, if
any, practical experience in using them.
Approximately 270 computers were bought by
the government and given to the courts. The gov-
ernment was not able to fund training classes in
computer skills for the court administrators.
However, the USAID Judicial Training and
Strengthening Project (East-West Management
Institute) stepped in and provided the necessary
training. Computerization is essential to improve
the efﬁciency of operations in the administrative
ofﬁces that support the Albanian Courts.
Some degree of modernization and IT has pene-
trated the courts in BiH, but virtually none in RS.
There the courts still operate on typewriters with
no databases other than the large registers and
ﬁle folders.
A large sum of donor money is now scheduled to
enter the court system through various judicial
reform sub-projects. One such case is the register
of enterprises and the register of pledges which
will both be run and maintained by the canton-
al/regional courts and will consist of an integrat-
ed public database that will be harmonized across
the Entity lines and in Brcko. This should provide
the commercial sections of the courts (perhaps to
become separate commercial courts in the future)
with the brand new equipment and the related
training, not only in IT, but also in the application
of the new laws to govern this area, as well as the
procedures in processing the matter and other
technicalities of the process.
There are also plans to modernize other parts of
the courts and such efforts will be streamlined
and coordinated by the IJC in collaboration with
the Ministries of Justice and the Entity budgets
and the HJCs throughout the country.
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In Bulgaria the administrative staff within the
judicial system works in a primitive environment.
The level of modernization of the working envi-
ronment and the conditions of work are still com-
paratively low. For instance numerous registries
are kept mainly by hand, causing great difﬁculties
to citizens and attorneys alike when they are mak-
ing inquiries. There are also unsolved problems
as regards to court buildings.
The following measures could be pointed out as
marking some progress in the ﬁeld of court
administration. Reforms were made in the admin-
istration of 11 pilot model courts, including:
More than 400 judges and court administra-
tion servants underwent judicial administra-
tion training.
Office re-organization aiming at “one-stop
shop” system was initiated.
More than 400 PCs and other equipment were
installed.
An automated system for case management
was created, developed especially for
Bulgarian courts. 
The working conditions are absolutely inade-
quate for the needs of the Judiciary in Croatia.
Problem areas include the rooms, tools, commu-
nications equipment, computers, and registers.
Only in the commercial courts is the digitization
of information routine. In all other courts, old-
fashioned machines continue to predominate. In
contrast, it is not rare for judges and administra-
tive staff to have their own private computers at
home. The poor status of the facilities and
resources includes other paradoxes. For the sake
of cost reduction, the Supreme Court was not
able to purchase works discussing the independ-
ence of the Judiciary. Simultaneously, however,
huge renovations of many court buildings were
being carried out, including renovations involving
the Supreme Court’s own building. 
In Macedonia the Judiciary is making huge
efforts to modernize its administration and
upgrade its facilities. A committee has recently
been established to digitize the workings of the
Supreme Court, including creating computer pro-
grams for the ﬁrst level procedure, the second
level procedure and the judicial practice of the
Supreme Court. The process should be completed
soon. It is anticipated that the incorporation of
these programs will improve the general environ-
ment of the Judiciary as well as assist the judicial
staff in performing their functions. Other invest-
ments include constructing new buildings and
modernizing current buildings and premises. 
Courts in Romania suffer profoundly from under-
investment, due to the limits of the state budget
resources in general, and to the courts’ small
budget in particular. It is interesting to note that
the budget for the Judiciary has constantly been
lower than the budget for police, armed forces or
secret services. The quality of the courts’ activity
is clearly inﬂuenced by the low level of ﬁnancial
resources. The small number of staff, the lack of
electronic registration of the archives and court
hearings, the poor conditions for studying case
ﬁles contribute to the low quality of services.
District courts, in particular, face permanent
resource shortages.
Judges endure rather difﬁcult working condi-
tions. Many of the courts’ buildings are inappro-
priate, in particular in Bucharest. The equipment
is old, the archives and hearing rooms are small
and overcrowded, in particular in the district
courts which hear the large majority of cases. In
many of the district courts in Bucharest 4-6 judges
share an ofﬁce. There are no legal requirements
on ofﬁce space or standard technology. Court
presidents are left to deal with these problems,
although many of the tools needed to resolve
them are out of their hands. 
Court hearings take place in rather precarious
conditions. They are not registered by electronic
means. In practice, judges dictate the clerks sum-
maries of what the witnesses, defendants or oth-
ers say in the court, and the clerks write these
down by hand or by using old manual typewrit-
ers. Quite often, the clerks’ written reports differ
from what the judges have said, due to the low
judicial knowledge and training of the clerks.
Obviously, the lack of full registration of the
courts’ hearings as well as of the electronic regis-
tration and distribution of the case ﬁles has a
strong negative impact upon the way justice is
done. 
Courts receive legal journals and the Ofﬁcial
Gazette, together with printed collections of laws.
However, many courts receive a reduced number
of copies, and therefore a large number of judges
do not get free individual copies. The legal mate-
rials, including the Ofﬁcial Gazette are usually
kept by the courts’ presidents. Digests of case law
are not freely available to most of the judges.
Under these circumstances, many judges have to
pay for copying or buying the legal materials. All
114
these constraints and limitations might constitute
entry points for corruption in courts.
*    *    *
Achieving legal stability and conﬁdence in the
Judiciary, providing conditions for greater efﬁ-
ciency, quality and transparency in the adminis-
tration of justice, creating internal control mecha-
nisms to combat abuse of power and corruption
within the Judiciary and creating a system for
improving the professional qualiﬁcations of mag-
istrates remain the major issues on the agenda of
judicial reform in the countries in Southeastern
Europe.
The necessity of counteraction against corruption
not only by the administration of justice but also
by high morality evokes the need of preparation
and implementation of the codes of ethics for
magistrates, and rules of ethics and standards of
conduct for court administration employees. In
most countries of the region such either do not
exist or their implementation is very limited. It is
very important that moral rules of conduct are
adopted and internal check-up and control mech-
anisms set up, disciplinary procedures for non-
compliance with the law and the rules of ethics
improved in order to raise the reputation of the
Judiciary and to create among the magistrates an
atmosphere of intolerance to any conduct dam-
aging the reputation of the profession.
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In modern times the Balkans have been always
the least economically developed region of
Europe. Even the accelerated industrialization of
some of the countries from the region, after the
end of World War II, did not help overcome the
gap between those countries and the more devel-
oped Western European states. The investment
decisions were not based exclusively on their
economic advantages, but were also politically
motivated in the context of the rivalry between
the two blocks. When eventually the economies of
those countries had to face the competition of the
world markets, most of their ﬁxed assets turned
out to be non-viable. Given the new market con-
ditions, their value was signiﬁcantly decreased.
For those countries, the last decade of the 20th
century was a period of economic degradation. 
The process of disintegration of former
Yugoslavia, ridden with conﬂicts and violence,
maintains the instability and unpredictability of
the region. The establishment and consolidation
of new states, the issues of national security and
minority problems are distracting the attention of
governments and social structures from the eco-
nomic aspects of the reforms. Many of the coun-
tries from the region are too engaged in building
new political systems, solving constitutional, eth-
nic, legal and many other problems. Thus, there
are little political, legal and institutional condi-
tions for launching a market-oriented economic
activity, particularly as the predominant stereo-
types of economic development in South-Eastern
Europe are ones of a state-dominated economy. 
All these conditions appear to be a very fertile
ground for corruption and it became one of the
striking features of the transformation in the
Southeast Europe. The widespread corruption was
enhanced by the state collapse, the rotation of
elites and the widespread failure to introduce and
enforce appropriate legal and cultural norms.53
6.1 Privatization And Post-Privatization
Control
Over the past decade, the pace of privatization in
the South-east European transition economies
had clearly lagged behind that in the “early
reformers” from central Europe, suffering from
basic difﬁculties and repeated delays due to a lack
of commitment, inconsistent policy measures,
complicated legislation and administrative deﬁ-
ciencies. While the late 1990s and early 2000s wit-
nessed a general acceleration in the process
across the region, as well as considerable
improvements in the procedures and their imple-
mentation, many problems still remained espe-
cially with respect to
the transparency of the
transactions, the appli-
cation of selection crite-
ria and the post-privati-
zation control. The insti-
tutions in charge of pri-
vatization have been
typically granted large
discretionary power
that is generally seen as
a hotbed of corruption.
Moreover, the adminis-
trative capacities of the
privatizing agencies
appeared overall weak
and these institutions
have practically
remained under rather
strong political influ-
ence despite their nom-
inal independence. The
VI. CORRUPTION IN THE ECONOMY
53 Economic Survey of Europe, 2000 No.2/3, Economic Commission for Europe, UN, Geneva, 2000, p. 134.
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prevention of potential conﬂicts of interest, insid-
er favoring and corrupt behavior proved also a
particularly challenging task in the context of the
existing legal loopholes and the preferential use
of some privatization techniques. Therefore, it
was not strange to see that the transfer of state-
owned assets into private hands has been accom-
panied by growing public discontent over the out-
comes of privatization and allegedly widespread
corruption.
6.1.1. The process of privatization in South-east
Europe: legal frameworks and current
progress
During much of the 1990s, the privatization
process in South-east European transition coun-
tries had been rather slow and hesitant, with the
region’s economies trailing well behind the more
advanced reformers from central Europe in the
pursuit of their ambitious strategies. While most
of the former countries had made a relatively
quick progress in transferring the ownership of
small- and medium-sized enterprises, large-scale
privatization had been considerably delayed due
mainly to political constraints and controversies,
as well as low incentives on the part of insiders.
The overall slow pace of economic reforms and
the gradualist approach towards the sell-off of
state assets created fertile ground for rent-seek-
ing behavior. In the second half of the 1990s,
however, there was a marked pick up in large-
scale sales that contributed to the notable accel-
eration of the whole process. This strengthening
momentum reﬂected important policy changes
and a general diversiﬁcation of the employed pri-
vatization schemes and methods. In line with the
shifts in the policy of divestiture the basic laws
governing the privatization process have been
amended rather frequently, although the effect of
the legal changes fell apparently short of expecta-
tions with respect to reducing the risks of corrup-
tion.
Yet, the signiﬁcant strides in privatization during
the latter half of the 1990s played a key role in the
restructuring of the South-east European transi-
tion economies, with the private sector gaining a
dominant position in overall output. The wide-
ranging reforms undertaken in Albania since the
fall of the communist regime have totally re-
shaped the national economy. The process of pri-
vatization has been going on in the country for 10
years on end and at present approximately 80%
of Albania’s GDP is generated by the private sec-
tor. The Privatization Law of 1991 paved the way
for the rapid privatization of small-sized entities
employing up to 10 people. That was the ﬁrst step
forward in terms of changing the ownership
structure of the then public property followed by
the adoption in mid-1990s of a voucher scheme. A
Mass Privatization Program was launched in
September 1995 with a view to privatizing all
small and medium-sized state-owned enterprises.
By now, almost all of them are already privately
owned and even some strategic state-owned
companies are about to be privatized soon.
Since 2000 there has been considerable progress
in the ﬁeld of liberalization and privatization in
both entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).
Despite the intensified efforts, however, the
process of large-scale privatization is only at the
beginning. Consequently, many of the larger
companies are still state-owned (almost all of the
top 100 companies in terms of net capital book
value and the number of employees are owned
by the state), although the number of small- and
medium-sized private enterprises appears sub-
stantial. The process of mass privatization is also
well under way, with the registration of people for
vouchers and their distribution and investment
being already completed. In addition, a number
of bidding procedures for the privatization of
enterprises with the capital value below and
above 300,000 KM (approximately 150,000 EUR)
have been carried out in the Republika Srpska
(RS), as well in the Moslem-Croat Federation
(FBiH). Yet, the privatization process could hardly
be described as being fast. The primary reason for
this seems to be the size and unattractiveness of
the BiH market for investment, and not so much
the unwillingness to privatize. Besides, there
were a number of forced delays and frauds in the
privatization process that caused some pullouts
and revisions of the privatization status, resulting
in an even lesser interest in the purchase of exist-
ing enterprises. Finally, the model that was to
offer as much participation, transparency and
equality to all citizens proved to be rather com-
plex, slow, expensive and painstaking. However,
any additional review of the model itself (having
undergone some two to three crucial structural
adjustments in the last decade) would prove to be
even more costly.
For the whole period since the start of 1993 up to
end-January 2002, a total of 4,789 privatization
deals have been concluded in Bulgaria. A report-
ed 52.64% of all state assets have been already
privatized, representing more than 80% of the
assets slated for privatization. Meanwhile, the
share of the private sector rose to 71.7% of total
value added in 2001, up some two points from the
previous year. The basic Law on Transformation of
State and Municipal Enterprises was passed in
April 1992 and has been amended many times
afterwards. The initial legal framework provided
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for a wide range of cash privatization methods,
although a 1995 major amendment in the original
law allowed for a mass privatization program to
be launched in 1996 based on a voucher-type
scheme close to the Czech model. Further impor-
tant amendments were made in 1997 and 1998 in
order to accelerate privatization by offering
greater ﬂexibility with regard to the employed
multiple methods. In early 2002, a new Law of
Privatization and Post-privatization Control has
been adopted that includes, among others, sever-
al provisions aimed at the prevention of corrup-
tion and increasing the transparency of the
process. The major goal was, however, to stream-
line the procedures with a view to rapidly com-
pleting the remaining large-scale deals and
paving the way for the second-round privatization
in network industries. 
In  2000, around 60% of Croatia’s GDP was pro-
duced in the private sector. At least three institu-
tional and legislative framework factors proved to
be decisive in the process of privatization in the
Croatia. The ﬁrst is the concept of privatization
chosen, which resulted in the Law on Ownership
Transformation of Socially Owned Property
(1991). It was mainly based on methods of selling,
on a case-by-case principle with preferential treat-
ment for former and current employees. The fre-
quent changes and amendments of the original
text put, however, the new owners in an unequal
position, produced feelings of legal insecurity
and created favourable conditions for many
forms of “grey economy” activities. The original
Law of 1991 had six amendments, with the major-
ity of them being aimed at the protection of small
shareholders in the privatization process. Their
participation was extremely important for the
government, seeking to ensure broad public sup-
port for privatization as the process had lost a
great deal of its vitality and strength during the
ﬁrst two years of implementation. The pace of pri-
vatization remained, however, rather slow and
tainted by insider favoring, lack of transparency
surrounding some transactions with privileged
individuals (tycoons) well-connected to the politi-
cal elite, as well as increasing reports of alleged
corruption that raised the concerns of potential
investors. The concentration of decision-making
in the privatization agency and the existence of
many legal lacunae with respect to important
practical issues contributed also to the rise of
irregularities during the privatization process of
the 1990s. Thus, the latter was widely perceived
as conductive to the expansion of the informal
economy and corrupt practices.
The privatization process in Macedonia started
by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the
1990s. During this period, a number of companies
went through transformation of ownership,
according to so-called “Markovic Law”.  The priva-
tization was mainly based on the method of sell-
ing to the managing board and employees in the
respective companies. There were several posi-
tive examples of companies privatized under this
law that succeeded in increasing investment,
broadening the ﬁeld of business activities, keep-
ing all employees and improving the company’s
efﬁciency in general. In 1993, Macedonia adopted
a new Law on Privatization and Restructuring of
the Enterprises with Social Capital which has
been amended and supplemented several times.
A special Law for the privatization of agriculture
companies (kombinats) was also passed.
According to most analysts, however, the privati-
zation process in Macedonia has been rather slow
and hesitant. Moreover, during the last three
years the government has privatized many com-
panies practically for its own interest, creating the
so-called “false privatization”. Yet, according to the
Privatization Agency, the sell-off process is near
completion. In the past decade, a total of 1,678
companies have been privatized and there
remain approximately 89 companies scheduled
for privatization via public tender. The number of
minority shares packages that remain to be sold
is, however, very large. There are currently about
390 such packages with a total nominal value of
EUR 400 million and it will likely take between
three to ﬁve years for this process to be complet-
ed if its recent pace is further maintained.
The government of Romania has recently also
made an important step towards addressing
some of the existing problems in the employed
privatization techniques by passing a Law for the
Speeding Up of Privatization in March 2002. This
so-called “law for 1-Euro selling” admits that pri-
vatization of state-owned companies on compli-
cated contracts, with many investment promises
and social strings attached, proved to be detri-
mental, since such contracts are hard to monitor
and enforce. Instead, the open tenders will be
preferred with the contract awarded to the high-
est bidder. Several hotels and other small compa-
nies have already been sold for cash, but analysts
still wait to see an important privatization deal
taking place under the new law.
In contrast to the rest of the South-east European
transition economies, the process of privatization
in Serbia had been delayed during the whole of
the past decade. Three attempts had been made
under the former regime to transform social- and
state-owned property into private ownership
along the lines of the following laws: the Law on
Social Capital (1989), the Law on Conditions and
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Process of Transforming Social Property into the
Other Forms of Property (1991), and the Law on
Property Transformation (1997). The dominant
method of privatization was the so-called “wild
privatization”, referring to the transfer of social
property into private hands in a murky way. Such
transfers were not necessarily illegal, but were
inevitably accompanied by corruption. Although
the pace of privatization accelerated during the
period of hyperinﬂation, the subsequent amend-
ments in the Law of 1991, as well as the Code on
Revalorization put the whole process to the very
beginning by annulling all the privatization trans-
actions that were closed at the time of the inﬂa-
tion hikes. Following these acts of annulling the
hitherto privatization deals, the share of the pri-
vatized capital was reduced to only 3% in 1994.
Until the change of regime in October 2000, only
400 enterprises, or 5% of all social-owned com-
panies, had stepped in the process of privatiza-
tion under the Law of 1997. Since the political
changes of October 2000 the process of privatiza-
tion has accelerated for a number of reasons,
ranging from new incentives for managers of
socially-owned enterprises up to the possibility to
gain a greater share of free of charge capital after
the ofﬁcial exchange rate came on par with the
market one. However, until the suspension of pri-
vatization under the Law on Property
Transformation, a modest total of 800 enterpris-
es, or slightly more than 10% of all enterprises
subject to privatization, have been privatized.
Thus, it may be concluded that legal privatization
had virtually stalled until the new Law on privati-
zation was adopted by the People’s Assembly of
Serbia in June 2001. Adding to the legal frame-
work of the privatization process are also the Law
on the privatization agency and the Law on the
share fund, as well as three government decrees
that refer to the methodology for valuation of
capital and property and their sale through public
auction and tender. The new model of privatiza-
tion has two main features: ﬁrst, the dominant
method is sale, and second, the government
granted itself signiﬁcant discretionary power in
order to play the main role in the privatization
process. 
After the ten years of practical stagnation, the
process of privatization in Serbia could be accel-
erated under the new law. There are currently
7,500 socially-owned enterprises. Larger enter-
prises (about 150-200 of total) will be sold
through public tender, while the remainder will
be privatized through public auction. The ﬁrst ten-
ders were organized in December 2001 when
three cement factories were sold to foreign
investors. Privatization through auctions has
began only recently, with the ﬁrst auction being
held on March 22 when three out of nine enter-
prises offered were successfully sold. The recent
experience showed that the privatization process
under the new law has been fairly smooth and
transparent until now. Public concern has been
raised only once on the occasion of the privatiza-
tion of the cement factory BFC Beocin as the gov-
ernment tried to sell the enterprise by a mutual
agreement with the purchaser, instead of organiz-
ing a public tender. As a result of huge public
pressure, however, a tender was ﬁnally organ-
ized, with the pre-selected buyer actually winning
the tender.
6.1.2. The institutions in charge of privatization
In Albania, the National Agency of Privatization
(NAP) is the main government institution respon-
sible for the implementation of the Privatization
Law and the organization of the prescribed pro-
cedures. It is also supposed to be a sort of regis-
ter containing detailed information on privatiza-
tion deals. The Agency has its own branches all
over the country. While the Ministry of Public
Economy and Privatization prepares the whole
package of privatization, the Agency is the execu-
tive institution of the bidding procedure. The
Agency reports every month at the Council of
Ministers and at the Anti-Corruption Commission
about its work. Throughout the transition period
the Agency has been allegedly involved in politi-
cally biased and corrupt privatization deals in sev-
eral cases. However, while the media has been
especially aggressive when it comes to denounc-
ing suspicious deals during the privatization
process, there has been not a single accusation of
corruption from either the High State Control or
the General Prosecutor for the period 1999-2000.
The Agency for Privatization is in charge of the
process in the Moslem-Croat Federation of BiH
with ofﬁces in each of the ten Cantons that con-
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Corrupt privatization
According to results of Transparency Interna-
tional BiH survey, 79.4 percent of respondents
think that corruption exists in privatization
process. 37.4 percent of respondents mark the
privatization process as mostly unsuccessful,
and 38.5 percent of respondents as very
unsuccessful. The most corrupt are managing
directors in the state owned enterprises (31.2
respondents think in that way), then ofﬁcials
in Agency for Privatization/ Directorate for Pri-
vatization (26.7 percent of respondents) and
ﬁnally those ofﬁcials in Entity governments
and ministries (20.9 percent of respondents).
(TI-BiH, ibid.)
duct the day-to-day operations, while in Republi-
ka Srpska this function is assigned to a central-
ized Directorate for Privatization. The agencies
work very closely with the respective govern-
ments, with their staff and especially chief execu-
tives being typically appointed by the same polit-
ical parties that are in charge of the cabinet for-
mation. Therefore, there are substantial political
and partisan interests at play. The distribution of
the higher-ranking posts in the respective agen-
cies mirrors the distribution of cabinet seats. The
same applies to the appointment procedure with
respect to the top executive positions in state-
owned enterprises, which are all subject to the so-
called “party co-ordination meetings”. Conver-
gence of the party interest at these various posts
all relating to privatization, either ensure deple-
tion of the enterprise budgets, spontaneous pri-
vatization or extra proﬁts from the “legal” one.
Often, it allows even for a combination of all that
mentioned above. Press reports appear to con-
ﬁrm such assumptions on a daily basis, entailing
the reaction of the IC in some instances.
Under the Law of 1992, various state agencies
were entitled to initiate privatization deals in
Bulgaria. Municipally owned enterprises were
privatized by municipal agencies, the privatiza-
tion of small enterprises was handled by the line
ministries, whereas that of larger companies was
the responsibility of a special body - the
Privatization Agency - that also served as a gen-
eral coordinator of the whole process. With the
start of the mass privatization program a separate
institution was also set up to carry out the specif-
ic tasks in this area. Until the notable pick-up in
privatization during the second half of the 1990s,
however, the line ministries and the municipali-
ties appeared rather reluctant to pursue a rapid
transfer of the ownership under their supervision.
On its part, the Privatization Agency remained
vulnerable to political pressures usually exer-
cised through its Supervisory Board whose mem-
bers were appointed by the government and the
parliament. While the process of transferring
state assets into private ownership accelerated
markedly since 1996, the vast array of programs
and employed privatization techniques strained
the administrative capacities of the implementing
agencies. Despite some problems in administrat-
ing and coordinating the whole process, the latter
part of the 1990s saw a strong momentum in pri-
vatization, although its outcomes caused growing
dissatisfaction among the population. Given the
advanced stage of privatization and the public
outcry against alleged corruption, the new Law of
2002 stipulates a centralized management of the
process by the special Agency, as well as a
strengthened control both on the conclusion of
deals and their subsequent implementation. 
One of the main factors that is deemed conduc-
tive to the increase of irregularities in Croatia’s
privatization experience was the concentration of
decision-making in the hands of a single state
agency, with the latter being also in charge of the
subsequent implementation. The central role of
the state in managing the entire process of priva-
tization had a series of undesirable side effects.
Although all ﬁrms and companies had been guar-
anteed the right to suggest their preferred privati-
zation modes under the Law of 1991, the ﬁnal
decision on the privatization of a particular com-
pany was made by the Agency for Restructuring
and Development (later to become the Croatian
Privatization Fund, CPF). This meant in practice
that it was the Agency that had the ﬁnal say on
whom to sell and at what price, even though the
companies themselves
had the right to pro-
pose privatization
methods and the poten-
tial buyers that suited
them best. Thus, cor-
ruption and other irreg-
ularities were some of
the undesirable side
effects of the dispropor-
tionate role of the state
Agency in charge of pri-
vatization. Yet, this was
not something speciﬁc
to Croatia alone as it is
to be found in other
countries in transition
and everywhere in the
world (especially in
developing countries),
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mainly in situations when a large part of decision-
making is left in the competence of a government
body or administration. 
The Law of 1991, however, did not precisely
establish the order of priorities or criteria for the
assessment of application for ownership transfor-
mation and privatization. The opacity of the crite-
ria and the procedure itself opened up possibili-
ties for an unusually large area of discretionary
maneuvering space for the Agency (CPF) admin-
istrative council to assess each case separately
and according to ad hoc established goals. This
unrestricted arbitrary decision-making and the
right to use own discretionary right in assess-
ment of individual purchase offers can by all
means be held responsible for the consequent
development of numerous irregularities in the
process as it fostered expansion of corruption
and intermeshing of politics with the new private
elite. The lack of transparency surrounding the
conditions for sale and their adjustment to each
individual case produced negative consequences
on the decisions of individual investors and
immensely damaged the general perception of
the privatization process in the eyes of the public.
In this respect, the biggest problem was the lack
of legal restrictions of the role of and arbitrary
decision-making by the state administration in
the privatization process. Had the Agency not
been given the role of central arbiter by the Law,
the problem would nowadays be far less critical.
According to the Law, the key institution that is
responsible for administration and support of the
privatization process in Macedonia is the
Privatization Agency whose mission falls in line
with the ﬁnal goal of ownership transformation in
the country. Although the Privatization Agency is
deﬁned as an independent institution, it is under
strong political influence. By appointing its
Director and other senior ofﬁcials the government
can directly inﬂuence all the decisions of the
Agency. The Director has always been a member
of the political party in power, implying his/her
acting in the interest of the given political forma-
tion and the government. For example, during the
last three years several directors of the Agency
were appointed and dismissed accordingly to the
ruling coalition parties’ wishes and their particu-
lar interests in the selection of a potential buyer
for proﬁtable companies (usually accompanied
with indications for corruption).
The institutions that have been created under the
new privatization laws in Serbia are the Agency
for privatization, the Shares fund and the Central
share register. The Agency for privatization is the
main body in charge of the process and has large
discretionary power. The institution promotes, ini-
tiates, executes, and controls the process of pri-
vatization, although the latter can also be initiated
by an enterprise slated for privatization and a
potential buyer. The Agency is also empowered to
approve the results of the tenders and auctions.
Thus, it appears to be granted strong discre-
tionary power, being at the same time burdened
with functions that should be distributed among
the enterprises slated for privatization, state and
independent bodies. The Agency is operating
under the control of the Ministry for Economy
and Privatization, the Government of the Republic
of Serbia, as well as the Serbian Parliament and
representatives of the World Bank.  Through this
four-fold monitoring of the Agency’s work, cor-
ruption possibilities seem vastly reduced.
Moreover, there is no evidence that political par-
ties exert inﬂuence on the privatization process.
The present minister of privatization, Aleksandar
Vlahovic, is not a member of any political party,
as well as the other high ofﬁcials of the Ministry.
6.1.3. Litigation, implementation and renegotia-
tions of closed deals
The experience of Albania showed that during
the privatization process, there have been several
cases where the parties involved claimed for
renegotiations. That was the case of the Italian
brewery “Peroni” which was the wining bidder
for a domestic brewing company and 6 months
after the privatization deal was struck “Peroni”
demanded renegotiations of the details of closed
contract. The request was not accepted by the
government and the deal was awarded to the sec-
ond-best bidder during the privatization process.
In BiH as well, there have been many cases of
undertaken campaigns for renegotiations of
already closed privatization deals. They are being
typically launched by the directors of the then
state-owned companies, most of whom are polit-
ical appointees, the moment the award of a pri-
vatization bid has been made public. All these
efforts have an aim to postpone the privatization
of the cash-cows that ﬁll the party budgets, pri-
marily during the frequent election campaigns.
Flagrant is the example of the Banjaluka Brewery
that was the ﬁrst cash-cow to undergo an inter-
national tender. The winning bidder - the Belgium
Interbrew - withdrew after two years of struggles
and an eventual Constitutional Court ruling, much
to the disgrace of the executive and the overall
privatization process in RS and BiH. The second-
place bidder - the Slovene Lasko Brewery - cur-
rently faces similar difﬁculties and the ﬁnal result
is yet unknown.
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In Croatia, the ownership transformation of
2,650 companies resulted in 908 legal proceed-
ings initiated against the CPF in the courts of
jurisdiction. Thus, more than one third of all com-
panies that have undergone ownership transfor-
mation feel that they were not accorded their due
rights. Moreover, nine company ownership trans-
formations were completely annulled, while
other 94 were partially cancelled. According to
the law, the annulment of ownership registration
is possible only within three years following
share registration in the share register. Therefore,
it seems likely that ownership of privatized com-
panies’ shares will consolidate regardless of the
manner of their acquisition. A large number of
companies were bought on an installment plan
that did not, however, affect their new owners’
rights to immediate management. A little more
than a year ago, an intensive trend was observed
in connection with some of these companies.
Unable to fulﬁll their obligations towards the CPF
they began being returned to state ownership.
Their adverse financial positions could be
explained by the fact that a signiﬁcant part of
their resources had gone “private”. These failures
very much affected the state, the taxpayer-credi-
tors and the banks that extended loans to these
companies. The structure of those who demand-
ed a review of the transformation is also indica-
tive of the public perception, with most of such
demands being made by the owners of national-
ized and conﬁscated property, small shareholders
and unions. The reactions of the legal system
were, however, overall slow and the ﬁrst indict-
ments were made only after the HDZ government
was ousted out of power, although some cases
had been investigated earlier.
While the existing mechanisms in Bulgaria
ensure a relatively fast transfer of ownership
once the privatization deals are struck, they do
not provide sufﬁcient guarantees for compliance
with the agreed upon obligations. The preferential
use of such a technique as “negotiations with a
prospective buyer”, the excessive reliance in
recent years on MEBOs and the use of indemni-
fying promissory notes for payment created wide
opportunities, often accompanied by corruption,
for the non-monetary obligations to be avoided.
The consequences of the deals with Balkan
Airlines, the Plama reﬁnery and several other
companies became clear in 2001, serving as a ﬁne
illustration of these practices. A number of these
privatizations brought about allegations of cor-
ruption in addition to the fact that they provoked
considerable losses for the former owner (i.e. the
state) and a practical liquidation of some of the
enterprises concerned. 
The discretionary power of the Privatization
Agency in Macedonia with respect to the assess-
ment of individual purchase offers and the ﬁnal
decision to whom to sell have resulted in numer-
ous irregularities. Such large rights in the selec-
tion of buyers are typically a fertile soil for the
abuse of public ofﬁce for private gains. Due to
allegedly corrupt practices and irregularities in
the completed procedures, more and more priva-
tization deals have been disputed at the court that
usually ﬁnds out an infringement of the Law. 
6.1.4. Post-privatization control
The problem with post-privatization control in
Croatia appears profound. Rather paradoxically,
the governing laws stipulated that the control
over privatization had to be performed by the
CPF, or the very same organization that was in
charge of the process. So, the unbiased public
control over privatization was practically absent
through the 1990s. In this aspect the role of media
turned to be quite important in ﬁlling the gap. The
need to strengthen the legal and institutional
framework remains, however, an urgent task in
view of providing efﬁcient safeguards to ensure a
strictly rule-based interface between public and
private interest. 
The lawmakers in Bulgaria have recently made
some important steps in this direction by stipulat-
ing, among a number of anti-corruption meas-
ures, the creation of a separate Agency for post-
privatization control. The role of such a spe-
cialised body is seen as key in reducing the
opportunities for the assumed legal obligations
under the privatization contracts to be evaded by
the parties involved. Indeed, the country’s experi-
ence showed a rather widespread practice of pri-
vatized enterprises getting seemingly unreason-
able waivers of obligations, following the renego-
tiations of the initial clauses of the contracts. The
Agency for post-privatization control was set up
in April 2002 and it remains to be seen whether
this controlling institution can prove effective in
protecting public interests, although already at
this stage some analysts warn about its frag-
mented legal regulation. 
Given the non-negligible amount of lawsuits and
the existing potential for litigation and renegotia-
tions with respect to already closed privatization
deals, it seems most surprising that the issues
related to the control over ongoing procedures
and post-privatization implementation of the con-
tracts have either been largely neglected or got
rather undue attention on the part of the legisla-
tive and the executive. Moreover, the controlling
functions are typically assigned to the privatiza-
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tion agency that is responsible for organizing the
procedures, specifying the terms of the sell-offs
and selecting the actual buyers. According to the
Law, for example, the control over the privatiza-
tion process in Macedonia should be performed
by the Privatization Agency and its bodies, which
may terminate the agreement for selling a partic-
ular company if an infringement of the procedure
is found out. A compliant against the Agency’s
decisions may be submitted to the government
whose conclusion could, in turn, be disputed in
court. 
6.1.5. Preferred methods of privatization
Since the beginning of transition in Albania, a
very liberal privatization law provided that priva-
tization could be carried out through a variety of
forms such as auction, free selling of shares,
direct selling of objects to employees and man-
agers, or any other appropriate form. A decision
of the Council of Ministers (No. 248 of April 1993)
accepted auction as the only way of transforming
state property to privately owned property, con-
siderably narrowing the latitude of the privatiza-
tion law. That led to social tensions among differ-
ent groups of employees. This situation drove the
Government to review the privatization strategy
and the Mass Privatization Process through
voucher scheme came into effect. The process
was launched on September 11, 1995.
The privatization process in BiH is proceeding
along separate lines in the two entities, although
there are many basic similarities. The divestiture
in Republika Srpska includes the privatization of
enterprises and banks on the basis of equal treat-
ment of domestic and foreign individuals and
legal entities. The basic law governing the process
is the Law on Enterprise Privatization in Republika
Srpska that was passed in June 1998. Subject to
privatization is the capital in state owned enter-
prises and enterprises that had already been par-
tially privatized according to the ex-Yugoslav
“Markovic’s” program of the late 1980s.
Enterprises are being sold partly against cash and
partly against vouchers issued as compensation
for frozen foreign exchange deposits, validated
restitution claims, claims related to unpaid
salaries during the war, but mostly general claims
that have been distributed to all the citizens.
Vouchers cannot be, however, used in banking
sector privatization as the strategy adopted is
based primarily on fresh capital injection and
know-how to the banks themselves rather than
on cash for the state budget. The transfer of own-
ership in the Federation BiH encompasses the pri-
vatization of enterprises, banks and socially
owned apartments. As in RS, the privatization
program also establishes various claim cate-
gories for FBiH citizens (frozen foreign currency
savings, earned but unpaid military salaries, pen-
sion arrears and restitution) that they can use in
the privatization schemes through certiﬁcates
(vouchers). Many of the strategic big companies
are not, however, subject to voucher privatization
in either entity. This refers mostly to the disguised
cash-cows that generate large natural monopoly
proﬁts. The other part represents those business-
es that are out of the market and for which the
government does not wish to take the risk of los-
ing electoral support as a result of painful meas-
ures, primarily in the form of closures and decla-
ration of bankruptcies. On its parts, the loosely
deﬁned voucher privatization has led to the exis-
tence of some privatization funds and quasi-
funds operated by the enterprise directors with
the inputs from the labor that have shown signs
of insider privatization. However, given the cur-
rent level of economic activity of most such enter-
prises, this has not been a major cause for con-
cern except as a procedural and legal matter.
The original Privatization Law in Bulgaria provid-
ed for a wide range of methods, including auc-
tions, tenders, direct negotiations, debt-for-equity
swaps, public offering of shares and MEBOs. The
subsequent amendments allowed for a mass pri-
vatization scheme to be launched, as well as a
more preferential treatment for managers and
employees. The latter contrasted with the virtual
absence of favouritism in the initial law, although
the most recent changes in the legal framework
restored the principle of equal treatment of all
prospective buyers. Besides, the new Law of 2002
prescribes open auctions and public offerings as
main privatization techniques, while direct nego-
tiations are practically excluded as a method of
divestiture.
The most common method of privatization in
Croatia was the management-employee buyout,
while as a second measure voucher privatization
was applied. Unfortunately, the inherited eco-
nomic system with its deep structural ﬂaws and
the initial “transitional depression”, later
enhanced by the war, were not particularly bene-
ﬁcial to the adopted basic concept of selling with
a preferential treatment of formerly and currently
employed persons. As time passed, it proved
more and more unrealistic with regard both to the
receipts realized through it and the extent of pri-
vatization. In the time limit laid down in the law,
no signiﬁcant interest was shown in the purchase
of parts of socially owned capital, except by
employees and managers. Because of the war the
interest of foreign investors was almost non-exis-
tent. Consequently, the greater part of socially
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owned capital ﬁnished up as a state-owned prop-
erty. A number of serious economic analyses had
very clearly and correctly foreseen this, consider-
ing as highly questionable a concept based only
on selling. According to the Law, all the unsold
property of the socially owned enterprises was
transferred without any compensation into the
ownership of three public funds: to the Croatian
Development Fund (two thirds) and two pension
funds (one third). The same happened to the
assets of companies that failed to apply for own-
ership transformation in the authorized time limit.
Non-privatized socially owned property thus for-
mally became state-owned property and the citi-
zens who had participated in creating that prop-
erty in the ﬁrst place were now represented by
state institutions. The chosen model of privatiza-
tion with its forms of preferential sale had at least
three negative consequences. These were the
centralization at the level of the state administra-
tion of all decisions concerning ownership trans-
formation and privatization; the state take-over of
a signiﬁcant part of socially-owned capital; and
the selection of large buyers according to political
loyalty.
Although the companies in Macedonia have the
guaranteed right to suggest the method of priva-
tization and buy out the enterprises, the ﬁnal deci-
sion to whom to sell and at what price is in the
hands of the Privatization Agency. Thus, a large
number of companies have been privatized in a
non-transparent way with respect to criteria and
procedure, by announcing the speciﬁc conditions
to known buyers before the public announcement
for the bidding procedure was started. The
Constitutional Court abolished some provisions
of the Privatization Law that had not been in
accord with the rules of a market-type economy
(for example, the privatization through direct
sale, which does not provide equal opportunities
for all prospective buyers). However, several pri-
vatization transactions with government shares
were accompanied by non-transparency, lack of
public tender and under-estimation that
decreased the value of the companies up to 80%.
The sale of the largest proﬁtable state companies
(such as the country’s oil reﬁnery) through non-
transparent tender procedures indicated an
involvement of the highest government ofﬁcials,
although no one was investigated. Very often, the
deﬁned criteria, procedures and methodology for
value estimation were not strictly applied, pro-
voking a considerable number of lawsuits. In
2001 alone, there were several cases when the
value of the companies slated for privatization
was decreased by up to 90% and they were sold
to members of the political parties in power or
their relatives. Numerous privatization proce-
dures turned being disputed by the employees at
the court and on several occasions the latter can-
celled their implementation that was not in con-
formity with the proscribed rules and criteria.
Besides, the Privatization Agency itself changed
its decision for selling several companies under
the pressure of employees’ protests and dis-
agreement.
In Romania, the main factors that stimulate cor-
ruption in the area of privatization are related to
enterprise restructuring before privatization, the
inclusion of municipal property on the privatiza-
tion list, the application of qualiﬁcation criteria
and other requirements for potential investors.
For example, the legislation gives the state prop-
erty fund (currently APAPS, a ministry-like institu-
tion) the option to restructure companies if such a
restructuring increases the sale price or make the
ﬁrms more attractive. This restructuring is paid
for either with proceeds from other privatizations,
or with money squeezed out of banks by political
pressure. The restructuring can also be used as a
pretext for postponing privatization or taking
loans and extending guarantees on behalf of the
state. 
The experience of other states as well shows that
state-managed restructuring is often protracted.
First, there is the theoretical argument that, if the
state had been able to restructure and make a
company more efﬁcient, there would be little
need for privatization in the ﬁrst place. In the sec-
ond place comes a more practical point: while
being under special supervision of the state fund,
the companies’ performance typically declines,
whereas assets are dissipated. The restructuring
capital is often siphoned off by interest groups
active in the company. Moreover, restructuring is
sometimes an easy excuse to delay action, espe-
cially when no clear timetable is set up. Though
there were many attempts to reduce govern-
ment’s discretion in this area, little progress has
been made so far. Many times the restructuring is
launched with no clear vision of what the ﬁnal
state of the company should be. Adding to this is
the absence of a ﬁrm blueprint of splitting the
ﬁrm into independent entities in order to sell
them one by one which seems to be the only
rationale for engaging in restructuring in the ﬁrst
place.
With respect to municipal assets the local gov-
ernments have the right to decide which of them
should be slated for privatization, as well as when
and how these assets are to be privatized. As the
privatization laws do not deﬁne automatic rules
or criteria for putting municipal property up for
sale, many municipalities and local public com-
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panies tend to retain commercial assets under
their control and postpone the privatization.
Delays in these areas are often related with cor-
rupt interests and attempts to derive personal
gains from the management of commercial
items. The situation is all the more serious since
the legislation covering the conﬂict of interests in
the local government is quite loose, and there are
many local councilors who engage in private
business transactions with the public institutions
they supervise. Such a high-proﬁle case was the
General Council of Bucharest, where about two
dozens of councilors from all parties (roughly 1/3
of the total) were doing business with the local
government institutions or public companies in a
way or another. Moreover, the provisions against
conﬂicts of interest introduced by a law passed in
2001 were considered inapplicable to the current
council who had been elected before the legal
changes. In this context, the central government
took the extreme measure to dissolve the General
Council and call for new local elections in
Bucharest in the ﬁrst half of 2002. 
Most of the cases of corruption disclosed by the
media in Romania were connected with public
tenders, both at the national and local level. Pre-
selection of the would-be owners has been one of
the most cited ﬂaws. This selection is done by
customizing the terms of the contract so that they
ﬁt the prospective winner only, or even by chang-
ing the conditions of the tender when things run
out of control. Even though sometimes such
changes can be motivated by genuine attempts to
defend the public interest, the non-standard
behavior is overall highly susceptible and opens
broad opportunities for corruption to materialize.
The means available so far to expose possible
manipulation in such schemes are very limited.
The search for “strategic investors” also raises
problems. A strategic investor is understood as a
credible company with a high level of efﬁciency
and expertise in a speciﬁc line of business. The
idea is that such investors are more capable than
“ordinary” ones to restructure and manage efﬁ-
ciently important companies currently owned by
the state and which the government would not
like to close down. The problem is, however, that
privatization executives have the right to estab-
lish different criteria for assessing how “strate-
gic” an investor is. This is another entry point for
corruption, since the arbitrariness and executive
discretion stimulate would-be buyers to offer
“success premiums” and other kickbacks to the
decision-makers. Moreover, evidence shows that
even if clear qualiﬁcation criteria are put forward,
they are usually skewed later on to the beneﬁt of
well-connected investors. 
The privatising agency in Romania has also in
many cases the right to negotiate with the top
two bidders over the improvement of their price
and investments proposals. Although in principle
this may seem beneﬁcial with a view to enhance
the terms of privatization, evidence shows that
such procedures invite corruption and abuse of
ofﬁcial power. First, when negotiations are car-
ried out with two potential investors, leaks of con-
ﬁdential information may help eliminate the rival.
Second, serious incentives for abuse of ofﬁcial
power stem from the powers of privatization
executives to offer potential investors special
concessions of exemptions provided that they
revise their bids in return. Very often, what looks
like an improvement of the initial bid ends up as
a contract with more favourable terms for the
buyer. The same pitfalls are involved in the pow-
ers of privatization authorities to establish
requirements relating to the preservation of jobs
and the volume of investment as well as the right
of investors to request additional concessions
and exemptions.
The Serbian Law on privatization prescribes the
sale by tenders and auctions as a basic method.
The tender procedure is stipulated for larger
enterprises, whereas auctions are being envis-
aged for the smaller companies. Seventy percent
of the social capital is to be sold, while the
remaining 30% should be distributed free to
employees and citizens. If the purchaser does not
accept the offer of 70%, a lesser percentage of the
capital will be sold. In the case of prior restructur-
ing, all of the capital or property is offered for
sale. The procedure can be initiated by the entity
to be privatized, by the Agency for Privatization or
by the Ministry of Economy and Privatization. The
privatization process is to be completed within a
four-year term; otherwise the Agency for
Privatization is obliged to do it. 
6.1.6. Transparency of the privatization process
The privatization process in Albania is believed
to be fairly transparent and is reported to the pub-
lic generally through the mass media, with the
information about the deals being ﬁled with the
NAP. However, even though the country has
adopted a Freedom of Information Law, there are
practical difﬁculties in ﬁnding data and informa-
tion on privatization issues sometimes. 
Transparency is one of the basic principles of the
adopted privatization model in BiH. The rules of
privatization are known to all those who wish to
participate, thus providing possibility for public
scrutiny of the process. Besides, the privatization
agencies in both entities are running pubic edu-
cation and information programs. On the imple-
mentation side, however, the story differs from
the technical issues relating to the model itself
and the mass privatization, which does not apply
to the profitable strategic enterprises. With
respect to the latter it is extremely difﬁcult peek-
ing behind the thick curtain and ﬁnding out what
is truly happening with those companies that are
not subject to the more transparent mass privati-
zation method. Already mentioned was the case
of the brewery that was on the never-ﬁnalized list
of some 60 so-called strategic enterprises in RS.
The media and the public are still trying to inves-
tigate the actual course of events and the com-
plexity of various interests. The same has hap-
pened in FBiH with the privatization of several
hotels in Sarajevo (Holiday Inn, Bristol), BH Steel
and, more recently, with large utilities such as the
energy distributors, telecoms etc.
The general lack of fully transparent mechanisms
for the transfer of public assets into private own-
ership is seen as one of the main sources of cor-
rupt behavior in the economic sphere. While the
privatization process in Bulgaria showed sus-
tained improvement in this respect during the
late 1990s and early 2000s, the recent changes in
the legal framework have included further meas-
ures to ensure greater transparency of the proce-
dures and outcomes of the sell-offs. The notable
shift in the preferences away from such a privati-
zation technique as direct negotiations with
prospective buyers is an important step in the
government’s drive for increased transparency
and prevention of corruption. The new Law of
2002 provides also for the creation of a public
register of the closed privatization deals and post-
privatization control that aims at making the
process more transparent and information easily
accessible to the general public. Despite this fur-
ther strengthening of the legal framework, how-
ever, the recently adopted provisions could hard-
ly be automatic safeguards as even open tenders
may turn into a source of corrupt practices and
favor certain prospective buyers through the cus-
tomization of the speciﬁc terms of the proce-
dures. 
Privatization in Croatia is widely perceived as a
hotbed of crime and illegality, corruption and
grey economy, as well as a symbol of all the neg-
ative social consequences of the process of tran-
sition. These perceptions have been partly attrib-
utable to the existing problems with transparency
of privatization deals that seem to be very pro-
found. The CPF management Board often made
decisions that were not fully in compliance with
legislation (such was, for example, the change of
illiquid for liquid shares between PIFS and CPF).
Some of those decisions were, however, ruled
out by the Court of Arbitration at Croatian
Chamber of Commerce. The lack of rule of law is
also perceived as the underlying cause for cor-
rupt privatization practices. In its 2000 program,
the new government expressed the intention to
improve the situation, but it has so far focused
the efforts on the legal basis for the review of the
privatization process, instead on building up
appropriate institutions. Obviously, the revision
of an already done ownership transformation is
not the best of all available solutions. On the one
hand, such a revision seems inadequate and inef-
ﬁcient, while on the other hand, it sends a bad
message to investors and puts new uncertainties
into the area of property rights. Instead of a revi-
sion of an ownership transformation, broader
institutional measures are required, especially
those aimed at the prevention of any future irreg-
ularities and corrupt practices. Having this in
mind, it should be pointed out that there is still no
public register containing detailed information on
privatization deals in Croatia. Even such organiza-
tions as the CPF and the Central Depository
Agency do not have a chronological record on
ownership change and privatization deals, which
is indicative of current transparency problems.
In Macedonia , the privatization deals have been
publicly reported through the media, especially
when it comes to large-scale sell-offs or dis-
putable cases. The Privatization Agency has an
investment section on its website in which poten-
tial investors can ﬁnd information about the
country, company-speciﬁc data, as well as infor-
mation about the current offer of residual shares,
public tenders etc. 
Following the adoption of the new privatization
laws in Serbia, the analysts share the opinion
that the process could be very transparent by
being performed through tenders and auctions
whose procedures are clearly defined.
Nevertheless, there is a potential for corrupt
behavior during the tender procedures since the
Law does not establish a sole criterion for the
selection of the winner. Furthermore, the minister
and the other officials of the Ministry for
Privatization and Economy have declared several
times that price offered would not be the most
important factor determining the winner of a ten-
der. In the absence of a sole criterion, a tender
might appear largely senseless because of the
vast possibilities for an arbitrary decision to be
taken.
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6.2. Corruption and Public Procurement
Public procurement appears to be a major hotbed
of corruption as this area typically gives ofﬁcials
large discretionary power. Yet, the South-east
European countries have made recent progress in
strengthening the legal framework of the process
and its harmonization with the EU Directives,
even though law enforcement has continued to
be characterized by many problems. The procure-
ment procedures generally remain insufﬁciently
transparent, which creates suspicions of corrupt
behavior in the context of a seemingly wide-
spread customization of the terms. With the pre-
selection of the prospective suppliers being
apparently one of the typical ﬂaws in the imple-
mentation of the stipulated procedures, the legal
guarantees for equal treatment of all candidates
should be further strengthened together with the
mechanisms for control over the preparation of
tenders. Adding to the reduction of the existing
legal opportunities for corruption and discretion
in this sphere could also be an explicit obligation
for the procurers to publicly explain the reasons
for their choice of winning bidders, as well as a
ban on discretionary amendments in the already
signed contracts. The enhanced introduction of an
electronic system of public procurement seems
also an important step in ensuring greater trans-
parency of the process. 
6.2.1. Regulation of public procurement proce-
dures
Public procurement is broadly perceived in
Albania as one of the areas most heavily affect-
ed by corruption. On the organizational side, the
Law established a National Public Procurement
Agency (NPPA) which is reporting to the Council
of Ministers as the central government body for
co-ordination and development of the public pro-
curement system in the country. Over the past
several years, Albania has made significant
progress in the development of its public pro-
curement system. The Law on Public Procurement
was modeled on best international practices and
became effective from January 1, 1996. This law
offers the simplicity of a single uniﬁed law, which
decentralizes the authority for conducting pro-
curement to procuring entities at both the central
and local government levels of the administra-
tion. The law provides for a comprehensive range
of procurement methods, which should enable
procuring entities to cope with different procure-
ment requirements. One of the strengths of the
law is that it established open tendering (OT) as
the preferred method of public procurement. In
practice, however, the efﬁcacy of this provision
has to date been undermined by weak enforce-
ment of legislation. Other advantages of the law
are the provisions for a two-stage bidding
method for complex procurements, a speciﬁc
method for consultants’ services and a simple
request for quotations (RFQ) method for low-
value purchases.
In Croatia, important efforts have been made in
order to enhance public procurement practices
and the established system was largely based on
the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Public
Procurement Law regulates the conditions and
procedures of public procurement that precede
the conclusion of contracts for acquisition of
goods and services with the aim of efﬁcient use of
budget and available public resources, as well as
strengthening market competition. The basic prin-
ciples that have to be followed relate to the efﬁ-
ciency of procurement, the equal position and
non-discrimination of offers, as well as the pub-
licity and transparency of procurement proce-
dures. The Law also deﬁnes the range of govern-
ment bodies and other legal entities that should
be engaged in public procurements. The provi-
sions of Law are applied on every public procure-
ment during the budget (ﬁscal) or business year if
its value equals or exceeds HRK 200.000,00 (ca.
EUR 26.666,67).
The Law on Public Procurement was enacted by
the Parliament of Macedonia in 1998. According
to its provisions, the procurement procedure
shall be carried out by a special commission,
which is established by the procurer. In cases
when the procurer is a user and an individual
beneﬁciary of budget funds, an authorized repre-
sentative from the Ministry of Finance without a
voting right shall participate in the commission in
order to supervise the procurement procedure.
According to the Law, the procurement may be
carried out through open announcement, restric-
tive announcement, collecting offers and direct
agreement. There is an obligation to publish the
open and restrictive announcement in the Ofﬁcial
Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia and in the
local media at the same time, while the
announcement for an international procurement
tender have to be published in foreign media. The
procedure of open announcement is to be
launched when the denar value of the procure-
ment exceeds EUR 50.000. When the value of the
procurement is higher than EUR 250.000 it shall
be carried out through limited announcement by
collecting documentation from a limited number
of bidders. Procurement by collecting offers shall
be carried out when the value of the procurement
is between EUR 2,500 and 50.000. 
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According to Transparency International, Serbia
is at present the only country in Europe without a
separate law on public procurement. The legal
provisions regulating public procurement are cur-
rently dispersed among a number of different
laws. The government of the Republic of Serbia
has, however, approved a draft Law of Public
Procurement, which was sent to the National
Assembly for adoption. The draft regulates the
process of public procurement in a very detailed
manner with a view to stimulating competition
among bidders, increasing the transparency of
the procedure and obtaining goods and services
under the most favourable conditions for the
state. It encompasses all direct and indirect bene-
ﬁciaries of budget resources, compulsory welfare
organizations and public companies. Public pro-
curement is to be conducted by means of open
tenders, except in very precisely deﬁned excep-
tions. There are no restrictions concerning the
accessibility to tenders. Since this draft law is
developed under the standards of the European
Union, it incorporates provisions relating to eligi-
bility and conﬂict of interest. A distinct feature of
the draft is that it provides for the creation of a
Public Procurement Agency, which will work with-
in the Treasury department of the Ministry of
Finance and Economy. In its Article 14 the draft
law also contains particular anti-corruption provi-
sions, stipulating the rejection of a bid that
involves attempts to inﬂuence the course of the
public procurement procedure.
From the beginning of 2002 the government of
Romania has put in place an electronic system of
public procurement and all public institutions are
required to start using it in one-year time span.
This is the ﬁrst substantial piece of e-government
implemented in Romania so far. The pillar of the
system is a web page-cum-database adminis-
tered by the Ministry of Public Information where
the public entities must register all their tender
calls. The system has been in use for just about
two months, which was not long enough to build
a critical mass of clients and suppliers. Moreover,
some contracts may by their nature be inappro-
priate for electronic bidding. Nevertheless, this is
a serious effort by the government to institution-
alize greater transparency in the public procure-
ment process. 
6.2.2. Enforcement of procurement rules
While the organizational arrangement of public
procurement in Albania is in conformity with the
internationally accepted practices, the effective-
ness of the NPPA has so far been severely under-
mined by the weakness of this institution charac-
terized by under-searching, continuing staff
changes and susceptibility to political inﬂuence.
The Agency is included in the government Anti-
Corruption matrix but still there are lots of prob-
lems to be solved in the future in order to have a
competitive procurement system that limits the
authority of government ofﬁcials and inﬂuences
in curbing corruption. It appears that poor appli-
cation and enforcement of the rules in Albania are
undermining a good procurement law. Put sim-
ply, it is too easy for procuring entities to avoid
strictly implementing the law because of the
weakness of the NPPA. Procuring entities too
often employ non-competitive procurement
methods, which lead to poor value in terms of
money and also facilitate corruption. Therefore,
one of the government’s top priorities should be
to take appropriate measures to combat corrup-
tion and strengthen the enforcement of existing
legislation. 
The continuous lack of a modern and EU
Directives-harmonised Law on public procure-
ment has played a detrimental role in the loss of
public revenues in BiH. It is estimated that some
5 percent of the country’s GDP relate to direct
government procurement of goods and services,
while this area remains largely unregulated and
subject to serious fraud. For example, the parlia-
ment buildings were built without applying any
known method of public procurement and in the
most non-transparent manners. Simultaneously,
that lack of legislation opened the room for grow-
ing corruption in the administration and ever
more irrational expenditures at all levels. At state
level, there is neither a decree, nor a law regulat-
ing public procurement, whereas the entities do
have a legal framework - a law of 2001 in the case
of RS and a decree of 1999 in FbiH, - although it
does not correspond to the EU positive practice
and is currently subject to review. In 2002, the
Ministry of Treasury of the Joint BiH Institutions
has proposed a draft Law on public procurement
at that level to the BiH Parliament, with its adop-
tion pending. At entity level, the legal changes
and amendments are being prepared by the
respective ministries of ﬁnance with a view to
accomplish the process by the year’s end.
The legal regime of public procurement in
Bulgaria is laid down in the 1999 Law on Public
Procurement, which has not been amended as of
yet despite the criticism it provoked. The deﬁcien-
cies of the law are typically associated with its
rather narrowly deﬁned scope of application, the
lack of control over the preparation of the ten-
ders, the overall insufﬁcient transparency of the
procurement procedures, as well as the slow and
inefﬁcient appeal procedures. However, a new
law on public procurement is being currently dis-
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cussed in the parliament (three separate drafts
has been submitted by the end of 2001) with the
aim of further harmonizing the procedures and
eradicating the legal opportunities for discretion
and corruption in this particular area.
The transparency of the procurement procedures
in Bulgaria has been also seen as rather insufﬁ-
cient, which together with the existing problems
with the enforcement of the 1999 Law created
suspicions of corrupt practices. The avoidance of
the current regulations has been facilitated by the
narrowly deﬁned scope of their application with
regard to both the subjects of public procurement
and the persons entitled to open the procedures.
The proclaimed equal treatment of all bidders has
been often infringed due to lack of control over
the preparation of tender documentation.
The recent experience in Croatia showed some
cases of public procurement procedures not
being performed according to the Law. They
were, however, cancelled by the Ministry of
Finance, which is the administrative government
body that controls the procurement decisions.
Yet, it seems too early to estimate the effect and
application of the new Law, although according
to an expert’s opinion it is an important improve-
ment to the former Law of acquisition of goods,
services, and relinquishment.The former Law had
not provided for enough transparency of public
procurement, so that the process had been pretty
murky and complex. The rules had also been very
often not respected. According to reports of the
State Audit Office, the public procurement
process had been characterized by substantial
disorder. Some bidders had turned to be in
advantageous positions, not according to any
real criteria and measures, but according to crite-
ria with completely private characteristics. The
new Law stipulates much better enforcement pro-
cedures. The value of acquisition during the ﬁscal
year should not be divided in such a way that the
value of public procurement would be lower than
the amount stated in the Law, so that the imple-
mentation of the latter could be avoided. Besides,
the new Law stipulates the estimated value of
acquisition when the exact value is not known.
The Law also deﬁnes the process of public pro-
curement for the insurance industry, banking and
other ﬁnancial services and project ofﬁces.
The adoption of the 1998 Law in Macedonia was
aimed at meeting the international standards
with respect to the procurement and biding pro-
cedures, their openness, fair competition, and
transparency. However, the public procurement
process became subject to criticism from the pub-
lic, especially on the part of bidders, for abuse of
the principles of equal participation and opportu-
nities for all participants by giving privileges to
pre-selected bidders. There have been serious
indications for non-transparency and infringe-
ment of the Law, most notably in the case of larg-
er procurement. Many of the public procurement
procedures, especially for large-scale deals, were
disputed in the Court. The general public opinion
is that, in spite of the proscribed procedure and
criteria in the Law, the high-value tenders are
agreed before the biding procedure has even
been started. Certain unclear provisions in the
Law create opportunities for abuse. For these rea-
sons, the Law is being currently examined by
domestic and EU experts in order to provide
more transparency, efﬁciency and rationality of
the biding procedures in line with the European
standards and to limit the opportunities for cor-
ruption.
In Romania as well, most cases of alleged cor-
ruption disclosed by the media were connected
with public tenders. The pre-selection of the
prospective suppliers appears to be one of the
typical ﬂaws in the implementation of the stipu-
lated procedure. As already mentioned, such a
pre-selection is done through the customization
of the terms of the tender to the advantage of a
particular bidder. This practice is generally
believed to involve kickbacks for government ofﬁ-
cials, but the means to expose possible corrupt
behavior in the process of specifying the terms of
a public tender remain extremely limited.
6.2.3. Control over procurement decisions and
public registers of procurement deals
A register for public procurement has been set up
in Bulgaria, with its database containing current-
ly some 8,000 deals. This is considered by ana-
lysts as an important step towards ensuring
greater transparency of the process. In Croatia,
the public register of procurement is at present in
the process of implementation. The establishment
of such registers is reportedly being envisaged as
an important step in strengthening the legal
framework in BiH and its harmonization with the
two Public Procurement Directives of the EU.
The supervision over the use of procurement for
beneﬁciaries of budgetary funds in Macedonia
shall be performed in compliance with the Law on
State Audit. The supervising functions are execut-
ed by the inspectors for Budget control and pub-
lic procurement from the Ministry of Finance. If
an inspector ﬁnds out an infringement of the pro-
cedure, a criminal act or misdemeanor, he/she
must without delay inform the competent author-
ities. Besides, any participant in a procurement
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procedure who is not satisﬁed with the selection
of the winning bidder may ﬁle an appeal to the
Committee of appeals within 8 days from the date
of the announcement of the results. The appeal
postpones the execution of the decision for the
selection of winning bidder. The decision of the
Committee of appeals is ﬁnal. The bidder may,
however, dispute the decision of the Committee
at the Court.
6.2.4. Foreign participation
The new Croatia’s Law on public procurement
does not contain any provision about privileges
for local suppliers and enables a complete open-
ing of the domestic market. Foreign companies
participating in local public procurement usually
did not complain on decisions, but on some par-
ticularities in the required documentation.
Opening of the public procurement to interna-
tional competition and/or favouring Cupertino
with foreign contractors, e.g., for rolling stock
maintenance/rehabilitation, road maintenance,
and the provision of transport services, have the
potential to reduce public procurement costs sig-
niﬁcantly.
There is a reasonably good framework for public
procurement in Albania, although some of the
provisions of the respective law could be
strengthened further with the objective of
increasing competitiveness, transparency and
enforceability, thereby minimizing corruption. For
instance, the Law on public procurement impos-
es excessive limitations on the participation of
foreign bidders by establishing an arbitrarily dif-
ferentiation between domestic OT and interna-
tional OT. As the procuring entities are left with
the discretion to decide whether to apply OT as a
domestic or international procedure, they most
frequently limit it to domestic bidders. The choice
of domestic bidders in cases where international
competition could be more cost-effective leads to
waste of budget resources. In this respect, the
discretionary power of the procurement entities
also leaves room for corruption and the current
situation should be corrected by amending the
legislation.
The experience in BiH with respect to foreign par-
ticipation in public procurement has been so far
rather limited. It relates mostly to the larger proj-
ects of the World Bank and to a lesser extent to
the European Commission donor projects that
are being implemented by the local units (PIUs).
While legally the PIUs are agencies of the Entity
governments, their public procurement rules are
those of the WB and EC respectively. The experi-
ence of foreign businesses with those procedures
is rather positive and there has been a lasting
attempt to transform the PIUs into strategic units
for procurement that will be designing, imple-
menting and monitoring the procurement
process in the future. With the PIUs running pro-
curement projects worth tens of millions of EURO
annually, there have only been a few isolated
instances of objections by either the bidders or
the donors.
6.3. Taxation and Tax Evasion
The existence of shadow economy in many tran-
sition countries is large-
ly associated with cor-
rupt linkages between
private businesses and
the tax administration.
One of the stimuli for
corruption in this
respect is the opportu-
nity to save money if
the size of the bribe is
lower than the size of
the tax liability. Over
the past decade, the
South-east European
countries introduced
new tax systems that
have been undergoing
rather frequent changes
aimed at maximizing
the overall collection
rate and minimizing tax
evasion. The latter has,
however, remained a
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mass phenomenon, with its forms and mecha-
nisms exhibiting both basic similarities and some
country-speciﬁc variations. Moreover, tax frauds
have apparently important cross-border implica-
tions in the context of the existing differences in
tax and trade regimes across the region, as well
as generally cumbersome custom regulations
whose implementation typically lacks transparen-
cy, leaving room for corrupt behavior.
6.3.1. Forms and mechanisms of tax evasion
Tax evasion in Albania seems to be of high lev-
els. According to a 1999 survey, 75% of business-
es stated that ﬁscal evasion of companies ranged
from “often to very often”.  Tax evasion in the
country takes many forms and corrupt practices
are allegedly widespread in the tax administra-
tion. One of the most notable mechanisms used
by many businesses to evade taxes is by operat-
ing with double balance sheets. In many cases
when tax inspectors ﬁnd evidence of tax evasion,
they accept bribes in return for reducing the
amount of taxable revenues. The opportunities for
tax evasion and corruption appear to be particu-
larly vast in the sector of small businesses that
are taxed at 4% of their annual turnover.
Measuring turnover is highly ambiguous due to a
lack of documentation and that leads to arbitrary
calculations in returns for bribes. VAT reimburse-
ment is, however, the most problematic issue
concerning the tax administration. Even though
the procedures of the relevant law are clear and
thorough, in reality the tax inspectors quite often
abuse their powers. Lots of cases related to
charges of corruption have been brought to the
courts. The penalties have ranged from simple
ﬁnes to criminal prosecution. It is important to
note that since 1998, more than 200 companies
have been taken to court on different charges
having to do with ﬁnancial cheating and hiding
evidence. Still, for such reasons as unclear accu-
sations, lack of clear facts and procedural irregu-
larities, the tax department has lost about 85%-
90% of the cases. A more general problem relates
to the fact that the tax administration has a very
important but constantly misunderstood attitude
towards the methods of achieving its revenue
goals. The revenue goals are set, compared and
analyzed based on the GDP weight of the tax bur-
den to the economy and its yearly growth. The
Albanian tax administration and the Ministry of
Finance set their revenue targets based on
macroeconomic indicators, and the tax burden to
the economy is consequence of the economic
growth and, more speciﬁcally, of the taxed por-
tion of the economic growth. Setting perform-
ance criteria outside of this framework damages
the traditional mission of the tax administration.
The tax department ends up arbitrarily calculating
tax obligations without using the formulas, which
are part of the legislation.
After gaining independence in 1992, Croatia had
adopted a new income and proﬁt tax system
effective from 1 January 1994. Following the gen-
eral elections of 2000, the new government decid-
ed to change the existing system and since 1
January 2001 the country has a new system of
corporate and personal income taxation, embod-
ied in the new Income Tax Act and Proﬁt Tax Act. It
could be argued, however, that the tax laws are
not clear and simple. Besides, they are subject to
very frequent changes that could make the tax
system less transparent, more vulnerable to the
misuse of discretionary power and the arbitrary
interpretation of the laws. In spite of the experts’
advice, some relief and exemptions were intro-
duced in the Personal Income Tax in order to pro-
tect certain categories of taxpayers. Given the
many changes in the tax system in the last two
years, the experts believe that it is necessary to
carry out a new reform to ensure a neutral tax
system that is not to be used to carry out govern-
mental social, economic and development poli-
cies. They also argue in favor of a much broader
basis for taxation, with as few exemptions and
privileges as possible. The principal causes
underlying the tendency towards tax evasion are
associated with the rise in the overall tax burden,
the inappropriate legislative framework, the exist-
ing administrative obstacles, the low credibility of
the legal system and the rather poor quality of
public services. 
The current average income levels in Bulgaria
imply that for the majority of the taxpayers the
notional value of a standard bribe and the
amount of money that could be saved by tax eva-
sion should apparently be pretty much the same.
People with higher incomes and especially corpo-
rations have, however, a stronger incentive to
evade taxes through corruption given the bigger
difference between the size of the bribe and the
amount of their tax liability. The size of the grey
sector (it varies between 27 and 35 percent of the
GDP according to different estimates) shows that
tax evasion is a mass phenomenon. With tax col-
lection remaining a problem, a paradoxical situa-
tion is created in which delinquent taxpayers (i.e.
economic agents which are better off) live at the
expense of conscientious taxpayers (i.e. the lower
income groups).
Obviously it is not the tax rates but the tax struc-
ture and taxation procedures, which determine
what part of the legal economic activities will be
taxed in accordance with tax laws. Bulgaria is a
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country with an average level of tax burden by
international standards, but nonetheless taxes
are perceived as being quite high because of the
low incomes of the population and the general
weakness of private businesses. The creation of a
system of taxation which performs both business
stimulating and social functions, seems a pre-
election priority of any political party running for
government, but the attempts to implement this
in practice clash with economic reality so that the
results are typically rather partial. The ambition to
restructure taxes by increasing indirect taxes and
decreasing direct ones is believed to have a
strong anti-corruption potential as it may help
achieve higher rate of tax collection and a
decrease of the share of the grey sector. For the
last few years the tax administration has been
undergoing a process of modernization. The year
2001 saw a lot of positive changes in the organi-
zation of the work of tax authorities, as their
strategic goal is to both guarantee revenue for the
budget and stimulate voluntary compliance with
tax laws.
The new tax system in the Republic of Macedo-
nia was introduced on January 1, 1994. Since
then several changes and amendments have
been made in the tax legislation. Tax evasion is a
big problem in Macedonia as well as in other
transition countries. There are several mecha-
nisms stipulated by the law, which aim at the pre-
vention and sanction of tax evasion. According to
the law, the tax inspector has a right to conﬁscate
temporally accounting books, other documents,
evidence and materials, being essential for mak-
ing assessment of tax obligation. The tax inspec-
tor has also the right to conﬁscate goods for
which excises and other duties haven’t been paid,
as well as vehicles used to transport such goods.
The law provides for an enforcement procedure
with respect to non-paid taxes and monetary
penalties for misdemeanor. According to Article
279 of the Criminal Code, large-scale tax evasion
is deﬁned as a criminal act. The punishment for
tax evasion is from 6 months to ﬁve years of
imprisonment and monetary penalties. However,
in spite of the apparently widespread tax evasion
there has been so far no major case brought up to
the court. Tax evasion seems to be on the increase
during the last years and the Public Revenue
Ofﬁce has been often criticized for tolerating such
a situation and ensuring no equal treatment of
taxpayers. Besides, tax evasion appears to be
closely related to the increased crime in the coun-
try, especially in its western part. It is considered
that tax evasion is most acute with respect to
excises on goods, such as cigarettes and petrol,
with the phenomenon being largely the result of
corrupt relations between representatives of the
tax administration and the taxpayers.
Ofﬁcially, the Romanian laws are quite strict in
the collection of taxes and there are few ways to
avoid paying. In practice however, tax compli-
ance has always been a problem, as the overall
collection rate is slightly below 60% (higher for
VAT and lower for other national taxes). Tax
frauds to sales taxes and excises are quite com-
mon, and they occur either in the small retail sec-
tor (VAT non-payment) or in some special areas
of business subject to excise taxes (alcohol, fuels,
and tobacco). The latter type of fraud has also
cross-border implications. Quite often, tax eva-
sion goes hand in hand with the smuggling of
excise goods, which implies some sort of region-
al criminal organization. A more recent pattern of
tax frauds has also developed with the use of fake
import-export documents for products that actu-
ally do not cross the borders but are sold on the
domestic market. This second possibility has cre-
ated a small regional trade in forged documents
(fuels production certiﬁcates, alcohol and ciga-
rette stamps) that represents a very lucrative
smuggling niche in itself. 
The existence of trade restrictions and special
taxes on certain goods that are not the same in
two neighboring countries thus creates strong
incentives for trafﬁc and the associated corrup-
tion of public ofﬁcials. Custom ofﬁcers are the
most exposed. The implementation of VAT special
regimes and excises, as well as the inspection of
origin and quality of imported goods provide
opportunity for corrupt practices. Also, the cum-
bersome custom regulations, sometimes imple-
mented in bad faith by the ofﬁcials, represent a
stimulant for kickbacks aimed at bypassing some
regulations or simply accelerating the procedure.
There is ample room for administrative improve-
ment in this area. Yet, realistically speaking cor-
ruption cannot be completely rooted out as long
as tax regimes in the SEE region differ consider-
ably from one country to the other and unneces-
sary restrictions to trade are still in place.
To start with, the duties and responsibilities of
custom ofﬁcers have to be deﬁned more clearly,
and the vague language in the Custom Code
should be eliminated (phrases such as “may
apply” or “by the decision of the custom ofﬁcer”).
Secondly, the abundant import tax exemptions
must be reduced in number and grouped in one
single document. Following intense lobbying of
interested parties, many such exemptions have
been adopted and they are subject to a myriad of
special regimes, delays and clauses of applicabil-
ity. Interpreting and advising on these regulations
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have become a business in itself, which usually
employs on a part-time basis the same custom
ofﬁcials that are supposed to administer the sys-
tem.
Tax exemptions are clearly an area that is far from
being transparent and based on well-deﬁned reg-
ulations. There is a small circle of top ofﬁcials in
the Romanian Ministry of Finance and the
Ministry of Welfare who have the power to grant
tax exemptions or rebates upon request, on a
case-by-case basis. According to the government,
business conﬁdentiality protects the list of com-
panies who have obtained tax relief over time.
However, this kind of sensitive information invari-
ably ﬁnds its way into the newspapers. Very often,
the list included companies for which forced pay-
ment or bankruptcy would not have created
severe economic or social problems, as the gov-
ernment claimed (private tobacco and alcohol
ﬁrms, TV stations, some of them with obvious
political connection). Leniency in collection exe-
cution towards such economic agents can only
exacerbate the moral hazard associated with tax
relief in general. Yet, in a recent move to improve
the business environment, the Ministry of
Finance has set up a new system of tax exemp-
tions granting, based on objective criteria. It is
being even envisaged that the initial claim and
the ﬁrst step in assessing eligibility will be per-
formed on a new web page to be created by the
government in the near future. Among the criteria
taken into consideration will be the social rele-
vance (proportion of employees in the population
of a community), total turnover, stability of the
ﬁrm’s location, compliance with the current tax
obligations. Any default from the rules associated
with tax relief will automatically lead to the aboli-
tion of the granted status and imposition of high
ﬁnes.
Yugoslavia does not have a common ﬁscal sys-
tem and policy on the federal level. The founda-
tions of the new ﬁscal system of the Republic of
Serbia were established in March and April 2001
when the People’s Assembly adopted several key
laws. The ﬁscal reform from early 2001 was one of
the major steps in the process of economic
reforms in Serbia. At the ﬁrst stage, eight new
laws were passed (among them on excises, sales
tax, income tax, tax on enterprise proﬁt, property
tax, etc.), with most of these acts coming into
force on June 1, 2001. With respect to corruption,
the major feature of the undertaken reform was
the simplification of the whole tax system.
Indeed, the former system of 235 different ﬁscal
forms was cut down to 6 main taxes and few ﬁs-
cal forms. In order to provide better conditions for
tax collecting, the Republican Directorate of
Public Revenues took an important part in prepar-
ing the laws and issued subsequently several
decrees on the rules and procedures concerning
the collection of taxes and other duties. Thus,
according to data of the Revenue Service,
revealed tax evasion increased in 2001 compared
with the previous year. About 26% of the total rev-
enue was the result of revealed tax evasion, while
the ratio for 2000 was 20%.
In BiH, the tax rates are not harmonized between
the two entities and neither of them has a VAT
system in place. Moreover, the existing tax sys-
tems appear rather complex and burdened with
provisions for different exemptions and rebates.
The personal income tax in the Federation is for
example characterized by a number rates, brack-
ets and rules for granting exemption and rebates.
In RS this complexity
has been recently
reduced as a lot of more
transparent, broader-
based and exemption-
free system was put in
place since 2002. In
order to promote inward
investment, the Federa-
tion grants an annual
proﬁt tax exemption for
newly established com-
panies with local and/or
foreign shares at the
level of 100 % for the
ﬁrst year of operations,
70 % for the second and
30 % for the third year. If
foreign investment
exceeds 20 % of compa-
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ny equity, that company is exempted of proﬁt
taxes for the ﬁrst ﬁve years, proportionally to the
foreign stakes in the total capital. In RS, the
exemption from proﬁt tax is for the ﬁrst ﬁve
years.
As in other complex ﬁscal systems, tax evasion is
a widespread phenomenon in BiH, rather than an
exception. The tax holidays given to foreign
investors have caused a lot of forged FDI to reg-
ister, i.e. companies that would operate for as
long as the period lasts and then close down and
register anew. The authorities experienced much
of a headache with the infamous Volkswagen deal
that sought large exemptions in order to re-enter
the country after the war. The same status was
then expected by other sizeable investors, which
led to a disarray in the overall tax system. The
hopes are that this will be overcome with the
gradual introduction of VAT in the next three
years. Yet, many entrepreneurs ﬁnd the ﬁscal sys-
tem extremely burdensome and see tax evasion
as the only way to stay in the market. While the
system of social funds indeed represents a large
payment problem and the concern may be justi-
ﬁed, the smuggling of excise goods is a major
issue linked much more to organized crime than
to a weak tax system. To deal with tax evasion the
authorities have been intensifying the inspec-
tions, although the results seem to be far from
tangible. The tax inspectors themselves are prone
to corruption and would frequently revisit those
ﬁrms where they would receive larger bribes,
irrespective of the genuine outcome of the
inspection. This has only increased administrative
corruption and helped little to eradicate tax eva-
sion. However, considerable efforts are being
made to increase the efﬁciency of the tax admin-
istrations and reduce corruption. The World Bank
have sponsored several projects that focus on a
less restrictive practice of the compliance mecha-
nisms, i.e. inspectors making their schedules and
visits less of a burden on enterprises, reducing
corruption and making them control only sus-
pected evasions in a co-ordinated manner with
other compliance authorities.
6.4. Informal Economy
The existence of typically large informal sectors
characterizes the economic development of all
transition countries, with the region of South-east
Europe being widely seen as a rather notorious
example for thriving activities of various shades
of grey. The estimated size of the shadow econo-
my in the South-east European countries varies
considerably, although it generally falls within the
range of 25 to 40% of GDP. The studies reveal a
considerable similarity in the factors that con-
tributed over the past decade to the expansion of
the informal economy across the region. In the
context of the overall slow progress in macroeco-
nomic stabilization and market-oriented reforms,
informal economic activities appeared to have
become deeply rooted largely as a reﬂection of
rising unemployment, the growing hardship of
everyday life that forced many to engage in the
smuggling of goods to make the two ends meet,
the low levels of tax awareness and people’s per-
ceptions of the existing tax burden as quite high,
the perceived injustice of the legal system and
general distrust in government institutions, the
lack of fair competition and transparency, as well
as the inherently weak institutional settings.
Another rather common feature of the informal
economy across South-east Europe seems to be
its close relationship with the networks of organ-
ized crime that has become the focus of govern-
ment policy efforts in many countries. The ﬁght
against money laundering has also gain impor-
tance recently on both national and international
scale since a considerable portion of the funds
involved is believed to serve terrorist organiza-
tions and activities.
6.4.1. Estimated scope and networks of informal
economy
The informal economy in Albania is estimated at
more than 35% of the country’s GDP. This ﬁgure is
derived as an approximation based on the model
of the power supply consumption and it is widely
believed to represent the minimum level of such
an economy. It is supposed that this sector is
more active in retail trade, transport and con-
struction. The shadow economy appears consoli-
dated to that extent that it has now become one
of the main obstacles to the functioning of the
formal sector because of the unfair competition.
On the other hand, there exists an organized
crime, involved in trade and smuggling of drugs,
human beings, etc. However, no one knows the
real extension of the underworld in the economic
activity of the country, even though it is suppos-
edly large. 
The results of a recent survey carried out by the
Economics Institute on the territory of Serbia
have indicated a very signiﬁcant scope of the
informal economy. According to estimates, at
least one million people have been engaged in
the shadow economy. Their share of the total
labor force amounted to 30%. Somewhat more
than one half of the participants in this black mar-
ket performs informal activities every month. If
the number of self-employed who performed
their activities in the informal sector is added, the
total reaches 1.2 million people. In the structure of
revenues, the grey economy participates with
18% of total revenues. The results of the survey
showed that the hidden economy has become a
major survival strategy for a considerable portion
of population. Namely, around 90% of the respon-
dents feel materially endangered due to the
decline in living standard and the quality of life,
as well as the risk of being left out of work.
Therefore, it seems understandable that for
80.7% of the respondents with additional activi-
ties, the main motive for engaging in the hidden
economy is associated with satisfying living
necessities, which is a pure survival strategy. If
this percentage is added to those participants in
the hidden economy who wish to maintain the
higher standard of living from the previous peri-
od, it becomes apparent that over 90% of the
respondents engage in additional activities in
order to earn income for sustaining more normal
living conditions.
At least two patterns of informal activities are to
be found in Serbia. First, there are large and well-
organized criminal gangs performing illegal activ-
ities of large scale, including trafﬁcking, contra-
band, and drug dealing. Second, there is a wide
range of petty violators, including petty smug-
glers, informal labor and hidden economy in
trade, crafts and agriculture. While the govern-
ment has a tacit policy toward the grey economy,
much more attention is paid to large-scale crimi-
nal and organized crime. Criminal gangs formed
in murky times continue to exert their inﬂuence
after the period of wars and sanctions. Their main
activities are trafﬁcking of oil, cigarettes, and nar-
cotics. The Serbian Prime Minister recently stated
that he was irritated by the fact that in 50 towns in
Serbia everybody knew who was the criminal
boss and still nothing happened. Regarding this,
it is important to emphasize that the present
Minister of Internal Affairs Dusan Mihajlovic was
the president of the political party that had been
in coalition with Milosevic’s Socialist Party during
the period 1993-1997, giving him necessary sup-
port to stay in power. It is particularly interesting
that Mihajlovic’s ﬁrm “Lutra” succumbed to the
Law on extra proﬁt and has already paid the ﬁne.
There are no surveys or ofﬁcial data and analyses
regarding the scope of the grey economy in
Macedonia after 1998. Some analyses carried
out by particular experts indicate a very high level
of the grey economy,
even up to 30% of
GDP. Its impact is
deemed considerable
for the loss of revenue
to the budget. The fall
in budget revenues,
especially from cus-
toms duties and other
import duties in the
last years, appears to
conﬁrm this supposi-
tion. Namely, the cus-
tom revenues fell to
Euro 96.7 million in
2001, down from Euro
99 million a year ago,
while for 2002 the
total amount of rev-
enues from customs
and other import
duties is projected to
decline further to Euro
71 million. Although
the ofﬁcial statements
of the Customs
Administration cited the recent free trade agree-
ments with several countries as the basic reason
for the fall in revenue, another important factor
for that could be found in the weak and inefﬁcient
custom control, as well as corrupt customs ofﬁ-
cials. Indeed, several low-key customs ofﬁcers
have been already arrested for involvement in
smuggling and bribe. Besides, public opinion sur-
vey data constantly place tax inspectors and cus-
toms ofﬁcers on the top of the table of corrupted
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public officials. The inefficiencies in the tax
administration, the overall weak tax control and
allegedly widespread corruption create ample
room for the expansion of the grey economy.
Among the social factors for the latter phenome-
non the experts point to the high rate of unem-
ployment (up to 35% of the workforce) and the
deterioration in living conditions that forced thou-
sands of citizens to engage in the smuggling of
goods. The legal aspects are associated with the
widespread awareness of injustice in the legal
system and distrust in the government institu-
tions, while the moral one reﬂect the general dis-
approval of the behavior of public ofﬁcials who
become rich in a short period of time. The most
serious reason relates, however, to the improper
functioning of the market economy, resulting in
the lack of fair competition and transparency,
dominant monopolistic structures, different stan-
dards for the companies with regard to taxation
and beneﬁts, as well as opportunities for corrup-
tion with the involvement of high-ranking ofﬁ-
cials.
The open nature of the Bulgarian economy in
which between 65 and 75 percent of the GDP is
realized through import and export creates
opportunities for the existence of illegal cross-
border activities. The customs authorities have
continued to be one of the basic mechanisms
involved in the redistribution of national wealth.
The scale of the latter can be assessed on the
basis survey data showing that some 25-35% of
imports and exports still passed through illegal
channels, even though smuggling appeared to
have followed a decelerating trend during 1998-
2000. In 2001, two opposite trends marked the
development of grey imports and smuggling into
the country. On the one hand, there was a steady
increase in legal imports of goods, semi-manu-
factured articles and raw materials, with the
process being positively inﬂuenced by the grow-
ing number of multinational companies on the
Bulgarian market. On the other hand, last year
saw increased pressures over border control
authorities to allow illegal and semi-legal imports
and exports of goods.  In contrast to the initial
years of transition, however, the post-1998 pre-
vailing pattern of custom violations involved
mainly imports at lower-than-the-actual prices,
use of incorrect lists of goods, etc. Squeezed by
subdued consumption and the intensiﬁed compe-
tition from rapidly expanding chain stores, some
importers and wholesalers restored the usage of
channels for “cheap goods”, which lead to a new
search for parallel import-export schemes. The
2001 situation seemed to have been also affected
by the constant changes in the customs manage-
ment. The personnel changes caused disintegra-
tion of the old schemes for illegal import and
export and seriously hampered smuggling and
parallel imports and exports. This positive effect
turned, however, to be counterbalanced by the
growing chaos and fear among the managers in
the customs administration that shortened, in
turn, the horizon of the rank-and-ﬁle customs ofﬁ-
cers. The latter started co-operating with grey
importers on their own, trying to make the “last
quick buck” before an eventual dismissal or “a
last favor” in order to get a subsequent job in the
private sector. 
In 1996, the Institute for Public Finance in Zagreb
(IPF) did research into the informal economy in
the Republic of Croatia for the period 1990-1995.
The authors of the study evaluated that the most
probable ratio of the informal economy to the
country’s GDP was at least 25% by 1995. Sector
data were consistent with this estimate as it cov-
ered a range from 8% of output in industry to 68%
of output in commerce in 1994. In the 1990-1993
period, the proportion of the informal economy to
GDP rose. In the 1994-1995 period it was impossi-
ble to make any ﬁnal judgment, because some
important indicators actually pointed to an
increase in the scope of the informal economy,
although most of the other signs suggested a fall.
While considering the 25% ratio of the informal
economy to GDP as rather high, the authors con-
cluded that it could be expected to stay equally
high in the foreseeable future due to the inherited
tradition, the ongoing transition with its vigorous
sectoral and institutional restructuring, and the
continuing great role of the state in the economy,
particularly in the ﬁeld of privatization. They were
also of the opinion that the high tax burden, the
resumption of growth and the enhanced creation
of new enterprises might well support further the
expansion of the informal economy. 
During 2001, the IPF went on with the previous
research and started a new chapter in the investi-
gation of the informal economy in Croatia. The
measurement of the informal sector at the level of
the economy as a whole was done through the
national accounting discrepancy method, mone-
tary methods, an adapted Eurostat method, esti-
mates of tax evasion and an assessment of the
informal activities in certain industries, such as
agriculture, industry and commerce, tourism and
foreign trade. With the use of the national
accounting method for the 1996-2000 period, the
informal economy has been estimated at an aver-
age of 10.4% of output. Such results seem fairly
logical, because in the earlier period Croatia had
the war, hyperinﬂation, the beginnings of the
transitions and reform, and in the second period
stabilisation and the strengthening of the ethical
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and legal system. Other methods gave different
results, but there is no huge discrepancy.
Although it has been reasonably expected that
the level of the informal economy in Croatia
would to a certain extent decrease given the
acceleration in the rates of economic growth, a
more important feature seems to be the change in
its structure and phenomenology. If the survey
results from 1995 and 1999 are compared, one
will notice that the level of opportunism has
decreased in both diffusion and intensity.  The
number of those who think that tax evasion and
corruption can never be justiﬁed has doubled. But
the fact still is that 46% of respondents were pre-
pared in certain circumstances to tolerate these
phenomena; the age structure of opportunism
has remained unchanged – the youngest age
group is still most apt to justify tax evasion and
taking bribes. This gives ground for concern
because it suggests the phenomenon might be of
a long-term nature. Moreover, the distrust in insti-
tutions has increased, and is once again most
pronounced among the young, which is a worry-
ing feature. In contrast, economic traditionalism
has ceased to be a relevant factor, which is rather
encouraging as people are after all getting used
to differences in wages. Rising social security
contributions have, however, added to the gener-
ally high tax burden that typically pushes eco-
nomic activity underground.
According to some economic analyses conducted
before 1998, the size of the informal sector in BiH
had been estimated at around 60% of GDP. This
ﬁgure would appear overstated nowadays due to
a number of systemic measures that tried to
incorporate some of the informal activities into
the formal economy. Therefore, a more accurate
estimate would possibly leave the grey economy
as high as 40% of GDP. Its most obscure seg-
ments seem to be the smuggling of immigrants
(particularly from the Islamic countries), prostitu-
tion, illicit drugs sales, weapons, racketeering and
money laundering. However, measuring their
impact would be next to impossible and there
have been no such known attempts, although the
overall size of the informal sector seems to be
larger than in the rest of the region. The informal
economy networks appear to be very strong and
closely related to organized crime of whose exis-
tence the general public is well aware as demon-
strated by a recent survey of Transparency
International - BiH. Illegal trafﬁcking, mainly of oil,
alcohol and cigarettes, was perceived as the most
widespread form of organized crime, with
respondents’ answers resulting in an average
grade of 4.57 on the scale from 1 to 5. Following
the September events, some of the criminal activ-
ities related to the shadow economy were brand-
ed as terrorism and the efforts to combat the
underground groups have been strengthened
with the help of foreign agencies. Apart from
being strong nationally, Maﬁa linked to the excise
goods smuggling appears to have well estab-
lished networks regionally with links in Belgrade,
Zagreb, Podgorica, Pristina and Tirana according
to press reports. They are mostly focused on oil
and cigarettes, as well as other excise goods. It
may be assumed that these groups partially, or in
total also cover prostitution and human trafﬁck-
ing, although there are no certain validations of
this assumption, other than the UNMBIH vague
ﬁndings.
6.4.2. Government policy
The government policy toward the informal econ-
omy in Croatia appears to be rather inconsistent.
According to the circumstances and situation, it
vacillates between varying attempts to make it
completely illegal and a policy that would tacitly
tolerate the informal economy. The efforts under-
taken by the government are not commensurate
with the gravity of the problem and there is a lack
of determination to confront and limit the infor-
mal economy, and to root out corruption. On their
part, many researchers have suggested detailed
measures of economic policy necessary for the
suppression of the informal economy, and partic-
ularly stressed that in the attempts to reduce the
phenomenon it was more important to do away
with the causes than to penalize the conse-
quences. They also stressed the importance of the
development of the institutional framework and
the relation between the state and the economy.
Besides, survey data shows a higher level of
opportunism (inclination to break any rules that
do not involve high risk of punishment) in Croatia
than in such countries as Slovakia, Hungary and
Romania. More than two thirds of the respon-
dents seem convinced that the majority of public
ofﬁcials are involved in corruption. There is also a
widespread public perception of injustice in the
legal system and dissatisfaction with the way
government functionaries and state civil servants
perform their duties.
The practices of the new Bulgarian government
concerning the making of rules for the interaction
between the state and the private business
involve controversial reactions. The intention to
set up a Council on Economic Growth with the
Council of Ministers including representatives of
big business provoked public criticism mainly
because a number of these people have been
allegedly involved in shady economic activities.
This, in turn, raises the question of formulating
clear and transparent criteria for participation in
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such structures as well as the need to specify
what their functions and status should be. The
activities of the government have so far reﬂected
a conﬂict between the political platform of the
new parliamentary majority and the existing eco-
nomic realities. Apart from the declared zero-tol-
erance to corruption, the authorities will need to
make rapid progress in improving the overall
business environment and strengthening the
institutional framework, increasing thereby the
opportunities for incorporating informal activities
into the main road of the organized economy. The
existence of a considerable grey sector and a
large volume of unaccounted for imports of
goods means that in addition to the state in the
country there exists a parallel system of manage-
ment of the economy, which controls approxi-
mately 1/3 of the turnover. The horizontal and ver-
tical links built by this parallel power will not lose
their importance even if there was a fully-ﬂedged
market economy. Therefore, the argument that
development itself will solve the problems of cor-
ruption in the economy is overly erroneous. First,
because the symbiosis between the state and the
private sector generates the shadow economy
that, in turn, hinders the transformation process;
and second, the consolidated structures of this
parallel power will always try to perpetuate the
existing channels of corruption. In this context,
priority should be given to the sustained
improvement in the conditions for doing busi-
ness, which seems of key importance for the
gradual legalization of the shadow economy.
The Macedonian government is tacitly tolerating
informal economic activities, and it seems that it
does not have a real political will to combat the
grey economy, despite some ofﬁcial statements
of commitment to the cause. 
Until now, the Albanian government has not
been clearly declared in the ﬁght against informal
economy as well. The main tool used by the
authorities has been the extension of the tax base
of businesses. The legal framework is continuous-
ly updated in order to keep up with the new chal-
lenges, but weak implementation remains a prob-
lem.
While some informal activities appear to be toler-
ated, the government of Serbia has announced a
ﬁght against large criminal groups. Besides, one
of the most widespread forms of informal activity
in the recent past - the foreign currency dealing -
was brought to an end by introduction of  con-
vertible Yugoslav Dinar. In order to crack down on
oil smuggling, the government issued in March
2001 the Decree on special conditions and proce-
dure of import, process, distribution and trade
with oil and oil derivatives. Yet, it is not certain
whether such a decree is going to reduce large-
scale corruption, although one evident result so
far has been the lower number of smugglers
caught. In turn, smuggling of cigarettes has been
fought through increased border control.
According to a Report on the activities on pre-
venting illegal ﬂows of tobacco, 50% of the con-
sumed cigarettes in 2000 was subject of illegal
trade, whereas in the ﬁrst half of 2001 this share
has diminished to 17%. A further step in ﬁghting
cigarette contraband will be the Tobacco Law
whose draft has been recently approved by the
government with the aim of regulating the pro-
duction, processing and trade activities in the
sector. While such a strengthening of the legal
framework will likely help to reduce the scope of
contraband, the new law shall provide govern-
ment ofﬁcials with large discretionary power in
issuing the necessary licenses, which is a major
source of corrupt behavior.
In the context of the political and economic devel-
opments in Serbia during the last decade, it could
appear that the informal sector was in a sense
beneﬁcial for the country. High taxation, govern-
ment encroaching, huge administration, rent-
seeking and rampant corruption had created a
discouraging business environment. Given the
growing extent of poverty among vast strata of
the population, the tolerance towards informal
economic activities could be regarded as a social
policy. Since legal business environment has not
been radically changed after the overthrow of the
old regime, it seems that the grey economy still
performs some social policy tasks and boosts the
whole economy up even now. Therefore, the gov-
ernment appears to continue tacitly tolerating the
informal sector of the economy to some extent.
Meanwhile, recent survey data have shed light on
the prerequisites that would motivate those
engaged in the grey economy to turn to the for-
mal sector. Half of the respondents assigned
prime importance to a decrease in tax rates, tar-
iffs and other duties, 25% of the interviewed
pointed to the necessity to reduce barriers and
regulations for doing business, whereas 9%
thought that the key factor was state administer-
ing. Besides, 25% of the respondents considered
sentences as rather soft, whereas 40% found that
control was poor, thus creating incentives for the
expansion of the grey economy. 
Statistical data on economy-related crime in FBiH
show that the prosecution pressed 13,183 charges
in 2001, with another 4,419 being inherited from
previous years. The respective ﬁgures for RS
were 11,997 and 2,211. On top of that, there have
been continuous efforts to close the smuggling
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channels and to clean up the street markets,
where goods go untaxed. These activities hurt,
however, mostly the “little people”, since much of
the economy is unregulated and so is their
employment status and the sale of their goods.
With constant improvements in the tax regime
and social beneﬁts, it is expected that this long-
term process will be gradually moving towards
more formal channels.
6.4.3. International connections
The opportunities for performing illegal and crim-
inal activities in Macedonia were markedly
boosted in the wake of the 2001 sharp deteriora-
tion in the political and security situation in the
country. In the context of the subsequent slow
process of the government regaining control on a
signiﬁcant portion of the territory, the continuing
precarious situation in neighboring Kosovo and
the rather weak border control, organized crime
appears to have remained widespread in certain
parts of the country. Moreover, there are serious
indications for well-developed international con-
nections of the criminal activities pursued
through smuggling of different goods, drugs,
arms and etc. 
The economic sanctions imposed on Serbia by
the United Nations in the period 1992-1995 paved
the way to the rapid expansion of the informal
sector. At the time of the embargo on all exports
and imports it was much more important to pro-
vide necessary consumer goods and allow for
means of exchange than to enforce rules and
laws. Thus, the dominant pattern of informal eco-
nomic activities during the sanctions was foreign
trade supported obviously by established interna-
tional links. Under the embargo, the authorities
were fairly tolerant towards this type of shadow
activity, although the same practice continued
even after the sanctions were lifted. Large traf-
ﬁcking groups formed during period of sanctions
and war stepped into close relations with state
ofﬁcials. The main activities were trafﬁcking of oil,
cigarettes and narcotics, with many signs point-
ing to vast international channels.
With respect to the international connections of
informal economic activities a most comprehen-
sive study was conducted by several investigative
journalists from the Zagreb’s weekly Nacional.
They uncovered links between organized crime in
all countries from the Western Balkans, with
many signs also pointing to regular links to the
policy-makers in power. That has prompted par-
liamentary committees to be formed for the
investigation of the claims and a growing number
of institutions are being drawn into this attempt
ever since the ﬁrst traces sprang up in early 2001. 
6.4.4. Anti-money laundering
With the recent adoption of an anti-money laun-
dering law Albania made an important step in
strengthening its legal framework in the ﬁeld of
ﬁnancial transactions. The purpose of the Law on
the Prevention of Money Laundering, enacted in
May 2000, is “to prevent the laundering of money
obtained through criminal activities and to com-
bat ﬁnancial crimes”, to quote the Article 1. The
law also provides for the establishment of a Co-
ordination Agency for the Fight against Money
Laundering at the Ministry of Finance. The Agency
is the government body in charge of collection
and veriﬁcation of all reports on effectuated trans-
actions, and is also entitled to exert control over
the observance of the reporting procedures.
However, the effectiveness of such administrative
arrangements have not yet been tested, since the
law has rather recently come into effect and the
Co-ordination Agency itself is still in the process
of organization and therefore unable to push for
better implementation standards. Even though
with a limited experience so far, the very exis-
tence of a proper regulatory framework is an
important element of the ﬁght against money
laundering in the country. Meanwhile, the Bank of
Albania seems to be the state institution, which
have taken the issue most seriously. Its supervi-
sory council has issued instructions to all com-
mercial banks to unify their standards of behavior
in the face of suspected money-laundering activi-
ties.
In Macedonia, the Law on Prevention of Money
Laundering was adopted in August 2001 but has
become effective only from March 1, 2002.
According to the Law, there is an obligation for
identiﬁcation of clients for transactions exceeding
the equivalent of EUR 10.000. If there is an indi-
cation for money laundering, the obligation for
identiﬁcation of the clients is effective regardless
of the amount of transaction. All suspicious trans-
actions are to be reported to the Office for
Prevention of Money Laundering that has been
established within the Ministry of Finance. Its task
is to collect, proceed, analyse and keep the
received records, and inform the competent
authorities in case of an indication for criminal
act. The Customs Ofﬁce is also obliged to register
all transferred cash money in and out of the coun-
try. However, the law did not incorporate all forty
recommendations of FATF, which is obligatory for
every country that adopts such legislation. This
refers to the provisions for the disclosure of the
banking secret, postponing of the suspicious
transactions, clear identiﬁcation of the clients
who have an obligation to make a report regard-
ing the indication for money laundering, etc.
Moreover, the necessary regulations related to
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the law have not been drafted and adopted by the
government so far. The banks and other ﬁnancial
institutions have not adopted internal rules of
procedures or started with internal training of the
staff for recognition of suspicious transactions
and implementation of the law. In compliance
with the Law the Government established the
Office on prevention of money laundering.
However, the Ofﬁce has not started with perform-
ing its activities yet. The lack of experience of the
staff, including its Director, cannot guarantee suc-
cessful and efficient implementation of anti-
money laundering legislation. The Ofﬁce has not
started with preparations for implementation of
the Law, training of the subjects, publicity of the
anti-money laundering legislation, and the like.
Due to the lack of any control measures so far,
Macedonia is especially vulnerable to money
laundering. It seems that there is also no political
will to deal with these phenomena. Such situation
creates potential for laundering of the funds
derived by criminal activities through legal bank-
ing system and other institutions. Also, the lack of
anti money laundering control mechanisms, was
used for acquiring companies, business premis-
es, banks, land and other property for enormous
amount of cash, without any proof for its origin.
Money laundering in Serbia had not been fought
at all for a long time, and no relevant estimation
on the scope of these activities is available. The
Money Laundering Act has been adopted at the
federal level only in September 2001, and imple-
mented starting from July 1, 2002. This act pre-
scribes the actions and measures to be undertak-
en for the purpose of discovering and preventing
money laundering, although it does not stipulate
any provisions regarding the international
Cupertino. (Yugoslavia is not a party to the
Council of Europe’s Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Conﬁscation of Proceeds
from Crime.). The Federal Government in Serbia
has formed the Federal Commission for preven-
tion of money laundering (Ofﬁcial Gazette of the
FRY, No 15/2002), as an independent federal insti-
tution. Commission will be responsible for collec-
tion, processing, analysis, providing information
to competent public institutions (Judiciary,
Inspection, Ministry of Interior), keeping record,
taking other measures according to the Law and
ﬁnally keeping data and information received
from obligors from Article 5, the Money
Laundering Act which are: 
Banks and other ﬁnancial organizations (Post
Ofﬁce Savings Bank, savings banks, savings
and credit organizations, and savings and
credit cooperatives); 
Post Ofﬁce units, other enterprises;
Government agencies, organizations, funds,
bureau and institutions as well as other legal
persons which are in whole or in part ﬁnanced
from public revenues;
The National Bank of Yugoslavia – Clearing
and Payments Department as the executor of
the country’s payment operations;
Insurance companies;
Stock exchanges, stock brokers and other per-
sons engaged in transactions involving cash,
securities, precious metals and jewels as well
as purchase and sale of claims and debts; and
Exchange offices, pawnshops, gambling
rooms, betting places, slot machine clubs as
well as organizers of commodity and money
lotteries and other games of chance.
Commission has a president and four members
that are nominated by the Federal Government
on proposal of Federal Minister of Finance, given
that the president manages its work and is
responsible for the performance of the organiza-
tion.
The general impression is that the ability of
Serbia to efﬁciently co-operate internationally in
ﬁnancial investigations and money laundering
cases is very limited. The Federal Ministry of
Internal Affairs has direct control over the Federal
police but not over the police of the Republic of
Serbia. Yet, the head of the Crime Investigation
Directorate of the Federal Ministry is also heading
the INTERPOL National Central Bureau. The Crime
Investigation Directorate’s staff serves as a link
between the police administrations of the two
Republics related to international requests for
assistance to and from international police forces.
In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code
(Article 535), full data is to be provided to the
Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs by the author-
ity before which proceedings are conducted with
regard to criminal offences related to counterfeit-
ing of money, money laundering and trafﬁcking.
The Bulgarian legislation has made signiﬁcant
progress with respect to measures against
money laundering. After the ﬁrst law of 1996 had
proved to be ineffective, a new one was adopted
in 1998, based on the principle of self-organiza-
tion of the ﬁnancial system to prevent and uncov-
er attempts for money laundering. At the end of
1998, a Financial Intelligence Bureau was estab-
lished and subsequently transformed into an
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agency within the Ministry of Finance. In early
2001 some important amendments to the Law on
Measures against Money Laundering came in
force, with most of them being aimed at harmo-
nizing the Bulgarian legislation with the EU
Directive on prevention of the use of the ﬁnancial
system for money laundering. The Financial
Intelligence Bureau was transformed into an
agency - a legal entity within the Ministry of
Finance, funded by the state budget and located
in Soﬁa (Organizational Rules of the Agency
Financial Intelligence Bureau, adopted with
Council of Ministers Regulation No. 33 of
February 12, 2001).
The commercial banks reported the highest num-
ber of signals of suspicious operations, followed
by the tax authorities. This conﬁrms the conclu-
sion that most of the money laundering opera-
tions and transactions are carried out through the
banking system or through illegal accounting
operations. According to the available data for the
period October 1998 - April 2001, 43% of the cases
involved operations for introducing financial
resources of criminal origin into the ﬁnancial sys-
tem; 11% represented operations for layering the
ﬁnancial resources aimed at removing their crim-
inal origin; 6% related to privatization deals in
which ﬁnancial resources of criminal origin were
invested in the legal economy and the remaining
40% of the cases concerned criminal activities
generating the so-called “dirty money”. The fact
that most of the cases of money laundering are
related to corrupt practices with both national
and international dimensions and that the funds
involved can serve terrorist organizations and
activities increases the need for cooperation
between the Financial Intelligence Bureau and
other state institutions - the Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce,
the Ministry of the Interior and the administrative
authorities performing similar functions, as well
as for international cooperation in this ﬁeld. The
new challenges require to further improve the
legal framework and modernize information tech-
nologies on a regular basis so that specialized
control against money laundering can continue to
contribute to the prevention and uncovering of
acts of corruption. Further amendments to the
Law on Measures against Money Laundering are
currently being prepared, aimed at blocking ter-
rorist group’s accounts (ﬁnancial resources) and
introducing stricter controls and sanctions.
The anti-money laundering legislation exists in
FBiH since 1998 and in RS since 2001. The OHR
has taken a leading role in co-ordinating this
activity through its Anti-Fraud Department. The
latter has recently organized a conference titled:
“Mechanisms for prevention of money launder-
ing in BiH: How applicable and efﬁcient they are”.
A preliminary action plan was agreed upon dur-
ing the forum and the principles of work in this
area were established. The existing money laun-
dering prevention mechanisms foresee supervi-
sion of the bank accounts where suspicions exist
and the formation of a department for anti-money
laundering within the Ministry of Justice (ex-
Financial Police in FBiH) and a new one in RS with
the Ministry of Finance. According to the law, a
single register of public and private entities
should also be set up and a number of related
laws are being currently amended to incorporate
provisions that would sanction this particular
activity.
In FBiH, the role of Financial Police that was an
integral part of the Ministry of Finance was
restructured and the administrative authority
over it has been shifted to the Ministry of Justice
with its mandate narrowed only to cover money
laundering. OHR was particularly instrumental
through its AFD in restructuring the Financial
Police and drafting its new curriculum.
In RS this role is now with the tax administration,
the Revenue Service, which is a part of the
Ministry of Finance and as of 2002 it combines
what used to be the Revenue Administration and
the Financial Police. Their mandate extends to
money laundering and in April 2002 charges were
pressed against several companies on merit of
money laundering.
6.5. Barriers to Business
The existing registration, licensing and permit
regimes are constantly generating two types of
problems that appear to be particularly acute in
the transition economies of South-east Europe
despite generally intensifying policy efforts to
deal with the underlying causes. On the one
hand, the overregulation of economic activities
results in considerable administrative barriers to
market entrants and higher costs of doing busi-
ness, pushing, in turn, many entrepreneurs into
the informal sector. On the other hand, the very
existence of registration and licensing regimes is
one of the main sources of corruption as it typi-
cally gives ofﬁcials large discretionary power, cre-
ating opportunities for the abuse of public ofﬁce
for private gains. With respect to the latter, the
overall unfavorable institutional environment
across the region remains clearly a notable root
cause of corruption. Yet, the current enhanced
development of market-type institutions is rightly
placed into the general context of reforming the
government’s role in the economy. This broader
perspective reveals, among others, the impor-
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tance of minimizing the institutionalized opportu-
nity for corrupt practices as a result of overregu-
lation. Furthermore, the alleviation of administra-
tive barriers through streamlining of registration
and licensing regimes, simplifying the proce-
dures and making them more transparent will
contribute both to a marked improvement in busi-
ness conditions and a gradual reduction in cor-
ruption levels. 
6.5.1. Registration procedures
There are two laws regulating the issues related
to the foundation, registration, operation, etc. of
companies in Albania, namely the Law on
Commercial Companies of 1992 and the Law on
the Business Register of 1993. The Trade Register
is located at the Court of the ﬁrst instance of the
Tirana District for all businesses that operate in
the Republic of Albania. The laws prescribe the
procedure that should be followed in order to reg-
ister a company and the necessary set of docu-
ments to be submitted to the court, which should
take the decision on the request in one-month
time. The registration procedure for business enti-
ties in Macedonia is defined in the Trade
Company Law. Following the decision of the
Court for enrolment of a new company the latter
is registered in the Trade Company Register and
receives a classiﬁcation from the State Statistical
Ofﬁce.
The overall operating environment in Croatia
does not pose signiﬁcant administrative chal-
lenges and the country compares well with lead-
ing transition economies from central and South-
east Europe. On the other hand, the process and
requirements for acquiring entry visas and work
permits – many investors’ ﬁrst encounter with the
country – are unnecessarily complicated and bur-
densome. Also, the process of acquiring land,
registering it and building new premises is
fraught with difﬁculty for investors. Although
these issues clearly entail a long-term agenda,
Croatia needs to take immediate actions where
possible to improve its performance. According
to the recent expert analyses, the greatest barri-
ers to business, which appear a major source of
corruption as well, are created by the lack of
detailed zoning plans and the ensuing complicat-
ed procedure for obtaining building permits. The
quality of zoning plans varies considerably across
the country. As things stand, the absence of clear
zoning plans in some areas creates opportunities
for corruption and confusion amongst investors.
The Investment Promotion Act of 2000 regulates
the promotion of investments by domestic and
foreign legal entities or natural persons with the
aim of stimulating the economic development of
Croatia, its integration into international trade
through the increase of exports and the competi-
tiveness of the Croatian economy. Investment
promotion comprises incentive measures, tax
and customs beneﬁts. The latter could, however,
be granted only to newly established companies
registered exclusively for the activities subject to
promotion measures. The envisaged incentive
measures are divided into three groups. The ﬁrst
one includes leasing, granting of construction
rights and sale or usage of real estate or other
infrastructure facilities owned by the Republic of
Croatia, local government or self-government
units under commercial or favourable conditions.
The second group of incentive measures refers to
assistance granted for the creation of new jobs.
The third group comprises incentive measures
related to assistance granted for vocational train-
ing or re-training. The various authorised state
administration bodies, utility companies and
other institutions are obliged to provide decisions
on consents, permits, certiﬁcates or other docu-
ments within 30 days of the submission of the
outline planning permission application; other-
wise, the City Ofﬁce is empowered to take the
decisions.
Today, the costs of doing business in BiH are
much too high, overloading the operation of pri-
vate ﬁrms. The country is still dominated by a
bureaucracy geared to the old socialist system
and controlled by ofﬁcials with formalistic mind-
sets. Missing are the market-type economic
incentives, while some informal remnants of ad
hoc wartime arrangements still remain.  Costly
administrative barriers create opportunities for
rent seeking and are particularly onerous for
SMEs. Many of the laws critical to business devel-
opment have not yet been promulgated or are not
supportive of private sector development.
Ownership rights remain unclear, contract law is
difﬁcult to enforce, and the courts are slow, non-
transparent and unpredictable. The tax rates on
business are high, the whole tax system is com-
plex and corruption is allegedly widespread.
These factors combined with perceptions of high
levels of political risk impede both foreign and
domestic investment. Companies and entrepre-
neurs with yearly income of more than KM
200,000 are entered in the register of the respec-
tive court according to the procedure set by the
Law on Enterprises. According to the Law on the
Policy of Foreign Investment registration of 1998,
foreign investment must be registered with the
authorized entity’s body, and also has the permis-
sion of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Relations of BiH. This step may be abol-
ished within the next six months since it is obso-
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lete with a view to differentiating between foreign
and domestic enterprises. In total it is a 15-step
procedure from the commencement of the
process, until the ﬁrm is able to operate and it
includes a number of ofﬁcial institutions and reg-
istration requirements.
The procedure of registering enterprises in
Serbia is clearly deﬁned in the Company Law. In
practice, however, the procedure of registering
ﬁrms in the respective courts is so complicated
that it seems almost impossible to register a ﬁrm
without professional help. A number of special
acts complicate the process. For example, esti-
mation of the initial capital is required even for
brand new things with invoice delivered. The Law
on procedure of registration in the court register
(1994) and the Decree on registration in the court
register (1997) regulate this procedure. It is
required from the ﬁrm to report all activities it is
planning to perform. The fact that only 37 compa-
nies were founded in 2001 may be good indicator
of the difﬁculties of the registration process.
Among the greatest problems is the procurement
of construction land and obtaining building
licenses. Construction land cannot be the private
property, but the right to use the land can be
granted in the form of concession. The Law on
construction land stipulates that land can be
granted through public tender or collecting bids
in response to a public announcement.
Although there are no signiﬁcant obstacles to the
registration of a business in Serbia, the pre-
scribed procedures appear to be rather time-con-
suming and costly. The G 17 Institute has done a
large study based on empirical analyses of the
existing regulation and interviews with entrepre-
neurs, showing that the costs of registering and
the time needed were extremely high in some
cases. According to the ﬁndings of the study, the
procedure typically lasted longer than the
amount of work needed for its completion.
Moreover, 21% of the interviewed entrepreneurs
had to bribe an ofﬁcial during the process of reg-
istration. The study also found that the overall
cost of the licenses required for construction was
DEM 7,787. 
In Romania, new entry in the banking sector has
always been fairly easy, though tougher criteria
were imposed lately. Romania is still ranked by
international agencies as one of the European
countries with the lowest barriers to entry and the
loosest banking supervision. As a result, many
small boutique-banks have been set up just to
tunnel funds from public institutions and collapse
one or two years later. These were among the
most serious examples of state-capture corrup-
tion we have seen so far. The completion of the
bank sector privatization in 2002 or 2003 will
probably reduce the scale of the phenomenon,
but loose supervision and standards will make
possible for private entrepreneurs with political
connections to continue to steal public resources
through various schemes.
6.5.2. Licensing regimes and their dynamics
One of the main sources of corruption stemming
from the regulation of economic activities is the
existence of registration and licensing regimes.
Their practical implementation has also proved
rather burdensome for the overall business envi-
ronment in Southeast Europe that remains gener-
ally difﬁcult and needs to be improved markedly
in order to create the necessary conditions for
sustainable growth. In this context, the past sev-
eral years saw many attempts across the region
to revise the existing regulatory framework with a
view to both strengthening the institutional set-
tings and streamlining the regimes. However, the
attitude toward the licensing type of regulation
still seems very contradictory. As a form of state
control licensing regimes are one of the ways to
reduce corruption by direct (administrative) con-
trol over economic activities. Yet, exactly because
of the way this control is exercised (direct control
protecting public interest but opposing private
interests who are subject to control) licensing
regimes themselves generate considerable eco-
nomic interests for side-stepping them through
corrupt practices. 
In Bulgaria, a large number of state agencies
(about 1/3 of total) are involved in licensing, reg-
istration and issuing permits but it is hard to say
how many regimes really exist (the current esti-
mates point to a ﬁgure of slightly above 500).
Given the numerous laws, which introduce or
cancel such regimes, there are no serious obsta-
cles for modiﬁcation of the existing regimes and
even introduction of new ones by various agen-
cies through different procedures. Still, the opti-
misation of the regulatory framework has long
remained a priority of government policy, even
though the declared intentions and the actual
developments point to considerable discrepan-
cies. Out of an estimated total of 526 licensing,
registration and permit regimes 148 had been
cancelled in the period 1999-2001, while another
102 had been slated for alleviation. According to
most recent estimates, the overall number of
regimes that are being currently reviewed is 512,
which is indicative of the ongoing developments.
The government has, however, reiterated its com-
mitment to alleviate the existing regulations. Out
of a total of 360 licensing regimes, the Council on
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Economic Growth has proposed the abolition of
74, as well as amendments of 194, with the pack-
age of legal changes being reportedly planned for
mid-2002. Among the line ministries in Bulgaria,
the Ministry of Agriculture is clearly the leader in
terms of the number of licensing regimes. It cur-
rently administers 62 such regimes of which 9 are
to be cancelled, while another 22 are to be allevi-
ated. In terms of the overall number of licensing,
registration and permit regimes, however, the
Ministry of Agriculture comes second with 75,
whereas the Ministry of Regional Development
and Welfare administers a total of 88 regimes.
The Bulgarian experience has also shown that the
accession process is creating additional difﬁcul-
ties in the attempts to solve the problems in the
ﬁeld of licensing regimes as the provisions of the
EU directives and regulations include a signiﬁ-
cant number of such regimes in the member-
states as well. Yet, the problem in Bulgaria is not
so much in the existence and the number of
regimes but in the clumsy, bureaucratised and
badly organized implementation, which creates
opportunities for corruption. The issue of overreg-
ulation is, in fact, the issue of administrative dis-
cretion instead of providing one-stop service for
the public. Adding to this, the current legislation
is full of contradictory provisions and creates a
room for corrupt behavior. Besides, it is possible
to introduce in a discretionary manner registra-
tion and licensing regimes - not only through
laws but also through administrative decrees,
ordinances, etc. It proves also possible to keep an
existing regime even after the law that initially led
to the introduction of this regime was repealed.
The lack of clearly formulated requirements for
the introduction of licensing and registration
regimes obviously raises the necessity for regu-
lating the very process of installing control mech-
anisms to protect public interest.
The licensing process in Romania is used to reg-
ulate the access to business areas such as
telecommunications, electronic broadcasting,
ﬁnance and insurance, foreign trade with a select-
ed list of goods (arms, products with quota
requirements) and mining. Even though the pro-
cedure of licensing should be transparent and
more or less automatic, there were many cases in
the past when the procedures resulted in suspi-
cion. Moreover, the Romanian national and local
administrations in general do not act as accurate
providers of public services, but as an annoying
structure to be tolerated and dealt with in case of
strict necessity. The frame of mind in the public
regulatory agencies is to be as uncooperative as
possible, by spotting ﬂaws in the business or indi-
vidual documents and use them as reasons for
blocking procedures. By doing so the bureaucrats
are rational agents who maximise their status
and income. 
Advice and assistance from civil servants are in
short supply, and often provided in exchange for
cash. For example, the Ministry of Finance has
not yet organized a service that can provide state-
ments with legal status on request. As a result,
different opinions on the same matter can be
heard from different ofﬁces of the ministry, while
an honest business that is seeking advice on a
complicated procedure can never be sure it is in
compliance with the law. This again expands the
decision-making discretion of public ofﬁcials and
opens new possibilities for corrupt practices.
Local governments are not immune, either. For
private individuals it is so difﬁcult to get a permit
to renovate or build a house on private land, that
the current practice is to start building ﬁrst and
then apply for permission. In exchange for a ﬁne,
which is less than the total administrative costs of
getting a legal permit, the construction can be
legalized afterwards. Such behavior perversely
saves time and money for the private agent, but
in time reduces the total welfare in society and
destroys the credibility of the public sector.
In Macedonia, there is a large number of licens-
es, approvals, reports or statements as precondi-
tions for opening a business, changing its nature
or starting construction activities. The rather long
and complicated bureaucratic procedures create
opportunities for the abuse of discretionary
power and corruption. The system of issuing and
obtaining permits, licenses and various approvals
for doing business in Macedonia has not changed
much during the last years. Its deﬁciencies have
provoked many complaints and initiatives by
businessmen aiming at a decrease in the number
of existing licenses. The country’s preparations
for membership in the WTO would also require a
streamlining of such regimes within the broader
scope of the targeted reduction in barriers to
business and functioning of the market economy.
Introducing a “one stop shop” is an important
step in order to shorten and improve the efﬁcien-
cy of the necessary procedures, narrowing at the
same time the possibility for corruption of public
ofﬁcials.
It is estimated that the average enterprise in BiH
needs to obtain about eight licenses annually in
order to function legally. Typically, ﬁrms with for-
eign direct participation need more licenses,
while large public companies have, on average,
ﬁve licenses. In co-operation with the entity gov-
ernments, the Council of Ministers of BiH has
developed a Global Framework of Economic
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Development Strategy (GFEDC). The ultimate goal
of this effort is to achieve sustainable economy in
the context of declining international assistance
that would require a marked improvement in the
existing business environment in order to stimu-
late domestic and foreign investment. In this
sense, one of the most important tasks is to
enhance the development of the private sector
and to reduce the sources of corruption. The
Strategy makes an immediate reference to the
elimination of administrative barriers to doing
business, among which particular importance is
attached to the simpliﬁcation of the registration
process, streamlining the controls for compliance
and decreasing the scope of the licensing
regimes. While BiH had seen a deterioration in
most of these factors during the initial transition
period, it could be reasonably expected that the
situation will start to gradually change as much of
the foreign aid is being now conditional on the
improvement in the overall business climate.
6.5.3. Foreign trade operations
The conduct of international trade business in
Macedonia is regulated by the provisions of the
Foreign Trade Law. According to it, the Ministry of
Economy issues the necessary licenses, permits
and approval for performing foreign trade opera-
tions. The law determines all the needed docu-
mentation and data that have to be submitted to
the Ministry of Economy in order for the latter to
make its decision upon it. Thus, the issuing of
licenses and approvals is in the discretionary
right of the Ministry, which decides whether the
criteria have been met. The resulting practice has
appeared fraught with irregularities and cases of
providing licenses and permits to companies
closely related to the ruling parties in a non-trans-
parent way and without fulﬁlment of criteria.
Most notorious was the scandal with a company
owned by a close friend of the Minister of
Economy that got the license to import sugar irre-
spective of the criteria and conditions, and
brought the deliveries in the country without pay-
ing any customs duties. Other examples refer to
the import licenses for meat from Croatia, as well
as recent imports of sugar free of customs duties.
Business entities wishing to conduct foreign
trade in Serbia have to register with the
Commercial Court and with the Federal Customs
Service. The former obligatory report of every
import-export transaction to the National Bank of
Yugoslavia was abolished in 2001. Out of 8,552
products speciﬁed in the Customs tariff nomen-
clature, 94 require an export license, 142 require
an import license, while the exports of 34 prod-
ucts are regulated by quotas. International trade
operations with certain goods require also addi-
tional approvals from relevant ministries such as
the Ministry of Health and Social Policy, the
Federal Institute for Measures and Precious
Metals or from the Federal Institute for
Standardisation. Licenses are necessary for the
export and import of goods regulated by interna-
tional agreements and conventions (arm, drugs,
etc.).  Many agricultural products are subject to
quotas. The Federal Government sets the condi-
tions, criteria and procedures concerning quotas
and the Federal Ministry for Economic Relations
issues authorisations. Since May 2001, quotas on
imports have been abolished. Thus, the country
has recently made notable progress in liberalis-
ing foreign trade operations, reversing the situa-
tion under the previous regime when foreign
trade had been almost exclusively organized on
the license system. Most of the licenses were
abolished by the end of 2000, while additional
measures were undertaken in May 2001 to signif-
icantly simplify the import and export proce-
dures. As mentioned earlier, however, the
Serbian government sometimes tries to solve
corruption problems by granting monopolies to
the state. There is a state monopoly on imports of
oil and oil derivatives since April 2001 and the
draft Tobacco Law provides for a monopoly on the
import of tobacco and cigarettes.
In Romania, a small circle of top government
ofﬁcials, who follow some rules that are not
always transparent, administers import-export
quotas, licenses and standards. The sheer com-
plexity of this activity makes the abuse hard to
prove as bureaucrats make use of very subtle
means to favour their business associates. For
example, the introduction of new quotas and
licenses may be done on ofﬁcial short notice,
while those who are well-placed are informally
notiﬁed in advance so that they have time to pre-
pare all the cumbersome documentation. Or, new
quality standards may be imposed overnight (ex.
in the food trade) as a competing ﬁrm has a large
quantity ready for import of export. The use of
non-tariff instruments may not only be bad for
the domestic business environment, creating
uncertainty and uneven playing ground, but also
detrimental for the whole society, since many
such measures are often just national protection
against competition for rent-seeking business
groups (another example of state capture).
Considering that many companies in BiH need to
obtain several export licenses annually, the
licensing procedures could be a source of corrup-
tion, if they are not clear and transparent, and
hence create obstacles for doing business. Yet,
almost all respondents in a survey carried out
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under a World Bank project (90% of ﬁrms that
applied for export licenses and 93% of those who
had experience with obtaining import licences)
found the procedures clear and transparent. 60%
of the surveyed ﬁrms got all the export licenses
they applied for, and another 29% received
almost all of them. Out of those ﬁrms that applied
for import licenses, 69% received all import
licenses they applied for, another 22% received
most of them. Overall, the analysis shows the
process of obtaining licenses being seen by the
respondents as clear, transparent and efﬁcient.
The time spent by ﬁrms on obtaining licenses
depends, among other things, on how many sig-
natures are required for each license. According
to respondents’ experience, the number of
required signatures is low – three on the average
for either export or import licenses. However, a
considerable number of enterprises reported pay-
ing bribes that equal, on the average, 2.6% of the
export license value and 2.8 % of the import
license value. 85% of the respondents who
answered this question put the size of the bribes
at 2% of the license value, suggesting that the
amount of the needed bribes is fairly well known.
6.6. Corporate Governance
Against the background of the existing supply-
demand interface within the corrupt relations, the
need to strengthen corporate governance in the
transition countries from South-east Europe
appears to be another key area of reform efforts
that should contribute to lower levels of corrup-
tion. The demand for kickbacks on behalf of repre-
sentatives of the administration is determined in
general by the nature of the relationship between
government and private business, as well as by
the state of public morality. Viewed from the sup-
ply side, the phenomenon is a function both of
the existing interests and of the inner structure
and rules of corporate decision-making. The
experience clearly demonstrates that the princi-
ples of sound corporate governance and its prac-
tice in the leading companies over the world
reduce considerably the opportunities for corrup-
tion. Therefore, the enhanced introduction of
sound corporate governance practices across the
region can have a strong anticorruption impact
on the supply side and help the South-east
European countries in casting off a corrupt repu-
tation. 
Corporate governance culture in Albania is at its
initial stages of development. Although the pri-
vate sector has been growing up dramatically
during the last decade, its corporate mentality is
far from being developed. Corporate governance
is a very powerful tool for curbing corrupt behav-
ior. The bribes offered to public ofﬁcials by com-
panies’ managers would drastically fall, should
better corporate governance practices be in place.
Thus, improving corporate governance means
reducing the opportunities for corruption prac-
tices. The current managers (who in the majority
of cases happen to be the controlling sharehold-
ers) of the private sector have a large authority on
the way the business is conducted. Establishing a
healthy corporate culture and strengthening the
legal framework with respect to publicly dis-
closed information should reduce the opportunity
for the top management of a company to act in an
abusive way and engage in bribery practices.
Given the negative past experience in Croatia,
the necessity to promote efﬁcient corporate gov-
ernance has been clearly recognized. An impor-
tant step was made in the autumn of 2000 with
the establishment of the Corporate Governance
Council within the Croatian Employers’
Association. This consultative body seeks to
engage in intensive dialogue to ﬁnd answers for
some burning issues of corporate governance in
Croatia, and it is hoped that it will make itself
heard in the preparation of the new legislation in
that domain. On the other hand, on the level of
the state, the policy-makers have at their dispos-
al a series of measures that might improve the
general corporate culture, as well as the gover-
nance and restructuring of companies. Such
measures would include the removal of all obsta-
cles to a greater participation of foreign investors
in the domestic economy, as well as the adoption
of the necessary legal amendments in order to
make possible the sale of land and real estate to
foreigners. Another key area of policy efforts
relates to the effective judicial protection of own-
ership and contract rights, the strengthening of
the legal mechanisms for owners’ control over
the management of the company and streamlin-
ing the procedures for exit from the market
(winding up and bankruptcy). Particular attention
should be given to the enhanced development of
ﬁnancial and capital markets that is very impor-
tant for raising the standards of corporate gover-
nance and increasing ﬁnancial transparency. At
the same time the authorities have to abandon
the practice of salvaging non-viable companies at
the taxpayers’ expense as the rescue operations
are weakening the incentives for corporate
restructuring and efﬁcient governance.
Looking at the supply side of corruption,
Bulgaria still lacks adequate regulation in the
ﬁeld, especially with regard to disclosure of con-
ﬂict of interests, which creates strong potential
for corrupt practices. In other words, the appar-
ently tolerated non-compliance with the rules of
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sound corporate governance leads also to toler-
ance of opportunities for corruption. Yet, thanks to
the Corporate Governance Initiative and civil soci-
ety in general, anticorruption efforts are directly
related to the issue of legislating and practising
sound corporate governance that undoubtedly is
a novelty for central and east Europe. Multiple
measures for solving the existing problems have
been proposed, although they failed to attract
sufﬁcient attention on the part of legislators and
regulators during 2001. The legal changes
deemed necessary include restrictions on the
simultaneous personal participation in several
governing bodies, an explicit ban on the partici-
pation of state employees and representatives of
the government in the boards of private compa-
nies, as well as clear rules for disclosure and
avoidance of conﬂicts of interests. With the goal
to establish high professional standards for the
members of the governing bodies of joint stock
companies in Bulgaria and to improve communi-
cation between investors and the management of
the companies, a draft law on amending the Law
on Public Offering of Security was prepared in
2001. It envisages important changes in the
requirements for selection and in the functions of
the members of managing and controlling bodies
of publicly traded companies, speciﬁc require-
ments for disclosing conﬂicts of interests, as well
as the introduction of the position of company
director for investor relations. The preparation of
a Code of Best Practices, which is supposed to be
completed in the near future, is also expected to
induce Bulgarian companies to voluntary comply
with principles of sound corporate governance,
induce discipline and discourage corruption.
7.1. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
The involvement of NGOs from SEE countries in
anti-corruption activities is conditional to three
mutually related processes: 1. Developments
within the third sector in each country; 2. The
availability of foreign funds, and 3. The prevailing
attitudes of national authorities vis-a-vis anti-cor-
ruption efforts by civil society.
7.1.1. Involvement of NGOs in anti-corruption
activities
Throughout the region the NGOs are still in a
process of deﬁning their ﬁelds of interest and
social role against a wide range of transition pri-
orities and problems. Anti-corruption, as a rela-
tively novel priority in public’s democracy and
civil rights agenda, is one of the topics, which
involve a growing number of NGOs. This involve-
ment is facilitated by the fact that anti-corruption
projects increasingly attract the attention of
potential Western donor organizations (both inter-
national bodies and national agencies).
In Albania it is believed that there are currently
between 400 and 800 NGOs, approximately 200
of which are active. The strongest NGOs are those
engaged in advocacy, youth issues, civic educa-
tion as well as women’s organizations. It is worth
noting that even the stronger NGOs remain donor
driven and dependent. The sector is very weak,
particularly when one compares its resources to
those of the state and of the informal economy.
This dependence is related to the constricted
Albanian economy, as well as a to the lack of con-
tinued technical assistance in organizational
development. A few months ago the Parliament
passed a new NGO law, which is considered as a
very positive step forward. Another positive step
forward is the increasing involvement of NGOs in
service providing. This is very important taking
into consideration the fact that the government is
unable to provide a sufﬁcient level of basic serv-
ices to its citizens. This recent involvement of
NGOs has somewhat enhanced the public image
of the sector. At the same time, it has exposed
local NGOs to more public scrutiny than they
have experienced before, which could increase
NGO accountability in the future. 
Thus, leaders of civil society organizations look
toward foreigners rather than fellow, perhaps
suspicious, Albanians for support. Some success-
ful multi-institutional investments by USAID have
shown that long-term sector-strategic commit-
ments can develop effective partnerships across
domestic political and economic barriers.
Examples include USAID projects in rural agricul-
tural development and the agribusiness sector,
where coalitions have succeeded in legislative
reform and public education activities. Hence, the
Albanian stage was set for a coalition to ﬁght cor-
ruption to enter.
The anti-corruption activities  in Albania devel-
oped as a  top-down initiative, as it is the govern-
ment which initiated them.
Gradually, with the assistance of the USAID, other
foreign organizations and the Institute for
Contemporary Studies (ICS) over 100 Albanian
NGOs were able to join the Albanian Coalition
Against Corruption (ACAC www.acac.info). The
members have worked together to develop a
strategic framework and to create an action plan
in order to ”reduce corruption throughout
Albania in a non-confrontational manner by
strengthening the role of civil society and work-
ing in coordination with governmental authorities
where appropriate.” (USAID Strategic
Framework) 
In addition to monitoring the Government’s
implementation of its revised anti-corruption
matrix, ACAC members have crafted an Action
Plan to address their priorities in the following
areas, which also serve as the working group
identities:
Public Procurement, Privatization, and
Property
Freedom of Information
Budget and Legislative Processes
Public Service Delivery
Judicial Reform
Taxation and Customs
ACAC will increase the awareness of Albanian
society regarding the causes and costs of corrup-
tion and to transform that awareness into advo-
cacy for reforms to reduce and combat corrup-
tion. It will promote as integrity, transparency,
accountability, and the rule of law in government
and society and monitor the progress of the
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reform process, focusing on the adoption and
implementation of transparent and clear rules of
law and the participation of citizens in govern-
mental decision making. 
Monthly Forums, hosted alternately by IDRA and
ICS, stimulate public debate on current corruption
issues and related events. These widely publicized
events involve high-level public ofﬁcials. 
In the wake of  Summer 2001 elections in Albania,
ACAC members participated in an USAID anti-
corruption project, which included organizing a
number of televised debates by youth, round-
tables on campaign ﬁnance ethics, distributing
ﬂyers and brochures about anti-corruption topics.
A member of ACAC drafted a plan to supplement
its legal aid clinic with a Citizen’s Anti-Corruption
Advocacy Ofﬁce in Tirana. The ofﬁce has already
opened and is available to anyone seeking help.
Despite the fact, that there are no BiH NGOs with
an anti-corruption background, the OSCE-spon-
sored NGO anti-corruption meeting that took
place in December 2000 signaled the readiness of
the third sector to become involved in both mon-
itoring and awareness activities. The BiH Chapter
of Transparency International was launched in
March 2001 and has been operating since coun-
trywide. It is also a rare instance that a domestic
NGO operates across the inter-Entity boundary
line with a single central ofﬁce and it includes
individuals from throughout BiH, of all nationali-
ties. 
Work undertaken thus far mostly focused on
awareness raising, either through reports pro-
duced, or a vivid media campaign on a broad
range of issues as well as seminars, workshops
and lectures given to students, general public or
parliamentarians.
Through the TI network a number of model laws
was acquired that were passed on to the authori-
ties for consideration. Some of these are being
built in the draft legislation, such as the preven-
tion of conﬂict of interest, public procurement etc.
More recently, as a continuation of the aware-
ness-raising campaign, TI BiH has undertaken a
large study of perception of corruption and its
results are currently being processed which will
mark another major pre-election attempt to place
corruption high on the political agenda and inﬂu-
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ence the future executive and legislative power to
combat this major social problem.
As a part of the internationally-led effort, involv-
ing primarily World Bank, but also EU and others
to a lesser extent, a dialogue was launched
between the public and the private sector to ana-
lyze various administrative barriers business
faces when operating in BiH. The initial efforts
were undertaken at the local level, but now the
Entities in particular and the State to a limited
extent are joining, according to the scope of
responsibility within their mandate. This effort is
at an initial stage. The stimulus for the process is
the ﬁnancial support of the WB, which condi-
tioned some of its business infrastructure pro-
grams by a progress in
this area.
Where such dialogue
was undertaken at the
municipal level, certain
advances were noted,
such as a quicker and
less complex access to
land, clearer and more
transparent and less
bureaucratic proce-
dures to register sole
proprietorships in the municipality as well as
information on other type of business registration
available on the spot (sometimes organized as
one-stop-shops) and a less demanding compli-
ance mechanisms management-wise.
The relative success of these initiatives at the
local level have now prompted the higher levels
of authorities to launch the same initiatives, but
this time focusing on more substantial issues,
such as taxation, business registration process,
customs reform etc.
Once the bulk of humanitarian activities were
over, in the immediate war aftermath, certain
irregularities were noted in the work of the inter-
national and national
NGOs dealing with the
refugee crises. Waste
disposal was often
organized in the form
of medical supplies etc.
being the most obvious
illegal practices in BiH.
The accounting stan-
dards and the account-
ability of such NGO was
disputable and it may
never be known what
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Independence of NGOs
A TI BiH public survey showed that only 11.1
percent of respondents think that corruption is
widespread in NGO’s sector. In answering the
question  "Who should combat corruption"
respondents pointed in the direction of State
agencies, the IC as well as the non-political
NGO sector, which displays little conﬁdence in
the ofﬁcial authorities and a growing one for
the non-proﬁt sector. 
extent of money laundering etc. was present in
BiH during and after the war.
Lately, equipment and books of four NGOs
ﬁnanced from the High Saudi Committee for
Refugees were seized in a FBiH police-led opera-
tion with a strong presence of International Police
Task Force – IPTF and SFOR, following US intelli-
gence reports of money laundering and illegal
terrorism-linked activities.55 This is more a result
of the momentum reached for the global anti-ter-
rorist campaign, than a continuous BiH and inter-
national efforts to combat corruption in the coun-
try.
Anti-corruption initiatives launched by Bulgarian
NGOs generally face an essentially ambivalent
attitude on the part of the state to the problem of
corruption and to anti-corruption efforts. Both
government and the National Movement Simeon
II parliamentary majority are split between their
eagerness to present themselves as the champi-
ons of anti-corruption and their understandable
uneasiness about “intrusive” civic efforts to
assess the seriousness of their own efforts and
the effectiveness of transparency programs.
When compared to the previous parliament,
however, both the Simeon Saxe Coburg-Gotha
government and the 39th National Assembly
appear more open to public-private partnership
in countering corruption. In this context, a num-
ber of areas in the ongoing public-private part-
nership were intensiﬁed and have produced spe-
ciﬁc outcomes: 
First steps were made towards successful
anti-corruption cooperation between the
executive and non-governmental organi-
zations. Experts from Coalition 2000 took part
in drafting the National Anti-Corruption
Strategy. It contains a section devoted to anti-
corruption cooperation among state institu-
tions, non-governmental organizations, and
the mass media. The document stresses the
importance of “building up mechanisms and
sound practices of partnership among state
institutions, non-governmental organizations,
and the private media in spheres such as pub-
lic control over the activity of the administra-
tion; civil rights safeguards; self-regulation
through the practical implementation of effec-
tive codes of conduct; initiating independent
monitoring, and launching anti-corruption
public awareness campaigns”. The importance
of the activity of anti-corruption initiatives
such as Coalition 2000 and Transparency with-
out Borders is also noted. The improved com-
munication between non-governmental
organizations in the sphere of counteracting
corruption and key representatives of the
executive favors the creation of a sustainable
mechanism for consultation and cooperation
on a number of governance-related issues of
public concern. However, at the present stage
public-private partnership in this area
still tends to be of a sporadic nature and
largely depends on the good will of the
respective ministers and their teams.
The principle of public-private partnership
in reforming the Judiciary is assuming
increasing importance. This has reinforced the
efforts of the Judiciary to intercept and sanc-
tion corrupt practices. One illustration of the
possibilities in this respect is the Judiciary
Reform Initiative, which joins the efforts of
eight non-governmental organizations /see
www.csd.bg/jri/.
Within the frames of the third sector itself
there emerged an even more pronounced
emphasis on the preventive function of
civil society in addition  to the aware-
ness-raising component, which was the ini-
tial focus of anti-corruption efforts.  Thus a
number of projects of non-governmental
organizations are establishing speciﬁc mecha-
nisms of private-public partnership aimed at
curbing corrupt practices in various sectors of
social life.
At a municipal level negotiating public-pri-
vate partnership mechanisms has produced
mixed results. Indeed, there was an even clear-
er differentiation of the attitudes of the local gov-
ernment representatives who had initially
expressed readiness to participate in the Coalition
2000 Local Government Transparency Program.
The pre-election commitments made in this
respect proved politically motivated and failed to
bring about the creation of permanent mecha-
nisms of public-private partnership or tangible
anti-corruption measures within the frames of
local government.
The shape and nature of civic participation in
counteracting corruption  continued to be largely
determined by the activities of Coalition 2000 and
its founder NGOs together with representatives
of state institutions and independent experts.
The chief areas of activity in this respect can
be summed up as follows:
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55 Media articles in February-April 2002: Dnevni Avaz, Glas Srpski and Oslobodjenje, Sarajevo, 2002
The civic monitoring of corruption contin-
ued, most notably through the regular publi-
cation of the Coalition 2000 Corruption
Indexes. Notwithstanding the absence of dra-
matic ﬂuctuations in public attitudes and per-
ceptions, the Corruption Indexes are increas-
ingly perceived as important and are a com-
monly consulted source of information about
the spread of corruption.
Within the frames of the anti-corruption
public awareness campaign non-govern-
mental organizations and their experts contin-
ued to take an active part in fostering the prop-
er public attitudes to help prevent corruption
and reinforce the new values of transparency
and accountability.
The consulting and expertise-sharing
activity of Coalition 2000 on anti-corruption
issues in cooperation with various state and
private institutions and companies assumed
growing importance. Representatives of for-
eign state and non-governmental organiza-
tions increasingly consult with Coalition 2000
experts. Regional anti-corruption projects
drawing on the experience gained in Bulgaria
are also under way. An example is the South-
East Europe Legal Development Initiative,
which draws on the experience of Coalition
2000 in corruption monitoring and assess-
ment and enlists non-governmental organiza-
tions from a number of states in the region. In
other words, Coalition 2000 is increasing-
ly perceived as a model of successful
mobilization of the efforts of the public
and private sectors in the ﬁght against
corruption.
There was continued cooperation between
non-governmental and business organizations
in the process of working out joint mecha-
nisms for assessment of the shadow economy
and of trafﬁcking, which are damaging both to
society as a whole and to legitimate business. 
Efforts were sustained to build up a consulta-
tive mechanism for the assessment and
measurement of the gray sector generat-
ed by illegal trafﬁcking practices and the
related corruption of public ofﬁcials by
initiative of Coalition 2000. These involved
Coalition 2000 experts, experts from private
companies with a vested interest in curbing
the shadow economy and more speciﬁcally,
competition through illegal import of goods,
and representatives of state institutions (cus-
toms, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of
Finances, and others). With the help of com-
parative studies and a specially developed
methodology, various data compilations are
being compared, thus measuring the dynam-
ics of the illegally imported goods and the
approximate value of the corruption deals tak-
ing place during these operations.
The anti-corruption education courses,
introduced as experimental lecture series
within the curriculum of Soﬁa University and
New Bulgarian University, are  gaining a per-
manent place in the curriculum. A number of
other educational establishments have shown
interest in this initiative.
A number of anti-corruption initiatives on
a municipal level, under the common motto
Local Government Transparency, continued to
develop by way of trial and error. The intro-
duction of the local ombudsman institution
and the alternative position of civic observer
in a number of municipalities had mixed
results, largely depending on the attitudes of
the local government representatives and the
local institutions of central power. The follow-
ing conclusions can be drawn from these
efforts:
The most ambitious attempt was the joint ini-
tiative of the Soﬁa Municipality and the inde-
pendent Center for Social Practices, which par-
ticipates in the activities of Coalition 2000, to
introduce the local ombudsman institution.
The actual  commencements of its activity,
however, was delayed by a complaint ﬁled in
court. This came as further evidence of the vul-
nerability of such initiatives, which are unpro-
tected by proper legal regulations.
Deﬁnite progress was made in the implemen-
tation of other local anti-corruption projects
(for instance in Shumen and Varna), despite
the initial doubts, the activity of the civic
observers in identifying the zones of non-
transparency within the municipal administra-
tion assumed a more regular character and
yielded identiﬁable results.  Attention was
drawn to the bureaucratic barriers impeding
citizens from monitoring the course of their
complaints and reports, as well as the lack of
proper coordination between the various
branches of local government. These problems
lead to unregulated relations between citizens
and ofﬁcials and to increased corruption risk.
Speciﬁc recommendations aimed at enhanc-
ing the  accountability of municipal adminis-
trations were made. 
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The attempt to introduce local mediators in
Pleven proved unsuccessful. The newly elect-
ed mayor appeared committed to the goals of
the anti-corruption campaign and Pleven was
declared a corruption-free city, with the munic-
ipal administration allegedly supporting the
introduction of the local ombudsman.
Subsequently, however, the proper mecha-
nism for interaction between the municipality
and the local civil society structures was not
established.
The civic observer institution is novel to the
Bulgarian practice. Its activity and functions con-
sist of the exercise of civic control and in provid-
ing independent expert assistance for the further
development of local government reform and for
guaranteeing the transparency and accountability
of local government institutions. Its advantage is
derived from the fact that it does not require addi-
tional regulation through legal or other instru-
ments and can make the most of current laws on
local self-government and the practices of open-
ness and accountability of the various forums of
local government that are already in place.
Coalition 2000 has highlighted the following pri-
orities within the local anti-corruption initiatives:
Providing assistance to intensify the work of
the municipal councils and to make use of the
existing legal framework to limit the possibili-
ties for corruption pressure in the municipali-
ties.
Focusing efforts to institute real control over
municipal council decisions on the part of per-
manent and ad hoc municipal committees.
Exercising civic control over the activity of
municipal council members, including
through the extension of regulations allowing
for their removal from ofﬁce in the case of
abuse of power. 
Improving the ability of the municipal PR and
information services to work effectively.
Drafting proposals to eliminate ineffective
mechanisms in the municipal administration,
as well as the duplication of functions, and the
blurring of the responsibilities of central, dis-
trict, and local authorities.
Supporting the adoption of legislative meas-
ures providing clear-cut legal and ﬁnancial
guarantees that ensure equal standing and
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Chart 21: Factors inﬂuencing the spread of 
corruption in Bulgaria
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System.
independence of local government in line with
the principles of the European Charter on
Local Self-Government.
It must also be noted that non-governmental
organizations themselves continue to be
liable to corrupt practices. Little progress has
been made in introducing codes of ethics in the
third sector, which sustains public criticism of the
activity of certain non-governmental organiza-
tions that enjoy forms of political protection and
privileges.
The most important NGO-led anti-corruption
activities in Croatia are related to  awareness-
raising NGOs like TI-Croatia and are active in
informing  the public about corruption threats,
publishing and distributing leaﬂets, brochures,
appearances of the members in the media. 
The Croatian Government Ofﬁce for Cooperation
with Non-Governmental Organizations was
established in October 1, 1998, with the goal of
establishing conﬁdence and promoting coopera-
tion between the Government of the Republic of
Croatia and non-governmental organizations
operating in the country as two essential prereq-
uisites for modernization and the development of
civil society in Croatia. In order to democratize the
relations and make its work transparent, the
Ofﬁce has: introduced a model of solicitation for
tenders to provide ﬁnancial support for NGO pro-
grams, published the results of the tender and
organizes other important activities. One of the
goals of the Ofﬁce is to help any NGO that will
deal with the ﬁght against corruption. 
In year 2000, Transparency International Ofﬁce
Croatia was founded and one could be proud of
the development it has made over this period. TI
Croatia is preparing promotional leaﬂets and
materials to explain brieﬂy the notion of corrup-
tion, the mission of  TI and suggest how every
individual can help in its activities. Ofﬁce experts
have drafted law proposals (for example, Conﬂict
of Interest Law), they have established contacts
with governing and public bodies, with the inter-
national community as well as cooperating with
similar NGOs (Association for Democratic
Development - news on the road project and a TV
show on national television). This all was and still
is very important for this organization and for the
Republic of Croatia. The continuous positive
movement of Croatia on the Corruption
Perception Index illustrates this rather well. 
There is an NGO Association for the Protection of
Victims of Corruption and Loan Sharking (Udruga
za zastitu zrtava korupcije i lihvarenja).
A Regional Conference on Civil Society was
organized by SPAI on 17-19 September, 2001 in
Cavtat, Croatia. It brought together representa-
tives of local civil society organizations, including
media, businesses and trade unions, senior ofﬁ-
cials of participating countries, donor countries,
as well as most of the major international NGOs
and bilateral agencies having technical assistance
programs related to anti-corruption issues and
civil society. The main objective of the conference
was to involve local civil society organizations,
international NGOs and donors in a constructive
dialogue and co-operation and to fully engage
them in SPAI activities. The objectives of the con-
ference were: 1) to discuss the involvement of
civil society in the ﬁght against corruption in
countries; to this end, the US Government is cur-
rently holding consultations with local civil socie-
ty experts in order to prepare an assessment
report to be examined at the conference;  2) to
address good practices in terms of patterns of
interaction between the government and civil
society organizations, including trade unions,
business associations and media, and to share
experience and ideas on formulating anti-corrup-
tion measures applicable to SEE countries;  3) to
discuss the funding of specific projects for
strengthening the involvement of civil society in
the ﬁght against corruption.
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Chart 22: Corruption expectations 
in Croatia
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System.  This index reg-
isters citizens’ assessments of the capacity (potential) of their
societies to cope with the problem of corruption. Scores close
to 1 correspond to optimism, those close to 10 to highest
degree of pessimism and doubts about the potential of the
society.
Very important (indirect) impact in ﬁght against
corruption was made by NGO GLAS ‘99 (Vote
‘99). GLAS ‘99 was formed when four major NGO
coalitions, representing women, youth, ethnic
minorities, and the environment, agreed to devel-
op the campaign using democratic processes.
Beginning in September 1999, the GLAS coalition
coordinated a sophisticated and comprehensive
campaign urging Croatians to vote (which would
increase voter turnout) and creating the condi-
tions for free and fair parliamentary elections in
Croatia.
Anticorruption is one of the issues that the
Macedonian NGO sector has worked the least
on in the last ten years since the independence.
The think-tank organizations that work on the
reforms of the social and economic system and
the achievement of standards of the European
Union, from time to time tackle the issue of cor-
ruption, but do not treat the corruption phenome-
non. 
The reasons for the insufﬁcient dealing with the
corruption in the Republic of Macedonia by the
NGOs (or at least not at the level it deserves) are
numerous:
until recently Macedonia lacked broader and
sufﬁciently mature society consciousness for
the need to curb the corruption;
a small number of developed and proﬁled
NGOs capable of taking on a treatment of as
complex phenomenon as the corruption;
insufﬁcient number of highly professional per-
sonnel engaged in the work of the NGOs who
could contribute in dealing with the corrup-
tion;
avoiding the corruption issue which should be
treated in the projects because of the “distinc-
tiveness” of the topic and the possible reac-
tions by the authorities;
insufficient co-ordination and co-operation
between the NGOs in the country;
the donors’ interest in ﬁnancing projects is
more oriented towards the interethnic rela-
tion, the human rights and the democratisa-
tion, and during and after the crisis towards
projects related to displaced persons, recon-
struction and conﬁdence building.
public opinion was mainly preoccupied with
the international and interethnic relations, the
economic transformation, the crisis in the
region and in the country;
the big absorption of personnel which could
work in the third sector from the side of the
foreign organizations.
An exception to the general rule is Forum - Centre
for Strategic Research and Documentation within
which framework also functions Transparency
International - Macedonia. Until now these two
NGOs have been the only ones in the Republic of
Macedonia, which work on projects, which specif-
ic topic of interest is corruption as well the meas-
ures for its prevention.
In the last two years they have carried out or are
still working on the following projects in the area
of corruption:
2001 and 2002 public opinion polls within the
framework of the Regional Corruption
Monitoring System in cooperation with the
Center for Study of Democracy from Soﬁa,
Bulgaria;
The need for the Drafting of the National
Anticorruption Strategy in the Republic of
Macedonia in cooperation with the OSCE
Secretariat - the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator for
Economic Activities and Environment;
The triangle cooperation among the
Government, the international community and
the NGOs on enhancing the anti-corruption
activities in the Republic of Macedonia in
cooperation with the Council of Europe;
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Chart 23: Corruption expectations 
in Macedonia
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System
One of the fundamental premises for a successful
confrontation of corruption is the intensive and
open public-private cooperation that in
Macedonia is on a lower level than required. The
reasons for that basically come down to the atti-
tude of all the governments towards the NGOs
that varies between ignoring up to insufﬁcient
readiness for cooperation as well as insufﬁcient
capacity of the civil sector, which need to impose
itself as a partner to the Government.
However, there are grounds for optimism,
because in the last few months part of the estab-
lishment shows signs of readiness for coopera-
tion with the NGO sector, even on sensitive
issues, such as corruption. Hence, the Ministry of
Finance of the Republic of Macedonia on its own
initiative asked Transparency International -
Macedonia to monitor the examination of the
authorized public accountants - audits. In doing
that the Ministry provided the representatives of
Transparency International - Macedonia with
open access to monitor the process in each of the
phases and with no limitations.
Apart from that there is a possibility Transparency
International - Macedonia to monitor the privati-
zation of the biggest public company in the
Republic of Macedonia - the Electric Power
Company of Macedonia. The Government shows
certain readiness for this to happen. Having in
mind the assessed value of this company - about
2 billion Euros, the experience from the privatiza-
tion process in the country as well as the great
political investment in the time of the elections,
one could expect that the monitoring will be the
key exam for the maturity of the civil sector in
that kind of cooperation with the establishment.
Even greater reason for optimism is the fact that
one may really expect that corruption and its pre-
vention will soon become one of the leading top-
ics of the public debates in Macedonia. The rea-
sons are the lower threshold of tolerance of the
citizens towards the illegal activities and the more
clearly expressed pressure by the international
community in regard to corruption prevention.
Hence one could expect greater readiness of the
establishment for corruption prevention and
greater cooperation with the NGO sector, the
media and the scientiﬁc circles.
Since only the Government and the Parliament
have direct authority in ﬁghting corruption, the
NGOs will have to impose themselves as partners
and monitors of this process. In order to be able
to do that, the NGO sector will need the support
from the donors’ community. Its support of the
projects in the area of anticorruption, especially
of those that would be focused on the preparation
of the anti-corruption strategy of the country and
the plan for its implementation should be greater
and more courageous that it is now.
There are more than 2,000 non-governmental
organizations in Serbia. At the end of the
Milosevic regime, there was a real boost of estab-
lishing new NGO’s. It was a form of gathering
most of the anti-Milosevic oriented citizens,
which played the major role in overthrowing the
regime. Since democratic government came to
power cooperation with the NGO sector has been
considerably improved, which was not unexpect-
ed given that there was substantial cooperation
among them while they were in opposition. 
Anti-corruption ofﬁce to the Ministry of Finance
and Economy cooperates with the NGOs that are
in one way or another, involved in ﬁght against
corruption. Their aim is to achieve higher cooper-
ation of anti-corruption activities. There is approx-
imately more than twenty  NGOs that visited
meetings organized by this department.
Most relevant NGOs that deal with the anti-cor-
ruption topics are “OTPOR” movement, Center
for Liberal and Democratic Studies, Center for
Management, Transparency International,
European Movement and Center for Policy
Studies, which have, so far, organized tangible
anti-corruption activities.
OTPOR organized large anti-corruption campaign
last year to increase the awareness on corruption
issues. Campaign was followed by various activi-
ties on more than eighty locations throughout
Serbia. Center for Liberal and Democratic
Studies, has published the most complete analy-
sis of corruption in Serbia, and presented both
quantitative and qualitative results.(Corruption in
Serbia, CLDS, 2001). Center for Management has
focused on education and training activities as
well as publishing and round table discussions on
corruption. Center for Policy Studies is devoted to
research and analysis of corruption problems.
European Movement published various studies
on corruption in speciﬁc institutions such as cus-
toms, police, health protection system etc. It has
been active since 1992. There is no need for spe-
cial presentation of the Transparency
International since it has been a part of almost
every anti-corruption activity in Serbia. It oper-
ates within the European Movement. TI has pub-
lished National Integrity System study, which
gives a different approach to analyzing corruption
since it compared the opinions of independent
experts and Government, and faced them on a
round table discussion in addition. TI is especially
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interested in development of the public procure-
ment system, and it signiﬁcantly participated in
the improvement of the Public Procurement Law.
7.2. Media
As a general rule, the freedom of information and
the freedom of expression are safeguarded under
the post-communist constitutional and legal
arrangements in the SEE countries. The new
media in the Balkan region are more or less inde-
pendent from the state, but dependent ﬁnancially
on their owners and sponsors. Political pressures
on journalists, and more speciﬁcally on the media
editorial staff still persist. Nevertheless, through-
out the past few years private media and above
all independent newspapers in a number of
Balkan countries have developed a keen interest
in exposing corruption scandals, often involving
political ﬁgures.
Article 22 of the Albanian Constitution sanctions
the freedom of speech, of the press, of the radio
and television, and since 1999, Albania has also
modern legislation concerning the freedom of
information. In June 1999, the parliament adopt-
ed Law No. 8503, “On the Freedom of Information
on Official Documents”. Article 23 of the
Constitution of 1998 has established the citizen’s
right to freedom of information. That Article pro-
vides the following:
The right to information is guaranteed;
Every citizen has the right, under the law, to
receive information about the activity of state
organizations and persons who exercise state
functions;
Every citizen can follow the meetings of col-
lectively elected bodies
The basic principle of the law is that if a public
ofﬁcial declines to provide a citizen with the
requested information, such ofﬁcial should issue
a statement explaining the legal basis for such
decision. The law also envisages speciﬁc time-
frames for refusal of a request for information,
the satisfaction of the request, and procedures for
the reinstatement of deadlines to be respected. 
However, poor implementation has been a prob-
lem for the Freedom of Information Act. Several
scholars argue that this is because no govern-
ment agency has been vested with the speciﬁc
and exclusive task of overseeing the implementa-
tion of the law. We believe that Ombudsman can
do a lot in terms of raising public awareness as to
the existence of the law and enable the people to
avail themselves of the guarantees provided
therein.
The Albanian press and media in general have
made considerable progress during the transition
years. Many newspapers, radio broadcasting and
TV stations have been established. Although the
number of the media entities has increased dra-
matically, their quality has not. It is important to
mention that what is hurting media with respect
to denouncing corruption is auto-censorship.
Journalists are afraid to make public embarrass-
ing documents because they are afraid that that
might displease their publishers (who do not
want to have trouble with politicians) who might
fire them. The media in Albania are totally
dependent upon ﬁnancing, i.e. upon their own-
ers. What is lacking in the sector is an investiga-
tive journalist capacity.
The current state of the media can be described
as follows:
Most of the actors are technically underdevel-
oped (in reference to the professionalism of
journalists and the technology they use);
The media remains financially dependent
upon certain business lobbies;
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in Serbia
Source: SELDI Corruption Monitoring System
Media is a subject of political instrumentaliza-
tion (which rises the issue of credibility of
media)
The following steps are needed to create
stronger, more credible and professional media
in Albania:
Establish and enforce a Professional Code of
Ethics for Journalists. The ethics of the jour-
nalists is lacking, and corrupted people exploit
them by encouraging distrust in media. One
day, “facts” are fabricated for sensational
sales, and the next day, the “facts” are denied
in a small corner of the newspaper. For this
reason, associations of journalists and their
trade unions must collaborate to establish pro-
fessional ethical rules in their activity.
Train journalists in investigative journalism,
especially on a regional basis. In this man-
ner, the investigative journalists can create
regional strata that strengthen their own chan-
nels of information and cooperation.
Train journalists with basic economic con-
cepts. Evidence in journals proves the need for
journalists who cover the economy in media
to learn fundamentals in macro and microeco-
nomics. 
Conduct joint public-private training modules
on the Freedom of Information Law. The
advantages of training both sectors together
cannot be overestimated. The Government
Offices of Public Information continue to
demonstrate their lack of awareness of the
law. Strategically training them alongside the
journalists who have tried to exercise the law
may bridge some misunderstandings. 
Monitor the media for cases of corruption pre-
sented in them.  Other members of civil socie-
ty should work in a partnership fashion to
ensure accuracy and to respond accordingly.
The International Community has been very
instrumental in the reform of Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s broadcast media structure and
regulation. The Ofﬁce of the High Representative
has considerable powers in relation to formula-
tion of legislation, as well as overturning laws.
The Independent Media Commission (IMC) was
created in June 1998 by the then-High
Representative Carlos Westendorp to introduce
international standards into a post-conﬂict envi-
ronment comprised of a deeply divided society
where the broadcast media was traditionally
dominated by the state and its associated fac-
tions. At the beginning of March 2001, the IMC
was superseded by the Communications
Regulatory Authority, which combines the com-
petencies of the IMC and the Telecommunications
Regulatory Agency (TRA).
Intimidation and harassment of journalists con-
tinue largely unabated in BiH. So too have attacks
against them and their premises. Structural short-
comings also contribute to thwart vigorous jour-
nalism and the audiovisual sector is by no means
exempt from such problems. Broadcasting out-
lets, for instance, suffer from endemic institution-
al susceptibility to political interference and vari-
ous ﬁnancial pressures. Politicians frequently use
their clout to try to interfere with personnel deci-
sions and other related matters, with varying
degrees of success. A harsh economic environ-
ment has broadcasters struggling for survival.
Financial problems arising from the vagaries of a
transitional economy are exacerbated by high
levels of taxation and poor job security for those
employed in the media sector. As in most former
Communist countries, a major concern is the
prevalence of self-censorship by journalists and
the need to raise professional standards in gener-
al. Furthermore, some commentators have advo-
cated judicial reform in order to depoliticize the
courts in BiH and to make the judiciary more
favorably disposed to freedom of expression
issues.
BiH ratiﬁed the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1993 (by succes-
sion). It is about to become a full member of the
Council of Europe in May 2002, but it has enjoyed
the status of Special Guest to the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council since 1994. It ratiﬁed the
Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities in February 2000 and this
Convention entered into force in June 2000. 
Paragraph 3(h) of the Constitution of BiH (1995)
explicitly mentions freedom of expression as one
of the human rights and fundamental freedoms
enjoyed by all persons within the territory of BiH.
This right is underpinned by a number of other
constitutional provisions. Paragraph 7, for
instance, states that BiH shall remain or become
a party to the international agreements listed in
Annex 1 to the Constitution. These Conventions
include several with provisions on freedom of
expression, such as the ICCPR, the European
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and
the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities. 
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Access to public information – legal provisions
and current practices
Freedom of Information Act was adopted by the
State and the Entity parliaments in 2001. It allows
for a public access to a wide range of information
and the journalists have since been receiving
training, both in legal terms (as provided by ABA-
CEELI) and in practical, investigative research
(supported by the BBC School of journalism,
USAID’s IREX and Open Society Fund).
Nevertheless, much work remains to be done par-
ticularly in training the journalists, since there is a
clearly visible lack of professionalism and under-
standing of the media processes. Most journalists
had no prior training and are only just starting in
this ﬁeld. This is why the reports often lack in-
depth analyses, coverage beyond the official
statements and press conferences and other
ready-served materials.
Provisions for disclosure of ﬁnancial standing of
ofﬁcials is also a subject of the election legisla-
tion, which was described earlier in the text.
Libel laws and other sanctions used to restrict the
independence of journalists
In addition to the lack of professionalism, various
other restrains are present in the work of journal-
ists. It has little legal foundation, except for the
ownership of the state media, particularly TV and
radio, where their inﬂuence is still exercised. In
case of all other media, they are mostly restricted
either by the owners, or ﬁnanciers or often com-
bined. As journalists themselves often claim, the
foreign donor that funds a magazine, does not
like seeing any damaging reports on the govern-
ment of its origin. More often even, they pay for
articles, i.e. advertisements for certain parties that
are considered to their liking. This is mostly not
on a article-by-article basis, but by permanently
funding certain publications, periodicals with a
particular political current.56There are articles that
will never see the light of the press, which are
being dismissed much before their publishing.
Trends in corruption coverage in the media; expo-
sure of grand corruption in the media
Rather vague and often counterproductive, due to
the lack of clear evidence and in-depth examina-
tion. It is not uncommon that the media from
another regional neighbor and primarily Croatia
and Serbia write about cross-border affairs that
are grand in scale and as a rule involve the BiH
politicians. Then certain superﬁcial follow-ups are
being composed by the local press.
It is rather unfortunate that media as a useful anti-
corruption tool is rather impotent and not ade-
quately staffed, trained and paid and it is from
this perspective one should observe lack of
decent grand corruption coverage in a country
where it clearly exists.
Reprisals against journalists and editors caused
by corruption exposure and publications.
Monitoring has proven that old habits die hard.
One of the innovations of the work of the OSCE
Department of Media Affairs in BiH has been the
establishment of a help-line for journalists to
report threats against them or threats to media
freedoms. The OSCE Free Media Help Line was
launched in November 1999 and in the ﬁrst year
of its operation, it registered a total of 138 cases.
Forty of these cases were from RS and 98 from
the FBiH. The category of people from which most
of these threats or perceived threats originated
was government/public ofﬁcials (35.5 per cent).
Anonymous threats constituted 20.3 per cent of
the reported cases.57
Measures to curb corruption in the Media/Codes
of conduct for journalists
Codes of conduct for journalists have not yet
been introduced and at present there are no
efforts to provide for these in practice.
With the political changes resulting from June
2001 parliamentary elections, the Bulgarian
media face a new situation:
There has been a rise in public and political
interest in the exposure of political cor-
ruption among the representatives of the
former government of the country. In this
new context the media have largely concen-
trated their efforts on carrying out into public
information.
The media are making a major contribution in
interpreting the specific disclosures
incriminating high-ranking government
ofﬁcials. In this respect the leading journal-
ists are giving credibility to deep-seated public
concerns and moods by publicly showcasing
issues of corruption, and therefore allowing
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56 Interviews of TI BiH with BiH journalists conducted in July-August 2001
57 Web site: (http://www.seenapb.org/legislation/default.htm)
knowledge of past abuse to rise to the level of
mass consciousness.
At the same time, investigative reporting
still confronts serious ﬁnancial, political,
and legal obstacles in the pursuit of its
mission. Reason for hope is found in the
efforts of the 39th National Assembly to adopt
a new Law on the Access to Public Informa-
tion, which is to allow greater transparency of
state institutions and to therefore facilitate the
work of reporters.
The considerable rise in media interest in corrup-
tion-related issues had the following characteris-
tics:
The subject of “political corruption” was
at the center of public interest. What is
more, the publications dealing with this phe-
nomenon revealed specific situations and
referred to familiar public ﬁgures. Dozens of
publications in the national press referred to
the initiated investigations, initiated against
former ministers and MPs under charges of
various forms of abuse of ofﬁce and discre-
tionary power. Interest in corruption-related
issues is sustained by the new government’s
resolve to shed full light on the acts of the for-
mer ruling majority, including though the pub-
lication of a White Book on instances of abuse
in the respective state agencies and institu-
tions.
Recent developments following from media
disclosures have occurred over the past few
years concerning corrupt government ofﬁ-
cials. Preliminary court proceedings were initi-
ated following several journalistic investiga-
tions,  cases which have boosted public
appreciation of the journalistic contribu-
tion to the efforts to counteract corrup-
tion. The ﬁrst half of 2002 was marked by an
increasing number of publications/broad-
casts focusing public criticism on the
“soft” forms of corruption: trade in inﬂu-
ence, conﬂict of interests, and other
forms of abuse of public office.
Clientelism has become a key term, especially
in the period since June-July 2001. The fre-
quency of its recurrence is about four times
higher compared to the same period of the
previous year. Kinship terms (“cousins”) are
also highly recurrent in the press publications
with reference to the same phenomenon. 
Speciﬁc schemes of legal, but unethical,
privileging of those in power have been
exposed:
The system of selling state-owned apartments
to high-ranking government ofﬁcials at prices
far lower than current market ones, which has
been inherited from the communist past.
The practice of including high-ranking govern-
ment ofﬁcials in numerous boards of enter-
prises in which the state has a stake.
Improper lavishness and excessive official
expense accounts of public ofﬁcials.
A new “balance of power” between the gov-
ernment and the media has appeared, which
has the following dimensions:
The media did not abide by the rule demand-
ing three-months of tolerance and started crit-
icizing certain pro-corruption actions of repre-
sentatives of the new ruling majority from the
very ﬁrst days of its formation. Thus there was
not any initial tabooing of critical publications
and programs, as had been the practice upon
each previous power shift during Bulgaria’s
transition.
The public debate, which took place in,
and through, the independent media,
was ideologically unencumbered and
largely perceived as an expression of
civic rather than political, interest.
The anti-corruption subject is increasingly
considered in the context of the debate on the
need for a new political and governmen-
tal culture and further administrative
reform aimed at overcoming the etatist
model.
This context favored a more active role of
the civic organizations specializing in the
safeguard of the freedom of journalism
and they declared their resolve not to allow
the reemergence of clientelism in govern-
ment/media relations. Once more the empha-
sis fell on the prevention of political abuse
rather than free speech and the public interest.
The above considerations, however, do not
rule out the risk of renewed restriction of the
access to public information coupled with cen-
soring in the public electronic media, as the
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new government consolidates its position in
power and takes over the levers of information
control.  The reticence and/or inability of cer-
tain representatives of the new majority to
communicate with the media demonstrated so
far sustains concerns about a possible
establishment of a new status quo in
government/mass media relations which
may not be conducive to transparency
and accountability.
It can be noted in conclusion that the tendency
towards intensifying anti-corruption pressure by
the media over the public sphere for greater
transparency and integrity will in all likelihood
remain as a permanent characteristic of journalis-
tic behavior in the coming months and years. This
trend is positive because it will lead to greater
accountability for those in power.
Among many other existent weak points in
Croatia is the lack of a Freedom Of Information
Act, which urgently needs passing. The drafting of
a law on Freedom of Information, foreseen in the
Transparency Croatia action plan, has been com-
pleted and a series of seminars are being organ-
ized by TI-Croatia on corruption and the role of the
media to raise public awareness and strengthen
media involvement in the ﬁght against corrup-
tion. 
The multiparty system, democracy and the fall of
former socialist political regimes have brought a
kind of liberalization for most print and electronic
media. On the one hand, numerous lively, inde-
pendent, private print media started to increase
circulations, capturing the market; at the same
time, the highly inﬂuential electronic media are
still in the hands of the ruling parties or coalitions
in almost all transition countries, and the term
“public radio and TV stations” is used instead of
the term “state run radio and TV”. In their compe-
tition for readers, strengthened by the survival
instinct, the editors of weeklies and/or some
dailies have resorted to certain always-timely
journalistic practices in presenting reality. Such
practices are far from the professional standards
of decent journalism and ethical norms and
codes, careless of the protection of human digni-
ty, far from facts – and, ﬁnally, close to untruth.
The use of long headlines (for example, even
more than 29 words), “fast investigative journal-
ism” with numerous unchecked facts, stories that
have nothing in common with the headlines, all
these are a product of new democracy that fol-
lowed the fall of communism. The media scene
split into two parts: one part in which most media
were completely under government control and
thus supportive of the ruling party, and the sec-
ond part that featured a few media in opposition
to the HDZ (in power in the previous
Government). The ﬁrst group of media comprised
almost all the national dailies, Croatian Radio and
Television and some weeklies; the other group of
independent media were represented by the
weekly Feral Tribune, the monthly Arkzin and the
daily Novi list. In between these two main groups
were the strong independent weeklies Globus
and Nacional. The owners and editors of these
weeklies started a new trend in Croatian journal-
ism – sensationalism, exclusive news, and the so-
called “fast investigative journalism”. Globus and
Nacional both became very popular because they
both published sensational news from political
life and uncovered numerous cases of corruption.
These two privately owned magazines have been
publishing stories based mostly on “sources
close to government” or “sources that wanted to
stay anonymous” or gossip. Their circulations are
still pretty high, somewhere between 70,000 and
90,000 copies each. Under present conditions –
the battle for circulation, an unshaped public
opinion, and the lack of a civil society – it is
impossible to expect real investigations. It is bet-
ter, then, to use the terms fast investigative jour-
nalism and sensationalism. 
Readers mostly believe  the mass media and the
many articles about corruption, but the effects of
these investigations have been almost negligible.
Nothing serious in Croatia ever happened after
any sensational story on corruption in the former
Croatian government, none of the highly posi-
tioned politicians has been under any real pres-
sure of public reaction, after the published story,
to leave his or her post or well paid state job. Very
often anonymity of sources and some evidently
unchecked facts ruined the entire effect. In short,
there has been a shortage of quality journalism.
But, it is also true that numerous facts have been
publicly revealed to the people about the dirty
jobs and corruption in the Croatian state during
the Tudjman period. At the elections on 3 January
2000, the former party lost its political power. The
media surely helped in this historical change.
Probably due to the rigid Tudjman political system
in the last ten years, the journalists of the inde-
pendent newspapers practiced a journalism simi-
lar to that of their colleagues in the controlled
press. These authors believe that the Croatian
journalists who worked for independent weeklies
offered one-sided stories and looked for a chance
to attack the ruling party by investigating their
misdeals, scandals and failed decisions. Linger-
160
ing state pressure even on the privately owned
media is still a serious problem. Journalists who
criticized the regime of former President Tudjman
found themselves faced with surprise tax inspec-
tions, shut out of the national distribution monop-
oly, or cut off from the national airwaves (World
Bank, 2000). The media situation in Croatia has
changed a little after the change of government
after the election of 3 January 2000. Still, Croatia
is faced with similar approach to fast investigative
journalism, but instead of the numerous state
media from the Tudjman era, now there is  only
the most powerful state medium - Croatian Tele-
vision. At the moment, Croatian Television is
passing through the painful and slow process of
transformation into a genuinely public television.
Croatian Television has a monopoly among the
electronic media: there is no single other strong
television  able to compete with it. Most of jour-
nals and public televisions have accepted the eth-
ical norms in written form.
The media in Macedonia is characterized by a
signiﬁcant legal freedom in its operating, relative-
ly big number of media in regard to the size of the
population, small and linguistically divided mar-
ket. As a result most of them are faced with prob-
lems in the area of proﬁtable operating and some
of them hardly manage to survive. Some of them
depend on additional ﬁnancing by the political
parties and the business community.
The right to freedom of speech and expression
are guaranteed in Article 16 of the Constitution of
the Republic of Macedonia, which among others
in the area of information unambiguously guar-
antees freedom of speech, public address, public
informing and free establishment of institutions
for public informing. Having in mind that there is
no law on media or any other law that could be
limited to that right, the media in the Republic of
Macedonia enjoy relatively great degree of free-
dom of speech and expression. In 2001 the gov-
ernment drafted a law on media that was
assessed as restrictive and as a result incited
harsh reactions among the media and the intel-
lectual circles after which it was withdrawn and
until today there has not been another attempt for
legal regulation of this area.
The freedom of information is signiﬁcantly limit-
ed with the lack of access to information that cre-
ates conditions for non-transparent operating of
the state and public services. Regardless of the
constitutional guarantees for free access to infor-
mation and the freedom to receive and pass
information, this right cannot be easily achieved
since it is not regulated by law. The openness of
the state institutions often depends on the will of
the leading persons of the state institutions, their
personal qualities and democratic orientation.
Generally viewed the institutions in the Republic
of Macedonia are not open enough for coopera-
tion with the media. There are always favored
media and the selection depends on the close-
ness to the ruling parties.
The Constitution forbids censorship, but this does
not prevent the attempts to inﬂuence the media
that are not inclined towards the authorities. In
the ten years of independence there were cases
of ﬁnancial control in the media or pressures on
their owners by creating problems for their other
businesses. A special kind of gaining inclination
by the media is the allocation of ﬁnancial means
to assist the independence of the printed media,
which is carried out by a commission appointed
by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.
The funds are allocated once a year with no strict
criteria and it regularly incites disapproval among
the media, which did not get any or enough ﬁnan-
cial assistance. Some of the unsatisﬁed media
consider this allocation of funds as kind of reward
for the media close to the authorities or “soft”
pressure.
Corruption, especially the so-called “grand cor-
ruption” occupies signiﬁcant space in the media,
especially related to the corruption affairs that
involve the higher circles of the establishment.
Because of the race for a greater auditorium, in
greater number of media the sensational articles
dominate, which lack analytical approach, sup-
ported by facts and documents. That trend is due
to the insufﬁcient access to information, based on
indirect sources of information, as well as on lack
of experience and tradition in research journal-
ism. The reason for that is the editing policy of
some of the media, which because of the depend-
ency on a direct or indirect (through ads) support
are inﬂuenced by political and business circles.
That orientation means insufﬁcient principality in
the treatment of the corruption activity - some
media keep quiet about the activities of the polit-
ical option to which they are close or they harsh-
ly criticize similar activities when the other politi-
cal party was in power. Of special concern are the
“ordered” articles - writing about corruption top-
ics for the needs of the political and the business
circles that makes space for the development of
one of the most negative things in the media -
“racket journalism”. There are media that base
their editing policy on the “market logic” - com-
161
promising articles on those persons and compa-
nies that are ready to pay and vice versa.
One of the tickling topics in the journalists’ circles
is the inﬂuence on the journalists and the media.
The low salaries of most of the journalists, the
uncertain future of some of the media on one
hand and the power and the ﬁnances of the poli-
tics and business on the other create an opportu-
nity for corruption in the media circles. Until now
apart from the unconﬁrmed speculations of small
number of media, there are no speciﬁc informa-
tion or affairs on corruption of the editors or jour-
nalists.
What could improve the situation in the media
regarding all these - a well organized profession-
al association, that would process and take care
of the compliance with the journalists’ codex, is
not on the required level. The journalists’ com-
munity lacks unity and consensus on many
important issues and in such a situation the cor-
ruption in the media is not on the highest level of
priorities of the journalists associations.
The main shortcoming in the treatment of corrup-
tion conduct of the media is the one-sided treat-
ment of this phenomenon - they report only
about corruption and not the anticorruption, i.e.
the ways it could be prevented. In reality the
media lack journalists that are able to write about
corruption. Neither the Government, nor the civil
sector has organized until now education of the
journalists for better coverage of corruption that
would help go beyond the current superﬁcial
treatment by the media.
Such coverage of corruption - without sufﬁcient
facts and expert knowledge - does not create a
feeling of familiarity of the establishment for de-
conspiracy of the corruption activities. The public
debate still does not have the crucial inﬂuence on
starting political or criminal responsibility. These
are the main reasons because of which there has
been no registered cases of undertaking meas-
ures against the journalists or the editors because
of their coverage of corruption.
The media together with the NGOs will play a key
role in preventing corruption in the Republic of
Macedonia. Hence the media will have to redirect
their editing policy more towards the essential
analytical and expert treatment of corruption, by
offering speciﬁc solutions on its prevention and
pressuring their implementation. 
The Constitution of Serbia guarantees the free-
dom of speech and press (Art. 46). However,
before October 2000 a severe Government
oppression of media was obvious. There is no
ofﬁcial data about media in Serbia. Only valid
source of information is the Guide through the
Yugoslavian Media, which has been done by the
Public Agency for Media Research and PR.
According to them, Yugoslavia has 1,371 media,
but unofﬁcially Serbia has 1,200 electronic media.
One of the pre-election promises was: guaran-
teed media independence, and development of
new legal frame for media operations. This
includes development of Public information and
Broadcasting Law. Drafting of new Public infor-
mation Act and Broadcasting Law was transferred
to the non-government sector. 
Broadcasting Act is in the ﬁnal phase of prepara-
tion. Discussions about this law are ﬁnalized and
it is expected that it will be discussed in the
Parliament. Law draft supposes the establish-
ment of the Serbian Broadcasting Council (SBC),
which will monitor the freedom of the media. “In
legal terms, the SBC shall be a separate entity,
functionally independent from any state body
whatsoever, as well as of any organization or per-
son involved with production and broadcasting of
radio and television programs and/or related
activities”. General competences of the SBC
described in Art. 7. are:
Observe that the provisions of this Act are
respected; 
Plan a strategy for broadcasting enhancement
in the Republic of Serbia; 
Grant broadcasting concessions; 
Pass by-laws and other general rules binding
on the broadcasters, and aimed at deﬁning
and implementing the broadcasting policy in
the Republic of Serbia; 
Monitor operations by broadcasters in the
Republic of Serbia; 
Appoint members of managing boards of the
public broadcasting service institutions in the
Republic of Serbia and its autonomous
provinces; 
Decide on complaints submitted by common
and legal persons, and broadcasters’ objec-
tions related to broadcasting operations; 
Provide its opinions to competent state bodies
concerning the FRY’s joining international
broadcasting conventions; 
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Pronounce sanctions on broadcasters pur-
suant to this Act;
Carry out other duties it has been assigned
under this Act; 
As far as Public Information Act is concerned, the
draft is ready. Public discussion about this draft is
ongoing. Independent union of journalists partic-
ipates in the development of this Act. It is expect-
ed that this Act will be adopted in a period of two
months. This Act regulates rights of citizens to
public information as a part of the freedom of
expressing opinions, as well as rights and obliga-
tions of journalists. 
Serbian Government through its project “Open
Government” posts all documents on its web site
www.srbija.sr.gov.yu (except for secret ones), in
attempt to increase the transparency of its work.
There is almost no investigative journalism pres-
ent in Serbia. Most of corruption articles that are
published are connected to the activities of the
previous regime. The reasons are insufﬁcient
funds and deﬁciency in training. Alongside with
the Serbian Government and Secretariat for
Information, an SOS line has been created for
journalists receiving threats.
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A succession of regional conﬂicts in the past
eleven years has brought the countries in the
Southeast Europe to the pressing necessity to
rethink not only their strategies for development
but also their relations with neighboring coun-
tries in a region-wide context. The commitment of
the international community to a radical and
comprehensive long-term program for stability
and development in the Balkans provides a
unique historic opportunity for the local commu-
nities. The regional crises of the past few years
obviated the importance for comprehensive
regional measures in two major ways:
By emphasizing the need for going beyond
country-speciﬁc efforts towards region-wide
cooperation networks, particularly as regards
issues of democratic governance. The impor-
tance of the NGOs in such networks in
addressing cross-country problems in a com-
prehensive manner has further expanded the
role of civil society;
By emphasizing the need for a regional mech-
anism for assessing the effectiveness of inter-
national stabilization and recovery assistance.
The success of reconstruction efforts depends
to a large extent on the ability of national gov-
ernments and their public administration to
implement stability and reform policies. A
high level of inefﬁciency and corruption of
public administration may jeopardize the pro-
vision of large-scale ﬁnancial assistance to the
region by distorting its impact.
A number of reasons have kept corruption low on
the priorities of international organizations prior
to the mid-90s. Among these, and relevant to our
analysis, is the consideration of corruption as an
issue closely linked to domestic politics and thus
not appropriate for development of assistance
targeting. This is important to note, as similar
considerations could still compromise the effec-
tiveness of growing momentum of international
anti-corruption cooperation. 
Once there is universal international consensus
that a particular issues belongs to the core of
development concerns, diplomatic considera-
tions of non-interfering in domestic politics seem
to diminish. In the ﬁeld of corruption this process
has been spearheaded through the adoption of a
number of international conventions – notably
those of OECD and the Council of Europe. Good
governance has emerged since as a preoccupa-
tion for both developed nations, concerned with
maximizing economic growth, and thus sensitive
to corruption in international trade, and for devel-
oping countries tackling poverty and weak institu-
tional capacity. Nevertheless, there is still little –
with the notable exception of US assistance in
Yugoslavia – anti-corruption conditionality in
international donor help to the countries in the
region.
Common programs between international organ-
izations and encouragement of public-private
partnership – both locally and between interna-
tional institutions and local NGOs - are a way of
circumventing the traditional diplomatic consid-
erations facing international agencies when
addressing politically sensitive issues of corrup-
tion in the national administrations. Even the best
government assistance program by international
donors is no substitute for developing the coun-
try’s institutional infrastructure, enhancing the
public’s trust in institutions and empowering civil
society. 
It is notable that there are no regional efforts ini-
tiated by and prioritizing cooperation among the
countries in SEE on development of joint meas-
ures to address cross-border corruption. Little
effort is also made at the governmental level to
encourage linkages between national anti-corrup-
tion programs.
Further, national anti-corruption programs need
international assistance to be effective but equal-
ly, if not more importantly, they need to generate
and respond to local civic demand. Thus interna-
tional institutions, governments and civil society
should all be considered when evaluating the
impact of international anti-corruption coopera-
tion in SEE. 
The understanding that the adoption and imple-
mentation by the SEE countries of international
legal instruments and their inclusion in the work
of international fora in this area is largely sufﬁ-
cient at this stage of development is shared by
both international agencies and regional govern-
ments. These efforts are, however, sometimes
compromised by “variable international institu-
tional geometry” in the region – countries
belonging to different international organizations
and processes which determine varying levels of
engagement and interests. 
VIII. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
*    *    *
On the wake of 1997 social unrest, the govern-
ment of Albania, which came out of the mid-year
elections, launched an anti-corruption initiative
with donor support, the World Bank being the
lead organization. First, it was designed as a pro-
gram to ﬁght corruption. This government’s pro-
gram was broad and comprehensive, including
more than 150 speciﬁc measures in the areas of
economic policy, rule of law, public administra-
tion, procurement, audit and public awareness.
Implementation of the program to date has been
mixed at best, due to a variety of factors. The
political leadership itself was not free from the
charges of corruption. The public sector was one
of the only sources of patronage for the newly
elected Socialist Party coalition, creating political
constraints on the reform. There was no unbiased
forum of “last resort” since enforcement agen-
cies and the judiciary were incapable of function-
ing properly and were themselves burdened by
allegations of corruption. The Prime Minister
changed three times within a two-year period.
Another problem was the Kosova crisis in 1999.
The crisis made corruption issue a second hand
priority for both the government and donors.
There also is in place an anti-corruption initiative
under the Stability Pact. On 18 and 19th of
December 2000 in Strasbourg the ﬁrst meeting of
the leading team for the Anti-Corruption Initiative
of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was
held. Albania presented in that strategy the
revised Anti-Corruption Matrix as a governmental
strategy. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s unique constitution-
al status determines a special type of relation to
international anti-corruption cooperation. Both
Entities have prepared a set of anti-corruption
legislation and large-scale alterations of the exist-
ing laws, which is a continuous process. These
laws are being prepared in close co-operation of
the Entity Ministries of justice and the interna-
tional institutions together. The aim is to ensure
their mutual compatibility. 
All legislation should engulf the provisions of the
relevant international conventions, as well as the
recommendations of the Ministers of Justice
Conference (1994) and the Programme of Action
Against Corruption adopted by the ministers of
the Council of Europe (1996). Support of interna-
tional institutions is expected in seeking the ade-
quate solutions and their harmonization with the
internationally recognized practice.
The UNMIBH Mandate Implementation Plan
(MIP) is a consolidated strategic and operational
framework for the completion of UNMIBH’s core
mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina by 31
December 2002. On the basis of the relevant
Security Council resolutions (SCR), the MIP iden-
tiﬁes the objectives of the mission and the pro-
grams and modalities that will be used to achieve
those objectives. UNMIBH’s mandate is derived
from the following SCR’s and is extended to:
monitor, advise and train law enforcement
agencies; 
monitor the investigations of, or to independ-
ently investigate human rights abuse commit-
ted by law enforcement agents/agencies; 
implement civilian law enforcement aspects of
the Brcko Arbitral Award; 
provide specialized training to the local police
in areas of drug control, organized crime and
incident management; 
monitor and assess the court system and con-
tribute to overall judicial reform efforts coordi-
nated by the Ofﬁce of the High Representative. 
continue with the tasks set out in Annex 11 of
the GFAP, as well as the Conclusions of the
London, Bonn, Luxembourg, Madrid and
Brussels Conferences and agreed by the
authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
UNMIBH’s role is to assist the parties to establish
the foundations for effective, democratic and sus-
tainable law enforcement agencies. This requires
action at three levels: the individual police ofﬁcer;
the institutions of law enforcement; and the rela-
tionship between law enforcement agencies and
civil authority and society. The speciﬁc and realiz-
able goals UNMIBH has established for its work
constitute a comprehensive approach to all three
levels.
UNMIBH’s goals take into account the legacy of
the war, current political conditions, rational
expectations of the population, local policing tra-
ditions and the aspirations of BiH to join the
European family of nations. Progress towards
attaining the goals is bound to be affected by the
actions of other members of the international
community, pursuant to their respective man-
dates. However, overall success in meeting and
sustaining the goals will be determined by the
cooperation of the local leadership and, especial-
ly, the willingness of police personnel to perform
their duty.
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At the PIC Conference in Bonn in December 1997,
the PIC called on the OHR to design a strategy to
combat corruption, fraud and diversion of public
funds. There was growing concern about the level
of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a
result, the Anti- Fraud Unit was established,
which later became the Anti-Fraud Department
(AFD). 
The AFD assists local authorities in identifying
and prosecuting illegal activities, following court
cases through all phases of the judicial process,
and strives for the resolution of systemic prob-
lems through reforms of the legal and judicial
systems. Additional priorities include the drafting
and passage of anti-corruption legislation in
accordance with international standards,
increased transparency in government proce-
dures, and a strengthened civic society involve-
ment in anti-corruption initiatives.
The AFD has drafted a comprehensive Anti-
Corruption Strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which was approved by the Steering Board in
March 1999 and is being implemented by the AFD
and a dozen international organizations in coop-
eration with the BiH authorities. The supporting
international agencies include IMF, the World
Bank, the European Commission, CAFAO, USAID,
IMG, INL, OSCE, IPTF, and SFOR.58
The World Bank approved a US$11 million equiv-
alent (SDR 8.7 million) credit for the Trade and
Transport Facilitation in Southeast Europe Project
(TTFSE) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) that will
foster trade by promoting more efﬁcient and less
costly trade ﬂows across the borders in Southeast
Europe and provide European Union-compatible
customs standards on February 22, 2001.
The project will reduce non-tariff costs to trade
and transport and reduce smuggling and corrup-
tion at border crossings. The project is the sixth to
be approved in a regional program for TTFSE that
will strengthen and modernize customs adminis-
trations and other border control agencies in BiH
as well as in Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR
Macedonia, and Romania. The program is a result
of a collaborative effort among the governments
of these countries in association with the
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI),
assisted by the World Bank, the European Union,
and the United States.
Bulgaria’s attitude towards international anti-
corruption cooperation in the region of SEE has
been marked by its effort to separate EU acces-
sion efforts from the regional context. Thus, the
previous government tried to play down the
importance of such cooperation, while the suc-
ceeding one is indicating its appreciation of the
international dimension of domestic anti-corrup-
tion efforts. 
Admittedly, there was a proliferation of interna-
tional initiatives aimed at monitoring the
progress of transition countries, particularly
those in Central and Southeast Europe to combat
corruption. Most of these initiatives did not
account for other existing mechanisms or the
other international institutional afﬁliations of a
given country and there has consequently been
little in terms of coordination among these initia-
tives. 
The UDF government (1997-2001), however, mis-
interpreted the enhanced international concern
with corruption in Bulgaria and distanced itself
from a number of initiatives. Notable examples
were its attitude towards the Stability Pact Anti-
Corruption Initiative and its failure to send a gov-
ernment delegation to the Second Global Forum
on Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding
Integrity held in the Hague in May. The Forum was
a follow up to the ﬁrst meeting hosted by the then
US Vice President Al Gore in 1999 in Washington.
The country also did not participate in the consul-
tative meeting of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe and was not included in the Joint
Position of the Participants at the Consultative
Meeting of CEE Countries on Fighting Corruption,
adopted in preparation of the Forum. 
The apprehension of the government reﬂected a
particular dilemma that it faced in 2001. On the
one hand, it was rightly concerned about the
international image of the country and the pro-
motion of the success of its reforms. To be sure,
there is a possibility that what is domestically an
awareness campaign aiming to sensitize policy
makers and increase public intolerance by
emphasizing corruption issues in the public
debate, internationally could be interpreted as
deteriorated governance, thus mistaking the
symptom for the disease. Nevertheless, the
Corruption Perceptions Index published annually
by Transparency International, points that
enhanced corruption awareness in Bulgaria has
had exactly the opposite effect –Bulgaria climbed
from 67 (out of 85 countries) in 1998, to 47 in
2001, and 45 in 2002 (above the Czech Republic). 
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OHR’s website on AFD (http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/afd/)
The UDF government, however, failed to appreci-
ate that mainstreaming corruption both into pub-
lic debate and government policies is an impor-
tant condition for building trust among the inter-
national community towards the country.
Although the government might have had some
legitimate concerns about the approach of the
international community in this area, its diplo-
matic awkwardness was counterproductive in try-
ing to persuade Bulgaria’s international partners
in its anti-corruption credentials. 
In particular, during the ﬁrst half of 2001, the
Bulgarian government voiced concerns both
about the general role of the Stability Pact and its
effectiveness, as well as about the role of
Bulgaria. Several arguments were put forward:
That Bulgaria needs to participate as a
“resource”, rather than a “beneﬁciary” country
in the Stability Pact Anti-Corruption Initiative
(SPAI);
That there is a contradiction between the
scope and genesis of the problem – corruption
bred by political instability (meaning that this
pertains to area of the so called Western
Balkans) – and the platform for solving, name-
ly all of SEE countries, including those on EU
and NATO accession track;
That the Pact and SPAI do not account for the
widely varying levels of development and do
not distinguish between countries contribut-
ing to and those undermining stability;
That Bulgaria is already participating in a num-
ber of  monitoring procedures that include
assessment of corruption (GRECO, EU regular
report, OECD convention, etc) which makes
SPAI monitoring redundant. For example, in
July the government pointed out that Bulgaria
should be part of SPAI only through the fulﬁll-
ment of the criteria of the Justice and Home
Affairs chapter of its accession to the EU.
Whether these arguments had aimed at exert-
ing additional pressure with respect to lifting
the Schengen area visas for Bulgarians, is a
matter for another discussion. 
Thus, the government faced a dilemma with the
anti-corruption efforts of the Stability Pact. On the
one hand, it worried that being linked to the sta-
bilization agenda of the Western Balkans, includ-
ing in the ﬁeld of anti-corruption, could slow it
down on the road to the EU because of shifting
priorities and diverted resources, particularly in
the public administration. This was particularly
relevant from the point of view of the tangled
web of overlapping monitoring procedures the
government was referring to. On the other, the
Stability Pact is an important platform for dealing
with continuing instability and security risks,
which undermine democratization and diminish
already low investor conﬁdence. More important-
ly, the Pact was a very good  opportunity for
attracting support and investment for crucial
regional infrastructure projects which Bulgaria’s
future depends heavily on. 
Balancing involvement in regional cooperation
initiatives, particularly in sensitive areas such as
anti-corruption, with an accelerated EU accession
process would not be an easy task for any
Bulgarian government. The government will,
however, always bear the burden of responsibili-
ty for convincing Bulgaria’s international partners
that EU accession is not being used as an excuse
for disengagement from joint measures against
problems with as many cross-border roots as
those present in the Balkans. 
Croatia has been putting signiﬁcant efforts into
joining international anti-corruption cooperation.
The country has acceded to the Global
Programme of the United Nations against corrup-
tion (UN Global Programme Against Corruption).
A delegation of Croatia has been actively partici-
pating in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of the
General Assembly of the UN for Drafting the
Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime since its establishment. Croatia has also
agreed to the implementation of 40 recommen-
dations of the Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering (FATF). In the implementation
of the internal criminal law order, Croatia has
tried to implement as extensively as possible the
so-called guiding principles for ﬁghting corrup-
tion and safeguarding the integrity between  jus-
tice and the security ofﬁcials (these were signed
at the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption,
Washington DC, 1999). 
Croatia has joined the Stability Pact which, even
though it does not have the force of a treaty,
imposes a political obligation. “The Anti-
Corruption Initiative for Southeast Europe” and
the “Ancona Declaration” (1999) encourage the
cooperation of police and judiciary bodies in
ﬁghting corruption and organized crime.  The
OECD Convention on Fighting Bribery of Foreign
Public Ofﬁcials has special signiﬁcance. The con-
vention envisages a range of obligations towards
candidate countries: the obligation to criminalize
the bribing of foreign ofﬁcials, the obligation to
provide legal assistance, etc. The Convention
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came into force on February 15th, 1999. The
Convention envisages the possibility for the
accession of countries that are not OECD mem-
bers, so the RC has announced its intention to
join the Convention. Practically all signiﬁcant
international forums – ranging from interparlia-
mentary associations, employers’ associations
and trade unions, to banking institutions (the
World Bank, the IMF), and even bishops’ synods –
have emphasized the need to ﬁght corruption. 
The intention of the European Commission to
enhance co-operation in the development of
democracy and civil society and institutions is
welcomed in Croatia. The intention of the initia-
tive to establish co-operation in the ﬁeld of judi-
cial and internal affairs is also welcome and con-
sidered necessary, especially in the context of
more effective border controls and combating
organized crime and corruption, which rank
among the priority tasks in Croatia. 
With a view to raise awareness about the costs of
corruption in business transactions and promote
private sector pro-active strategies to reduce
bribery, in line with the SPAI objectives, the
Integra Foundation (Slovakia) recently published,
in partnership with the Ruke Association (Croatia)
and Kulturkontakt (Austria), the “Coping with
Corruption Toolkit” for small- and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) in Croatia. The report, which is
available in English and Croat, can be ordered
free of charge at: http://www.integra.sk. The report
is the result of a survey conducted among small
businesses in Croatia in 2001 and aimed at deter-
mining the nature and costs of corruption for
Croatian SMEs and at identifying pro-active
strategies to enable SMEs to reduce corruption
within their stakeholder circle. Among the most
striking results of the report is that 82 % of the
surveyed SMEs support anti-corruption initiatives
initiated at the national (Croatian) and interna-
tional levels. The Croatian SME anti-corruption
research project is part of a larger project carried
out by the Integra Foundation in Eastern Europe
which aims  to identify corruption-related prob-
lems faced by SMEs in the region and efﬁcient
strategies to cope with them.
In addition to the technical expertise delivered in
the ﬁeld of the rule of law the Council of Europe
is currently providing technical assistance to the
Croatian authorities on the issue of international
co-operation and mutual legal assistance. Further
technical assistance could be provided with
regard to the revision of criminal legislation,
especially in the area of the use of special inves-
tigative means and conﬁscation of proceeds of
crime.
Within the framework of harmonization of the
domestic legislation with the international,
Macedonia accepted most of the relevant inter-
national instruments for fighting corruption.
Accepting the international documents the
Government did not show any reservations in
regard to the content of the documents, which
provides a solid basis for building a contempo-
rary anti-corruption legislation designed in accor-
dance with the international standards.
Macedonia is at the very bottom of the list of
countries in the region in regard to the quality of
domestic anti-corruption legislation. The different
governments did not have the political will to
pass the necessary laws and sub-legal acts for
efﬁcient prevention of corruption.
The basic law, which should implement all the
international standards in regard to corruption –
the Law on Corruption Prevention - has not been
passed yet.
In March 1997 within the framework of the joint
project between the European Union
Commission and the Council of Europe –
Corruption and Organized Crime in the Countries
in Transition (Octopus), the government of
Macedonia was addressed with recommenda-
tions and guidelines for action, which include sev-
eral directions of action:
enhancement of corruption and organized
crime estimation;
enhancement of public knowledge about the
threats coming from corruption and organized
crime and similar acts;
corruption and organized crime prevention;
increase in the efﬁciency of the policy on crime
control;
increase of the efﬁciency of the regulatory pol-
icy in corruption and organized crime control;
modernization of the investigation means in a
way which is in compliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and other internation-
al document;
enhancement of the efﬁciency and the effec-
tiveness of the international cooperation;
formulation of the codex of conduct of the civil
servants;
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legal regulation of the conﬂict of interest and
the access to information.
The bilateral and multilateral donor’s organiza-
tions have poor record supporting the anticorrup-
tion programs in Macedonia. This is due to two
basic reasons:
The donors’ community for unjustiﬁably long
period of time and with an enormous percent-
age of funds was oriented towards projects in
the ﬁeld of interethnic relations and civil soci-
ety, mostly on a grass-root level, while anti-
corruption until a year or two ago was not on
the agenda of most of the donors. As an illus-
tration the Institute Open Society - Macedonia
regardless of the concrete program efforts
refused the request for support in establishing
the Macedonian National Chapter of
Transparency International.
The NGO sector in the country that is mostly
supply driven did not succeed in advocating
its agenda by pressuring the donors’ commu-
nity to include the anticorruption programs in
their agendas. This is among others due to the
fact that the civil sector until now did not have
sufﬁcient capacity to overcome the subordi-
nate role in regard to the executive power and
to get involved in the treatment of a complex
and sensitive phenomenon like corruption.
The developments during and after the crisis in
the Republic of Macedonia as well as the analyses
showed that one of the fundamental reasons for
the crisis was the absence of rule of law and the
high level of corruption in the country and the
region. The representatives of the international
community more and more openly point out the
issue of anticorruption, which is treated more
openly on public debates and in the media in the
country. This has contributed for the anticorrup-
tion to climb a bit higher on the agenda of the
bilateral and multilateral donors. For now, the
issues like the building of conﬁdence, reconstruc-
tion of the destroyed homes, returning of the dis-
placed persons and organizing fair and democrat-
ic elections will continue to dominate.
*   *   *
As noted in the introduction, one of key chal-
lenges facing regional anti-corruption coopera-
tion is broadening the responses to cross-border
corruption factors by enhancing public-private
partnerships. This has been the main objective of
the Southeast European Legal Development
Initiative (SELDI). SELDI is an effort of leading
not-for-profit organizations, representatives of
government and intergovernmental institutions
and experts from the countries of Southeast
Europe aimed at public-private coalition
building for legal development in the countries
of Southeast Europe.
SELDI is a joint initiative of the Center for the
Study of Democracy (CSD), a Bulgarian policy
institute and the International Development Law
Institute (IDLI) (www.idli.org), an inter-govern-
mental organization based in Rome, to build upon
the success of the Coalition 2000 process in
Bulgaria (www.online.bg/coalition2000), the
Judicial Reform Initiative for Bulgaria (JRI)
(www.csd.bg/jri), and other previous efforts in
Bulgaria by these two organizations aimed at pro-
moting the rule of law and a institutional environ-
ment beneﬁcial to the transition process and eco-
nomic development.
SELDI is distinguished from the other region-
wide initiatives as being the first NGO-led
effort to encourage public-private coopera-
tion as an instrument for regional develop-
ment. The Initiative provides a forum for cooper-
ation among the most active civil society institu-
tions, public ﬁgures and government and interna-
tional agencies in Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, and
Yugoslavia. 
For the past two years coalition building for anti-
corruption has been the most active area of work
for the Initiative. The overall objective of the
SELDI anti-corruption component is to introduce
a region-wide institutional framework for public-
private cooperation in countering corrup-
tion in the countries of Southeast Europe. 
It is proceeding through a two-step process:
diagnosing corruption and assessing the insti-
tutional environment followed by the develop-
ment and endorsement of a Regional Anti-
Corruption Action Agenda supported by an
awareness campaign. 
The results so far of SELDI include enhancing
civic capacity throughout the region to main-
tain a watchdog role as well as to engage public
institutions in the design and implementation of
anti-corruption policies. The achievements in this
area so far include three unique products:
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The ﬁrst ever region-wide corruption diag-
nostics59 carried out in Albania, Bosnia &
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia,
Romania, and Yugoslavia on the basis of a uni-
form methodology.
Training for watchdog capacity for a criti-
cal number of civil society organizations in
SEE.
An assessment of the institutional envi-
ronment, contained in this report, as regards
public administration, the judiciary, economy,
civil society and media and international coop-
eration against corruption in the SEE coun-
tries. 
59
http://www.seldi.net/indexes.htm
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Membership in Major International Organizations of SEE Countries
Organization
Country
Council of
Europe (CoE)
World Trade
Organization
(WTO)
European
Union (EU)
Organization
for Security
and
Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE)
European Bank
for
Reconstruction
and
Development
(EBRD)
Euro-Atlantic
Partnership
Council
(EAPC)
World Bank
(WB) 
Albania Member Member
Negotiations
for Stabiliza-
tion& Associa-
tion Agreement
(SAA)
Member Member Member Member
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Member Observer
Negotiations
for SAA
Member Member No Member
Bulgaria Member Member EAA Member Member Member Member
Croatia Member Member
SAA,
29 Oct 2001
Member Member Member Member
Macedonia Member Observer SAA Member Member Member Member
Romania Member Member EAA Member Member Member Member
Serbia Guest Observer SAA Member
Member since
April 2001
No
Member since
may 8, 2001
Organization
Country
Central
European Free
Trade
Agreement
(CEFTA
Central
European
Initiative (CEI)
Black See
Economic
Cooperation
(BSEC)
Stability Pact
for Southeast
Europe
(SPSEE)
Anti-corruption
Initiative for
South Eastern
Europe 
(SPAI)
South East
European
Cooperation
Process
(SEECP)
Southeast
European
Cooperative
Initiative
(SECI)
Albania No Member Member Member Member Member Member
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
No Member No Member Member
Member
http://www.see
cp.gov.mk/par-
liaments/gen-
eral_info.htm
Member
Bulgaria Member Member Member Member
Has not partici-
pated since
2000
Member Member
Croatia No Member No Member Member Observer Member
Macedonia No Observer No Member Member Member Member
Romania Member Member Member Member Member Member Member
Serbia No Observer No Member Member Member No
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Accession to major international anti-corruption legal instruments
Legal Instrument Country Date of signature
Date of 
ratiﬁcation
Date of entry 
into force
Civil Law Convention on Corruption, 
Council of Europe
Albania 04-04-00 21-09-00 -
Bosnia and Herzegovina 01-03-00 30-01-02 -
Bulgaria 04-11-99 08-06-00 -
Croatia 02-10-01 - -
Macedonia 08-06-00 - -
Romania 04-11-99 23-04-02 -
Serbia and Montenegro - - -
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,
Council of Europe
Albania 27-01-99 19-07-01 01-07-02
Bosnia and Herzegovina 01-03-00 30-01-02 01-07-02
Bulgaria 27-01-99 07-11-01 01-07-02
Croatia 05-09-99 08-11-00 01-07-02
Macedonia 28-07-99 28-07-99 01-07-02
Romania 27-01-99 11-07-02 01-11-02
Serbia and Montenegro - - -
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Ofﬁcials in International Business
Transactions - OECD Status as of January 2002
Albania -
Bosnia and Herzegovina -
Bulgaria - 22-12-98 20-02-99
Croatia -
Macedonia -
Romania -
Serbia and Montenegro -
